[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mtl/montec/9105.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey

Author

Listed:
  • DIONNE, G.
  • DOHERTY, N.
Abstract
No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:9105
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    2. Puelz, Robert & Snow, Arthur, 1994. "Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 236-257, April.
    3. Dionne, Georges, 2000. "The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud," Working Papers 00-4, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    4. Marie Allard & Jean-Paul Cresta & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Pooling and Separating Equilibria in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection and Distribution Costs*," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 22(2), pages 103-120, December.
    5. Hoy, Michael, 1989. "The value of screening mechanisms under alternative insurance possibilities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 177-206, July.
    6. Bertrand Villeneuve, 2000. "The Consequences for a Monopolistic Insurance Firm of Evaluating Risk Better than Customers: The Adverse Selection Hypothesis Reversed," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 25(1), pages 65-79, June.
    7. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Macho, Ines & Rey, Patrick & Salanie, Bernard, 1994. "Repeated moral hazard: The role of memory, commitment, and the access to credit markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 1527-1553, October.
    8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-641, June.
    9. Bertrand Villeneuve, 2003. "Concurrence et antisélection multidimensionnelle en assurance," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 69, pages 119-142.
    10. Dionne, Georges & Lasserre, Pierre, 1987. "Adverse selection and finite-horizon insurance contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 843-861, June.
    11. Dionne, Georges & Fombaron, Nathalie, 1996. "Non-convexities and the efficiency of equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 31-40, July.
    12. Xavier Freixas & Roger Guesnerie & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(2), pages 173-191.
    13. Dionne, G. & Fluet, C., 1999. "Full Pooling in Multi-Period Contracting with Adverse Selection and Noncommitment," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- 99-04, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
    14. Cooper, Russell & Hayes, Beth, 1987. "Multi-period insurance contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 211-231.
    15. Hajime Miyazaki, 1977. "The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 394-418, Autumn.
    16. Georges Dionne & Pierre Lasserre, 1985. "Adverse Selection, Repeated Insurance Contracts and Announcement Strategy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(4), pages 719-723.
    17. Russell Cooper, 1984. "On Allocative Distortions in Problems of Self-Selection," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 568-577, Winter.
    18. Harris Milton & Townsend, Robert M, 1981. "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 33-64, January.
    19. Claude Fluet & François Pannequin, 1997. "Complete Versus Incomplete Insurance Contracts under Adverse Selection with Multiple Risks," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 22(2), pages 81-101, December.
    20. Bond, Eric W & Crocker, Keith J, 1991. "Smoking, Skydiving, and Knitting: The Endogenous Categorization of Risks in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 177-200, February.
    21. Dionne, G & Vanasse, C, 1992. "Automobile Insurance Ratemaking in the Presence of Asymmetrical Information," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 7(2), pages 149-165, April-Jun.
    22. Georges Dionne & Christian Gourieroux & Charles Vanasse, 1998. "Evidence of Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance Markets," Working Papers 98-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    23. Whinston, Michael D., 1983. "Moral hazard, adverse selection, and the optimal provision of social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 49-71, October.
    24. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1977. "Monopoly, Non-linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 407-430.
    25. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-359, March.
    26. Allen, Franklin, 1985. "Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 27-31.
    27. Didier Richaudeau, 1999. "Automobile Insurance Contracts and Risk of Accident: An Empirical Test Using French Individual Data," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 24(1), pages 97-114, June.
    28. Landsberger, Michael & Meilijson, Isaac, 1996. "Extraction of Surplus under Adverse Selection: The Case of Insurance Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 234-239, April.
    29. Dionne, G. & Lasserre, P., 1983. "Adverse Selection and Repeated Insurance Contracts: Finite and Infinite Horizons," Cahiers de recherche 8326, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    30. Jaynes, Gerald David, 1978. "Equilibria in monopolistically competitive insurance markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 394-422, December.
    31. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1990. "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1041-1063, September.
    32. Michael Hoy, 1982. "Categorizing Risks in the Insurance Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 97(2), pages 321-336.
    33. Richard Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1988. "Randomization with Asymmetric Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 344-362, Autumn.
    34. Dionne, G. & Maurice, M. & Pinquet, J. & Vanasse, C., 2001. "The Role of Memory in Long-Term Contracting with Moral Hazard: Empirical Evidence in Automobile Insurance," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- 01-05, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
    35. repec:bla:econom:v:56:y:1989:i:223:p:395-400 is not listed on IDEAS
    36. Spence, Michael, 1978. "Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 427-447, December.
    37. Bolton, Patrick, 1990. "Renegotiation and the dynamics of contract design," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 303-310, May.
    38. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1990. "Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(4), pages 597-625.
    39. B. Dahlby, 1981. "Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 547-558, January.
    40. B. Caillaud & R. Guesnerie & P. Rey & J. Tirole, 1988. "Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    41. David A. Malueg, 1988. "Repeated Insurance Contracts with Differential Learning," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(1), pages 177-181.
    42. Crocker, Keith J & Snow, Arthur, 1986. "The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 321-344, April.
    43. Dionne, Georges & Doherty, Neil A, 1994. "Adverse Selection, Commitment, and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 209-235, April.
