My dissertation concerns the problem of induction, or rather, two related problems of induction. The first is what I call the negative problem of induction. This is the problem of rebutting the skeptical argument, first articulated by... more
My dissertation concerns the problem of induction, or rather, two related problems of induction. The first is what I call the negative problem of induction. This is the problem of rebutting the skeptical argument, first articulated by Hume, which purports to show that inductive inferences cannot in principle result in epistemically justified beliefs. A solution to this problem, i.e., a negative justification of induction, merely shows that the skeptical conclusion can be plausibly denied, specifically, that it is possible that induction results in epistemically justified beliefs. It does not show that this is probable, or that it is reasonable to rely on induction as a source of epistemically justified beliefs. This is the second or positive problem of induction. In this dissertation I develop solutions to both of these problems. In what follows, I briefly summarize each chapter and then say a few words about the philosophical significance of my results. Chapter 1: The Problem of In...
Alexander Pruss has recently argued on probabilistic grounds that Christian philosophers should reject Open Futurism—roughly, the thesis that there are no true future contingents—on account of this view’s alleged inability to handle... more
Alexander Pruss has recently argued on probabilistic grounds that Christian philosophers should reject Open Futurism—roughly, the thesis that there are no true future contingents—on account of this view’s alleged inability to handle certain statements about infinite futures in a mathematically or religiously adequate manner. We argue that, once the distinction between being true and becoming true is applied to such statements, it is evident that they pose no problem for Open Futurists.
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If the future is settled in the sense that it is exhaustively and truly describable in terms of what either will or will not obtain, then divine omniscience (the thesis that God knows all and only truths) entails exhaustively definite... more
If the future is settled in the sense that it is exhaustively and truly describable in terms of what either will or will not obtain, then divine omniscience (the thesis that God knows all and only truths) entails exhaustively definite foreknowledge. Conversely, if the future is open in the sense that a complete, true description of it must include reference to what might and might not obtain, then divine omniscience entails open theism and the denial of exhaustively definite foreknowledge. The nature of the future is, therefore, a key issue in the open theism debate. In this paper, we develop two arguments in support of a central claim of the open future view and critically respond to several arguments in favor of the settled future view. A key issue in the ongoing debate between defenders of exhaustively definite foreknowledge and open theists is a dispute about the nature of the future. Since the former hold that God knows the future as exhaustively settled, i.e., that he knows an...
entities. World states, and states of affairs generally, are concrete. History, I take it, has been a continuous succession of world states begin8. The classic expression of this argument is Hilary Putnam, “time and Physical Geometry,” in... more
entities. World states, and states of affairs generally, are concrete. History, I take it, has been a continuous succession of world states begin8. The classic expression of this argument is Hilary Putnam, “time and Physical Geometry,” in idem, Philosophical Papers, vol. 1. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). For an extended response, see William Lane Craig, Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2001). 9. see William Lane Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2000) and Craig, Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity. 10. Verificationism is widely regarded as self-refuting. Regardless, it should be clear that the inference from the epistemological claim that we cannot experimentally identify absolute simultaneity relations to the metaphysical claim that there are no absolute simultaneity relations is a non sequitur. 11. Recent defenses of divine sempiternality include William Lane Craig, Time an...
J. Diller and A. Kasher (eds.), Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-5219-1_24, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 Among the many models of God now competing in the marketplace of ideas is... more
J. Diller and A. Kasher (eds.), Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-5219-1_24, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 Among the many models of God now competing in the marketplace of ideas is a view that has come to be known as ‘open theism’. 1 The view itself is not new, 2 but until very recently it was off the radar of most philosophers of religion. Things changed dramatically in 1994 with the publication of The Openness of God , 3 a book which ignited a fi restorm of controversy among evangelical Christians. 4 Open theism has since been embraced by a sizable and growing minority of theistic philosophers and is now recognized as a major player in philosophical discussions of the nature of God and of divine providence. The main goal of this paper is to situate open theism in conceptual space by explaining its core commitments and distinguishing it from its primary competitors. While most of the popular discussion of open theism has bee...
