Adam Weyde, Regulamin wojskowy z 1698 roku, Regulamin wojskowy z 1698 roku, opracowali i prygotowali do druku Karol Łopatecki i Pweł Krokosz, tłumaczył Paweł Krokosz, Białystok 2022, 2022
Adam Adamovich Weyde (1667–1720), a friend and associate of Peter
I, is known to the general publ... more Adam Adamovich Weyde (1667–1720), a friend and associate of Peter
I, is known to the general public primarily for the famous 1698 Military
Charter which he composed for the Russian army. At the same time, he
has frequently been overlooked by historians, who, when discussing the
reforms (not only military) undertaken by the tsar, mention the tsar’s
other closest advisers first. This is most likely due to the fact that Weyde
was a “background character” during the events unfolding at the time.
Although he did not hold the most prominent positions in the army or
the apparatus of state structures, it was his perceptiveness, potential for
innovation and hard organizational work that played a huge role in the
modernization of the Russian army and state in the late 17th and early
18th centuries.
Historians who analyze the modernization process of the Russian
state during the reign of Peter I in increasing depth are gradually beginning
to recognize the role of Adam Weyde. One of his most important
achievements was the establishment of modern Russian military legislation, with the turning point being the military charter presented to the tsar in 1698. Notably, Adam Weyde also initiated and completed the work related to the general codification of Russian military law, which resulted in the modern regulations being adopted in 1716, commonly known as the Military Code of Peter the Great.
Russia also largely owes to him the introduction, and later consolidation,
of the recruitment system, and the establishment of new bodies
of central state administration, collegia, which replaced the obsolete prikazes. It was him who organized an efficient military judiciary as the second (vice) president of the military collegium, whose rules of operation
he basically developed himself. At the same time, Weyde made a name
for himself as an observant strategist and tactician during various war
campaigns against Sweden and Turkey conducted in the second decade
of the 18th century. He distinguished himself as a commander in battles:
the land battle of Narva (1700) and the naval battle off Cape Hangö
Udd (1714). His hypercritical report on the condition of the Danish army
from 1716 prevented Peter I from making an allied landing on the coast
of Skåne and moving the ongoing war with Sweden to the Scandinavian
Peninsula. Undoubtedly, the list of Adam Weyde’s achievements would
have been much longer had it not been for his more than 10-year stay in
Swedish captivity (1700–1711).
Adam Weyde’s Military Charter itself is relevant not only to the
Russian military. It was a work that presented the latest training, organizational and tactical solutions that were being introduced at the end
of the 17th century in Europe. It might even be concluded that if Weyde’s
Military Charter had been published in print and translated into German
or French, it would have had a chance to become a key treatise for
the development of military thought in the 18th century. However, this
did not happen for a number of reasons, the main being that Weyde was
taken prisoner by Sweden after the Battle of Narva in 1700. Today, the
work of this tsarist general is a valuable source for tracing and understanding the transformations taking place in the Russian military at theturn of the 17th and 18th centuries. The Western European models that
he adopted were adjusted to his own solutions, thus becoming the basis
for the establishment of an entirely new army by Peter I.
According to our hypothesis, 17th-century military treatises can
be closed between two time caesuras. On the one hand, there is the year
1607, when Jacob de Gheyna’s innovative publication entitled Wapenhandelinghe van Roers Musquetten ende Spiessen was issued. This work can be considered the most important early modern treatise on the art of infantry warfare. On the other hand, the end to the concepts initiated in the early 17th century came in the second half of the 1690s. First, in 1696, the French military charter L’art Militaire Françoise, pour l’infanterie by Pierre Giffart was issued, incorporating some new tactical developments. Then, two years later, Adam Weyde presented the result of his efforts to Peter I; the “signature” charter soon came to be used as a manual of military training in the newly formed Russian infantry regiments. Thus, at the very end of the 17th century, the Russian army had a new and, importantly, its own military charter breaking with the previously adopted patterns of its training and overall functioning.
The aforementioned French charter of 1696 was a kind of harbinger
of change; it presented the actions performed by grenadiers and the
drill of soldiers using muskets (still with a fuse lock) with a bayonet, but
at the same time the traditional exercises for pikemen. This was applicable to a modern and modernizing army which was forced to go through the process of replacing one solution with another. The provisions of the charter in question were to play a different role. The tsar and his associate envisioned a complete modernization of the infantry by adapting the latest solutions already in place in Western European armies. In this regard, Russian delays may have been an asset, as they made it possible to reform the army without any intermediate forms. Thus, Adam Weyde’s Military Charter is not just a description of (and a driver for) the militarychanges taking place in Russia, but is a reflection of the broader changes in the military occurring on the Old Continent. An analysis of the charter’s content indicates that this is the first European military treatise that presents the complete solutions described and applied in the 18th century. It is a successful compilation of the achievements of previous theorists of the military and military laws, as well as the direct observations of Adam Weyde, a participant in the military campaigns against the army of the Turkish Sultan – in 1695–1696 launched by the Russian army at Azov, and in 1697 by the Imperial Army in Hungary. In the first case, the Turkish fortress of Azov was captured, and in the second, Prince Eugene Francis of Savoy smashed a stronger opponent at the Battle of Zenta.