    44. Michael Kremer, 1996. "Integrating Behavioral Choice into Epidemiological Models of AIDS," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(2), pages 549-573.
    45. Dionne, G., 1981. "Adverse Selection and Repeated Insurance Contracts," Cahiers de recherche 8139, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    46. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(1), pages 1-26.
    47. Mathias Dewatripont, 1989. "Renegotiation and Information Revelation Over Time: The Case of Optimal Labor Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(3), pages 589-619.
    48. Marie-Cécile Fagart, 1996. "Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 43, pages 1-27.
    49. Georges Dionne & Christian Gourieroux & Charles Vanasse, 1997. "The Informational Content of Household Decisions," Working Papers 97-01, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    50. Radner, Roy, 1985. "Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1173-1198, September.
    51. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    52. D'Arcy, Stephen P & Doherty, Neil A, 1990. "Adverse Selection, Private Information, and Lowballing in Insurance Markets," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(2), pages 145-164, April.
    53. Crocker, Keith J. & Snow, Arthur, 1985. "The efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 207-219, March.
    54. Michael Rothschild & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1997. "Competition and Insurance Twenty Years Later," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 22(2), pages 73-79, December.
    55. Claude Fluet & François Pannequin, 1995. "Insurance Contracts under Adverse Selection with Random Loss Severity," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9510, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
    56. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    57. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    58. Dahlby, B. G., 1983. "Adverse selection and statistical discrimination : An analysis of Canadian automobile insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 121-130, February.
    59. Michael Kremer, 1996. "Integrating Behavioral Choice into Epidemiological Models of the AIDS Epidemic," NBER Working Papers 5428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    60. Kunreuther, Howard & Pauly, Mark, 1985. "Market equilibrium with private knowledge : An insurance example," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 269-288, April.
    61. Oliver D. Hart & Jean Tirole, 1988. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(4), pages 509-540.
    62. Arthur J. Hosios & Michael Peters, 1989. "Repeated Insurance Contracts with Adverse Selection and Limited Commitment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 229-253.
    63. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January.
    64. Guesnerie, Roger & Picard, Pierre & Rey, Patrick, 1989. "Adverse selection and moral hazard with risk neutral agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 807-823, April.
    65. Neil A. Doherty & Hong Joo Jung, 1993. "Adverse Selection When Loss Severities Differ: First-Best and Costly Equilibria," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 18(2), pages 173-182, December.
    66. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Comparative statics of the optimal dynamic incentive contract," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 901-926, June.
    67. Dionne, G. & Lasserre, P., 1985. "Dealing with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Simultaneously," Cahiers de recherche 8559, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    68. Tabarrok, Alexander, 1994. "Genetic testing: An economic and contractarian analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 75-91, March.
    69. Herschel I. Grossman, 1979. "Adverse Selection, Dissembling, and Competitive Equilibrium," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 336-343, Spring.
    70. M.- C. Fagart, 1996. "Compagnies d'assurance informées et équilibre sur le marché de l'assurance," THEMA Working Papers 96-26, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    71. Crocker, Keith J. & Snow, Arthur, 1992. "The social value of hidden information in adverse selection economies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 317-347, August.
    72. Picard, Pierre, 1987. "On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 305-331, August.
    73. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Salanie, Bernard, 1997. "Empirical contract theory: The case of insurance data," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 943-950, April.
    74. Hellwig, Martin, 1987. "Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection ," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 319-325.
    75. Thomas R. Palfrey & Chester S. Spatt, 1985. "Repeated Insurance Contracts and Learning," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 356-367, Autumn.
    76. Samuel Gal & Michael Landsberger, 1988. "On "Small Sample" Properties of Experience Rating Insurance Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(1), pages 233-243.
    77. Townsend, Robert M, 1982. "Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1166-1186, December.
    78. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    79. Radner, Roy, 1981. "Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(5), pages 1127-1148, September.
    80. Riley, John G, 1985. "Competition with Hidden Knowledge," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 958-976, October.
    81. Bruno Jullien & Georges Dionne & Bernard Caillaud, 2000. "Corporate insurance with optimal financial contracting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 16(1), pages 77-105.
    82. Bourgeon, J.M., 1998. "Decentralized Markets with Informed Sellers," Papers 9827, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
    83. Doherty, Neil A & Eeckhoudt, Louis, 1995. "Optimal Insurance without Expected Utility: The Dual Theory and the Linearity of Insurance Contracts," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 157-179, March.
    84. Doherty, Neil A & Schlesinger, Harris, 1983. "Optimal Insurance in Incomplete Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(6), pages 1045-1054, December.
    85. Malueg, David A., 1986. "Efficient outcomes in a repeated agency model without discounting," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 217-230, June.
    86. Hellwig, Martin F., 1988. "A note on the specification of interfirm communication in insurance markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 154-163, October.
    87. Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 1999. "Coalition-Proof Allocations in Adverse-Selection Economies," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 24(1), pages 5-17, June.
    88. Richard Watt & Francisco J. Vazquez, 1997. "Full Insurance, Bayesian Updated Premiums, and Adverse Selection," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 22(2), pages 135-150, December.
