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Some say that turning to diplomacy in the face of nuclear threats will prompt a rash of nuclear proliferation and coercion. They’re wrong. This short article explains why the outcome of the Ukraine war will have little bearing on nations’... more
Some say that turning to diplomacy in the face of nuclear threats will prompt a rash of nuclear proliferation and coercion. They’re wrong. This short article explains why the outcome of the Ukraine war will have little bearing on nations’ pursuit of nuclear weapons and little effect on the incidence of nuclear coercion. While nuclear coercion is in some ways analogous to common blackmail, there are important differences. Common “blackmail” is a relatively low-cost, low-visibility, low-risk endeavor. Nuclear coercion is none of the these things. And this limits the practice. Also, the high cost of acquiring, holding, and using nuclear weapons will always impede nuclear acquisition. Conversely, nations perceiving a critical threat will always seek more powerful means of deterrence and defense, regardless of the Ukraine war outcome.
Western brinkmanship in Ukraine depends on denying there is a brink. T hat's a mistake. How to assess the risk that Moscow will use nuclear weapons to rescue some part of its "special military operation" in Ukraine? Look to nuclear... more
Western brinkmanship in Ukraine depends on denying there is a brink. T hat's a mistake. How to assess the risk that Moscow will use nuclear weapons to rescue some part of its "special military operation" in Ukraine? Look to nuclear capability, operational effectiveness, the value of the asset or position Moscow hopes to protect, the likely retaliation it will face or price it will pay for nuclear use, and its ability to defer that price or parry retaliation.
This brief article provides a well-documented and concise overview of the war’s profound global effects, beginning with the combatants’ losses in lives and treasure. Beyond this it assesses the war’s impact on global trade and economy;... more
This brief article provides a well-documented and concise overview of the war’s profound global effects, beginning with the combatants’ losses in lives and treasure. Beyond this it assesses the war’s impact on global trade and economy; energy and food price inflation and their effects on poverty, hunger, and mortality; the redirection of humanitarian and official development assistance; the total sum of aid to the Ukrainian war effort, and the estimated cost of postwar reconstruction and recovery. Also examined is the war’s effect on global defense spending.
This is an abridged version of "Tempting Armageddon: The Likelihood of Russian Nuclear Use is Misconstrued in Western Policy" (which is also available here at Academia.edu.) Both works - one in long form, the other in brief - assess... more
This is an abridged version of "Tempting Armageddon: The Likelihood of Russian Nuclear Use is Misconstrued in Western Policy" (which is also available here at Academia.edu.)

Both works - one in long form, the other in brief - assess Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine crisis, the related interplay between Moscow and Washington, the factors driving Russian thinking on nuclear use, the nuclear options available to Russia, and why US-NATO leaders dismiss these options as impracticable. We conclude that the probability of Russian nuclear use, although conditionally modest, is rising.
The probability of Russian nuclear use related to the Ukraine war is rising-but why? Neither Washington nor Brussels fully apprehend the risk. Report tracks and assesses the evolution of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine crisis, the... more
The probability of Russian nuclear use related to the Ukraine war is rising-but why? Neither Washington nor Brussels fully apprehend the risk.

Report tracks and assesses the evolution of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine crisis, the related interplay between Moscow and Washington, the factors driving Russian thinking on nuclear use, the nuclear options available to Russia, and why US-NATO leaders and hawkish observers dismiss these options as impracticable. We conclude that the probability of Russian nuclear use, although conditionally modest, is rising as Ukraine’s armed forces push forward toward Crimea and the Russian border while also increasing their retaliatory attacks on recognized Russian territory. On its present trajectory, the crisis will soon run a risk of nuclear conflict greater than that experienced during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict is an unfolding catastrophe for Ukraine, the region, and the world. Its deleterious effects have only begun to be felt worldwide. A negotiated end is possible and needs to be advanced without delay. The essay... more
The Russia-Ukraine conflict is an unfolding catastrophe for Ukraine, the region, and the world. Its deleterious effects have only begun to be felt worldwide. A negotiated end is possible and needs to be advanced without delay.

