Viktor Stepanenko

This paper aims to tentatively analyze how Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has changed Ukrainian and Russian societies. It looks at the social organization of war, at how Ukraine and Russia adapt and change under wartime conditions. Combining political science and sociological approaches, we interpret the war under organizational and communicative aspects in the context of opposite political regimes: dictatorial autocracy in Russia versus democracy in Ukraine. Opposite regimes imply opposite meanings and objectives of war, of warfare and the military. Big differences exist regarding organizing and mobilizing resources and support for the war-with considerable advantages for a dictatorship such as Russia controlling its societal space by the means of repression and propaganda. Societies at war need to be distinguished from an organized and highly militarized war society such as Russia which has imposed on its neighbor military, organizational and ideological constraints to which Ukraine must respond with its own militarization and organization of war and warfare. The social organization of war is understood as a complex multi-layered interplay of various institutional actors and spheres (the state, the military, NGOs, business, media, public and private spheres, etc.). Military mobilization in both societies also has different organizational and communicative effects as well as various, often contrasting, political, cultural and societal implications.

The reasons for and the lessons and significance of the long-term historical effects of Ukraine’s protest movement and its culmination, the people’s uprising in late 2013–early 2014, still require in-depth study. This is so due to the ongoing process of the country’s dramatic social-political changes, the final outcomes of which are hardly predictable. Indeed, at the beginning of 2014 nobody would have been able to predict the ignominious flight of former president Yanukovich and the rapid collapse of his authoritarian state machine over the following couple of days, the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation, the pre-term election of the new president Petro Poroshenko in one electoral turnover (for the first time in Ukraine’s complex political history), radical separatism and the ensuing strange, “hybrid ” war (officially still called an “anti-terrorist operation”) on the Ukrainian Donbass, and all the complex socio-economic and financial consequences of the country’s dramat...

The article attempts to apply the methodology of the research program in its sociological adaptation (D. Berger, M. Zelditch and D. Wagner) to the analysis of historical and contemporary issues of civil society. The concept of civil society is presented as a research program, which is characterized by its own logic of development, historical sequence, variability of semantic representations and actualization of various contextual accents. The structure and features of the concept of civil society as a research program are outlined. Its theoretical core consists of two basic conceptual premises: 1) the principle of social self-activity, separated from state power and 2) the system of norms and value regulations outlined by the concept of civility. The theoretical issues of modern theorizing of civil society are analyzed, in particular the connection between civil society and democracy, the relationship between civil society and the state and the market. It is argued that the key feat...

У статті представлено соціологічні підходи до соціальної проблематики COVID-19 на основі огляду та узагальнення проміжних результатів дослідницького проєкту Інституту соціології НАН України. Обґрунтовано необхідність формування вітчизняної соціології пандемії як актуального напряму в корпусі сучасних епідеміологічних досліджень. Окреслено виклики та можливості нового соціального досвіду в Україні в чотирьох соціальних вимірах: соціально-структурному, суспільно-політичному, соціально-психологічному та соціокультурному. Досліджено актуальні аспекти біополітики, проблематику соціальних та суспільно-психологічних ризиків пандемії. Розглянуто особливості коронавірусної кризи в Україні, зумовлені її поєднанням зі складними викликами суспільної трансформації, а також з гуманітарними наслідками окупації АР Крим і поточного військового конфлікту на Донбасі.

Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine has already changed the European security order, but it has also become a major challenge to global peace and security. For the first time since the end of World War II and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the world is on the verge of a new global military confrontation with real risks of the state-aggressor using nuclear weapons. Until recently, Ukrainian sociologists (like many of their foreign colleagues) were actively discussing the social aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Now the reality has been changed in Ukraine and the wa became the main issue and social experience in a large scale.

