Since the publication of O’Regan and Noe’s original article in Behavioral and Brain Sciences in 2... more Since the publication of O’Regan and Noe’s original article in Behavioral and Brain Sciences in 2001, which first set out the sensorimotor account by which sensory experience and motor engagement are inextricably intertwined, there have been not just one but many sensorimotor accounts. However, in many ways that original article remains the canonical account. In this paper, I discuss a particular theory of concepts from philosophy of mind – the unified conceptual space theory, based on Peter Gardenfors’ conceptual spaces theory – and, in that light, set out what I take to be the key points of the 2001 account, along with its strengths and weaknesses. I discuss the ways in which the 2001 account aligns with, and departs from, the unified conceptual space theory; and I offer an extension to it that I call sensorimotor++, which adds to the 2001 account a key role for emotional affect and the somatosensory system, with which one might ground salience, and a key role for (so-called ‘mental’) representation, properly understood. I argue that sensorimotor++ makes for a better theory of concepts – one that is not just embedded and embodied but enactive – and, perhaps, a better sensorimotor theory more broadly.
One of the key claims I have defended previously is that longstanding arguments over whether conc... more One of the key claims I have defended previously is that longstanding arguments over whether concepts are either (mental) representations or(non-representational) abilities gets its premises fundamentally wrong: concepts must be both. When one reflects on them – when one considers one’s concepts as concepts – they just are representations; but when one possesses and employs them non-reflectively then, logically, they must be something else: and, here, "non-representational ability" seems the best description. In order to advance this position, however, one must first be as clear as possible what one means by representations, either of the iconic or symbolic variety. A major stumbling block to resolving the conflict between representationalists and antirepresentationalists is that, too often on both sides of the aisle, the term "representation" is used without any attempt at definition. This paper is an attempt to address this deficiency and set forth definitions that are, if not definitive, at least a step in the right direction. (Less)
Human beings have wondered about the stars since the dawn of the species. Does life exist out the... more Human beings have wondered about the stars since the dawn of the species. Does life exist out there – intelligent life, even – or are we alone? The quest for life in the universe touches on fundamental hopes and fears. It touches on the essence of what it means to formulate a theory, grasp a concept, and have an imagination. This book traces the history of the science of this area and the development of new schools in philosophy. Its essays seek to establish the history and philosophy of astrobiology as research fields in their own right by addressing cognitive, linguistic, epistemological, ethical, cultural, societal, and historical perspectives on astrobiology. The book is divided into three sections. The first (Cognition) focuses on the human mind and what it contributes to the search for life. It explores the emergence and evolution of terrestrial life and cognition and the challenges humans face as they reach to the stars. The essays raise philosophical questions, pose ethical dilemmas, and offer a variety of approaches, including one from cognitive zoology, in formulating a theory of the universal principles of intelligence, the limits of human conceptual abilities, and the human mind’s encounter with the unknown. The second section (Communication) examines the linguistic and semiotic requirements for interstellar communication. What is needed for successful communication? Are there universal rules for success? What are the possible features – and limitations – of exolanguages? What is required for recognizing a message as a message? The third section (Culture) considers cultural and societal issues. It explores astrobiology’s organization as a scientific discipline, its responsibilities to the public sphere, and its theological implications. It reviews the historically important panspermia hypothesis, along with the popularization of astrobiology and its ongoing institutionalisation. Through addressing these questions, we take our first steps in exploring the immense terra incognita of extraterrestrial life and the human mind.
Recent years have seen a number of competing theories of concepts within philosophy of mind, supp... more Recent years have seen a number of competing theories of concepts within philosophy of mind, supplanting the classical definitionist and imagist accounts: among them, Jerry Fodor’s Informational Atomism Theory, Jesse Prinz’s Proxytypes Theory, and Peter Gardenfors’ Conceptual Spaces Theory (CST). On the whole there has been little empirical investigation into the competing theories’ merits; the (limited) empirical investigation of CST offers the one obvious exception. Some theories, such as Informational Atomism, seem almost beyond the possibility of such testing by design. Some philosophers would claim that theories of concepts, by their nature, cannot be tested empirically; and they raise valid concerns. Although I concede that theories of concepts are not open to direct empirical investigation, nonetheless indirect methods can provide strong circumstantial evidence for or against a theory such as CST; and I offer a research plan for doing so. Indeed, I argue that an extension of CST I call the Unified Conceptual Space Theory (UCST) is better placed than the competition when it comes to such testing, not least because it comes with a software application, in the form of a mind-mapping program, as a more-or-less direct translation of the theory into a working computer model. This paper provides the most detailed specification to date of the algorithm underlying the UCST, described in earlier publications as an attempt to move CST in a more algorithmically amenable and therefore, it is hoped, more empirically testable direction. UCST brings all the many widely divergent conceptual spaces discussed in CST together into a single unified “space of spaces” arranged along three axes, where points in the space have both local and distal connections to other points.
