I begin by developing a challenge for the Higher-Order Thought variant of Higher-Order representa... more I begin by developing a challenge for the Higher-Order Thought variant of Higher-Order representational theories of consciousness. The challenge is to account for the distinctive phenomenal character of visual experience—its presentational character. After setting out the challenge, I articulate a novel form of Higher-Order theory that can account for presentational character: the Map Theory of consciousness. The theory’s distinctive claim is that the relevant higher-order representations have a cartographic format.
David Pitt (2017) has argued that reductive representationalism entails an absurdity akin to the ... more David Pitt (2017) has argued that reductive representationalism entails an absurdity akin to the 'paramechanical hypothesis' Gilbert Ryle (1949) attributed to Descartes. This paper focuses on one version of reductive representationalism: the property-complex theory. We contend that at least insofar as the property-complex theory goes, Pitt is wrong. The result is not just a response to Pitt, but also a clarification of the aims and structure of the property-complex theory.
Ambitious Higher-Order theories of consciousness—Higher-Order theories that purport to give an ac... more Ambitious Higher-Order theories of consciousness—Higher-Order theories that purport to give an account of phenomenal consciousness—face a well-known objection from the possibility of radical misrepresentation. Jonathan Farrell (2017) has recently added a new twist to an old worry: while Higher-Order theorists have the resources to respond to the misrepresentation objection, they do so at the expense of their ambitions. At best, they only account for phenomenal consciousness in the technical Higher-Order sense, not in the standard Nagelian sense. Building on the work of Berger (2014) and Brown (2015), I contend that Farrell's argument fails. The upshot is not only that radical misrepresentation presents no threat to the ambitiousness of Higher-Order theories, but also a deeper insight both into Higher-Order theories themselves, and what the standard Nagelian construal of phenomenal consciousness does, and does not, commit us to.
Perceptual experience is often said to be transparent; that is, when we have a perceptual experie... more Perceptual experience is often said to be transparent; that is, when we have a perceptual experience we seem to be aware of properties of the objects around us, and never seem to be aware of properties of the experience itself. This is a (purported) introspective fact. It is also often said that we can infer a metaphysical fact from this introspective fact, e.g. a fact about the nature of perceptual experience. A transparency theory fills in the details for these two facts, and bridges the gap between them. Our aim in this paper is threefold: to scrutinize Michael Tye's transparency theory (2002, 2009, 2014a), introduce a new transparency theory, and advance a meta-theoretical hypothesis about the interest and import of transparency theories in general.
Journal of the American Philosophical Association (forthcoming)
Ian Stoner (2017) has recently argued that we ought not colonize Mars because (i) doing so would ... more Ian Stoner (2017) has recently argued that we ought not colonize Mars because (i) doing so would flout our pro tanto obligation to not violate the Principle of Scientific Conservation, and (ii) there is no countervailing considerations that render our violation of the principle permissible. Here I remain agnostic on (i). Instead, my primary goal is to challenge (ii): there are countervailing considerations that render our violation of the principle permissible. As such, Stoner has failed to establish that we ought not colonize Mars. I close with some thoughts on what it would take to show that we do have an obligation to colonize Mars, and related issues concerning the relationship between the way we discount our preferences over time and projects with long time-horizons like space colonization.
The primary aim of a theory of consciousness is to articulate existence conditions for conscious ... more The primary aim of a theory of consciousness is to articulate existence conditions for conscious states, i.e. the conditions under which a mental state is conscious rather than unconscious. There are two main broad approaches: The Higher-Order approach and the First-Order approach. Higher-Order theories claim that a mental state is conscious only if it is the object of a suitable state of higher-order awareness. First-Order theories reject this necessary condition. However, both sides make the following claim: for any mental state M of a subject S, M is conscious if there is something it is like for S to be in M. This is the Nagelian Conception of consciousness. Taking the Nagelian Conception as a starting point, I contend that the best rationalizing explanation for the ways in which Higher-Order and First-Order theorists contribute to their dispute is to see those contributions as consistent responses to two distinct questions.
We can divide philosophical theories of consciousness into two main camps: First-Order theories a... more We can divide philosophical theories of consciousness into two main camps: First-Order theories and Higher-Order theories. Like all Higher-Order theories, many First-Order theories are mentalistic theories of consciousness: they attempt to reduce a mental state's being consciousness using mental (but non-phenomenal) terms, such as being available to certain cognitive centers. I argue that mentalistic First-Order theories, once fully cashed out, collapse into some form of Higher-Order theory. I contend that not only is there general considerations in favor of this conclusion, but that the four most prominent mentalistic 'First-Order' theories are, in fact, Higher-Order theories in disguise. Given a strong assumption in favor of some form of mental ism, if this is right, what emerges is a powerful argument for the Higher-Order theory of consciousness.
