“I urge that we turn Kuhn on his head and demonstrate that a paradigm is nothing more than an arr... more “I urge that we turn Kuhn on his head and demonstrate that a paradigm is nothing more than an arrested social development.” (K402) Notwithstanding the long debate to which The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has given rise since its publication in 1962, this quote from Steve Fuller’s assessment of its author’s legacy suggests an original if controversial project: may a better understanding of science arise from the ashes of idealist historicism! Yet rather than furnish the Marx to Kuhn’s Hegel, Fuller but manages a pastiche of Proudhon, as it were, which calls for another inversion of titles as rejoinder in turn. There can be no doubt that some very important issues are raised in this book, but just as this reader’s expectations were dashed in its course, so the issues end.up curiously diminished; given the significance of the subject matter, it is of interest to find out why.
hand to resolve a hermeneutical controversy. For instance, when he considers the question of whet... more hand to resolve a hermeneutical controversy. For instance, when he considers the question of whether or not Peirce is in some sense an idealist, Hausman does not use Peirce's distinction among the three grades of conceptual clarity as itself a tool for becoming clear about just this question. Yet Peirce himself turned, near the end of "How to Make Our Ideas 'Clear," to the idea of reality as a means of clarifying the pragmatic maxim (a maxim by which grades of clarity higher than subjective familiarity and abstract definition might be reached). In general, Hausman relies too heavily on the conceptual clarity to be attained via abstract definitions, and too sparingly on the clearness to be reached via pragmatic considerations. Without taking back in the least what was said earlier, I find that Hausman's Peirce is not enough of a pragmaticist. In particular, such topics as habit, history, and agency are somewhat occluded by the author 's emphasis, at a very abstract level, on such topics as intelligibility, continuity, and resistance. From a pragmaticist perspective, abstract definitions and dialectical arguments are in the end insufficient; translating concepts into hab/ts of acting and of imagining is imperative. So, too, is the task of constructing a thick narrative of the habit changes of historical agents (in more familiar language, the paradigm shifts so forcefully brought to our attention by Thomas Kuhn). As a crucial feature of the case for evolutionary realism, thick narratives need to be offered as pointed alternatives to those stories so captivatingly told by, say, Richard Rorty in, e.g., "The Contingency of Language" (chapter 1 of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity). Yet another curious feature is that Hausman develops his own views without reference to several Peirce scholars who are at once the ablest expositors of Charles Peirce and the strongest allies o f Carl Hausman (most notably, David Savan, T. L. Short, and Joseph Ransdel l the three expositors to whom I alluded above). But this is a quibble and the above criticisms perhaps not much more than that; for Carl Hausman's book is a firstrate interpretation o f a first-rank philosopher. In sum, for those of us who are specialists in Peirce, this study is required reading; for those who are interested in the most central issues of contemporary philosophy, it is nothing less than highly recommended. VINCENT COLAPIE'rRo Fordham University
“I urge that we turn Kuhn on his head and demonstrate that a paradigm is nothing more than an arr... more “I urge that we turn Kuhn on his head and demonstrate that a paradigm is nothing more than an arrested social development.” (K402) Notwithstanding the long debate to which The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has given rise since its publication in 1962, this quote from Steve Fuller’s assessment of its author’s legacy suggests an original if controversial project: may a better understanding of science arise from the ashes of idealist historicism! Yet rather than furnish the Marx to Kuhn’s Hegel, Fuller but manages a pastiche of Proudhon, as it were, which calls for another inversion of titles as rejoinder in turn. There can be no doubt that some very important issues are raised in this book, but just as this reader’s expectations were dashed in its course, so the issues end.up curiously diminished; given the significance of the subject matter, it is of interest to find out why.
hand to resolve a hermeneutical controversy. For instance, when he considers the question of whet... more hand to resolve a hermeneutical controversy. For instance, when he considers the question of whether or not Peirce is in some sense an idealist, Hausman does not use Peirce's distinction among the three grades of conceptual clarity as itself a tool for becoming clear about just this question. Yet Peirce himself turned, near the end of "How to Make Our Ideas 'Clear," to the idea of reality as a means of clarifying the pragmatic maxim (a maxim by which grades of clarity higher than subjective familiarity and abstract definition might be reached). In general, Hausman relies too heavily on the conceptual clarity to be attained via abstract definitions, and too sparingly on the clearness to be reached via pragmatic considerations. Without taking back in the least what was said earlier, I find that Hausman's Peirce is not enough of a pragmaticist. In particular, such topics as habit, history, and agency are somewhat occluded by the author 's emphasis, at a very abstract level, on such topics as intelligibility, continuity, and resistance. From a pragmaticist perspective, abstract definitions and dialectical arguments are in the end insufficient; translating concepts into hab/ts of acting and of imagining is imperative. So, too, is the task of constructing a thick narrative of the habit changes of historical agents (in more familiar language, the paradigm shifts so forcefully brought to our attention by Thomas Kuhn). As a crucial feature of the case for evolutionary realism, thick narratives need to be offered as pointed alternatives to those stories so captivatingly told by, say, Richard Rorty in, e.g., "The Contingency of Language" (chapter 1 of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity). Yet another curious feature is that Hausman develops his own views without reference to several Peirce scholars who are at once the ablest expositors of Charles Peirce and the strongest allies o f Carl Hausman (most notably, David Savan, T. L. Short, and Joseph Ransdel l the three expositors to whom I alluded above). But this is a quibble and the above criticisms perhaps not much more than that; for Carl Hausman's book is a firstrate interpretation o f a first-rank philosopher. In sum, for those of us who are specialists in Peirce, this study is required reading; for those who are interested in the most central issues of contemporary philosophy, it is nothing less than highly recommended. VINCENT COLAPIE'rRo Fordham University
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