The paper provides an overview of S.Eisenstadt’s theoretical legacy through focusing on its theoretical-methodological core, that is civilizational analysis. Theoretical sources, synthesis and links of civilizational analysis, its conceptual coordinates on the map of sociological theoretical knowledge are examined. It is argued that the formation of this theoretical direction meant the restoration of classic sociological tradition, in particular approaches indicated by E.Durkheim, M. Mauss and M.Weber to the problematic of historical civilizations. This theme has acquired its new meanings and actualizations in reflections on peculiarities and challenges of modernization from the end 1970-s in Eisenstadt’s and some other researchers’ works. Conceptual interpretation of modernity as a distinctive civilizational pattern and Eisenstadt’s concept of multiple modernities are also important aspects of this theoretical direction. Some methodological implications of Eisenstadt’s civilization...

In the paper some aspects of social problematic and consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are considered under the angle of sociological approaches. In particular these are the issues of institutional capacity and efficiency of government in facing the pandemic, the problems of actualization of biopolitics and of social inequality, social psychological challenges of the pandemic. It is argued that the global consequences of the pandemic imply the shifts in the configurations of basic societal values and regulations such as freedom, responsibility, security, civility, equality, trust and solidarity. Administrative regulations, restrictions and lockdown during quarantine are not only measures that are justified by the protection of security and public health, but also certain tests by the governments of the thresholds for the perception of strict social control. Based on the analysis of the results of sociological research, in particular by the Institute of Sociology of the National A...

In the paper some aspects of social problematic and consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are considered under the angle of sociological approaches. In particular these are the issues of institutional capacity and efficiency of government in facing the pandemic, the problems of actualization of biopolitics and of social inequality, social psychological challenges of the pandemic. It is argued that the global consequences of the pandemic imply the shifts in the configurations of basic societal values and regulations such as freedom, responsibility, security, civility, equality, trust and solidarity. Administrative regulations, restrictions and lockdown during quarantine are not only measures that are justified by the protection of security and public health, but also certain tests by the governments of the thresholds for the perception of strict social control. Based on the analysis of the results of sociological research, in particular by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the features of the coronavirus crisis in Ukraine are outlined. These features are due to the fact that in Ukraine universal social challenges of the pandemic are combined with the country’s multifactorial social transformation. Thus, the social consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic in Ukraine can manifest themselves in two ways: as a negative catalyst that exacerbates the problem of uncompleted social transformation or as a kind of "equalizer", that is the factor in which the values of security, social survival, tolerance and solidarity will become a priority.

In the paper some aspects of social problematic and consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are considered under the angle of sociological approaches. In particular these are the issues of institutional capacity and efficiency of government in facing the pandemic, the problems of actualization of biopolitics and of social inequality, social psychological challenges of the pandemic. It is argued that the global consequences of the pandemic imply the shifts in the configurations of basic societal values and regulations such as freedom, responsibility, security, civility, equality, trust and solidarity. Administrative regulations, restrictions and lockdown during quarantine are not only measures that are justified by the protection of security and public health, but also certain tests by the governments of the thresholds for the perception of strict social control. Based on the analysis of the results of sociological research, in particular by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the features of the coronavirus crisis in Ukraine are outlined. These features are due to the fact that in Ukraine universal social challenges of the pandemic are combined with the country’s multifactorial social transformation. Thus, the social consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic in Ukraine can manifest themselves in two ways: as a negative catalyst that exacerbates the problem of uncompleted social transformation or as a kind of "equalizer", that is the factor in which the values of security, social survival, tolerance and solidarity will become a priority.

The paper analyses two periods of Ukraine’s post-independence history:
after the Orange Revolution (2005–2009) and the Revolution
of Dignity (2014–2018). The common denominator of these post-Maidan periods is the dynamics of public moods characterized by growing disappointment and discontent. The author makes the assumption that such a cyclical pattern is not determined purely by socio-psychological factors which are activated in the pre-election period. Rather it results from a complex interplay of institutional factors that reflect systemic particularities of a hybrid model permeating all social and political structures in Ukraine. Overcoming this  hybrid institutionality has turned out to be far more serious and lengthy challenge than it seemed in 2004.

