- Clinical Psychology, Consciousness, Social Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Mentalization, Relational Psychoanalysis, and 25 morePsychology, Communication, Discourse Analysis, Developmental Psychology, Health Psychology, Music Psychology, Metacognition, Intersubjectivity, Theoretical Psychology, Mentalizing, Speech Prosody, Altered States of Consciousness, Intentionality, Nonverbal Communication, Comparative psychology, Consciousness (Psychology), Language and Social Interaction, Coordination, Joint attention, Arts and Music for Health and Wellbeing, Mental Spaces Theory, Metacognition and its development, Church History, Cognitive development, and Theory of Mindedit
- Senior lecturer in Psychologyedit
ABSTRACT In our response, we address four themes arising from the commentaries. First, we discuss the distinction between cognition and metacognition and show how to draw it within our framework. Next, we explain how metacognition differs... more
ABSTRACT In our response, we address four themes arising from the commentaries. First, we discuss the distinction between cognition and metacognition and show how to draw it within our framework. Next, we explain how metacognition differs from social cognition. The underlying mechanisms of metacognitive development are then elucidated in terms of interaction patterns. Finally, we consider measures of metacognition and suitable methods for investigating it. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
From primary intersubjectivity to mentalization : on the development of social understanding
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The aim of the thesis was to examine different aspects of the role of intersubjectivity in metacognitive development and in social understanding. More specifically, it investigates how different theoretical frameworks, such as... more
The aim of the thesis was to examine different aspects of the role of intersubjectivity in metacognitive development and in social understanding. More specifically, it investigates how different theoretical frameworks, such as mentalization theory, the theory of primary intersubjectivity, and interaction theory describe the developmental role of intersubjectivity. The suggestions these theories make in regard to this is also studied. Common to all three papers included in the dissertation is the conviction that intersubjectivity actually is central for, and affects in a basic way, social and cognitive development from the very beginning of life. The methods employed are theoretical and concern the analysis of empirical studies in developmental psychology, as well as the analysis of, and comparison between, theories concerning different aspects of social understanding. In the first paper, metacognition is interpreted as a way of managing cognitive resources that does not necessitate ...
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Research Interests:
Research Interests:
17 INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP-ENACTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY 1 Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Lund University, Sweden 2 Department of Psychology, Lund University, Sweden ingar. brinck@ fil. lu. se METACOGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
We explain metacognition as a management of cognitive resources that does not necessitate algorithmic strategies or metarepresentation. When pragmatic, world-directed actions cannot reduce the distance to the goal, agents engage in... more
We explain metacognition as a management of cognitive resources that does not necessitate algorithmic strategies or metarepresentation. When pragmatic, world-directed actions cannot reduce the distance to the goal, agents engage in epistemic action directed at cognition. Such actions often are physical and involve other people, and so are open to observation. Taking a dynamic systems approach to development, we suggest that implicit and perceptual metacognition emerges from dyadic reciprocal interaction. Early intersubjectivity allows infants to internalize and construct rudimentary strategies for monitoring and control of their own and others' cognitions by emotion and attention. The functions of initiating, maintaining, and achieving turns make proto-conversation a productive platform for developing metacognition. It enables caregiver and infant to create shared routines for epistemic actions that permit training of metacognitive skills. The adult is of double epistemic use to the infant—as a teacher that comments on and corrects the infant's efforts, and as the infant's cognitive resource in its own right.
Research Interests:
In our response, we address four themes arising from the commentaries. First, we discuss the distinction between cognition and metacognition and show how to draw it within our framework. Next, we explain how metacognition differs from... more
In our response, we address four themes arising from the commentaries. First, we discuss the distinction between cognition and metacognition and show how to draw it within our framework. Next, we explain how metacognition differs from social cognition. The underlying mechanisms of metacognitive development are then elucidated in terms of interaction patterns. Finally, we consider measures of metacognition and suitable methods for investigating it.
