Georgios Theotokis

The Battle of Manzikert on August 26, 1071 is widely regarded as one of the most significant turning points in medieval history, frequently presented as the culmination of a Turco-Islamic assault upon the Byzantine bulwark of a Christian world struggling for survival. Emperor Romanus IV’s campaigns between 1068 and 1071 do, in many ways, represent the empire’s fightback against an enemy that for decades had penetrated deep into Asia Minor, its heartland and strategic bulwark. Yet Manzikert was not a disaster. This book examines the geopolitical background and the origins of the campaign that led to the battle, the main protagonists, and their strategies and battle tactics. It also evaluates the primary sources and the enduring legacy of the battle, for both the Greek and Turkish historiography of the twentieth century.

Η τέχνη της παρότρυνσης των ανδρών στη μάχη έχει μακραίωνη ιστορία και ανάγεται στην Ιλιάδα του Ομήρου, ενώ ήταν επίσης ιδιαίτερα σημαντικό χαρακτηριστικό του χαρακτήρα των Βυζαντινών ηγητόρων, οι οποίοι μπορούσαν να εμπλουτίσουν τους παροτρυντικούς λόγους προς τους στρατιώτες τους με ρητορικές φράσεις – παραδείγματα διαφόρων επιφανών ρητόρων. Κατά μια ευρύτερη έννοια, οι λόγοι που διαβάζονταν ή εκφωνούνταν στο στράτευμα αποτελούσαν επίσης, μαζί με τις επευφημίες, τους επίσημους χαιρετισμούς και τις καθημερινές θρησκευτικές τελετουργίες, αναπόσπαστο μέρος της αυτοκρατορικής προπαγάνδας που επιβεβαίωνε την ιδιαίτερη θέση του στρατού στη Βυζαντινή κοινωνία, την πίστη του στον αυτοκράτορα και τα ιδανικά για τα οποία πολεμούσε. Σκοπός της παρούσας μετάφρασής, λοιπόν, είναι να μπορέσει το κείμενο του Συριανού Μαγίστρου να γίνει προσβάσιμο στους απανταχού ερευνητές που δεν κατανοούν την μεσαιωνική ελληνική γλώσσα, ώστε να μελετηθεί μαζί με τα υπόλοιπα έργα, ρίχνοντας φως σε μια πτυχή των πολεμικών συγκρούσεων της βυζαντινής περιόδου, λιγότερο ή περισσότερο παραγνωρισμένη ως σήμερα, δηλαδή αυτή της στρατιωτικής ρητορικής.

Bohemond of Taranto was man of boundless ambition and inexhaustible energy, he was, in the words of Romuald of Salerno, "always seeking the impossible." If he failed, however, to conquer the Byzantine Empire and establish his own great Eastern Empire, he did succeed in founding the most enduring of all the states in the Latin East. He proved to be one of the most remarkable warriors in medieval Mediterranean history, coming from a family of ‘soldiers of fortune’, the Hautevilles, who managed to establish a powerful principality in Italy and seriously threaten the Byzantine Empire’s very existence.
Remarkably few monographs have been devoted to this chevalier d’aventure (Jean Flori) and the only one in English was published exactly a century ago, in 1917, by Ralph Yewdale. Since then, Jean Flori has published an updated and modern, although dense and difficult to read, examination of Bohemond’s life and career. I would like to write about him as a warrior - in a sense, minimising his political and diplomatic 'machinations' or his contribution to the Holy War in the Middle East (something for which I published back in 2010) and focus, instead, on his military achievements in Italy, Sicily, the Balkans, Anatolia and the Middle East.
Bohemond was famous for being one of the most experienced officers in the Crusader army and the undisputed leader because he 'knew' the enemy. He had fought in Italy and Sicily against the local Lombard and Arab levies, while he was the second-in-command (later to become the leader) of the Norman armies that invaded Byzantine Illyria twice in three decades to face the multi-cultural armies of the Byzantine Emperor Alexius Comnenus comprising of Greek, Armenian, and Turkish troops.
Therefore, because medieval commanders have in general received little credit for their strategic understanding, I wish to focus on Bohemond’s carrier as:
(a) a strategist: analyse his war-plans in different operational theatres (Italy, Balkans, Middle East) and examine which strategy does he follow - annihilation, exhaustion, or attrition? In view of the wider debate among modern scholars such as Rogers, Gillingham and Morillo about Vegetian strategy, I will attempt to elucidate the degree to which one can characterise the Norman – and more specifically Bohemond’s – strategies in Italy, Sicily and the Balkans as ‘Vegetian’.
(b) a tactician: Bohemond’s deployment and the employment of troops in actual fighting against different enemies in different operational theatres. How well does he adapt his battle-tactics to those of the enemy? How well does he ‘know’ the enemy (reconnaissance, diplomacy, espionage etc.)? How suitable were these tactics for the warfare in each region?
(c) a trans-cultural warrior: How typical of a ‘Norman’ warrior was Bohemond? While the many “cultures of war” that emerged in the medieval world shared some basic characteristics, what is more broadly comparable are the processes or dynamics that shaped military cultures around the world. More specifically, in this monograph I will explore those dynamics and the cultural patterns they produced by focusing on Bohemond’s military career in regions that were hotly contested in the Middle Ages – the Italian Peninsula, Sicily and the opposite Adriatic coast, and the Middle East.