Интервью Виктора Степаненко с Абелем Полезе (Abel Polese), автором и редактором книги «Неформальный национализм после коммунизма: повседневное конструирование пост-социалистических идентичностей» (Informal Nationalism after Communism: The Everyday Construction of Post-Socialist Identities/ Ed. by Abel Polese, Oleksandra Seliverstova, Emilia Pawłusz and Jeremy Morris. – London • New York: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2018)

The paper analyses the peculiarities of the development of Ukrainian
sociology in the context of social, historical, ideological and political
transformation of Ukrainian society from the end of the 19th century up
to the current period. It is argued that contentious historical heritage of
Ukrainian sociology and its struggle for its own institutionalization from the
end of 19-th century and through the Soviet period still has the impact on
the character and issues of modern Ukrainian sociology.

Mit Blick auf die Forderungen des Euromajdan zeigt sich in der Ukraine heute ein durchzogenes Bild. Positive Zeichen setzen die wirtschaftliche Erholung, erfolgreiche Reformschritte im Gesundheitswesen und bei der Dezentralisierung sowie die außenpolitische Annäherung an die EU. Dennoch bleiben die Herausforderungen groß, insbesondere im Justizwesen und bei der Korruptionsbekämpfung. Angesichts des schleppenden Reformtempos droht eine zunehmende Der fünfte Jahrestag des Euromajdan ist eine gute Gelegen-heit, um eine erste Bilanz zu ziehen, ob die effektiven Ver-änderungen die Hoffnungen und Wünsche vieler Menschen erfüllt haben. Dabei war schon 2014 offensichtlich, dass ein "Neustart" des ganzen Systems (wie es der Majdan forderte), von einer rückständigen und korrupten Staatsmaschinerie zu einem neuen demokratischen, effizienten und sozial ver-antwortlichen Modell, eine schwierige Aufgabe sein würde. Die alltägliche Arbeit zur Zivilisierung des Landes könnte sogar eine größere Herausforderung darstellen, als einen Dik-tator von seinem Thron zu stoßen, umso mehr, als dieser Wan-del auch eine Transformation von Werten und Veränderungen in der Mentalität und der Haltung vieler Menschen verlangt. Doch trotz dieses Wissens war es kaum möglich, die ganze Trägheit und Widerstandskraft des Systems umfassend vor-herzusagen. Letzteres ist keineswegs abstrakt, denn es betrifft Personen und einflussreiche Gruppen, die nicht ernsthaft daran interessiert sind, die "Spielregeln" zu ändern. Schließ-lich haben diese Regeln diese Gruppen lange Zeit mit sta-bilen wirtschaftlichen und politischen Zusatzeinnahmen ver-sorgt-und tun das weitgehend immer noch. Dennoch hat die post-Majdan Ukraine auch Veränderungen und Erfolge vorzu-weisen. Aber sind diese bereits unumkehrbar? Aufgrund der größtenteils ungünstigen sozioökonomischen Bedingungen in den letzten Jahren und des militärischen Konflikts im Don-bass mit all seinen sozialen, psychologischen und wirtschaft-lichen Folgen sind Zeichen der Frustration und Ermüdung in der ukrainischen Gesellschaft unübersehbar. Der öffentliche Diskurs in der post-Majdan Ukraine