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Book under contract with Hurst and Co. for publication in Spring 2021
Book manuscript currently in press with Georgetown University Press, for publication in Spring 2018
By contrast, the defence seems reactive and passive, not commonly traits praised in military commanders or strategists. Waiting, Clausewitz averred, is the ‘leading feature’ of the defence.2 Passivity in the face of enemy hostility is not... more
By contrast, the defence seems reactive and passive, not commonly traits praised in military commanders or strategists. Waiting, Clausewitz averred, is the ‘leading feature’ of the defence.2 Passivity in the face of enemy hostility is not commonly remarked upon as a feature of martial prowess. Even when an attack was underway, the defensive force would remain on the back foot, reacting to events, rather than shaping them decisively; passively enduring the blows of the assaulting armies. As Clausewitz saw it, ‘prudence is the true spirit of defence, courage and confidence the true spirit of the attack’.3 How then could defence be the stronger of the two forces in war?
Is AI limited because machines aren't alive? I debate with Ali Hossaini....
Removing emotion from nuclear strategy was not ultimately possible; artificial intelligence makes it possible, and therein lies its true radicalism and greatest risk.
We argue that Artificial Intelligence will, in the very near future, have a profound impact on the conduct of strategy and will be hugely disruptive of existing power balances. To do so, we review current and evolving capabilities in... more
We argue that Artificial Intelligence will, in the very near future, have a profound impact on the conduct of strategy and will be hugely disruptive of existing power balances. To do so, we review current and evolving capabilities in ‘narrow’ AI that is optimised to perform in a particular environment, and explore its military potential across a range of operational and strategic activities. We then review the psychological foundations of strategy and explore the ways in which such AI will transform human decision-making. Lastly, we look ahead to the more distant prospect of a general AI.
Why do states persist in enduring, expensive conflicts when the costs seem so high, the potential benefits, at best, somewhat ambiguous? This article suggests that emotional psychology can provide some insights into this problem.... more
Why do states persist in enduring, expensive conflicts when the costs seem so high, the potential benefits, at best, somewhat ambiguous? This article suggests that emotional psychology can provide some insights into this problem. Decision-makers construct a vision of the future that is greatly informed by affect. How they feel in the present has a big impact on their conception of events and their decisions about them. The risks they are prepared to take, the desires they anticipate having in future, the lessons of the past they draw on—all are constructed under the influence of current emotions, and all may encourage the persistence of conflict beyond a point at which more dispassionate minds might desist. This theoretical argument is then illustrated with a discussion of US policy-making in the Vietnam War.
Al Qaeda has developed a coherent strategy for insurgent violence that has much in common with the focoism advocated by Che Guevara in the 1960s. In their strategic writing, explored here, key Islamist strategists stress the role of... more
Al Qaeda has developed a coherent strategy for insurgent violence that has much in common with the focoism advocated by Che Guevara in the 1960s. In their strategic writing, explored here, key Islamist strategists stress the role of violence in creating revolution, and describe the export of committed fighters to focoist enclaves at the margins of enemy control. In contrast to some prominent themes in recent scholarship, the article argues that physical space is demonstrably important to the revolutionaries, that their development of leaderless jihad is designed to supplement not replace territorial control, and that their violence is avowedly strategic.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Propaganda is at the heart of the struggle between Al Qaeda's strain of militant Islamism and the governments of the United States and United Kingdom. In an ideological struggle, propaganda is critical in shaping outcomes. Both Al Qaeda... more
Propaganda is at the heart of the struggle between Al Qaeda's strain of militant Islamism and the governments of the United States and United Kingdom. In an ideological struggle, propaganda is critical in shaping outcomes. Both Al Qaeda and the U.S. and U.K. governments recognize this, and have devised propaganda strategies to construct and disseminate messages for key audiences. This article considers the key elements in the Al Qaeda propaganda narrative, and the means through which it is disseminated. On the other side, it assesses the U.S. and U.K. governments’ response, focusing particularly on the British effort to define and propagate a narrative centered on British values.
