This paper continues work begun by Koopmans: how to order infinite utility, consumption, or payof... more This paper continues work begun by Koopmans: how to order infinite utility, consumption, or payoff streams; and, in particular, how to provide an axiomatic basis for ordering them. Diamond's anonymity axiom is compatible with dictatorship and is therefore too weak. We motivate a form of anonymity that gives an equal weight to equally large coalitions, and investigate its implications. Medial
... to be linear (Debreu, 1960). In order to axiomatize the discounting rule Koopmans uses an inf... more ... to be linear (Debreu, 1960). In order to axiomatize the discounting rule Koopmans uses an infinite version of independence 2 that allows him to extend Debreu's theorem and its proof to a infinite context. However, to make his ...
We develop an incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism for a two-player Bayesian ... more We develop an incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism for a two-player Bayesian bargaining problem. We provide conditions that guarantee the mechanism to be incentive e¢ cient. The mechanism is gradually implemented through a …- nite number of rounds. The Bayesian perfect equilibrium within each round is characterized through a sequence of critical risk lim- its (Zeuthen, Haranyi). The bargaining solution
To test the joint hypothesis that players in a noncooperative game (allowing mixed strategies) ma... more To test the joint hypothesis that players in a noncooperative game (allowing mixed strategies) maximize expected utilities and select a Nash equilibrium, it suffices to study the reaction of the revealed collective choice upon changes in the space of strategies available to the players. The joint hypothesis is supported if the revealed choices satisfy an extended version of Richter’s congruence axiom together with a contraction-expansion axiom that models the noncooperative behavior. In addition, we provide sufficient and necessary conditions for a binary relation to have an independent ordering extension, and for individual choices over lotteries to be rationalizable.
We investigate the mechanism that provides the optimal decision rule for two agents making joint ... more We investigate the mechanism that provides the optimal decision rule for two agents making joint decisions. It is shown that, a special rectangular mechanism with two sided screening, elicit correct information when agents?preferences are private information. Such mechanism is presented as a game of incomplete information. It is shown that if types are uniformly distributed, then a three stage sequential game with an exogenously given probability of a terminal break down cannot be improved upon within a restricted class of models.
In ordering infinite utility streams, anonymity and Pareto are con-sidered two basic principles. ... more In ordering infinite utility streams, anonymity and Pareto are con-sidered two basic principles. Anonymity is usually expressed by means of a group of cyclic or Pareto-compatible permutations. Maximal (for inclusion) groups of cyclic permutations involve free ultrafilters on the lattice of partitions of positive integers and are therefore nonconstructible objects. This result is in line with the conjecture of Fleurbaey and Michel (2003) and with the results of Lauwers (2006) and Zame (2007).
We study multidimensional poverty comparisons. It is assumed that overall poverty is measured by ... more We study multidimensional poverty comparisons. It is assumed that overall poverty is measured by the sum of individual poverty lev- els. We do not from the outset impose restrictions on how to identify the poor or on how to compare individual poverty levels. Instead, we require only that the individual poverty ranking of bundles is consistent with the overall poverty
One of the main results in topological social choice states the non-existence of a continuous, an... more One of the main results in topological social choice states the non-existence of a continuous, anonymous, and unanimous aggregation rule on spheres. This note provides a proof based upon simple methods such as integration.
This paper continues work begun by Koopmans: how to order infinite utility, consumption, or payof... more This paper continues work begun by Koopmans: how to order infinite utility, consumption, or payoff streams; and, in particular, how to provide an axiomatic basis for ordering them. Diamond's anonymity axiom is compatible with dictatorship and is therefore too weak. We motivate a form of anonymity that gives an equal weight to equally large coalitions, and investigate its implications. Medial
... to be linear (Debreu, 1960). In order to axiomatize the discounting rule Koopmans uses an inf... more ... to be linear (Debreu, 1960). In order to axiomatize the discounting rule Koopmans uses an infinite version of independence 2 that allows him to extend Debreu's theorem and its proof to a infinite context. However, to make his ...
We develop an incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism for a two-player Bayesian ... more We develop an incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism for a two-player Bayesian bargaining problem. We provide conditions that guarantee the mechanism to be incentive e¢ cient. The mechanism is gradually implemented through a …- nite number of rounds. The Bayesian perfect equilibrium within each round is characterized through a sequence of critical risk lim- its (Zeuthen, Haranyi). The bargaining solution
To test the joint hypothesis that players in a noncooperative game (allowing mixed strategies) ma... more To test the joint hypothesis that players in a noncooperative game (allowing mixed strategies) maximize expected utilities and select a Nash equilibrium, it suffices to study the reaction of the revealed collective choice upon changes in the space of strategies available to the players. The joint hypothesis is supported if the revealed choices satisfy an extended version of Richter’s congruence axiom together with a contraction-expansion axiom that models the noncooperative behavior. In addition, we provide sufficient and necessary conditions for a binary relation to have an independent ordering extension, and for individual choices over lotteries to be rationalizable.
We investigate the mechanism that provides the optimal decision rule for two agents making joint ... more We investigate the mechanism that provides the optimal decision rule for two agents making joint decisions. It is shown that, a special rectangular mechanism with two sided screening, elicit correct information when agents?preferences are private information. Such mechanism is presented as a game of incomplete information. It is shown that if types are uniformly distributed, then a three stage sequential game with an exogenously given probability of a terminal break down cannot be improved upon within a restricted class of models.
In ordering infinite utility streams, anonymity and Pareto are con-sidered two basic principles. ... more In ordering infinite utility streams, anonymity and Pareto are con-sidered two basic principles. Anonymity is usually expressed by means of a group of cyclic or Pareto-compatible permutations. Maximal (for inclusion) groups of cyclic permutations involve free ultrafilters on the lattice of partitions of positive integers and are therefore nonconstructible objects. This result is in line with the conjecture of Fleurbaey and Michel (2003) and with the results of Lauwers (2006) and Zame (2007).
We study multidimensional poverty comparisons. It is assumed that overall poverty is measured by ... more We study multidimensional poverty comparisons. It is assumed that overall poverty is measured by the sum of individual poverty lev- els. We do not from the outset impose restrictions on how to identify the poor or on how to compare individual poverty levels. Instead, we require only that the individual poverty ranking of bundles is consistent with the overall poverty
One of the main results in topological social choice states the non-existence of a continuous, an... more One of the main results in topological social choice states the non-existence of a continuous, anonymous, and unanimous aggregation rule on spheres. This note provides a proof based upon simple methods such as integration.
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Papers by Luc Lauwers