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Thirza Lagewaard

What is it for a group to be ignorant? This is the question we answer in this chapter. After a few important distinctions regarding ignorance, we provide two case studies of group ignorance: fundamentalist ignorance and white ignorance.... more
What is it for a group to be ignorant? This is the question we answer in this chapter. After a few important distinctions regarding ignorance, we provide two case studies of group ignorance: fundamentalist ignorance and white ignorance. We formulate six desiderata that an account of group ignorance should meet. Subsequently, we argue that existing accounts of group belief, group justification, and group knowledge cannot easily be transposed to group ignorance. We then lay out our own Dynamic Account of group ignorance and reply to several objections that might be leveled against it.
Sometimes ordinary disagreements become deep as a result of epistemic injustice. The paper explores a hitherto unnoticed connection between two phenomena that have received ample attention in recent social epistemology: deep disagreement... more
Sometimes ordinary disagreements become deep as a result of epistemic injustice. The paper explores a hitherto unnoticed connection between two phenomena that have received ample attention in recent social epistemology: deep disagreement and epistemic injustice. When (pre-existing) epistemic injustice comes into play in a regular disagreement, this can lead to higher-order disagreement about what counts as evidence concerning the original disagreement, which deepens the disagreement. After considering a common definition of deep disagreement, it is proposed that the depth of disagreements is best understood as a matter of degree. Then, a case study of real-life disagreement is introduced: the disagreement about whether racism is a significant issue in the Netherlands, illustrated by the tradition of ‘Black Pete’. It is argued that there is disagreement about what counts as evidence in the case study because of two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical injustice...