Research Interests:
Metacognition traditionally has been conceptualized as a form of higher-order thought that requires metarepresentation, logical reasoning, self-consciousness, and introspective access to knowledge states. Thinking of metacognition along... more
Metacognition traditionally has been conceptualized as a form of higher-order thought that requires metarepresentation, logical reasoning, self-consciousness, and introspective access to knowledge states. Thinking of metacognition along these lines precludes metacognition in nonhuman animals, preverbal human infants, and subjects with certain cognitive and
neurophysiological impairments. Recent experimental evidence of implicit metacognitive skills in nonhuman primates, human infants, and human adults show the need for a broad
concept of metacognition, based in what metacognition does, i.e., its operative function, instead of theoretical hypotheses about what it is, i.e., its nature. Such a concept would permit
unbiased cross-disciplinary investigations of the evolution and development of metacognition. Presenting a new theoretical and conceptual framework for investigating implicit and
perceptual forms of metacognition, the article explores the claim that metacognition has its developmental origin in primary intersubjectivity. The claim has implications for research on metacognition in comparative psychology, cognitive science, and related disciplines. It is argued that basic metacognitive skills start to develop from 2 months of age in episodes of turn-taking between infant and caregiver. Infants initially acquire the means for joint monitoring and control of the interaction with the caregiver. Later metacognitive development is a function of the quality and quantity of the stimulation during this period. Turn-taking is apt for scaffolding metacognitive growth because, first, monitoring and control of cognition is integral to it, second, it enables learning and training of epistemic actions that realize monitoring and control functions, and third, feedback is immediate.
neurophysiological impairments. Recent experimental evidence of implicit metacognitive skills in nonhuman primates, human infants, and human adults show the need for a broad
concept of metacognition, based in what metacognition does, i.e., its operative function, instead of theoretical hypotheses about what it is, i.e., its nature. Such a concept would permit
unbiased cross-disciplinary investigations of the evolution and development of metacognition. Presenting a new theoretical and conceptual framework for investigating implicit and
perceptual forms of metacognition, the article explores the claim that metacognition has its developmental origin in primary intersubjectivity. The claim has implications for research on metacognition in comparative psychology, cognitive science, and related disciplines. It is argued that basic metacognitive skills start to develop from 2 months of age in episodes of turn-taking between infant and caregiver. Infants initially acquire the means for joint monitoring and control of the interaction with the caregiver. Later metacognitive development is a function of the quality and quantity of the stimulation during this period. Turn-taking is apt for scaffolding metacognitive growth because, first, monitoring and control of cognition is integral to it, second, it enables learning and training of epistemic actions that realize monitoring and control functions, and third, feedback is immediate.
Research Interests:
In our response, we address four themes arising from the commentaries. First, we discuss the distinction between cognition and metacognition and show how to draw it within our framework. Next, we explain how metacognition differs from... more
In our response, we address four themes arising from the commentaries. First, we discuss the distinction between cognition and metacognition and show how to draw it within our framework. Next, we explain how metacognition differs from social cognition. The underlying mechanisms of metacognitive development are then elucidated in terms of interaction patterns. Finally, we consider measures of metacognition and suitable methods for investigating it.
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Research Interests:
The introduction of the concept of mentalization in psychological science by Fonagy and colleagues has opened up new perspectives for the understanding of psychopathology, psychotherapy, and child development. The present study reviews... more
The introduction of the concept of mentalization in psychological science by Fonagy and colleagues has opened up new perspectives for the understanding of psychopathology, psychotherapy, and child development. The present study reviews the theory of mentalization, with a focus on its 4 dimensions (cognitive/affective, implicit/explicit, self/other, and external/internal), and some unclear points and unresolved issues are identified. Mentalization theory is then contrasted with the theory of primary intersubjectivity, which is often seen as an incompatible approach to the development of social understanding. It is argued that this theory, at least in 1 of its interpretations, is not only compatible with mentalization theory, but may also possibly contribute to the resolution of some problems in mentalization theory. More specifically, it is argued that mentalization originally develops in the context of primary intersubjectivity, and that primary intersubjectivity is a basic prerequisite for the development of mentalization; but also that there is a considerable overlap between the concepts of primary intersubjectivity and those of implicit and externally focused mentalization. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved)
Research Interests:
The aim of the thesis was to examine different aspects of the role of intersubjectivity in metacognitive development and in social understanding. More specifically, it investigates how different theoretical frameworks, such as... more
The aim of the thesis was to examine different aspects of the role of intersubjectivity in metacognitive development and in social understanding. More specifically, it investigates how different theoretical frameworks, such as mentalization theory, the theory of primary intersubjectivity, and interaction theory describe the developmental role of intersubjectivity. The suggestions these theories make in regard to this is also studied. Common to all three papers included in the dissertation is the conviction that intersubjectivity actually is central for, and affects in a basic way, social and cognitive development from the very beginning of life.
The methods employed are theoretical and concern the analysis of empirical studies in developmental psychology, as well as the analysis of, and comparison between, theories concerning different aspects of social understanding.