ist daher oft von einer ambivalenten Wechselwirkung andauernder "Siege" und "Ver-luste" geprägt. Unterschiedliche Stimmungsbilder Bemerkenswert ist, dass die ausländischen Partner der Ukraine die Veränderungen seit dem Majdan oft wohlwollender und positiver bewerten als einheimische Experten, ganz zu schwei-gen von der überwiegend kritischen Einschätzung der norma-len Bevölkerung. Insbesondere die Umsetzung von Reformen beurteilten die einheimischen Experten als unterdurchschnitt-lich: 2017 mit der Note 2,66 von 5 (wobei 1 bedeutet "es gibt überhaupt keine Reformen" und 5 "die Implementation der Reform ist erfolgreich") und 2018 mit 2,73. 1 In der ukrainischen öffentlichen Meinung werden die Reformen noch kritischer bewertet: Fast zwei Drittel der Befragten (61 Prozent) einer landesweiten Umfrage im Mai 2018 glaubten mehr oder weni-ger ausgeprägt nicht an einen Erfolg der Reformen, während nur ein Drittel der Umfrageteilnehmer (35 Prozent) daran glaubte. Diese Gruppe der Optimisten umfasst lediglich einen kleinen Anteil Befragter (ca. 5 Prozent), die sich über den Erfolg der Reformen während der ganzen Zeit der Umfragen von 2015 bis 2018 ziemlich sicher war. 2 Die vorwiegend kritische öffentliche Einstellung angesichts der Veränderungen nach dem Majdan lässt sich teilweise mit dem bekannten psychologischen Effekt von übertriebenen Erwartungen nach Revolutionen erklären, die oftmals in verbreitete Gefühle der Enttäuschung umschlagen. Aber die kritische Haltung vieler normaler Ukrainer ist auch rational begründet, da sogar die positiven Veränderungen bisher nicht zu greifbaren Verbesserungen in ihrem Leben geführt haben, ihr sozioökonomisches Wohlergehen nicht gesteigert (oder zumindest nicht bedeutend verbessert) und die Deformationen im Rechts-und Justizsystem nicht behoben haben. Die öffentliche Unzufriedenheit rührt auch von der be-rechtigten Wahrnehmung her, dass im Vergleich zu wirtschaft-lichen Verbesserungen, die Zeit brauchen und in erheblichem Maße von vielen objektiven Faktoren abhängen, die Durch-setzung von Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Recht vor allem vom poli-tischen Willen der Behörden abhängt. Der fehlende Fortschritt in diesem Bereich ist angesichts gewisser wirtschaftlicher Ver-besserungen umso offensichtlicher. Laut offiziellen Statistiken hat die Ukraine die schwierigste Periode des wirtschaftlichen Niedergangs mit einem kritischen Tiefststand der National-bankreserven 2014/15 bereits überwunden. Das Land zeigt eine stete wirtschaftliche Erholung und 2016 bis 2018 sogar ein jährliches Wachstum des BIP von 3 Prozent. Doch trotz der wichtigen finanziellen und wirtschaftlichen Stabilisierung wird das Land mit der jetzigen Dynamik 50 Jahre brauchen, um das ökonomische Niveau des Nachbarlands Polen in seinem heutigen Zustand zu erreichen. 3 Die Veränderungen seit dem Majdan können relativ, inkonsistent und sogar widersprüchlich wirken. In Anbetracht dessen soll nun detaillierter erfasst werden, was die Ukraine in den letzten fünf Jahren erreicht hat, was getan wurde und was gescheitert ist.