Last year was another deadly one for journalists. In all, 130 media workers were deliberately killed, in the latest instalment of a grisly upward trend stretching back over the last four or five years. ... That is comfortably more than... more
Last year was another deadly one for journalists. In all, 130 media workers were deliberately killed, in the latest instalment of a grisly upward trend stretching back over the last four or five years. ... That is comfortably more than were killed in over two decades of war in Vietnam.
With recent events in Bosnia and Kosovo providing evidence of an increasing American reluctance to commit ground forces in support of European security, the members of the European Union have understandably begun work on the creation of... more
With recent events in Bosnia and Kosovo providing evidence of an increasing American reluctance to commit ground forces in support of European security, the members of the European Union have understandably begun work on the creation of an autonomous defence capability. Closer European integration and the changing strategic value of the region to the US have created the incentive for a more coherent European approach on defence issues, but the immediate likelihood of genuine EU autonomy is remote, not least because the allies cannot agree on the fundamental parameters of co‐operation. As in earlier episodes when European defence co‐operation was proposed, the United States is reluctant to cede political influence commensurate with its diminished appetite for resolving regional conflicts. Through its possession of unique military assets, America has the ability to stifle European ambitions that Europe should wield greater military influence. Together with internecine European disagreement over defence restructuring, the ambivalent American attitude to a separate EU defence identity threatens to transform the initiative into a palliative for American isolationism.
Research Interests:
Report prepared for the UK MoD Doctrine and Concepts Development Centre.

No public release as yet - I'll post here if I get permission to do so.
It is part of a recent trend of scholarship exploring the history of ideas in IR, one that has brought about a reinterpretation of classical realism. Too often, this reviewer thinks, we see the classical realists through the detritus of... more
It is part of a recent trend of scholarship exploring the history of ideas in IR, one that has brought about a reinterpretation of classical realism. Too often, this reviewer thinks, we see the classical realists through the detritus of decades of positivist social science which drains both ...
In one of his more elliptical statements, Carl von Clausewitz argued that the defence is stronger than the attack. This in an era in which Napoleon’s Grand Armée swept all before it, including Clausewitz himself. Here, I argue that... more
In one of his more elliptical statements, Carl von Clausewitz argued that the defence is stronger than the attack. This in an era in which Napoleon’s Grand Armée swept all before it, including Clausewitz himself. Here, I argue that prospect theory offers a way of interpreting Clausewitz’s claim. In attempting an answer, I first link prospect theory to the endowment effect and sunk costs, as related ways of understanding our essential loss aversion. I connect the origins of this aversion to our evolutionary history. I then explore ideas of possession in war – including territory, and prestige, and show how challenges to these can constitute, in the mind of the strategist, a domain of losses, the defence of which warrants risk acceptance. Lastly, I explore some substantial methodological challenges in applying prospect theory to strategic affairs.
Presentation to DSD research colloquium, King's College London. March 2015
Research Interests:
Publication View. 6300179. US foreign policy towards the United Nations (1990-1995) :--a path dependent explanation of military intervention /--by Kenneth Payne. (1998). Payne, Kenneth--(Kenneth Roland). Abstract. Thesis (M.... more
Publication View. 6300179. US foreign policy towards the United Nations (1990-1995) :--a path dependent explanation of military intervention /--by Kenneth Payne. (1998). Payne, Kenneth--(Kenneth Roland). Abstract. Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Oxford, 1998.. ...
Publikationsansicht. 45108547. Personality and the policy stream : explaining US foreign policy decision-making during the first Clinton administration / (2003). Payne, Kenneth. Abstract. Thesis (Ph. D.), Dept. of Government -- University... more
Publikationsansicht. 45108547. Personality and the policy stream : explaining US foreign policy decision-making during the first Clinton administration / (2003). Payne, Kenneth. Abstract. Thesis (Ph. D.), Dept. of Government -- University of Essex, 2003. Details der Publikation. ...