This book is a history of the Europe in the Middle Ages as viewed through the lens of war. The point is to present to the general audience how significant and decisive pitched battles could be, bearing in mind the recent studies among historians on Macro-historical analysis which seeks out large, long-term trends in world history.
There are battles which claim our attention, independently of the moral worth of the combatants, on account of their enduring importance, and by reason of the practical influence on our own social and political condition, which we can trace up to the results of those engagements. They have for us an abiding and actual interest, both while we investigate the chain of causes and effects, by which they have helped to make us what we are; and also while we speculate on what we probably should have been, if any one of those battles had come to a different termination.
The chronological focus of this book is the period that we have come to know as the Middle Ages, roughly defined as the centuries from the 4th to the 15th. The emphasis is both on analysis and storytelling, and each chapter will highlight battles and campaigns that demonstrate classic and sometimes unchanging aspects of the “Art of War,” as well as illustrating changes in tactics and practices in response to new challenges, weapons, and environments.

As the title suggests, this is a comparative study of the military cultures that clashed in Cilicia, Syria and northern Mesopotamia in the tenth century. For the purposes of this comparison I examine two pools of primary material: first, the accounts of the major and most important raids, sieges and pitched battles of this period, since they could have had a decisive outcome on the course of a campaign or even a war, through whatever information we can deduce from the contemporary historical accounts; second, the Byzantine and Arab military manuals which, being prescriptive and not descriptive in their nature, provide crucial information on how armies should have been organized and deployed in the battlefield up to the period when they were compiled, thus reflecting decades and even centuries of experience in fighting.
A series of fundamental questions for deliberation are:
• What were the tactics of each state in the region under consideration and what basic similarities can we trace? How suitable were they for the warfare in the region?
• Do we identify any similarities in the tactics used against different enemies in the same region or do we notice a change depending on the enemy each army is facing in the field? Are we able to trace the origins of a tactic and what does that say about the influence each culture had on its neighbours?
• What is the connection between adaptability in the battlefield and the overall strategy of a state? Do we see nations that pursue a more defensive strategy adapt more easily to the changing tactics of their enemies?
• Can we say that certain cultures are more susceptible to tactical changes than others, and if so, what are the deeper reasons behind this phenomenon? In what way does this reflect their social structure and any changes in it? What was the role of religion and religious enthusiasm in this procedure?

