antonio mazzitelli

La nascita e lo sviluppo delle organizzazioni criminali moderne sono spesso riflesso delle dinamiche economiche, politiche e sociali dei territori nei quali queste operano. La storia recente dell’America Latina e delle industrie criminali in Messico e Colombia ne sono un chiaro esempio. Soltanto un’amministrazione giudiziaria trasparente e democratica potrà consolidare i progressi compiuti nella costruzione di moderni stati di diritto democratici.

LA UNAM Y LA OFICINA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS CONTRA LA DROGA Y EL DELITO (UNODC) REALIZARON UN INTERCAMBIO DE CARTAS CON EL PROPOSITO DE CONSOLIDAR EL VINCULO ENTRE AMBAS INSTITUCIONES Y DESARROLLAR ACTIVIDADES CONJUNTAS EN AREAS COMO ESTADO DE DERECHO, SEGURIDAD, JUSTICIA Y GOBERNABILIDAD DEMOCRATICA.

Ancora oggi la presenza di organizzazioni mafiose in Ita-lia e nel mondo è in gran parte analizzata e studiata dai sociologi, dagli storici, dagli antropologi, dai magistra-ti ma non dagli economisti. Eppure è proprio l'economia il terreno sul quale il nuovo ruolo delle mafie si ride-finisce nell'era della globalizzazione. Non solo per le potenzialità «criminogene» che il lun-go ciclo politico ed economico liberista su scala globa-le ha offerto a organizzazioni che storicamente hanno avuto la capacità di unire, con le loro attività e con la loro funzione di mediazione, mercati legali e mercati il-legali, ma anche perché, in nome dell'ideologia del pri-mato assoluto del mercato e delle sue dinamiche, si è imposto un arretramento della funzione regolatrice de-gli Stati anche in termini di controllo e di trasparenza sui processi di finanziarizzazione dell'economia e sul-le forme ad essi collegate di transazioni e movimenta-zioni dei capitali. È per questo motivo che molti dei saggi che compon-gono questo volume avviano una prima riflessione e si misurano direttamente o indirettamente con il tema dei rapporti tra mafie ed economia, sia quando trattano di specifiche inchieste giudiziarie, sia quando si occupa-no di radicamento all'estero di alcune mafie italiane, sia quando descrivono il ruolo centrale del narcotraf-fico nell'economia di importanti nazioni o analizzano il problema del riciclaggio dei proventi mafiosi. L'economia è solo uno degli argomenti affrontati. Com-pletano il volume altri saggi che si soffermano su temi di fondo o su questioni più specifiche legate alle or-ganizzazioni mafiose in rapporto a loro aspetti pecu-liari in " territori " vecchi e nuovi: dalla 'ndrangheta alla camorra da cosa nostra alla sacra corona unita per fi-nire all'assoluta novità di mafia capitale; e ancora: dal-la Terra dei fuochi alla Stidda, alla social mafia: il nuo-vo networking mafioso. La parte internazionale si concentra su Brasile, Messi-co, Spagna, America Latina con il contributo di autori italiani e stranieri. Chiude il volume la " cronologia delle mafie " dal 1983 al 2012.

El presente artículo se centra en la investigación del fenómeno criminal en México. La evolución de algunos grupos criminales mexicanos, la aparición de una serie de delitos estrechamente relacionados con el control territorial, la creciente mezcla de intereses entre elementos criminales y administradores públicos, la existencia y el desarrollo de expresiones culturales estrechamente relacionadas al crimen organizado y sus agentes y, por último, el uso casi sin precedentes de la violencia por parte de los operadores criminales, son todos factores que han llevado al uso del término “mafia” por parte de algunos analistas y de la prensa en general para describir la realidad de los grupos criminales locales.