Known under the potentially misleading rubric of “knowledge representation” in cognitive science,... more Known under the potentially misleading rubric of “knowledge representation” in cognitive science, theories of concepts represent both a subfield within philosophy of mind and an application area fo ...
Abstract: A context-sensitive grammar of English is being developed into an object-oriented progr... more Abstract: A context-sensitive grammar of English is being developed into an object-oriented programming language. which will in turn be used to implement the goal of the Pharos project: an interactive writing environment for designing social research questionnaires. The paper consists of a ...
Understanding the relationship between concepts and experience seems necessary to specifying the ... more Understanding the relationship between concepts and experience seems necessary to specifying the content of experience, yet current theories of concepts do not seem up to the job. With Peter Gärdenfors’s conceptual spaces theory as a foundation and with enactivist philosophy as inspiration, we present a proposed extension to conceptual spaces theory and use it to outline a model of the emergence of concepts and experience. We conclude that neither is ultimately primary but each gives rise to the other: i.e., that they co-emerge. Such a model can then serve as the anchor to a theory of concepts more generally. Concepts are most naturally understood in symbolic and representational terms, while much of experience, in contrast, is non-symbolic and non-representational; yet the conflict between the two will, herein, be shown to be more apparent than real. The main contribution of this paper is to argue for, by means of this account of co-emergence, a continuum between “low-level” mental...
Concepts are the building blocks of higher-order cognition and consciousness. Building on Concept... more Concepts are the building blocks of higher-order cognition and consciousness. Building on Conceptual Spaces Theory (CST) and proceeding from the assumption that concepts are inherently dynamic, this paper provides historical context to and significantly elaborates the previously offered Iterative Subdivision Model (ISDM) with the goal of pushing it toward empirical testability. The paper describes how agents in continuous interaction with their environment adopt an intentional orientation, estimate the utility of the concept(s) applicable to action in the current context, engage in practical action, and adopt any new concepts that emerge: a largely pre-intellectual cycle that repeats essentially without interruption over the conceptual agent's lifetime. This paper elaborates utility optimization by establishing three constraints on concept formation/evaluation—non-redundancy, distinctiveness and proportionality—embedding them in a quasi-mathematical model intended for developmen...
While the recent special issue of JCS on machine consciousness (Vol-ume 14, Issue 7) was in prepa... more While the recent special issue of JCS on machine consciousness (Vol-ume 14, Issue 7) was in preparation, a collection of papers on the same topic, entitled Artificial Consciousness and edited by Antonio Chella and RiccardoManzotti, was published.1 The editors of the JCS special
Since the publication of O’Regan and Noe’s original article in Behavioral and Brain Sciences in 2... more Since the publication of O’Regan and Noe’s original article in Behavioral and Brain Sciences in 2001, which first set out the sensorimotor account by which sensory experience and motor engagement are inextricably intertwined, there have been not just one but many sensorimotor accounts. However, in many ways that original article remains the canonical account. In this paper, I discuss a particular theory of concepts from philosophy of mind – the unified conceptual space theory, based on Peter Gardenfors’ conceptual spaces theory – and, in that light, set out what I take to be the key points of the 2001 account, along with its strengths and weaknesses. I discuss the ways in which the 2001 account aligns with, and departs from, the unified conceptual space theory; and I offer an extension to it that I call sensorimotor++, which adds to the 2001 account a key role for emotional affect and the somatosensory system, with which one might ground salience, and a key role for (so-called ‘mental’) representation, properly understood. I argue that sensorimotor++ makes for a better theory of concepts – one that is not just embedded and embodied but enactive – and, perhaps, a better sensorimotor theory more broadly.