The Norman expansion in eleventh-century Europe was a movement of enormous historical importance, which saw men and women from the duchy of Normandy settling in England, Italy, Sicily and the Middle East. The Norman establishment in the South is particularly interesting, because it represents the story of a few hundred mercenaries who managed to establish a principality in the Mediterranean that would later develop in to the Kingdom of Sicily.
In this book the author examines the clash of two different "military cultures" - the Normans and the Byzantines - in one theatre of war - the Balkans. It is the first study to date of the military organization of the Norman and Byzantine states in the Mediterranean, and of their overall strategies and their military tactics in the battlefield. It is also the first to examine the way in which each military culture reacted and adapted to the strategies and tactics of its enemies in Italy and the Balkans. The author closely follows the campaigns conducted by the Normans in the Byzantine provinces of Illyria and Macedonia and their battles against Imperial armies commanded by the Byzantine Emperor. He also examines the ways in which the Italian-Norman and Byzantine military systems differed, and their relative efficiencies.

Summary
A collective volume devoted to the study of warfare in a crucial period of paramount geo-political changes for the Byzantine Empire, and which will attempt to present new insights and critical approaches to warfare between Byzantium and its neighbours in the eleventh century.

Description
Modern historians have identified the eleventh century as the landmark of Byzantine history. This was a period of invasions, political tumult, financial crisis and social disruption, but it was also a time of cultural and intellectual innovation and achievement. In terms of the military history of the eleventh century Byzantium, both John Haldon and Warren Treadgold have written about this period, but both have done so only to bridge the gap between the wars before and after. Yet, there is no specific study devoted to the study of warfare in such a crucial period in the history of Byzantium, a period of paramount geo-political changes when the Empire was being attacked on all sides, and all its frontiers were breached. This collective volume would try and fill this gap in the historiography by bringing together scholars who would present new insights and critical approaches to warfare between the Byzantine Empire and its neighbours in the eleventh century.

In any history of the Norman people the kingdom of Sicily, the most cosmopolitan of all their conquests, demands an important place. Whether we consider the year 1017 as a cut-off point that marked the advent of the Norman presence in Italy and Sicily, thus inaugurating a new era of invasion, interaction, and integration in the Mediterranean, is a moot point. Regardless if we decide the millennial anniversary is significant, the moment offers an ideal opportunity to explore the story in the south, about a thousand years ago. Regrettably, the bibliography on the topic of military history of the Normans in the Mediterranean has been overshadowed by the achievements of their cousins in the North and the East. Thus, the aim of the volume is to rectify that and bring the Hautevilles, their successors and followers, back into the spotlight of European and Mediterranean history.
It is our intention to deviate, partly, from the “fashionable” (an inappropriate term, still used by some historians, that pertains conformity and adherence to popular norms) narratives of the, so-called, “New Military History” and to reintegrate the operational, tactical, technical and equipment aspects of the conduct of warfare in the South in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, whilst not ignoring its impact on the wider multi-cultural society of Italy and Sicily.
Essays are envisioned as being in the 7,000-8,000 word range.

I. NAVAL TECHNOLOGY AND WARFARE
Philip Line - Galley Wars north and south: some observations on the tactics employed in battles between oared ships in the High Middle Ages, 1000-1300
Konstantinos Karatolios - Greek Fire, reconsidering a terrifying Byzantine weapon
Abdulmennan Mehmet Altintaş - Transition of War and Ship Materials between the Mediterranean and Egypt - Red Sea during the 16th and 17th Centuries
İrfan Kokdaş - Account books and local military expenses in the early modern Ottoman world: the cases of KARAHISÂR-I SÂHIB and RUSE
Gerassimos D. Pagratis - War at sea and trade routes in the Mediterranean during the Napoleonic period through the reports of Septinsular Republic’s diplomatic representatives
Christophe Austruy - Cristoforo da Canal, “la militia da mar”: The experiences feedback and influences on the Venetian war fleet 1500-1600

II. MILITARY ORGANIZATION & WARFARE
Med Lakhdar Oulmi - The evolution of the defensive system of the Aurès (VIII-XII century)
Georgios Theotokis, Aysel Yildiz - Transmission of military knowledge between empires: the case of a 17th century Ottoman treatise