In this book we present the 1698 Military Charter by Adam Weyde translated into Polish, with the relevant scientific background. The work
of the tsar’s associate was released only once in Russia in 1841 without
a critical elaboration. Our publication features original, never-published
illustrations of the holds of soldiers during the drill (for the purposes of
the 19th-century source edition, lithographs based on the existing illustrations were made). In addition, we have reproduced the drill patterns
not preserved in the Military Charter and proposed by Adam Weyde,
which should be an integral part of the work. The annex contains the
final text of the “combat infantry charter” compiled in 1700 and entitled
Short ordinary instruction with a more detailed, stronger and better explanation (concerning the drill of infantry regiments) of how to do it and what the captain, other commanders and non-commissioned officers are to be on the lookout for. The charter edited by general Avtamon Golovin, another associate of the tsar’s, with the commentary of Peter I himself, was a creative elaboration of the thoughts found in the provisions of Adam Weyde’s Military Charter.
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Papers by Paweł Krokosz
This article explores various aspects related to the functioning of the Kyiv garrison in the socio-economic life of the city from the 17th to the early 20th century. Following the Khmelnytsky Uprising (1648–1654) and subsequent treaties concluding the Polish-Russian War (1654–1667) – the Treaty of Andrusovo (1667) and the Treaty of Grzymułtowski (1686) – Kyiv separated from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and permanently came under the rule of the Tsars. Despite this political shift, Kyiv remained a vital economic, cultural, and especially military center, serving as a key point in the defense system of the southwestern borders of the Tsardom of Moscow (later the Russian Empire from 1721). The city’s strength was largely determined by its fortifications and the garrison stationed there. Upon assuming control, the Russian authorities promptly began reinforcing the city. In 1706, Tsar Peter I ordered the construction of the modern Pechersk Fortress (Kyiv-Pechersk Fortress). Over the years, the Russian military presence in the fortress grew significantly. Consequently, the city itself underwent gradual Russification, as soldiers, officials of the Tsarist administration, and Russian merchants and industrialists moved in, gradually displacing the predominantly Ukrainian population. The Polish community in Kyiv also played a significant role in the socio-economic landscape of the city and the entire guberniya. Particularly noteworthy were the famous Kyiv Contracts established in the late 18th century, where Poles dominated trade transactions. Throughout the 19th century, Kyiv experienced dynamic economic growth, which was reflected in the increasing population. The fortress itself also evolved, undergoing a complete reconstruction in 1830 by order of Tsar Nicholas I, which led to a rise in the number of soldiers in its garrison, further intertwining the military presence with Kyiv’s economic, social, and cultural development. By the late 19th century, the fortress lost its original military function, becoming more of a fortress-warehouse complex. In the early 20th century, parts of the fortifications were gradually dismantled to accommodate the expanding city. The soldiers stationed there were involved in the revolutionary events of 1917, efforts to establish an independent Ukrainian state, the Russian Civil War, and the Polish-Soviet War of 1919–1921.
This article examines the changes in Russian military legislation implemented during the reign of Tsar Paul I (1796–1801). Under the ruler’s decision in the years 1796–1797, the Russian infantry and cavalry adopted entirely new military regulations inspired by the rules in force in the Prussian army under King Frederick II (1740–1786). It quickly became apparent that the provisions of the introduced regulations had certain shortcomings, leading to the necessity of amendments and supplements through subsequent documents. Representatives of the tsarist general staff, particularly the then General Field Marshal Alexander Suvorov, author of the famous work “The Science of Victory” (1795), also developed their own military instructions.
The article is devoted to the role played by representatives of the Stroganov
family, famous for salt-making and conducting a profitable trade (primarily
in furs and hides), in the initial stage of the conquest of Siberia by the Moscow State, which fell in the second half of the 16th century. It was then that they received from Tsar Ivan IV the Grozny huge land grants on the eastern borders of the state on the Kama River with instructions to develop them. Settlements and manufacturing enterprises were quickly established there, mainly salt brewing plants, managed by the Stroganovs. On the other hand, the safety of the new colonists already living in and attracted to these lands from incursions by local peoples and Siberian Tartars was guarded by their private troops, armed with firearms, deployed in fortified spurs. Over the
years, thanks to successive tsarist grants, the family’s domains grew to the
point where they reached beyond the Ural Mountains. This, in turn, increasingly worried the ruler of the Siberian Khanate, Khan Kuchum, who also claimed sovereignty over these lands. In order to secure the lands they had received possession of from the destructive incursions of the Siberian Tatars and subordinate peoples, the Stroganovs decided to take advantage of the Volga Cossack troops, who were engaged in robbery, led by the ataman Yermak. In the late 1670s and early 1680s, the Cossacks, supplied with food, firearms and supported by the Stroganovs’ armed men, set off for Siberia, with the goal of the expedition being to reach Kashlyk, the capital of the Siberian Khanate. Although the seat of Khan Kuchum was finally occupied in 1582, the fact that the Stroganovs organized the entire expedition turned into a kind of beginning of the conquest of Siberia by the Muscovite state, for the state authorities soon joined in the development of the lands occupied by the Cossacks and Stroganov men beyond the Urals. However, this did not mean that the Stroganovs lost their decisive role in the entire Siberian epic. They were still responsible for all kinds of assistance (victualing in food and weapons, supplying ships and their own armed forces) to the tsarist troops moving to conquer the territory of the former Siberian Khanate. Naturally, they gained gratitude from the rulers for their actions, which translated into economic and legal concessions for their activities and subsequent large land grants on the eastern frontiers of the Muscovite state. Thus, the Stroganovs, seeking to ensure the security of their domains, which at the same time remained at all times under the supreme authority of the tsars, by sending Yermak’s Cossack troops to Siberia, began the process of dynamic Russian expansion to the east, which could no longer be stopped.