One of the key claims I have defended previously is that longstanding arguments over whether conc... more One of the key claims I have defended previously is that longstanding arguments over whether concepts are either (mental) representations or(non-representational) abilities gets its premises fundamentally wrong: concepts must be both. When one reflects on them – when one considers one’s concepts as concepts – they just are representations; but when one possesses and employs them non-reflectively then, logically, they must be something else: and, here, "non-representational ability" seems the best description. In order to advance this position, however, one must first be as clear as possible what one means by representations, either of the iconic or symbolic variety. A major stumbling block to resolving the conflict between representationalists and antirepresentationalists is that, too often on both sides of the aisle, the term "representation" is used without any attempt at definition. This paper is an attempt to address this deficiency and set forth definitions that are, if not definitive, at least a step in the right direction. (Less)
Human beings have wondered about the stars since the dawn of the species. Does life exist out the... more Human beings have wondered about the stars since the dawn of the species. Does life exist out there – intelligent life, even – or are we alone? The quest for life in the universe touches on fundamental hopes and fears. It touches on the essence of what it means to formulate a theory, grasp a concept, and have an imagination. This book traces the history of the science of this area and the development of new schools in philosophy. Its essays seek to establish the history and philosophy of astrobiology as research fields in their own right by addressing cognitive, linguistic, epistemological, ethical, cultural, societal, and historical perspectives on astrobiology. The book is divided into three sections. The first (Cognition) focuses on the human mind and what it contributes to the search for life. It explores the emergence and evolution of terrestrial life and cognition and the challenges humans face as they reach to the stars. The essays raise philosophical questions, pose ethical dilemmas, and offer a variety of approaches, including one from cognitive zoology, in formulating a theory of the universal principles of intelligence, the limits of human conceptual abilities, and the human mind’s encounter with the unknown. The second section (Communication) examines the linguistic and semiotic requirements for interstellar communication. What is needed for successful communication? Are there universal rules for success? What are the possible features – and limitations – of exolanguages? What is required for recognizing a message as a message? The third section (Culture) considers cultural and societal issues. It explores astrobiology’s organization as a scientific discipline, its responsibilities to the public sphere, and its theological implications. It reviews the historically important panspermia hypothesis, along with the popularization of astrobiology and its ongoing institutionalisation. Through addressing these questions, we take our first steps in exploring the immense terra incognita of extraterrestrial life and the human mind.
Recent years have seen a number of competing theories of concepts within philosophy of mind, supp... more Recent years have seen a number of competing theories of concepts within philosophy of mind, supplanting the classical definitionist and imagist accounts: among them, Jerry Fodor’s Informational Atomism Theory, Jesse Prinz’s Proxytypes Theory, and Peter Gardenfors’ Conceptual Spaces Theory (CST). On the whole there has been little empirical investigation into the competing theories’ merits; the (limited) empirical investigation of CST offers the one obvious exception. Some theories, such as Informational Atomism, seem almost beyond the possibility of such testing by design. Some philosophers would claim that theories of concepts, by their nature, cannot be tested empirically; and they raise valid concerns. Although I concede that theories of concepts are not open to direct empirical investigation, nonetheless indirect methods can provide strong circumstantial evidence for or against a theory such as CST; and I offer a research plan for doing so. Indeed, I argue that an extension of CST I call the Unified Conceptual Space Theory (UCST) is better placed than the competition when it comes to such testing, not least because it comes with a software application, in the form of a mind-mapping program, as a more-or-less direct translation of the theory into a working computer model. This paper provides the most detailed specification to date of the algorithm underlying the UCST, described in earlier publications as an attempt to move CST in a more algorithmically amenable and therefore, it is hoped, more empirically testable direction. UCST brings all the many widely divergent conceptual spaces discussed in CST together into a single unified “space of spaces” arranged along three axes, where points in the space have both local and distal connections to other points.
Known under the potentially misleading rubric of “knowledge representation” in cognitive science,... more Known under the potentially misleading rubric of “knowledge representation” in cognitive science, theories of concepts represent both a subfield within philosophy of mind and an application area fo ...
Abstract: A context-sensitive grammar of English is being developed into an object-oriented progr... more Abstract: A context-sensitive grammar of English is being developed into an object-oriented programming language. which will in turn be used to implement the goal of the Pharos project: an interactive writing environment for designing social research questionnaires. The paper consists of a ...