III. WARFARE & SOCIETY
Juho Wilksman - The rabble: Attitudes towards the armed commoners and using them in late Byzantine and early Ottoman armies
Andriy Posun'ko - The Splintered Communities: Refugees, Mercenaries, and Irregulars in the Russian-Ottoman Wars 1806–1812 and 1828–1829

What do the mysterious Roman author Vegetius, the Byzantine emperor Leo , and the Chinese general Li Jing all have in common? ey are three of the dozens of authors across the medieval Mediterranean world and beyond who wrote works of military literature, sometimes called military handbooks, manuals, or treatises. is book brings together a multidisciplinary international team of scholars who present cu ing-edge essays on diverse aspects of medieval military literature. While some chapters o er novel approaches to familiar authors like Vegetius, and some present research on under-valued topics like Byzantine military illustrations, others provide holistic studies on subjects like early modern treatises, they all move the discussion of medieval military literature forward.

The details of the mechanisms for the diffusion of military knowledge, both across time and space, are still obscure to historians. The transmission of military knowledge does not always occur through institutional mechanisms or grand reforming projects by the decision-makers. Spies, hired engineers, mercenaries, merchants, as well as war captives, can be excellent agents in this regard. A late-seventeenth author, Esirî Hasan Ağa, in his work Mi‘y}rü’d-Düvel ve Misb}rü’l-Milel [Standards of States and Probe of Nations] offers a good case study in terms of the transmission of military knowledge along the Habsburg-Ottoman frontiers in the seventeenth century, which was the scene of bloody wars between the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires for many decades between 1593–1606 (the Long War), 1658–60, and 1683–99. As a junior military officer in the armourer corps, Esirî participated in several campaigns and spent two years in Austria as a prisoner of war. During his captivity, he had a chance to compare the Austrian military system and figure out measures to overcome the political and military problems that plagued his country. As a lieutenant to the chief armourer, he paid attention to military issues and has included a separate section on the art of warfare in his work. Yet, unlike the treatises of the late seventeenth century, Esirî Hasan Ağa’s section on warfare in his Mi‘y}rü’d-Düvel ve Misb}rü’l-Milel resembles a military manual rather than a piece of mirror for princes.
Our paper has two main aims: first, to study Esirî Hasan Ağa’s general views on warfare (strategy, operational and battle tactics, logistics, ideology etc.) and compare them with other samples of the same literary genre from different cultures (Byzantium, Western Europe, Medieval Islamic polities) in order to show the transmission of military knowledge between ‚military cultures‛ both horizontally (geographically) and vertically (chronologically). Another main concern would be to highlight Esirî Hasan Ağa’s views on the decline of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the eighteenth century, as his views and explanations reflect those of an average military official of the Ottoman Empire of the period.

The eleventh century is a period of profound political, social, and cultural upheaval in Italy, owing largely to the, so-called, “invasion” of the Normans who, initially offering their services to the highest bidder, they ended up carving up their own polities in Apulia, Campania and Sicily. This paper will concentrate on the military affairs in southern Italy between 1017, the year of the famous meeting with the Lombard rebel Melus, and 1077 that ends with the siege of Naples by the joint forces of Robert Guiscard and Richard of Capua. 
The main aim of the paper is to examine the Greek and Latin narrative sources for this period, strictly from a military perspective and reach some conclusions regarding the value of these sources for the Norman expansion in the South and the history of warfare in the Mediterranean in the eleventh century. The major questions that are raised are: to what extent are the figures they provide for army sizes, reliable, both in absolute numbers and in the ratios given between cavalry and infantry? What is our chroniclers’ knowledge of the local geography where the military operations took place, and to what extent – if at all – were they familiar with the terrain of the battles or sieges, or the campaign routes of armies which they describe? How accurate and detailed are their description of castles and fortifications and how far do their narratives permit the accurate reconstruction of a chain of events, especially about the battlefield manoeuvres of armies in action? Do we have enough information to reconstruct the Norman strategy of expansion in the, different but interconnected, operational theatres of Italy and Sicily?