    89. Chassagnon, A. & Chiappori, P.A., 1994. "Insurance Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Case of Pure Competition," Papers 28, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie.
    90. Dominique Henriet & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1986. "La logique des systèmes bonus-malus en assurance automobile: une approche théorique," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 1, pages 133-152.
    91. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(1), pages 27-41.
    92. repec:adr:anecst:y:1986:i:1:p:07 is not listed on IDEAS
    93. Nilssen, Tore, 2000. "Consumer lock-in with asymmetric information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 641-666, May.
    94. Mark V. Pauly, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62.
    95. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    96. Virginia R. Young & Mark J. Browne, 1997. "Explaining Insurance Policy Provisions via Adverse Selection," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 22(2), pages 121-134, December.
    97. Doherty, Neil A. & Thistle, Paul D., 1996. "Adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 83-102, December.
    98. Rey, Patrick & Salanie, Bernard, 1996. "On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1395-1414, November.
    99. Riley, John G., 1983. "Adverse selection and statistical discrimination : Further remarks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 131-137, February.
    100. Machina, Mark J, 1987. "Choice under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 121-154, Summer.
    101. de Garidel, T., 1997. "Welfare-Improving Asymmetric Information in a Dynamic Insurance Market," Papers 32, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie.
    102. Rubinstein, Ariel & Yaari, Menahem E., 1983. "Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 74-97, June.
    103. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dionne, Georges & Fombaron, Nathalie, 1996. "Non-convexities and the efficiency of equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 31-40, July.
    2. David A. Cather, 2018. "Cream Skimming: Innovations in Insurance Risk Classification and Adverse Selection," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 21(2), pages 335-366, September.
    3. Kifmann, Mathias, 2002. "Community rating in health insurance and different benefit packages," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 719-737, September.
    4. Strohmenger, R. & Wambach, A., 2000. "Adverse selection and categorical discrimination in the health insurance markets: the effects of genetic tests," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 197-218, March.
    5. Igal Hendel & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2003. "The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 299-328.
    6. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5370 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. von Berchem, Sascha & Berthold, Norbert, 2004. "Reform der Arbeitslosenversicherung: Markt, Staat oder beides?," Discussion Paper Series 70, Julius Maximilian University of Würzburg, Chair of Economic Order and Social Policy.
    8. Peilu Zhang & Marco A. Palma, 2021. "Compulsory Versus Voluntary Insurance: An Online Experiment," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 103(1), pages 106-125, January.
    9. Gautam Goswami & Martin Grace & Michael Rebello, 2008. "Experimental evidence on coverage choices and contract prices in the market for corporate insurance," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 11(1), pages 67-95, March.
    10. Kifmann, Mathias, 1997. "To commit or not to commit: A health insurance monopoly with variable quality and uncertain types of individuals," Discussion Papers, Series I 288, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.
    2. Henri Loubergé, 1998. "Risk and Insurance Economics 25 Years After," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 23(4), pages 540-567, October.
    3. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    4. Dionne, Georges & Fombaron, Nathalie & Mimra, Wanda, 2023. "Adverse selection in insurance," Working Papers 23-5, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    5. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N. & Fombaron, N., 2000. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- 00-05, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
    6. Dionne, Georges, 2012. "The empirical measure of information problems with emphasis on insurance fraud and dynamic data," Working Papers 12-10, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    7. Georges Dionne & Casey Rothschild, 2014. "Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 39(2), pages 184-221, September.
    8. Kosenko, Andrew & Stiglitz, Joseph & Yun, Jungyoll, 2023. "Bilateral information disclosure in adverse selection markets with nonexclusive competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 205(C), pages 144-168.
    9. Dionne, Georges & Michaud, Pierre-Carl & Pinquet, Jean, 2013. "A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 85-97.
    10. Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2014. "Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets," TSE Working Papers 14-532, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Sep 2016.
    11. Ruo Jia & Zenan Wu, 2019. "Insurer commitment and dynamic pricing pattern," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 44(1), pages 87-135, March.
    12. Jennifer L. Wang, 2004. "Asymmetric Information Problems in Taiwan's Automobile Insurance Market: The Effect of Policy Design on Loss Characteristics," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 7(1), pages 53-71, March.
    13. Ruo Jia & Zenan Wu, 2019. "Insurer commitment and dynamic pricing pattern," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 44(1), pages 87-135, March.
    14. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, "undated". "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Working Papers 620, Barcelona School of Economics.
    15. Georges Dionne & Casey G. Rothschild, 2011. "Risk Classification in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1137, CIRPEE.
    16. Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2021. "Competitive Nonlinear Pricing under Adverse Selection," TSE Working Papers 21-1201, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Aug 2022.
    17. Dionne, Georges, 1998. "La mesure empirique des problèmes d’information," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 74(4), pages 585-606, décembre.
    18. Dosis, Anastasios, 2018. "On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 140-149.
    19. Dosis, Anastasios, 2019. "Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 52-59.
    20. Nilssen, Tore, 2000. "Consumer lock-in with asymmetric information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 641-666, May.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:9105. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sharon BREWER (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cdmtlca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.