Ukrainian people in the 18th century (1)
This article is devoted to the policy of the tsarist authorities against the Ukrainian territories which were part of the Russian Empire in the 18th century. During the Great Northern War (1700–1721), Hetman Ivan Mazepa attempted to create a Ukrainian state that was independent from Russia. His activities ended in failure. In the following years, the Russian government allowed the Cossack Hetman state to operate to a very limited degree under its total control. In 1764, Empress Catherine II
removed the last Hetman, Cyril Razumovsky, from his post. Soon there was also a complete elimination of the existing autonomy of Ukraine, which under the new rules was incorporated into the Russian state. The Ukrainian population was also then deprived of the special „rights and freedoms” which had once been guaranteed by the Russian rulers.
Spis treści:
- Håkan Henriksson, The Nystad Congress and the Release of Russian Prisoners of War in 1721;
- Natallia Sliž (Наталля Сліж), Княжна Барбара Соломерецкая (?–1595) – безнаказанная преступница, часть I;
- Hlieb Bierastavy, Przywileje ogólnoziemskie wielkich książąt litewskich
z lat 1522–1551. Rys dziejów powstania na tle tekstologii aktów
- Mariusz Balcerek, The Daugava River in the Early Modern Period.
A Border, an Obstacle, and a Trade Route;
- Norbert Morawiec, Euntes in mundum. Pope John Paul II’s Millennium
of the Baptism of Rus’ (Between Political Theology, Historiography, and the Theology of History);
- Monika Anna Graczyk, Trendy w modzie damskiej po I wojnie światowej.
Przyczynek do badań;
of their own surgical developments. The role of M. Sklifosovsky in the formation and development of military field surgery and sanitation in Ukraine and the Russian Empire. The main stages of his professional development, managerial activity in the leading positions of the largest clinics, research institutes in Moscow, Kiev, St. Petersburg are revealed.
At his own expense, the surgeon established a school, a hospital for the disabled of the Russian-Turkish war, a pottery school and took care of the affairs of the Poltava province.
The article is devoted to the gradual liquidation of the autonomous rights of left-bank Ukraine during the reign of Tsar Peter I (1682–1725). This process began in 1708 when during the ongoing Russo-Swedish War 1700–1721, Zaporizhia hetman Ivan Mazepa “betrayed” the tsar and turned it over to King Charles XII. This action was dictated by the desire of Mazepa’s supporters to shed Russian dependence and an attempt to create an independent (independent) Ukrainian state backed by Sweden and the Republic of Poland. Peter I agreed to appoint successive hetmans – Ivan Skoropadski and Pawlo Połubotok, but over the years he gradually limited their power. In 1722, the hetman’s office was liquidated, and control over the Ukrainian lands, for a short time until 1727, was taken over by the Malorossiya College – the Russian central office. According to Peter I, in the Russian Empire established in 1721, there was no room for any autonomous forms of power that could result in gaining independence. This reform lasted only two years, but it became a determinant for his successors as to how Ukrainian lands should be controlled and finally absorbed into Russia.
The article is devoted to issues related to the comprehensive preparation of a temporary museum exhibition on militarytopics. The article presents the following aspects: developing the concept of the exhibition and its scenario; selecting exhibits; preparation of documentation (loans and returns of objects); realization of the exhibition (cooperation with artists and technicians); preparation of a popularizing and educational program accompanying the exhibition (museum lessons, scientific sessions, etc.).
The article is devoted to the formation and functioning of ruling elites in Russia in the 16th-18th centuries. Along with the coronation of the grand prince of Mocow Ivan Vasilyevich, the tsar in 1547, visible rivarly between the rulers (tsars) and representatives of Russian aristocracy (influential princely and boyar families) began. In the 17th century, people from nobility (dvoryanstvo) or merchants joined in the circle of people coming from prominent families which controlled both internal policy of the state. At the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries in the time of Peter the Great's reigning, people from other, sometimes the lowest social ranks, were also admitted to the most important state functions. At the time, the traditional advirsory authority of the Russian rulers - Boyar Duma, whose fundations were based on the representatives of aristocracy, was also liquidated. Boyar Duma was replaced by the Governing Senate, instituted by Peter the Great in 1711, a collegial legislative, judicial and executive body responsible for all state issues. In the following years, the Governing Senate was completely subordinated to the tsars' will ruling in Russia.
In 1721 in town of Nystad, Finland, Russia and Sweden signed a peace treaty ending a long-term war, which in history is called the Great Northern War (1700-1721). The winning side was Russia, which gained access to the Baltic Sea and took Sweden eastern provinces once for all – Livonia, Estonia, Ingermanlandia, a part of the Karelia and Finland. In 1721, in consequence of the achieved successes, tsar Peter I was given the title of “The Father of His Country, Emperor of All the Russia and the Great” by his subjects. Since then Russia, which became real and key power in Europe, began to use the new official name – the Russian Empire.