Understanding the relationship between concepts and experience seems necessary to specifying the ... more Understanding the relationship between concepts and experience seems necessary to specifying the content of experience, yet current theories of concepts do not seem up to the job. With Peter Gärdenfors’s conceptual spaces theory as a foundation and with enactivist philosophy as inspiration, we present a proposed extension to conceptual spaces theory and use it to outline a model of the emergence of concepts and experience. We conclude that neither is ultimately primary but each gives rise to the other: i.e., that they co-emerge. Such a model can then serve as the anchor to a theory of concepts more generally. Concepts are most naturally understood in symbolic and representational terms, while much of experience, in contrast, is non-symbolic and non-representational; yet the conflict between the two will, herein, be shown to be more apparent than real. The main contribution of this paper is to argue for, by means of this account of co-emergence, a continuum between “low-level” mental...
Concepts are the building blocks of higher-order cognition and consciousness. Building on Concept... more Concepts are the building blocks of higher-order cognition and consciousness. Building on Conceptual Spaces Theory (CST) and proceeding from the assumption that concepts are inherently dynamic, this paper provides historical context to and significantly elaborates the previously offered Iterative Subdivision Model (ISDM) with the goal of pushing it toward empirical testability. The paper describes how agents in continuous interaction with their environment adopt an intentional orientation, estimate the utility of the concept(s) applicable to action in the current context, engage in practical action, and adopt any new concepts that emerge: a largely pre-intellectual cycle that repeats essentially without interruption over the conceptual agent's lifetime. This paper elaborates utility optimization by establishing three constraints on concept formation/evaluation—non-redundancy, distinctiveness and proportionality—embedding them in a quasi-mathematical model intended for developmen...
While the recent special issue of JCS on machine consciousness (Vol-ume 14, Issue 7) was in prepa... more While the recent special issue of JCS on machine consciousness (Vol-ume 14, Issue 7) was in preparation, a collection of papers on the same topic, entitled Artificial Consciousness and edited by Antonio Chella and RiccardoManzotti, was published.1 The editors of the JCS special
While the recent special issue of JCS on machine consciousness (Volume 14, Issue 7) was in prepar... more While the recent special issue of JCS on machine consciousness (Volume 14, Issue 7) was in preparation, a collection of papers on the same topic, entitled Artificial Consciousness and edited by Antonio Chella and Riccardo Manzotti, was published. The editors of the JCS special issue, Ron Chrisley, Robert Clowes and Steve Torrance, thought it would be a timely and productive move to have authors of papers in their collection review the papers in the Chella and Manzotti book, and include these reviews in the special issue of the journal. Eight of the JCS authors (plus Uziel Awret) volunteered to review one or more of the fifteen papers in Artificial Consciousness; these individual reviews were then collected together with a minimal amount of editing to produce a seamless chapter-by-chapter review of the entire book. Because the number and length of contributions to the JCS issue was greater than expected, the collective review of Artificial Consciousness had to be omitted, but here at last it is. Each paper’s review is written by a single author, so any comments made may not reflect the opinions of all nine of the joint authors!
Abstract: Not all research in machine consciousness aims to instantiate phenomenal states in arte... more Abstract: Not all research in machine consciousness aims to instantiate phenomenal states in artefacts. For example, one can use artefacts that do not themselves have phenomenal states, merely to simulate or model organisms that do. Nevertheless, one might refer to all of these pursuits--instantiating, simulating or modelling phenomenal states in an artefact--as' synthetic phenomenality'.
Standard, linguistic means of specifying the content of mental states do so by expressing the con... more Standard, linguistic means of specifying the content of mental states do so by expressing the content in question. Such means fail when it comes to capturing non-conceptual aspects of visual experience, since no linguistic expression can adequately express such content. One alternative is to use depictions: images that either evoke (reproduce in the recipient) or refer to the content of the experience. Practical considerations concerning the generation and integration of such depictions argue in favour of a synthetic approach: the generation of depictions through the use of an embodied, perceiving and acting agent, either virtual or real. This paper takes the first steps in an investigation as to how one might use a robot to specify the non-conceptual content of the visual experience of an (hypothetical) organism that the robot models.
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