Representationalism, in its most basic form, is a supervenience claim. In its more interesting fo... more Representationalism, in its most basic form, is a supervenience claim. In its more interesting form, it adds to this supervenience claim an explanatory commitment: necessarily, for any two experiences E and E*, if E and E* are different in their phenomenal character, then there is some difference in representational content between E and E* that renders their phenomenal difference intelligible. Representationalism is popular. Alas, it’s false—or so I claim. My argument appeals to two types of exceptional episodic memory: hyperthymesia or Highly-Superior Autobiographical Memory (HSAM), and savants with prodigious visual memory. I contend that HSAM and prodigious visual memory provide strong evidence that there can be a perceptual experience and an episodic memory of that perceptual experience that differ in phenomenal character, yet lacking in any representational difference that would render their phenomenological difference intelligible.
TRANSITIVITY is the claim that conscious states are mental states we are aware of in some way. TR... more TRANSITIVITY is the claim that conscious states are mental states we are aware of in some way. TRANSPARENCY is the claim that conscious states are transparent to awareness in some way. Both claims are widely accepted, and are often considered ‘truisms’ about the nature of consciousness. I argue that there is likely no precisification of TRANSITIVITY’s ‘in some way’ clause that is (i) compatible with the various ways of precisifying TRANSPARENCY‘s ‘in some way’ clause, yet (ii) allows TRANSITIVITY to play its intended role--viz. the theoretical backbone for a 'Higher-Order' theory of consciousness.
Though an improvement upon qualia readings, we argue that representationalist treatments of Desca... more Though an improvement upon qualia readings, we argue that representationalist treatments of Descartes’ theory of pain, thirst, and hunger conflict with his metaphysics and theory of biological function. We offer a way out of this challenge by jettisoning a problematic assumption made by representationalist commentators, namely, that intentional properties are identical to representationalist properties. We claim that in the Sixth Meditation Descartes anticipates imperativism. On this reading, pains, thirsts, and hungers have commands as their content. We contend that imperativism fits better with the textual evidence and avoids the problems that plague representationalist treatments.
Experiences, by definition, have phenomenal character. But many experiences have a specific type ... more Experiences, by definition, have phenomenal character. But many experiences have a specific type of phenomenal character: presentational character. While both visual experience and conscious thought make us aware of their objects, only in visual experience do objects seem present before the mind and available for direct access. I argue that Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness have a particularly steep hill to climb in accommodating presentational character.
I begin by developing a challenge for the Higher-Order Thought variant of Higher-Order representa... more I begin by developing a challenge for the Higher-Order Thought variant of Higher-Order representational theories of consciousness. The challenge is to account for the distinctive phenomenal character of visual experience—its presentational character. After setting out the challenge, I articulate a novel form of Higher-Order theory that can account for presentational character: the Map Theory of consciousness. The theory’s distinctive claim is that the relevant higher-order representations have a cartographic format.
David Pitt (2017) has argued that reductive representationalism entails an absurdity akin to the ... more David Pitt (2017) has argued that reductive representationalism entails an absurdity akin to the 'paramechanical hypothesis' Gilbert Ryle (1949) attributed to Descartes. This paper focuses on one version of reductive representationalism: the property-complex theory. We contend that at least insofar as the property-complex theory goes, Pitt is wrong. The result is not just a response to Pitt, but also a clarification of the aims and structure of the property-complex theory.
Ambitious Higher-Order theories of consciousness—Higher-Order theories that purport to give an ac... more Ambitious Higher-Order theories of consciousness—Higher-Order theories that purport to give an account of phenomenal consciousness—face a well-known objection from the possibility of radical misrepresentation. Jonathan Farrell (2017) has recently added a new twist to an old worry: while Higher-Order theorists have the resources to respond to the misrepresentation objection, they do so at the expense of their ambitions. At best, they only account for phenomenal consciousness in the technical Higher-Order sense, not in the standard Nagelian sense. Building on the work of Berger (2014) and Brown (2015), I contend that Farrell's argument fails. The upshot is not only that radical misrepresentation presents no threat to the ambitiousness of Higher-Order theories, but also a deeper insight both into Higher-Order theories themselves, and what the standard Nagelian construal of phenomenal consciousness does, and does not, commit us to.
Perceptual experience is often said to be transparent; that is, when we have a perceptual experie... more Perceptual experience is often said to be transparent; that is, when we have a perceptual experience we seem to be aware of properties of the objects around us, and never seem to be aware of properties of the experience itself. This is a (purported) introspective fact. It is also often said that we can infer a metaphysical fact from this introspective fact, e.g. a fact about the nature of perceptual experience. A transparency theory fills in the details for these two facts, and bridges the gap between them. Our aim in this paper is threefold: to scrutinize Michael Tye's transparency theory (2002, 2009, 2014a), introduce a new transparency theory, and advance a meta-theoretical hypothesis about the interest and import of transparency theories in general.