Sobre esta base, el objetivo del presente trabajo es comparar las características de algunas de esas organizaciones (el “Cártel del Pacífico”, el “Cártel del Golfo”, “Los Zetas”, “La Familia Michoacana/Orden del Temple”) con las de las mafias italianas. Dicho análisis comparativo se llevará a cabo utilizando las cincos cualidades que, de acuerdo a Ciconte, Forgione y Salas, caracterizan a estas últimas, a saber: sociales, institucionales, económicas, ideológicas y regulatorias.

El analis tiene una doble justificación. En primer lugar, ayuda a limitar y a colocar bajo la lente adecuada el potencial dinámico y expansivo que habitualmente se suele atribuir a la mafia en el mundo. En segundo término, se trata de evitar el riesgo que conlleva la identificación de la mafia italiana con fenómenos criminales que, aun cuando comparten con aquélla uno o varios elementos, son esencialmente diferentes. Dicho riesgo consiste básicamente en la posibilidad de recurrir a instrumentos regulatorios inapropiados. La caracterización de
un fenómeno criminal como “mafioso” debería implicar el uso de técnicas y herramientas de investigación y penales desarrolladas específicamente para combatir a la mafia, y no para otras
manifestaciones criminales. En otras palabras, y para recurrir a una comparación médica, no todos los tumores tienen que ser tratados con quimioterapia.

En la región latinoamericana, no hay semana sin que los medios de comunicación hablen del problema de la seguridad,sea por los violentos acontecimientos que a diario sacuden y atemorizan indistintamente a ricos y a pobres, o por el poder de las redes criminales y su capacidad de penetración en el tejido social y económico de los países de la región.
Desde esta perspectiva, las altas tasas de homicidios registradas en la mayoría de los países
de Latinoamérica y del Caribe no son nada más que el epifenómeno de una enfermedad mucho más profunda. El crimen, la violencia y la cultura de la ilegalidad encuentran sus raíces en la incapacidad de las instituciones públicas de honrar el contrato social que han establecido con los ciudadanos para promover la seguridad y la justicia necesarias, que alimenten un desarrollo económico, social, equilibrado y sustentable, y que contribuyan a reducir las enormes desigualdades que caracterizan hoy en día las sociedades latinoamericanas. Por un lado, factores como el creciente poder económico de las organizaciones criminales, la permeabilidad de las instituciones y la corrupción,
entre otros, aumentan las desigualdades y fomentan una cultura de la ilegalidad, de la  impunidad y del dinero fácil. Por el otro lado, la adopción de respuestas institucionales puramente reactivas y centradas en la represión y la punición (políticas de mano dura, de cero tolerancia, etcétera), la militarización de la seguridad ciudadana con la utilización cada vez más frecuente de las fuerzas armadas para tareas de seguridad pública, así como la privatización de la seguridad, representan indicadores preocupantes con respecto a la consolidación de las sociedades democráticas de la región. La siguiente entrevista al Representante de la Oficina de Enlace y Partenariado de la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el Delito (unodc) para México, Antonio Mazzitelli, pretende abordar estos temas, actualizando la información y el debate sobre los desafíos a los que se enfrenta la región en materia de seguridad y delincuencia organizada.