This article explores various aspects related to the functioning of the Kyiv garrison in the socio-economic life of the city from the 17th to the early 20th century. Following the Khmelnytsky Uprising (1648–1654) and subsequent treaties concluding the Polish-Russian War (1654–1667) – the Treaty of Andrusovo (1667) and the Treaty of Grzymułtowski (1686) – Kyiv separated from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and permanently came under the rule of the Tsars. Despite this political shift, Kyiv remained a vital economic, cultural, and especially military center, serving as a key point in the defense system of the southwestern borders of the Tsardom of Moscow (later the Russian Empire from 1721). The city’s strength was largely determined by its fortifications and the garrison stationed there. Upon assuming control, the Russian authorities promptly began reinforcing the city. In 1706, Tsar Peter I ordered the construction of the modern Pechersk Fortress (Kyiv-Pechersk Fortress). Over the years, the Russian military presence in the fortress grew significantly. Consequently, the city itself underwent gradual Russification, as soldiers, officials of the Tsarist administration, and Russian merchants and industrialists moved in, gradually displacing the predominantly Ukrainian population. The Polish community in Kyiv also played a significant role in the socio-economic landscape of the city and the entire guberniya. Particularly noteworthy were the famous Kyiv Contracts established in the late 18th century, where Poles dominated trade transactions. Throughout the 19th century, Kyiv experienced dynamic economic growth, which was reflected in the increasing population. The fortress itself also evolved, undergoing a complete reconstruction in 1830 by order of Tsar Nicholas I, which led to a rise in the number of soldiers in its garrison, further intertwining the military presence with Kyiv’s economic, social, and cultural development. By the late 19th century, the fortress lost its original military function, becoming more of a fortress-warehouse complex. In the early 20th century, parts of the fortifications were gradually dismantled to accommodate the expanding city. The soldiers stationed there were involved in the revolutionary events of 1917, efforts to establish an independent Ukrainian state, the Russian Civil War, and the Polish-Soviet War of 1919–1921.
This article examines the changes in Russian military legislation implemented during the reign of Tsar Paul I (1796–1801). Under the ruler’s decision in the years 1796–1797, the Russian infantry and cavalry adopted entirely new military regulations inspired by the rules in force in the Prussian army under King Frederick II (1740–1786). It quickly became apparent that the provisions of the introduced regulations had certain shortcomings, leading to the necessity of amendments and supplements through subsequent documents. Representatives of the tsarist general staff, particularly the then General Field Marshal Alexander Suvorov, author of the famous work “The Science of Victory” (1795), also developed their own military instructions.
The article is devoted to the role played by representatives of the Stroganov
family, famous for salt-making and conducting a profitable trade (primarily
in furs and hides), in the initial stage of the conquest of Siberia by the Moscow State, which fell in the second half of the 16th century. It was then that they received from Tsar Ivan IV the Grozny huge land grants on the eastern borders of the state on the Kama River with instructions to develop them. Settlements and manufacturing enterprises were quickly established there, mainly salt brewing plants, managed by the Stroganovs. On the other hand, the safety of the new colonists already living in and attracted to these lands from incursions by local peoples and Siberian Tartars was guarded by their private troops, armed with firearms, deployed in fortified spurs. Over the
years, thanks to successive tsarist grants, the family’s domains grew to the
point where they reached beyond the Ural Mountains. This, in turn, increasingly worried the ruler of the Siberian Khanate, Khan Kuchum, who also claimed sovereignty over these lands. In order to secure the lands they had received possession of from the destructive incursions of the Siberian Tatars and subordinate peoples, the Stroganovs decided to take advantage of the Volga Cossack troops, who were engaged in robbery, led by the ataman Yermak. In the late 1670s and early 1680s, the Cossacks, supplied with food, firearms and supported by the Stroganovs’ armed men, set off for Siberia, with the goal of the expedition being to reach Kashlyk, the capital of the Siberian Khanate. Although the seat of Khan Kuchum was finally occupied in 1582, the fact that the Stroganovs organized the entire expedition turned into a kind of beginning of the conquest of Siberia by the Muscovite state, for the state authorities soon joined in the development of the lands occupied by the Cossacks and Stroganov men beyond the Urals. However, this did not mean that the Stroganovs lost their decisive role in the entire Siberian epic. They were still responsible for all kinds of assistance (victualing in food and weapons, supplying ships and their own armed forces) to the tsarist troops moving to conquer the territory of the former Siberian Khanate. Naturally, they gained gratitude from the rulers for their actions, which translated into economic and legal concessions for their activities and subsequent large land grants on the eastern frontiers of the Muscovite state. Thus, the Stroganovs, seeking to ensure the security of their domains, which at the same time remained at all times under the supreme authority of the tsars, by sending Yermak’s Cossack troops to Siberia, began the process of dynamic Russian expansion to the east, which could no longer be stopped.
Ukrainian people in the 18th century (1)
This article is devoted to the policy of the tsarist authorities against the Ukrainian territories which were part of the Russian Empire in the 18th century. During the Great Northern War (1700–1721), Hetman Ivan Mazepa attempted to create a Ukrainian state that was independent from Russia. His activities ended in failure. In the following years, the Russian government allowed the Cossack Hetman state to operate to a very limited degree under its total control. In 1764, Empress Catherine II
removed the last Hetman, Cyril Razumovsky, from his post. Soon there was also a complete elimination of the existing autonomy of Ukraine, which under the new rules was incorporated into the Russian state. The Ukrainian population was also then deprived of the special „rights and freedoms” which had once been guaranteed by the Russian rulers.
Spis treści:
- Håkan Henriksson, The Nystad Congress and the Release of Russian Prisoners of War in 1721;
- Natallia Sliž (Наталля Сліж), Княжна Барбара Соломерецкая (?–1595) – безнаказанная преступница, часть I;
- Hlieb Bierastavy, Przywileje ogólnoziemskie wielkich książąt litewskich
z lat 1522–1551. Rys dziejów powstania na tle tekstologii aktów
- Mariusz Balcerek, The Daugava River in the Early Modern Period.
A Border, an Obstacle, and a Trade Route;
- Norbert Morawiec, Euntes in mundum. Pope John Paul II’s Millennium
of the Baptism of Rus’ (Between Political Theology, Historiography, and the Theology of History);
- Monika Anna Graczyk, Trendy w modzie damskiej po I wojnie światowej.