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In this paper I define ‘open theism’ as a version of ‘broadly classical theism’ distinguished by commitment to a causally, epistemically, and providentially open future. After clarifying open theism, I then compare and contrast the open... more
In this paper I define ‘open theism’ as a version of ‘broadly classical theism’ distinguished by commitment to a causally, epistemically, and providentially open future. After clarifying open theism, I then compare and contrast the open theistic model of divine providence with its chief competitors: theological determinism, Molinism, and process theism.
The goal of this paper is to facilitate ongoing dialogue between open and non-open theists. First, I try to make precise what open theism is by distinguishing the core commitments of the position from other secondary and optional... more
The goal of this paper is to facilitate ongoing dialogue between open and non-open theists. First, I try to make precise what open theism is by distinguishing the core commitments of the position from other secondary and optional commitments. The result is a characterization of ‘generic open theism’, the minimal set of commitments that any open theist, qua open theist, must affirm. Second, within the framework of generic open theism, I distinguish three important variants and discuss challenges distinctive to each. The significance of this approach is that it helps avoid conflating arguments bearing on specific versions of open theism with arguments pertaining to open theism simpliciter.
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Discussions of the evidential argument from evil generally pay little attention to how different models of divine providence constrain the theist's options for response. After describing four models of providence and general theistic... more
Discussions of the evidential argument from evil generally pay little attention to how different models of divine providence constrain the theist's options for response. After describing four models of providence and general theistic strategies for engaging the evidential argument, I articulate and defend a definition of ‘gratuitous evil’ that renders the theological premise of the argument uncontroversial for theists. This forces theists to focus their fire on the evidential premise, enabling us to compare models of providence with respect to how plausibly they can resist it. I then assess the four models, concluding that theists are better off vis-à-vis the evidential argument if they reject meticulous providence.
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Page 1. PRESENTISM, TRUTHMAKERS, AND GOD by ALAN R. RHODA Abstract: The truthmaker objection to presentism (the view that only what exists now exists simpliciter) is that it lacks sufficient metaphysical resources to ground truths about... more
Page 1. PRESENTISM, TRUTHMAKERS, AND GOD by ALAN R. RHODA Abstract: The truthmaker objection to presentism (the view that only what exists now exists simpliciter) is that it lacks sufficient metaphysical resources to ground truths about the past. ...
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Page 1. Penultimate draft 9/20/09. Forthcoming in Faith and Philosophy. PROBABILITY, TRUTH, AND THE OPENNESS OF THE FUTURE: REPLY TO PRUSS Alan R. Rhoda ABSTRACT: Alexander Pruss's recent argument against the open future view... more
Page 1. Penultimate draft 9/20/09. Forthcoming in Faith and Philosophy. PROBABILITY, TRUTH, AND THE OPENNESS OF THE FUTURE: REPLY TO PRUSS Alan R. Rhoda ABSTRACT: Alexander Pruss's recent argument against the open future view (OF) is unsound. ...
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Page 1. PRESENTISM, TRUTHMAKERS, AND GOD by ALAN R. RHODA Abstract: The truthmaker objection to presentism (the view that only what exists now exists simpliciter) is that it lacks sufficient metaphysical resources to ground truths about... more
Page 1. PRESENTISM, TRUTHMAKERS, AND GOD by ALAN R. RHODA Abstract: The truthmaker objection to presentism (the view that only what exists now exists simpliciter) is that it lacks sufficient metaphysical resources to ground truths about the past. ...
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Page 1. Penultimate draft 9/20/09. Forthcoming in Faith and Philosophy. PROBABILITY, TRUTH, AND THE OPENNESS OF THE FUTURE: REPLY TO PRUSS Alan R. Rhoda ABSTRACT: Alexander Pruss's recent argument against the open future view... more
Page 1. Penultimate draft 9/20/09. Forthcoming in Faith and Philosophy. PROBABILITY, TRUTH, AND THE OPENNESS OF THE FUTURE: REPLY TO PRUSS Alan R. Rhoda ABSTRACT: Alexander Pruss's recent argument against the open future view (OF) is unsound. ...