The essay looks at the policies that shaped the contention leading to war and that increased the likelihood of conflict. It looks at the effects of NATO expansion and military activism, the “color revolutions” in Ukraine, the disposition of Crimea, the rebellions in Ukraine’s east, the Minsk process, Putin’s revisionism, Russia’s security concerns, and how the USA and Europe responded to the intensifying friction between Moscow and Kyiv.
Argues for a new balance among the various instruments of national power reflecting today’s strategic conditions. Taking a realistic view of security needs, the report advocates a military 20% smaller than today’s. It advances a... more
Argues for a new balance among the various instruments of national power reflecting today’s strategic conditions. Taking a realistic view of security needs, the report advocates a military 20% smaller than today’s. It advances a “discriminate defense” strategy that would focus the military on cost-effective missions and save $550 billion more than official plans over the next decade. Main report includes 9 tables. Appendix has 18 additional tables and charts addressing personnel, force structure, and budgets.
Efforts to cull savings from the US defense budget for purposes of deficit reduction have been stymied by Pentagon claims that any significant cut might have “devastating” or even “catastrophic” effects. However, a 2012 review of global... more
Efforts to cull savings from the US defense budget for purposes of deficit reduction have been stymied by Pentagon claims that any significant cut might have “devastating” or even “catastrophic” effects. However, a 2012 review of global defense spending data shows that America and its allies outspend potential rivals by a margin of four-to-one. (Note: A 2016 review would show a 3:1 advantage.)
Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph #5, 1998. The expansion of NATO has proved to be one of the most consequential policy efforts of the 1990s and early 2000s. This report examines the drivers and consequences of... more
Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph #5, 1998. The expansion of NATO has proved to be one of the most consequential policy efforts of the 1990s and early 2000s. This report examines the drivers and consequences of NATO's "double expansion" - expansion eastward and expansion into out-of-area missions. It details the policy debate in Europe and the USA, while also summarizing public opinion. The report also appeared as a chapter in Europäische Friedensordnung: Konturen einer Sicherheitsarchitektur, eds., Gerald Mader, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, and Wolfgang Vogt (Muenster: Agenda, 1998).
With his decision to boost defense spending, President Obama is continuing the process of re-inflating the Pentagon that began in late 1998 – fully three years before the 9/11 attacks on America. The FY 2011 budget marks a milestone,... more
With his decision to boost defense spending, President Obama is continuing the process of re-inflating the Pentagon that began in late 1998 – fully three years before the 9/11 attacks on America. The FY 2011 budget marks a milestone, however: The inflation-adjusted rise in spending since 1998 will probably exceed 100 percent in real terms by the end of the fiscal year. Taking the new budget into account, the Defense Department has been granted about $7.2 trillion since 1998, when the post-Cold War decline in defense spending ended. The rise in spending since 1998 is unprecedented over a 48-year period. In real percentage terms, it’s as large as the Kennedy-Johnson surge (43 percent) and the Reagan increases (57 percent) combined. Whether one looks at the entire Pentagon budget or just that part not related to the wars, current spending is above the peak years of the Vietnam War era and the Reagan years. And it’s set to remain there. Looking forward, the Obama administration plans to...
Index Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The fog of transformation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2... more
Index Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The fog of transformation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Revolutionary regimes and military transformation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Audacity versus caution: a cost calculus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The pre-war French defense posture: a case of “RMA refusal”?.. . . . . . . . . . . . 5 French ground force development before the war.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 “Enduring lessons” or 20/20 hindsight?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 France’s choice: the “thinkable” alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 The road not taken: an option “outside the box”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 The French air force: disabled by contending visions. . . . . . . . . ....
In the Winter War the Finnish Army relying on poorly equipped, guerilla-style light infantry, operating without sizable heavy reserves thwarted a large-scale mechanized thrust. Despite an eventual Soviet victory resulting from a grotesque... more
In the Winter War the Finnish Army relying on poorly equipped, guerilla-style light infantry, operating without sizable heavy reserves thwarted a large-scale mechanized thrust. Despite an eventual Soviet victory resulting from a grotesque imbalance of forces, Finnish achievements in minimizing damage and terrain losses remain remarkable. Thousands of low-scale tactical victories added up to strategic success.
On April 16, 2003, speaking at a Boeing plant in St. Louis, President Bush outlined the hypothesis with specific reference to the Iraq and Afghan war: “We’ve applied the new powers of technology...to strike an enemy force with speed and... more
On April 16, 2003, speaking at a Boeing plant in St. Louis, President Bush outlined the hypothesis with specific reference to the Iraq and Afghan war: “We’ve applied the new powers of technology...to strike an enemy force with speed and incredible precision. By a combination of creative strategies and advanced technologies, we are redefining war on our terms. In this new era of warfare, we can target a regime, not a nation.”
As originally conceived the Quadrennial Defense Review was meant to help ensure the internal consistency of midand longer-term US defense planning. By “internal consistency” I here mean a concordance of strategy, assets, and budgets. As... more
As originally conceived the Quadrennial Defense Review was meant to help ensure the internal consistency of midand longer-term US defense planning. By “internal consistency” I here mean a concordance of strategy, assets, and budgets. As critics often put it in the past: the point is to show how the force fits the strategy and the budget fits the force. The exercise is supposed to “connect” our military strategy with our force development plans and, in turn, connect these with current and future budgets. In this regard, the 2006 QDR is long on assertion and short on quantification “short” as in utterly lacking.

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Text of Presentation to Einstein Forum, Berlin, 15 Nov 2005. Changes in the nature of warfare, military technology, and the global strategic environment pose new challenges for arms control. The article critically examines new forms of... more
Text of Presentation to Einstein Forum, Berlin, 15 Nov 2005. Changes in the nature of warfare, military technology, and the global strategic environment pose new challenges for arms control. The article critically examines new forms of strategic warfare, cyber-war, so-called “precision” conventional warfare, global conventional strike weapons, and less-lethal weaponry.
Prepared for “Economics and Security: Resourcing National Priorities,” a workshop sponsored by William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 19–21 May 2010. Full conference proceedings... more
Prepared for “Economics and Security: Resourcing National Priorities,” a workshop sponsored by William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 19–21 May 2010. Full conference proceedings here: http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA530819