Przyczynek do badań;
of their own surgical developments. The role of M. Sklifosovsky in the formation and development of military field surgery and sanitation in Ukraine and the Russian Empire. The main stages of his professional development, managerial activity in the leading positions of the largest clinics, research institutes in Moscow, Kiev, St. Petersburg are revealed.
At his own expense, the surgeon established a school, a hospital for the disabled of the Russian-Turkish war, a pottery school and took care of the affairs of the Poltava province.
The article is devoted to the gradual liquidation of the autonomous rights of left-bank Ukraine during the reign of Tsar Peter I (1682–1725). This process began in 1708 when during the ongoing Russo-Swedish War 1700–1721, Zaporizhia hetman Ivan Mazepa “betrayed” the tsar and turned it over to King Charles XII. This action was dictated by the desire of Mazepa’s supporters to shed Russian dependence and an attempt to create an independent (independent) Ukrainian state backed by Sweden and the Republic of Poland. Peter I agreed to appoint successive hetmans – Ivan Skoropadski and Pawlo Połubotok, but over the years he gradually limited their power. In 1722, the hetman’s office was liquidated, and control over the Ukrainian lands, for a short time until 1727, was taken over by the Malorossiya College – the Russian central office. According to Peter I, in the Russian Empire established in 1721, there was no room for any autonomous forms of power that could result in gaining independence. This reform lasted only two years, but it became a determinant for his successors as to how Ukrainian lands should be controlled and finally absorbed into Russia.
The article is devoted to issues related to the comprehensive preparation of a temporary museum exhibition on militarytopics. The article presents the following aspects: developing the concept of the exhibition and its scenario; selecting exhibits; preparation of documentation (loans and returns of objects); realization of the exhibition (cooperation with artists and technicians); preparation of a popularizing and educational program accompanying the exhibition (museum lessons, scientific sessions, etc.).
The article is devoted to the formation and functioning of ruling elites in Russia in the 16th-18th centuries. Along with the coronation of the grand prince of Mocow Ivan Vasilyevich, the tsar in 1547, visible rivarly between the rulers (tsars) and representatives of Russian aristocracy (influential princely and boyar families) began. In the 17th century, people from nobility (dvoryanstvo) or merchants joined in the circle of people coming from prominent families which controlled both internal policy of the state. At the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries in the time of Peter the Great's reigning, people from other, sometimes the lowest social ranks, were also admitted to the most important state functions. At the time, the traditional advirsory authority of the Russian rulers - Boyar Duma, whose fundations were based on the representatives of aristocracy, was also liquidated. Boyar Duma was replaced by the Governing Senate, instituted by Peter the Great in 1711, a collegial legislative, judicial and executive body responsible for all state issues. In the following years, the Governing Senate was completely subordinated to the tsars' will ruling in Russia.
In 1721 in town of Nystad, Finland, Russia and Sweden signed a peace treaty ending a long-term war, which in history is called the Great Northern War (1700-1721). The winning side was Russia, which gained access to the Baltic Sea and took Sweden eastern provinces once for all – Livonia, Estonia, Ingermanlandia, a part of the Karelia and Finland. In 1721, in consequence of the achieved successes, tsar Peter I was given the title of “The Father of His Country, Emperor of All the Russia and the Great” by his subjects. Since then Russia, which became real and key power in Europe, began to use the new official name – the Russian Empire.
Historycy coraz dogłębniej analizujący fenomen procesu modernizacji państwa rosyjskiego za panowania Piotra I – zaczynają dostrzegać rolę Adama Weyde. Jednym z najważniejszych jego osiągnięć była budowa nowożytnego rosyjskiego prawodawstwa wojskowego, a punkt zwrotny stanowił przedstawiony w 1698 r. carowi regulamin służby wojskowej. Nie należy zapominać, że Adam Weyde był także pomysłodawcą i głównym wykonawcą prac związanych z generalną kodyfikacją rosyjskiego prawa wojskowego, której owocem była przyjęta w 1716 r. nowoczesna regulacja, zwana powszechnie Kodeksem wojskowym Piotra I.
To również jemu w dużym stopniu zawdzięcza Rosja wprowadzenie, a później ugruntowanie, systemu rekruckiego, powołanie nowych organów centralnej administracji państwowej – kolegiów, które zastąpiły przestarzałe prikazy. W końcu to on jako drugi (wice) prezydent Kolegium Wojskowego, którego mechanizmy funkcjonowania w zasadzie sam opracował, zorganizował sprawne sądownictwo wojskowe. Jednocześnie Weyde dał się poznać jako spostrzegawczy strateg i taktyk podczas poszczególnych kampanii wojennych ze Szwecją i z Turcją prowadzonych w 2. dziesięcioleciu XVIII w. Odznaczył się jako dowódca w bitwach – lądowej pod Narwą (1700) i morskiej u Przylądka Hangö Udd (1714). Nie bez znaczenia był również sporządzony przez generała hiperkrytyczny raport o stanie armii duńskiej w 1716 r., co powstrzymało Piotra I przed sojuszniczym lądowaniem na wybrzeżu Skanii i przeniesieniu toczącej się wojny ze Szwecją na Półwysep Skandynawski. Niewątpliwie katalog jego dokonań byłby znacznie dłuższy, gdyby nie ponad 10-letni pobyt w niewoli szwedzkiej (1700–1711).