Journal of the American Philosophical Association (forthcoming)
Ian Stoner (2017) has recently argued that we ought not colonize Mars because (i) doing so would ... more Ian Stoner (2017) has recently argued that we ought not colonize Mars because (i) doing so would flout our pro tanto obligation to not violate the Principle of Scientific Conservation, and (ii) there is no countervailing considerations that render our violation of the principle permissible. Here I remain agnostic on (i). Instead, my primary goal is to challenge (ii): there are countervailing considerations that render our violation of the principle permissible. As such, Stoner has failed to establish that we ought not colonize Mars. I close with some thoughts on what it would take to show that we do have an obligation to colonize Mars, and related issues concerning the relationship between the way we discount our preferences over time and projects with long time-horizons like space colonization.
The primary aim of a theory of consciousness is to articulate existence conditions for conscious ... more The primary aim of a theory of consciousness is to articulate existence conditions for conscious states, i.e. the conditions under which a mental state is conscious rather than unconscious. There are two main broad approaches: The Higher-Order approach and the First-Order approach. Higher-Order theories claim that a mental state is conscious only if it is the object of a suitable state of higher-order awareness. First-Order theories reject this necessary condition. However, both sides make the following claim: for any mental state M of a subject S, M is conscious if there is something it is like for S to be in M. This is the Nagelian Conception of consciousness. Taking the Nagelian Conception as a starting point, I contend that the best rationalizing explanation for the ways in which Higher-Order and First-Order theorists contribute to their dispute is to see those contributions as consistent responses to two distinct questions.
We can divide philosophical theories of consciousness into two main camps: First-Order theories a... more We can divide philosophical theories of consciousness into two main camps: First-Order theories and Higher-Order theories. Like all Higher-Order theories, many First-Order theories are mentalistic theories of consciousness: they attempt to reduce a mental state's being consciousness using mental (but non-phenomenal) terms, such as being available to certain cognitive centers. I argue that mentalistic First-Order theories, once fully cashed out, collapse into some form of Higher-Order theory. I contend that not only is there general considerations in favor of this conclusion, but that the four most prominent mentalistic 'First-Order' theories are, in fact, Higher-Order theories in disguise. Given a strong assumption in favor of some form of mental ism, if this is right, what emerges is a powerful argument for the Higher-Order theory of consciousness.
Representationalism, in its most basic form, is a supervenience claim. In its more interesting fo... more Representationalism, in its most basic form, is a supervenience claim. In its more interesting form, it adds to this supervenience claim an explanatory commitment: necessarily, for any two experiences E and E*, if E and E* are different in their phenomenal character, then there is some difference in representational content between E and E* that renders their phenomenal difference intelligible. Representationalism is popular. Alas, it’s false—or so I claim. My argument appeals to two types of exceptional episodic memory: hyperthymesia or Highly-Superior Autobiographical Memory (HSAM), and savants with prodigious visual memory. I contend that HSAM and prodigious visual memory provide strong evidence that there can be a perceptual experience and an episodic memory of that perceptual experience that differ in phenomenal character, yet lacking in any representational difference that would render their phenomenological difference intelligible.
TRANSITIVITY is the claim that conscious states are mental states we are aware of in some way. TR... more TRANSITIVITY is the claim that conscious states are mental states we are aware of in some way. TRANSPARENCY is the claim that conscious states are transparent to awareness in some way. Both claims are widely accepted, and are often considered ‘truisms’ about the nature of consciousness. I argue that there is likely no precisification of TRANSITIVITY’s ‘in some way’ clause that is (i) compatible with the various ways of precisifying TRANSPARENCY‘s ‘in some way’ clause, yet (ii) allows TRANSITIVITY to play its intended role--viz. the theoretical backbone for a 'Higher-Order' theory of consciousness.
Though an improvement upon qualia readings, we argue that representationalist treatments of Desca... more Though an improvement upon qualia readings, we argue that representationalist treatments of Descartes’ theory of pain, thirst, and hunger conflict with his metaphysics and theory of biological function. We offer a way out of this challenge by jettisoning a problematic assumption made by representationalist commentators, namely, that intentional properties are identical to representationalist properties. We claim that in the Sixth Meditation Descartes anticipates imperativism. On this reading, pains, thirsts, and hungers have commands as their content. We contend that imperativism fits better with the textual evidence and avoids the problems that plague representationalist treatments.
Experiences, by definition, have phenomenal character. But many experiences have a specific type ... more Experiences, by definition, have phenomenal character. But many experiences have a specific type of phenomenal character: presentational character. While both visual experience and conscious thought make us aware of their objects, only in visual experience do objects seem present before the mind and available for direct access. I argue that Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness have a particularly steep hill to climb in accommodating presentational character.
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