The paper analyses the dynamics and distinctive features of civic
pride in Ukraine. The social survey data since 2002 indicate that
the differences in the manifestation of this phenomenon are determined
by a respondent’s region of residence and his/her ethno-cultural
self-identification. There are some positive things about the process
of making the modern Ukrainian nation, such as the establishment
of its inclusive nature on the whole and acknowledgement of the
priority of political and legal aspects of belonging and recognition in
the institution of citizenship. The author contends that the main
factors contributing to Ukrainians’ civic pride are grassroots activism
and the process of national civic self-identification.

Four years after the start of the Euromaidan, Ukraine still faces many difficulties, including war and a destructive political struggle. The problem most likely to produce lasting damage to the country, however, is Ukraine's stalled effort to move toward an inclusive state. We have nearly missed our chance. Three major fault lines in government and in society are contributing to this opportunity slipping away. First, application of the rule of law, the protection of civil rights, and ensuring access to the justice system are beset with problems. Second, there are increasing problems with poverty and socioeconomic inclusion. Third, corruption prevails in communications between the state and society. These aspects of the problem mutually reinforce one other and undermine reformists' efforts to take over the " blackmail state " and change the dominant model of extractive institutions to an inclusive institutional model. This paucity of effective change is especially disheartening in light of the Euromaidan's political agenda, to reboot the system. Let's look at these three fault lines in more detail. 1. Need for Improved Legal and Judicial Systems The Euromaidan started as a protest against the arbitrary decision by Viktor Yanukovych's government to turn away from the path of Ukraine's European integration. The protest gathered strength after the brutal beating of the student protesters by police. The pursuit of justice in punishing the perpetrators became the first decisive episode that provided the Euromaidan with dynamic growth in its protest wave. Notwithstanding its violent character, however, this episode merely epitomized the whole practice of the state authoritarian machine, in which law enforcement and judicial systems were only scenery and the interpretation of laws and access to justice were regulated by mainly informal rules and corruptive agreements. Despite the Euromaidan victory, the legal and judicial systems cannot be said to have reformed substantially. Nonetheless, there have been certain changes in the law enforcement sector. In addition to the Prosecutor's Office, the system developed in a positive direction thanks to the appearance of new organizations such as the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), the National Agency to Prevent Corruption (NAPC), and the nascent State Bureau of Investigation (SBI). The court system is getting simplified and structured in more logical way. However, the outcomes of such efforts at institution building are rather humble: corruption remains endemic, security in the streets is far from guaranteed, and the courts are very slow to reach just decisions. Unfortunately, we are witnessing how old and new institutions conflict with each other and undermine law and order in Ukraine. In recent months the general prosecutor, the head of NABU, and the head of NAPC have opened investigations against each other. Their respective staffs keep arresting each other, while criminality feels freed of law enforcement's prosecution. But the weakest, most ineffective, and supposedly most corrupt part of the system remains the courts. Remarkably, the catastrophically low level of public trust in the judicial system has not changed since pre-Maidan days: in both 2013 and 2017 up to 75 percent of Ukrainians did not trust the court system. (The data are from the nationwide representative survey, " Monitoring Ukrainian Society, " conducted annually by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine [NASU]. The sample of 1,800 respondents represented all the regions and sociodemographic groups of Ukraine, excluding, beginning in 2014, Crimea and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in the Donbas.) And the court as the principal institution of the rule of law is responsible for administering and creating access to justice for all citizens. Poor functioning of the court system and a lack of clear legal rules result as well in a continuing high level of corruption and low attractiveness for investors wanting to do business in Ukraine. 2. Need for a More Inclusive Model of Institutional Functioning The Revolution of Dignity, as Ukrainians call the Euromaidan, has not resulted in the dissolution of the " blackmail state, " that is, a state organization built on the nontransparent, mostly informal rules of monopolistic control and the corruptive distribution of public wealth by oligarchic clans. In fact, the Euromaidan was the third chance for Ukraine to transform from an extractive to an inclusive model in the nation's twenty-five years of independence. But even the unprecedentedly high price in human lives of the Revolution of Dignity and the fear of the ruling elites that they might be displaced or punished did not make them switch from running an extractive state to developing a state characterized by political and economic inclusiveness. It seems to me that Ukraine's ruling elites are unable to adapt to an inclusive model. All they can do is reproduce the usual (and to them, comfortable) institutional environment, one that is based on extra rent seeking and extractive practices. Ukrainian authorities have refused to rely on civil society, though this is perhaps the only the way to gain the necessary societal support for conducting

Abstract: This article focuses on the analysis of public opinions of the Ukrain-ian people on the nature, character, and characteristics of the citizens' political activism during the Orange Revolution. The author analyzes data from the annual nationwide representative survey, ...

Импликации современной социокультурной динамики, в частности усиление влияния политического популизма на отечественные реалии и опыт гражданского общества, имеют свои особенности. Последние заключаются, во-первых, в более сложных конфигурациях соотношения между политическим популизмом и практиками гражданского активизма; во-вторых, вызовы популизма в Украине гораздо опаснее и несут больше рисков для пока еще не устоявшейся демократии, учитывая современные обстоятельства российско-украинской войны и мощные информационные влияния соседнего государства-агрессора.