Sam Regulamin wojskowy Adama Weyde jest istotny nie tylko z punktu widzenia wojskowości rosyjskiej. Było to bowiem dzieło, które prezentowało najnowsze, wprowadzane pod koniec XVII stulecia w Europie rozwiązania szkoleniowe, organizacyjne i taktyczne. Całkiem śmiało można pokusić się o konstatację, że gdyby regulamin Weyde został wydany drukiem i przetłumaczony na język niemiecki lub francuski, miałby szanse stać się kluczowym traktatem dla rozwoju powszechnej myśli wojskowej XVIII w. Tak się jednak nie stało z wielu powodów, a główną tego przyczyną było dostanie się jej autora do niewoli szwedzkiej po bitwie pod Narwą w 1700 r. Obecnie dzieło carskiego generała stanowi niezwykle cenne źródło, pozwalające prześledzić i zrozumieć przemiany zachodzące w wojskowości rosyjskiej na przełomie XVII i XVIII stulecia. Zaadaptowane przez niego zachodnioeuropejskie wzorce zostały odpowiednio dostosowane do rozwiązań własnych, stając się tym samym bazą budowy całkowicie nowej armii przez Piotra I.
Według naszej hipotezy XVII-wieczne traktaty wojskowe można zamknąć między dwiema cezurami czasowymi. Z jednej strony jest to rok 1607, kiedy ukazała się nowatorska publikacja Jacoba de Gheyna zatytułowana Wapenhandelinghe van Roers Musquetten ende Spiessen. Dzieło to możemy uznać za najważniejszą wczesnonowożytną pracę na temat sztuki wojennej piechoty. Natomiast kres zapoczątkowanych na początku XVII w. koncepcji przypada na drugą połowę lat 90 tego stulecia. Najpierw w 1696 r. wydano francuski regulamin wojskowy L’art Militaire Françoise, pour l’infanterie autorstwa Pierre’a Giffarta, uwzględniający pewne nowe rozwiązania taktyczne. Natomiast dwa lata później Adam Weyde zaprezentował Piotrowi I efekt swojej pracy, przedkładając autorski regulamin, który już wkrótce zaczął być wykorzystywany jako podręcznik nauki żołnierskiej w nowo formowanych rosyjskich pułkach piechoty. Tym sposobem jeszcze w ostatnich latach XVII w. armia rosyjska posiadała nowy, a co ważne własny regulamin wojskowy zrywający z przyjętymi dotychczas schematami jej szkolenia i całościowego funkcjonowania .
Wspomniany regulamin francuski z 1696 r. był swoistym zwiastunem zmian – prezentował czynności wykonywane przez grenadierów oraz musztrę żołnierzy wyposażonych w muszkiety (jeszcze z zamkiem lontowym) z bagnetem, ale jednocześnie tradycyjne ćwiczenia dla pikinierów. Zjawisko to było właściwe dla nowoczesnej i modernizującej się armii, która była zmuszona przejść proces zastąpienia jedynych rozwiązań drugimi. Inaczej było w przypadku zapisów omawianej przez nas regulacji. Car i jego współpracownik zakładali całkowitą modernizację piechoty poprzez zaadaptowanie najnowszych rozwiązań już funkcjonujących w wojskach zachodnioeuropejskich. Pod tym względem opóźnienia rosyjskie mogły stanowić atut, gdyż pozwalały na zreformowanie armii bez form pośrednich. Zatem Regulamin wojskowy Adama Weyde nie jest jedynie opisem (i katalizatorem) przemian wojskowych zachodzących w Rosji, lecz stanowi odzwierciedlenie szerszych zmian zachodzących w zakresie wojskowości na Starym Kontynencie. Na podstawie analizy jego zawartości śmiało można wskazać, że jest to pierwszy europejski traktat (regulamin) wojskowy, który w pełni prezentuje rozwiązania opisane i stosowane w XVIII stuleciu. Stanowi on udaną kompilację dorobku dotychczasowych teoretyków wojskowości i praw wojskowych oraz bezpośrednich obserwacji Adama Weyde, uczestnika działań wojennych toczonych przeciwko wojskom sułtana tureckiego – w latach 1695–1696 przez armię rosyjską pod Azowem i armię cesarską na Węgrzech w 1697 r. W pierwszym przypadku przeprowadzono skuteczny szturm twierdzy, a w drugim książę Eugeniusz Sabaudzki w bitwie pod Zentą rozbił silniejszego przeciwnika.
W niniejszej książce prezentujemy przetłumaczony na język polski Regulamin wojskowy z 1698 r. autorstwa Adama Weyde, opatrzony stosownym opracowaniem naukowym. Dotychczas dzieło carskiego współpracownika, pozbawione oprawy krytycznej, było wydane jedynie raz w Rosji w 1841 r. Do naszej publikacji zostały dołączone oryginalne, nigdy nie publikowane ilustracje dotyczące chwytów żołnierzy ćwiczących musztrę (na potrzeby XIX-wiecznej edycji źródłowej na ich bazie wykonano wzorujące się na istniejących rysunkach litografie). Dodatkowo odtworzyliśmy niezachowane w Regulaminie wojskowym schematy musztry, zaproponowane przez Adama Weyde, które powinny być integralną częścią pracy. Z kolei w aneksie wydajemy opracowany w 1700 r. ostateczny tekst „bojowego regulaminu piechoty” noszący tytuł Krótkie zwyczajne nauczanie z dokładniejszym mocniejszym i lepszym wyjaśnieniem (dotyczącym musztry pułków piechoty), jak przy tym postępować i co kapitan, inni dowódcy i podoficerowie mają mieć na baczeniu. Regulacja zredagowana przez generała Awtamona Gołowina, innego z carskich współpracowników, do której uwagi naniósł sam Piotr I, stanowiła twórcze rozwiniecie myśli znajdujących się właśnie w zapisach Regulaminu wojskowego Adama Weyde.