According to the US Government, over 60 percent of the cocaine intended for the US market transit through Central American. Since the early 1990’s, Colombian and Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) established logistics bases both on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Central America, facilitating the movements of large shipments of cocaine. In establishing these routes, the DTOs took advantage of a number of local enabling factors. Among them, the preexistence of well-established smuggling networks, the weakness of law enforcement and judicial structures in most countries in the region, and the overall culture of lawless and impunity resulting from the civil conflicts that marked the paths to democracy of
some of these nations. The tough campaigns launched against DTOs by the governments of Colombia and Mexico during the past eight years, coupled with the gradual evolution of both local and foreign criminal organizations (COs) involved in (but not exclusively) cocaine trafficking, seem to have further worsened the situation in Central America.
Old styled DTOs and local “transportistas” are increasingly challenged by new criminal groups, usually emerging from the military and claiming specific territories. These new groups are exerting a capillary control over all types of criminal activity taking place in the territories under their control. The confrontation between two different criminal “cultures”-- the first, business oriented; the second one, territorial oriented-- constitutes a serious threat not only to the security of citizens, but also to the very consolidation of balanced democratic rule in the region.
Mexican DTOs and COs poses a serious threat to Central American, if left unchecked. Responses by national institutions, assisted by their main international partners, will have to be carefully tailored according to the specific feature of the predominant foreign criminal organization operating in its territory. In the case of DTOs, interventions will have to privilege investments in the areas of financial investigations, specialized prosecution and international cooperation, as well as anti-corruption initiatives. In combating COs (Zetas type), intervention will have to privilege restructuring, professionalization and deployment of local police corps that would then be capable of controlling the territory and preventing the infiltration of external criminal actors. In both cases, governments need to strengthen the intelligence capacity of law enforcement agencies allowing the early identification of the likely threat, its analysis and its subsequent removal. National law enforcement and judicial efforts should also be geared toward the creation of a sincere and mutual beneficial international cooperation (both investigative and judicial) that is built not only on common objectives, but also on the use of common investigative instruments and harmonized procedures.

África Occidental se ha convertido en un destino atractivo para las redes de delincuencia internacional. En asociación con redes locales, está surgiendo progresivamente un nuevo modelo específico de criminalidad que está comenzando a exportarse.

Despite of its vast natural and human resources and the undisputable progresses made in the last decade towards the establishment and rooting of democratic culture and governing systems, West African countries continue to occupy the latest ranks of the UN Human Development index. Similarly many of them score poorly in World Bank and Transparency International indexes measuring good governance. In recent times international mass media have highlighted the role played by the West African region in the transatlantic cocaine trade, as well as in the flow of irregular migrants towards Europe. Drugs and migrants are however just two of the numerous illicit activities which feed the growth of local and trans-national criminal organizations, and the rooting of a culture of quick and easy money which is progressively eroding the foundations of any sustainable and well balanced socio-economic development. The pervasive power of corruption of criminal organizations, coupled with a generalized crisis by state actors in administering justice and enforcing the rule of law contribute towards the progressive fading of the credibility of the State as the institution entrusted with the prerogatives of guaranteeing security (of people and investments) and dispensing justice. In this perspective, the case of Guinea Bissau is probably the clearest example of what West African states may face in the near future if the issues of justice and security are not properly and promptly addressed. If primary responsibilities lie with West African governments and institutions, the international community as a whole should also review its approach to development policies by not only mainstreaming the issues of security and justice in their bilateral and multilateral agendas, but also by making it an essential cornerstone of policies and programmes aimed at supporting good governance and the establishment of states ruled by the law.

In February 2005, the UN Secretary General in his Report to the Security Council called the attention of the Security Council and the international community on a new threat to peace, stability and development of West Africa. From this moment on the analysis of the potential impact of the money and the culture of drug trafficking and transnational organized crime has become necessary complements to the work of international and regional security bodies and think tanks involved in West African affairs. These important progresses have not however impeded the materialization of some the worst scenarios in Guinea Bissau, Guinea, and the Sahel Saharan corridor, as proved by repeated coups d’état, murdering of prominent political figures, mass violence, kidnapping of foreigners, terrorist attacks. This article looks at the consolidation of the West African route in term of both operators and modus operandi. In so doing it examines the rising of a new typology of criminal actor in West Africa as result of the evolution of original providers of world-wide services to other criminal organizations to full partners of major trafficking networks and potential global entrepreneurs of the drug industry. In this respect the article attempts analyzing the dangers resulting from the strengthening of tactical relationships between criminal operators, insurgent and terrorist groups along the West African cocaine route.  Finally it compares the current West African situation with similar situation experienced by other drug transit countries and societies all over the words. In this perspective the article looks at possible operational scenarios and for each of them formulates a set of suggestions on the possible course of action.