Perhaps the most well known reference of the lasso in battle comes from the description of a Hun warrior by the 4th century Roman historian Ammianus Marcelinus who, although had never seen a Hun in his life, in 392 CE he wrote his report about their steppe tactics based on the accounts he had gathered from contemporary Goth fighters. Although the lasso can be found in historical sources and pictorial representations spreading from the Black Sea and the Urals to Transoxania and China, very little has been mentioned thus far in contemporary bibliography about its place and value in the Eastern Roman armies and the influence of central Asian elements in its introduction into the Roman panoply.
My aim in this paper would be to trace the origin of this weapon in the Eastern Mediterranean basin and to evaluate the historical evidence that modern historians have about the use of the lasso by the Imperial soldiers or by soldiers in the service of the Byzantine Emperor. I would use a variety of sources ranging from the Strategika - military manuals - of the 6th and 10th centuries, histories and chronicles from the Late Roman period up to the Fourth Crusade and the beginning of the 13th century, epic poems from the Byzantine, Iranian and Turkish folklore tradition, manuscript miniatures, and mosaic and fresco representations.

This paper is primarily a comparative study and will attempt to give answers
to a series of questions regarding the image of the Normans as elite warriors. My
focus will be the Norman expansion in the south of Italy and I will compare the
image of the Norman soldier in different parts of the European continent, namely
Italy, Normandy, and England. What role did the Norman “warlike nature”, energy
(strenuitas), courage (corage), boldness (hardiesce), and valour (vaillantize) play in
shaping the identity of these newcomers in Italy? I will also compare this with the
figure of the Normans on the other side of the Adriatic and I will examine the ways in
which Byzantine authors tried to build a comprehensive image of the “Frankish”
military tactics and of the “Frankish” soldier as an individual warrior. Was the
“Norman invincibility” really a myth?

One of the most prominent chroniclers of the Norman infiltration in southern
Italy and Sicily was Geoffrey Malaterra, who was recruited by Roger Hauteville to
write his “Deeds of Count Roger of Calabria and Sicily and of his brother Duke
Robert Guiscard”. This paper will examine Malaterra as a “military historian” of the
Norman expansion in southern Italy and Sicily, from the 1040s to the Illyrian
invasion of 1081, and compare his work with other contemporaries like William of
Apulia, Amatus of Montecassino and Anna Comnena.
A series of questions that will be addressed are: to what extent are the figures
he provides for army size, reliable, both in absolute numbers and in the ratios given
between cavalry and infantry? What is our chronicler’s knowledge of the local
geography where the military operations took place, and to what extent – if at all –
was he familiar with the terrain of the battles or sieges, or the campaign routes of
armies which he describes? How accurate or detailed is his description of castles and
fortifications? To what extend does Malaterra date major military events, and how
far does his narratives permit the accurate reconstruction of the sequence of events?

This conference aims to offer a vertical history of war in the Mediterranean from the early Middle Ages to the Early Modern period (c. AD1700), putting the emphasis on the changing face of several of war’s aspects and contexts over time. This is an international collaboration between academics from Turkey and Greece that aspires to bring together scholars of military history in a bi-annual event and stimulate academic discussion in different aspects of the military history of the Mediterranean Sea.

This international collaboration between scholars from Istanbul and Thessaloniki aspires to bring the Macedonian capital of Thessaloniki to the forefront of academic attention, by organizing the Second International Conference on the Military History of the Mediterranean Sea, to be hosted at the Byzantine Museum of the Thessaloniki between 19-20 June 2020. We welcome papers that explore any topic related to the study and teaching of the military history of the Mediterranean from late Antiquity and the fall of Rome to the seventeenth century. We especially encourage papers that focus on the conference’s theme of ‘models of military leadership’.
 Points of discussion could potentially, but not exclusively, include:
 Secular and ecclesiastical leadership
 Gender and authority
 the social strata of military leaders/commanders
 the role of military ideals and practices in shaping a military leader
 What could make or break a military leader
 the effectiveness of leaders/commanders in the battlefield
 the ‘ideal’ leadership and ‘heroic individualism’
 Divine authority