I, is known to the general public primarily for the famous 1698 Military
Charter which he composed for the Russian army. At the same time, he
has frequently been overlooked by historians, who, when discussing the
reforms (not only military) undertaken by the tsar, mention the tsar’s
other closest advisers first. This is most likely due to the fact that Weyde
was a “background character” during the events unfolding at the time.
Although he did not hold the most prominent positions in the army or
the apparatus of state structures, it was his perceptiveness, potential for
innovation and hard organizational work that played a huge role in the
modernization of the Russian army and state in the late 17th and early
18th centuries.
Historians who analyze the modernization process of the Russian
state during the reign of Peter I in increasing depth are gradually beginning
to recognize the role of Adam Weyde. One of his most important
achievements was the establishment of modern Russian military legislation, with the turning point being the military charter presented to the tsar in 1698. Notably, Adam Weyde also initiated and completed the work related to the general codification of Russian military law, which resulted in the modern regulations being adopted in 1716, commonly known as the Military Code of Peter the Great.
Russia also largely owes to him the introduction, and later consolidation,
of the recruitment system, and the establishment of new bodies
of central state administration, collegia, which replaced the obsolete prikazes. It was him who organized an efficient military judiciary as the second (vice) president of the military collegium, whose rules of operation
he basically developed himself. At the same time, Weyde made a name
for himself as an observant strategist and tactician during various war
campaigns against Sweden and Turkey conducted in the second decade
of the 18th century. He distinguished himself as a commander in battles:
the land battle of Narva (1700) and the naval battle off Cape Hangö
Udd (1714). His hypercritical report on the condition of the Danish army
from 1716 prevented Peter I from making an allied landing on the coast
of Skåne and moving the ongoing war with Sweden to the Scandinavian
Peninsula. Undoubtedly, the list of Adam Weyde’s achievements would
have been much longer had it not been for his more than 10-year stay in
Swedish captivity (1700–1711).
Adam Weyde’s Military Charter itself is relevant not only to the
Russian military. It was a work that presented the latest training, organizational and tactical solutions that were being introduced at the end
of the 17th century in Europe. It might even be concluded that if Weyde’s
Military Charter had been published in print and translated into German
or French, it would have had a chance to become a key treatise for
the development of military thought in the 18th century. However, this
did not happen for a number of reasons, the main being that Weyde was
taken prisoner by Sweden after the Battle of Narva in 1700. Today, the
work of this tsarist general is a valuable source for tracing and understanding the transformations taking place in the Russian military at theturn of the 17th and 18th centuries. The Western European models that
he adopted were adjusted to his own solutions, thus becoming the basis
for the establishment of an entirely new army by Peter I.
According to our hypothesis, 17th-century military treatises can
be closed between two time caesuras. On the one hand, there is the year
1607, when Jacob de Gheyna’s innovative publication entitled Wapenhandelinghe van Roers Musquetten ende Spiessen was issued. This work can be considered the most important early modern treatise on the art of infantry warfare. On the other hand, the end to the concepts initiated in the early 17th century came in the second half of the 1690s. First, in 1696, the French military charter L’art Militaire Françoise, pour l’infanterie by Pierre Giffart was issued, incorporating some new tactical developments. Then, two years later, Adam Weyde presented the result of his efforts to Peter I; the “signature” charter soon came to be used as a manual of military training in the newly formed Russian infantry regiments. Thus, at the very end of the 17th century, the Russian army had a new and, importantly, its own military charter breaking with the previously adopted patterns of its training and overall functioning.
The aforementioned French charter of 1696 was a kind of harbinger
of change; it presented the actions performed by grenadiers and the
drill of soldiers using muskets (still with a fuse lock) with a bayonet, but
at the same time the traditional exercises for pikemen. This was applicable to a modern and modernizing army which was forced to go through the process of replacing one solution with another. The provisions of the charter in question were to play a different role. The tsar and his associate envisioned a complete modernization of the infantry by adapting the latest solutions already in place in Western European armies. In this regard, Russian delays may have been an asset, as they made it possible to reform the army without any intermediate forms. Thus, Adam Weyde’s Military Charter is not just a description of (and a driver for) the militarychanges taking place in Russia, but is a reflection of the broader changes in the military occurring on the Old Continent. An analysis of the charter’s content indicates that this is the first European military treatise that presents the complete solutions described and applied in the 18th century. It is a successful compilation of the achievements of previous theorists of the military and military laws, as well as the direct observations of Adam Weyde, a participant in the military campaigns against the army of the Turkish Sultan – in 1695–1696 launched by the Russian army at Azov, and in 1697 by the Imperial Army in Hungary. In the first case, the Turkish fortress of Azov was captured, and in the second, Prince Eugene Francis of Savoy smashed a stronger opponent at the Battle of Zenta.
In this book we present the 1698 Military Charter by Adam Weyde translated into Polish, with the relevant scientific background. The work
of the tsar’s associate was released only once in Russia in 1841 without
a critical elaboration. Our publication features original, never-published
illustrations of the holds of soldiers during the drill (for the purposes of
the 19th-century source edition, lithographs based on the existing illustrations were made). In addition, we have reproduced the drill patterns
not preserved in the Military Charter and proposed by Adam Weyde,
which should be an integral part of the work. The annex contains the
final text of the “combat infantry charter” compiled in 1700 and entitled
Short ordinary instruction with a more detailed, stronger and better explanation (concerning the drill of infantry regiments) of how to do it and what the captain, other commanders and non-commissioned officers are to be on the lookout for. The charter edited by general Avtamon Golovin, another associate of the tsar’s, with the commentary of Peter I himself, was a creative elaboration of the thoughts found in the provisions of Adam Weyde’s Military Charter.