In the first paper, metacognition is interpreted as a way of managing cognitive resources that does not necessitate algorithmic strategies or metarepresentation. When pragmatic, world-directed actions cannot reduce the distance to a particular goal, the agents involved may engage in epistemic action directed at cognition. Such actions are often physical and involve other people, and thus are open to observation. Taking a dynamic systems approach to development, it is suggested that implicit and perceptual metacognition emerges from dyadic reciprocal interaction. Early intersubjectivity allows infants to internalize and construct rudimentary strategies for monitoring and control of their own and of others’ cognitions by means of emotion and attention. The functions of initiating, maintaining and achieving turns make proto-conversation a productive platform for developing metacognition. It enables the caregiver and the infant to create shared routines for epistemic actions that permit training of metacognitive skills. The adult is of double epistemic use to the infant—as a teacher who comments on and corrects the infant’s efforts, and as a cognitive resource for the infant.
The second paper deals with the question of how primary engagement and interaction relate to social understanding, most notably mentalization. The basic hypothesis considered is that primary intersubjectivity and mentalization are complementary and that the latter depends on the former, but the converse to this is not the case. Primary intersubjectivity is the sharing of experiences. It involves emotional engagement in second-person relations that are meaningful to the infant already from the start, whereas the theory of affect mirroring provides an explanation of how mentalization and representational abilities develop from dyadic interaction and contingency detection. A comparison of the theories suggests that, despite of their differences, they can fruitfully be combined. This paves the way for developing an alternative interpretation of affect mirroring, one based on the idea of young infants’ understanding the experiential dimension of emotion and using this to understand others. This makes it possible to trace the continuous development of social understanding based on emotion experience and affect sharing, and in addition to elaborate on the role of second-person engagement in attachment.
The third paper concerns the concept of mentalization as it was introduced into psychological science by Fonagy and his associates. The study describes some fundamental aspects of how the development of mentalization is viewed within the framework of this theoretical approach, enabling certain issues that seem difficult to explain in terms of mentalization theory to be more readily understood. A critical discussion of the theory is then undertaken, comparing and contrasting it with the theory of primary intersubjectivity. A suggestion is made concerning the development of mentalization that connects it with the notion of primary intersubjectivity. More specifically, it is argued that mentalization develops originally within the context of primary intersubjectivity, and that primary intersubjectivity is a basic prerequisite for the development of mentalization and in addition that there is a partial overlap between the concepts of primary intersubjectivity and implicit mentalization.
The methods employed are theoretical and concern the analysis of empirical studies in developmental psychology, as well as the analysis of, and comparison between, theories concerning different aspects of social understanding.
In the first paper, metacognition is interpreted as a way of managing cognitive resources that does not necessitate algorithmic strategies or metarepresentation. When pragmatic, world-directed actions cannot reduce the distance to a particular goal, the agents involved may engage in epistemic action directed at cognition. Such actions are often physical and involve other people, and thus are open to observation. Taking a dynamic systems approach to development, it is suggested that implicit and perceptual metacognition emerges from dyadic reciprocal interaction. Early intersubjectivity allows infants to internalize and construct rudimentary strategies for monitoring and control of their own and of others’ cognitions by means of emotion and attention. The functions of initiating, maintaining and achieving turns make proto-conversation a productive platform for developing metacognition. It enables the caregiver and the infant to create shared routines for epistemic actions that permit training of metacognitive skills. The adult is of double epistemic use to the infant—as a teacher who comments on and corrects the infant’s efforts, and as a cognitive resource for the infant.
The second paper deals with the question of how primary engagement and interaction relate to social understanding, most notably mentalization. The basic hypothesis considered is that primary intersubjectivity and mentalization are complementary and that the latter depends on the former, but the converse to this is not the case. Primary intersubjectivity is the sharing of experiences. It involves emotional engagement in second-person relations that are meaningful to the infant already from the start, whereas the theory of affect mirroring provides an explanation of how mentalization and representational abilities develop from dyadic interaction and contingency detection. A comparison of the theories suggests that, despite of their differences, they can fruitfully be combined. This paves the way for developing an alternative interpretation of affect mirroring, one based on the idea of young infants’ understanding the experiential dimension of emotion and using this to understand others. This makes it possible to trace the continuous development of social understanding based on emotion experience and affect sharing, and in addition to elaborate on the role of second-person engagement in attachment.
The third paper concerns the concept of mentalization as it was introduced into psychological science by Fonagy and his associates. The study describes some fundamental aspects of how the development of mentalization is viewed within the framework of this theoretical approach, enabling certain issues that seem difficult to explain in terms of mentalization theory to be more readily understood. A critical discussion of the theory is then undertaken, comparing and contrasting it with the theory of primary intersubjectivity. A suggestion is made concerning the development of mentalization that connects it with the notion of primary intersubjectivity. More specifically, it is argued that mentalization develops originally within the context of primary intersubjectivity, and that primary intersubjectivity is a basic prerequisite for the development of mentalization and in addition that there is a partial overlap between the concepts of primary intersubjectivity and implicit mentalization.