Dan Kovenock

Jn this paper, we investigate project selection choices of duopolists facing two alternatives: lundertaking a "pioneering" type project (Type A) aimed to develop a highly innovative product, or an "incremental innovation" type project (Type B) aimed to develop a less innovative product such as the ...

This article analyzes a multi-winner contest with players distributed around a ring network. Players expend costly effort and a fixed number of adjacent players are selected as the winning coalition by applying a lottery contest success function to the sum of the individual bids of all possible groups of adjacent players. Hence, the players view other players as both friends and foes, and coalitions are formed endogenously. With symmetric valuations, we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and compare our results with previous studies of multi-winner contests. We characterize equilibrium for two specific examples under asymmetric valuations. Implications for the role of economic network and contest design issues are explored.

In this note, we characterize the full set of Equilibria of the 2-firm patent race analyzed by Amaldoss and Jain (Management Science, 48(8), August 2002, pp. 972-991). Contrary to Amaldoss and Jain’s (2002) claim, we show that the equilibrium is not always unique and that the set of Equilibria is non-robust to changes in the (discrete) set of available strategies. In some Equilibria, the qualitative results are the reverse of those in the only equilibrium Amaldoss and Jain identify. Our findings have important implications for the analysis of the data from Amaldoss and Jain’s experiments, as well as other experiments appearing in the literature.

This article analyzes tacit collusion in infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopolywith capacity-constrained firms.Under two popular definitions of the uniform price, when each firm sets a price-quantity pair, perfect collusion with equal sharing of profit is easier to sustain in the uniform price auction than in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary

This paper examines the feasibility of tacit collusion in price setting duopoly supergames with capacity constrained firms. We assume that in each period firms simultaneously set a price-quantity pair specifying the price for the pe- riod and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price. Under price-quantity competition firms are able to ration their output below

This paper examines the feasibility of collusion in capacity constrained duopoly supergames. In each period firms simultaneously set a price-quantity pair specifying the price for the period and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell as this price. Under price-quantity competition firms are able to ration their output below capacity. For a wide range of capacity pairs, the