TRANSLATED BY TERESACZOGAŁA-KOCZY
In 2016 300 years will have passed since the enforcement of the first Russian military code. This code which became a fundamental legal act regulating the order of the army in the Russian Empire in the XVIII, and even in the XIX century. The military codification, which was formulated on the recommendation of czar Peter the Great (1682 – 1725), was based on contemporary innovations which were accepted in armies of Western Europe countries. The codification was an exceptional achievement of both the Russian and wider European military legislation of the Modern Period. The military code, which started binding in 1716, consisted of three separate books: book I – which was preached in the year and which finalized the whole legislative process and two remaining - books II and III, which were published earlier. It was because of this reason the authors of the elaboration accepted the name: The Military Code of the Peter the Great of the Year 1716, as the title for the whole of czar Peter’s law regulation which consisted of three books.
As 2016 is the year of the 300th anniversary of the introduction of the code, it induced the authors to trouble to translate, adapt and publish this unusually important normative act. Findings by the authors simultaneously in files of The Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw and The National Archive in Krakow of Russian Military Article 1715, which were translated in the XVIII century, was an indubitable impulse to start the work. It was the military penal code making the first part of II book of the military codification of Peter the Great. Compilation of the material found in the Polish archives, along with translated text of the remaining two books (I and III) and the second part of book II of The Code of 1716 will make the homogeneous whole. This will permit, first of all, Polish recipients (not only specialists of history and law) to complex perusal of this eighteenth-century monument of Russian military and legal thought.
It is important to mention, that Peter the Great, in a ukase, directed to the Governing Senate in 1716, underlined that regulations binding in the army were to be a model for the construction of future structures of the organization of the state, and that regulations of the military code had to be followed not only by soldiers, but also by all landowners. In his next order the czar recommended to the Governing Senate (without any superfluous delay) to accede to producing copies of the code in such numbers, so that it would be available for all units of the ground forces and gubernia offices.
It is worth noting that regulations concerning the organisation of the army which were included in The Code of 1716, served as a model during the following decades, and law regulations were not only applied in the military jurisdiction, but also civil. The regulations were in force in the Russian Empire, even after the death of Peter the Great, until the first half of the XIX century. Essential for the Polish recipient is the fact that book I of the Code, which was produced later than the others and which also is a close-down of work with the code, was published in Gdansk in 1716 for the first time. The meaning of this normative act for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is not only symbolic. It ought to be noted also that this monument of Russian legislation was applied subsequently in the XVIII century in the armies of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
Translated by Otylia Plucińska
Предисловие
В 2016 г. исполняется 300 лет со дня принятия первого российского военного устава, который стал фундаментальным законодательным актом, определявшим функционирование армии Российской империи в XVIII и даже в XIX веке. Подготовленный по поручению Петра I (1682–1725) кодекс основывался на современных новаторских разработках, существовавших в армиях западноевропейских стран, представляя собой важнейшее достижение в сфере как российского, так и общеевропейского военного законодательства Нового времени. Действовавший с 1716 г. воинский устав состоял из трех самостоятельных книг (частей): книги I, появившейся в том же году и подытоживавшей весь законотворческий процесс и двух других – книг II и III, появившихся ранее. В связи с этим авторы данного издания использовали в качестве названия для всей совокупности петровского военного законодательства, состоящего из трех книг, название Воинский устав Петра I 1716 года.
Приходящийся на 2016 г. юбилей введения устава, подвигнул авторов взять на себя труд по переводу, подготовке текста и изданию этого несомненно важного нормативного акта. Еще одним очевидным стимулом к данной работе послужила находка в собраниях Главного архива древних актов в Варшаве и Национального архива в Кракове переводов российских воинских артикулов 1715 г. на польский язык, а именно военного уголовного кодекса, являющегося первой частью II книги венного законодательства Петра I. Объединение под одной обложкой материалов из польских архивов с текстом современного перевода остальных двух книг (I и III), а также второй частью II книги устава имеет целью представить на суд читателя целостный корпус источников, который позволит не только историкам и правоведам, но и широкому кругу тех, кто интересуется военной историей, получить комплексное представление о этом памятнике российской военно-юридической мысли XVIII в.
Петр I в одном из указов, данных Сенату в 1716 г., подчеркивал, что нормы, действующие во всей армии, должны стать образцом для последующего формирования законодательства иных государственных институтов, кроме того, предполагалось, что сам воинский устав помимо солдат и офицеров распространит свое действие на всех землевладельцев страны. Очередным распоряжением царь проучил Сенату без какого-либо промедления приступить к печати и распространению экземпляров воинского устава в таком количестве, чтобы их хватило для всех подразделений сухопутной армии и губернаторских канцелярий.
Представляется важным и то, что правила Воинского устава 1716 года, касающиеся организации армии, послужили образцом для соответствующего законотворчества в последующие десятилетия, а отдельные принятые тогда законодательные нормы использовались не только в военной, но и гражданской юриспруденции и после смерти Петра, действуя вплоть до первой половины XIX столетия. Для польского читателя существенным является и тот факт, что I книга уставов, подготовленная позднее других и представляющая собой своеобразный итог всей законодательной деятельности царя в военной сфере, впервые была издана в Гданьске в 1716 г. Впрочем, рассматриваемый корпус законодательных актов для шляхетской Речи Посполитой имеет не только символическое значение. Следует подчеркнуть, что этот памятник российского законодательства в качестве вспомогательного свода применялся в XVIII веке в армиях Короны и Великого княжества Литовского.
Перевод Кирилл Кочегаров