Nationalism's role in the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire is re-examined. Traditionalists bla... more Nationalism's role in the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire is re-examined. Traditionalists blamed the breakdown on the extreme nationalism of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) while today's orthodoxy attributes it to the external contingency of the Balkan Wars and World War I instead. This article looks at the onerous state-building and mild nation-building demands put forth by the CUP toward the Albanians. The Albanian resistance created unstable coalitions that broadened to include north and south, and tempered religion in favor of ethnicity, but fell short of demanding independence. The First Balkan War forced a vulnerable Albania to reluctantly declare independence for which it had made contingent plans. The Ottoman center refused to change course and its pursuit of an imperial nation-state prompted other populations to think and act more ethnically than ever before and draw up their own contingent plans. The concept of ethnicity without groups (Brubaker) and the ...
The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Middle Eastern and North African History, 2019
The history of both modern Turkey and modern Iran have often been told through their founding fig... more The history of both modern Turkey and modern Iran have often been told through their founding figures, Atatürk and Reza Shah, whose state-building projects are often assumed to have been similar. This chapter compares the Young Turk Revolution in the Ottoman Empire of 1908 with the Constitutional Revolution in Iran in 1906 to point to both similarities and differences in the trajectories of these two countries in the early twentieth century. Both revolutions, it is argued, were foundational moments for the political development and processes of each country and are key to understanding the context in which Atatürk and Reza Shah emerged.
Nationalism's role in the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire is reexamined. Traditionalists blamed t... more Nationalism's role in the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire is reexamined. Traditionalists blamed the breakdown on the extreme nationalism of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) while today's orthodoxy attributes it to the external contingency of the Balkan Wars and World War I instead. This article looks at the onerous state-building and mild nation-building demands put forth by the CUP toward the Albanians. The Albanian resistance created unstable coalitions that broadened to include north and south, and tempered religion in favor of ethnicity, but fell short of demanding independence. The First Balkan War forced a vulnerable Albania to reluctantly declare independence for which it had made contingent plans. The Ottoman center refused to change course and its pursuit of an imperial nation-state prompted other populations to think and act more ethnically than ever before and draw up their own contingent plans. The concept of ethnicity without groups (Brubaker) and the causal connection between state-building and nationalism (Hechter) are critically assessed in the Ottoman context. Was the Ottoman Empire's demise caused externally or internally? Was it owed to war or homegrown nationalism? Three concepts can help us navigate this puzzle: reluctant nationalists, imperial nation-state, and neo-Ottomanism. Together they provide a conceptual framework for understanding the end of the empire as a liminal space of contradictions. They also bring into sharper focus the forces that impinged on the empire to bring it down. The framework presented here tells us that neither war nor nationalism operated in isolation as exogenous and endogenous factors. It was their interaction that proved explosive and it is that nexus which should be the object of our attention. The Young Turks turned to nationalism to deal with their fears of impending wars and prospects of disintegration. Their recourse to nationalism resulted in unpopular policies whose implementation caused unprecedented conflict with Albanians and galvanized nationalistic activities among them. Disorders and Albanian nationalism both influenced the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, and without the Balkan Wars in the
Nationalism's role in the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire is reexamined. Traditionalists blamed t... more Nationalism's role in the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire is reexamined. Traditionalists blamed the breakdown on the extreme nationalism of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) while today's orthodoxy attributes it to the external contingency of the Balkan Wars and World War I instead. This article looks at the onerous state-building and mild nation-building demands put forth by the CUP toward the Albanians. The Albanian resistance created unstable coalitions that broadened to include north and south, and tempered religion in favor of ethnicity, but fell short of demanding independence. The First Balkan War forced a vulnerable Albania to reluctantly declare independence for which it had made contingent plans. The Ottoman center refused to change course and its pursuit of an imperial nation-state prompted other populations to think and act more ethnically than ever before and draw up their own contingent plans. The concept of ethnicity without groups (Brubaker) and the causal connection between state-building and nationalism (Hechter) are critically assessed in the Ottoman context. Was the Ottoman Empire's demise caused externally or internally? Was it owed to war or homegrown nationalism? Three concepts can help us navigate this puzzle: reluctant nationalists, imperial nation-state, and neo-Ottomanism. Together they provide a conceptual framework for understanding the end of the empire as a liminal space of contradictions. They also bring into sharper focus the forces that impinged on the empire to bring it down. The framework presented here tells us that neither war nor nationalism operated in isolation as exogenous and endogenous factors. It was their interaction that proved explosive and it is that nexus which should be the object of our attention. The Young Turks turned to nationalism to deal with their fears of impending wars and prospects of disintegration. Their recourse to nationalism resulted in unpopular policies whose implementation caused unprecedented conflict with Albanians and galvanized nationalistic activities among them. Disorders and Albanian nationalism both influenced the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, and without the Balkan Wars in the
Nationalism's role in the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire is re-examined. Traditionalists bla... more Nationalism's role in the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire is re-examined. Traditionalists blamed the breakdown on the extreme nationalism of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) while today's orthodoxy attributes it to the external contingency of the Balkan Wars and World War I instead. This article looks at the onerous state-building and mild nation-building demands put forth by the CUP toward the Albanians. The Albanian resistance created unstable coalitions that broadened to include north and south, and tempered religion in favor of ethnicity, but fell short of demanding independence. The First Balkan War forced a vulnerable Albania to reluctantly declare independence for which it had made contingent plans. The Ottoman center refused to change course and its pursuit of an imperial nation-state prompted other populations to think and act more ethnically than ever before and draw up their own contingent plans. The concept of ethnicity without groups (Brubaker) and the ...
The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Middle Eastern and North African History, 2019
The history of both modern Turkey and modern Iran have often been told through their founding fig... more The history of both modern Turkey and modern Iran have often been told through their founding figures, Atatürk and Reza Shah, whose state-building projects are often assumed to have been similar. This chapter compares the Young Turk Revolution in the Ottoman Empire of 1908 with the Constitutional Revolution in Iran in 1906 to point to both similarities and differences in the trajectories of these two countries in the early twentieth century. Both revolutions, it is argued, were foundational moments for the political development and processes of each country and are key to understanding the context in which Atatürk and Reza Shah emerged.
Nationalism's role in the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire is reexamined. Traditionalists blamed t... more Nationalism's role in the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire is reexamined. Traditionalists blamed the breakdown on the extreme nationalism of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) while today's orthodoxy attributes it to the external contingency of the Balkan Wars and World War I instead. This article looks at the onerous state-building and mild nation-building demands put forth by the CUP toward the Albanians. The Albanian resistance created unstable coalitions that broadened to include north and south, and tempered religion in favor of ethnicity, but fell short of demanding independence. The First Balkan War forced a vulnerable Albania to reluctantly declare independence for which it had made contingent plans. The Ottoman center refused to change course and its pursuit of an imperial nation-state prompted other populations to think and act more ethnically than ever before and draw up their own contingent plans. The concept of ethnicity without groups (Brubaker) and the causal connection between state-building and nationalism (Hechter) are critically assessed in the Ottoman context. Was the Ottoman Empire's demise caused externally or internally? Was it owed to war or homegrown nationalism? Three concepts can help us navigate this puzzle: reluctant nationalists, imperial nation-state, and neo-Ottomanism. Together they provide a conceptual framework for understanding the end of the empire as a liminal space of contradictions. They also bring into sharper focus the forces that impinged on the empire to bring it down. The framework presented here tells us that neither war nor nationalism operated in isolation as exogenous and endogenous factors. It was their interaction that proved explosive and it is that nexus which should be the object of our attention. The Young Turks turned to nationalism to deal with their fears of impending wars and prospects of disintegration. Their recourse to nationalism resulted in unpopular policies whose implementation caused unprecedented conflict with Albanians and galvanized nationalistic activities among them. Disorders and Albanian nationalism both influenced the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, and without the Balkan Wars in the
Nationalism's role in the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire is reexamined. Traditionalists blamed t... more Nationalism's role in the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire is reexamined. Traditionalists blamed the breakdown on the extreme nationalism of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) while today's orthodoxy attributes it to the external contingency of the Balkan Wars and World War I instead. This article looks at the onerous state-building and mild nation-building demands put forth by the CUP toward the Albanians. The Albanian resistance created unstable coalitions that broadened to include north and south, and tempered religion in favor of ethnicity, but fell short of demanding independence. The First Balkan War forced a vulnerable Albania to reluctantly declare independence for which it had made contingent plans. The Ottoman center refused to change course and its pursuit of an imperial nation-state prompted other populations to think and act more ethnically than ever before and draw up their own contingent plans. The concept of ethnicity without groups (Brubaker) and the causal connection between state-building and nationalism (Hechter) are critically assessed in the Ottoman context. Was the Ottoman Empire's demise caused externally or internally? Was it owed to war or homegrown nationalism? Three concepts can help us navigate this puzzle: reluctant nationalists, imperial nation-state, and neo-Ottomanism. Together they provide a conceptual framework for understanding the end of the empire as a liminal space of contradictions. They also bring into sharper focus the forces that impinged on the empire to bring it down. The framework presented here tells us that neither war nor nationalism operated in isolation as exogenous and endogenous factors. It was their interaction that proved explosive and it is that nexus which should be the object of our attention. The Young Turks turned to nationalism to deal with their fears of impending wars and prospects of disintegration. Their recourse to nationalism resulted in unpopular policies whose implementation caused unprecedented conflict with Albanians and galvanized nationalistic activities among them. Disorders and Albanian nationalism both influenced the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, and without the Balkan Wars in the
Working Paper Series of the HCAS "Multiple Secularities - Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities", 2019
Iran’s constitutional revolution of 1906 is arguably the most significant turn toward the secular... more Iran’s constitutional revolution of 1906 is arguably the most significant turn toward the secular in its modern history. I start this investigation by making a conceptual distinction between secularism and secularity. Here, secularism is defined as the ideologically-driven separation of religion and state according to an agenda, a blueprint, a model, that could be indigenously, or externally informed and is achieved with the assistance of the modern state and explicit political motivations. Secularity, on the other hand, is expressed in terms of a non-ideological separation that comes about unintentionally. In some accounts, this separation may take on evolutionary connotations in terms of the natural separation of functions as a result of the growing complexity of a natural organism or social system. What I have in mind here is a separation of functions that is agent-driven but the secularity that emerges is both unintentional and unideological. In other words, separation is attained not because actors consciously distinguish between the religious and the political at the conceptual level, or experience a wholesale shift in belief systems, but because some new contexts open novel avenues for pursuing goals or interests that are experienced by actors as more effective than previously undifferentiated ones, without necessarily effecting conscious change, or any change, in belief systems.
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Papers by Nader Sohrabi