8000 [2.7] bpo-30458: Disallow control chars in http URLs. (GH-12755) (GH-13154) by vstinner · Pull Request #13315 · python/cpython · GitHub
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[2.7] bpo-30458: Disallow control chars in http URLs. (GH-12755) (GH-13154) #13315

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May 21, 2019
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16 changes: 16 additions & 0 deletions Lib/httplib.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -247,6 +247,16 @@
_is_legal_header_name = re.compile(r'\A[^:\s][^:\r\n]*\Z').match
_is_illegal_header_value = re.compile(r'\n(?![ \t])|\r(?![ \t\n])').search

# These characters are not allowed within HTTP URL paths.
# See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.3 and the
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#appendix-A pchar definition.
# Prevents CVE-2019-9740. Includes control characters such as \r\n.
# Restrict non-ASCII characters above \x7f (0x80-0xff).
_contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re = re.compile('[\x00-\x20\x7f-\xff]')
# Arguably only these _should_ allowed:
# _is_allowed_url_pchars_re = re.compile(r"^[/!$&'()*+,;=:@%a-zA-Z0-9._~-]+$")
# We are more lenient for assumed real world compatibility purposes.

# We always set the Content-Length header for these methods because some
# servers will otherwise respond with a 411
_METHODS_EXPECTING_BODY = {'PATCH', 'POST', 'PUT'}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -927,6 +937,12 @@ def putrequest(self, method, url, skip_host=0, skip_accept_encoding=0):
self._method = method
if not url:
url = '/'
# Prevent CVE-2019-9740.
match = _contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re.search(url)
if match:
raise InvalidURL("URL can't contain control characters. %r "
"(found at least %r)"
% (url, match.group()))
hdr = '%s %s %s' % (method, url, self._http_vsn_str)

self._output(hdr)
Expand Down
31 changes: 31 additions & 0 deletions Lib/test/test_urllib.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
import sys
import mimetools
import tempfile
try:
import ssl
except ImportError:
ssl = None

from test import test_support
from base64 import b64encode
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -257,6 +261,33 @@ def test_url_fragment(self):
finally:
self.unfakehttp()

@unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
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is this true for these tests? (not that it matters, all sane platforms have ssl so these tests will be run regardless)

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oops, no, the decorator is wrong: i removed it.

def test_url_with_control_char_rejected(self):
for char_no in range(0, 0x21) + range(0x7f, 0x100):
char = chr(char_no)
schemeless_url = "//localhost:7777/test%s/" % char
self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
try:
# urllib quotes the URL so there is no injection.
resp = urllib.urlopen("http:" + schemeless_url)
self.assertNotIn(char, resp.geturl())
finally:
self.unfakehttp()

@unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
def test_url_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
host = "localhost:7777?a=1 HTTP/1.1\r\nX-injected: header\r\nTEST: 123"
schemeless_url = "//" + host + ":8080/test/?test=a"
try:
# urllib quotes the URL so there is no injection.
resp = urllib.urlopen("http:" + schemeless_url)
self.assertNotIn(' ', resp.geturl())
self.assertNotIn('\r', resp.geturl())
self.assertNotIn('\n', resp.geturl())
finally:
self.unfakehttp()

def test_read_bogus(self):
# urlopen() should raise IOError for many error codes.
self.fakehttp('''HTTP/1.1 401 Authentication Required
Expand Down
63 changes: 56 additions & 7 deletions Lib/test/test_urllib2.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
import unittest
from test import test_support
from test import support
from test import test_urllib

import os
Expand All @@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
except ImportError:
ssl = None

from test.test_urllib import FakeHTTPMixin


# XXX
# Request
# CacheFTPHandler (hard to write)
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -683,7 +686,7 @@ def test_file(self):
h = urllib2.FileHandler()
o = h.parent = MockOpener()

TESTFN = test_support.TESTFN
TESTFN = support.TESTFN
urlpath = sanepathname2url(os.path.abspath(TESTFN))
towrite = "hello, world\n"
urls = [
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1154,7 +1157,7 @@ def test_basic_auth_with_unquoted_realm(self):
opener.add_handler(auth_handler)
opener.add_handler(http_handler)
msg = "Basic Auth Realm was unquoted"
with test_support.check_warnings((msg, UserWarning)):
with support.check_warnings((msg, UserWarning)):
self._test_basic_auth(opener, auth_handler, "Authorization",
realm, http_handler, password_manager,
"http://acme.example.com/protected",
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1262,7 +1265,7 @@ def _test_basic_auth(self, opener, auth_handler, auth_header,
self.assertEqual(len(http_handler.requests), 1)
self.assertFalse(http_handler.requests[0].has_header(auth_header))

class MiscTests(unittest.TestCase):
class MiscTests(unittest.TestCase, FakeHTTPMixin):

def test_build_opener(self):
class MyHTTPHandler(urllib2.HTTPHandler): pass
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1317,6 +1320,52 @@ def test_unsupported_algorithm(self):
"Unsupported digest authentication algorithm 'invalid'"
)

@unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
def test_url_with_control_char_rejected(self):
for char_no in range(0, 0x21) + range(0x7f, 0x100):
char = chr(char_no)
schemeless_url = "//localhost:7777/test%s/" % char
self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
try:
# We explicitly test urllib.request.urlopen() instead of the top
# level 'def urlopen()' function defined in this... (quite ugly)
# test suite. They use different url opening codepaths. Plain
# urlopen uses FancyURLOpener which goes via a codepath that
# calls urllib.parse.quote() on the URL which makes all of the
# above attempts at injection within the url _path_ safe.
escaped_char_repr = repr(char).replace('\\', r'\\')
InvalidURL = httplib.InvalidURL
with self.assertRaisesRegexp(
InvalidURL, "contain control.*" + escaped_char_repr):
urllib2.urlopen("http:" + schemeless_url)
with self.assertRaisesRegexp(
InvalidURL, "contain control.*" + escaped_char_repr):
urllib2.urlopen("https:" + schemeless_url)
finally:
self.unfakehttp()

@unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
def test_url_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
host = "localhost:7777?a=1 HTTP/1.1\r\nX-injected: header\r\nTEST: 123"
schemeless_url = "//" + host + ":8080/test/?test=a"
try:
# We explicitly test urllib.request.urlopen() instead of the top
# level 'def urlopen()' function defined in this... (quite ugly)
# test suite. They use different url opening codepaths. Plain
# urlopen uses FancyURLOpener which goes via a codepath that
# calls urllib.parse.quote() on the URL which makes all of the
# above attempts at injection within the url _path_ safe.
InvalidURL = httplib.InvalidURL
with self.assertRaisesRegexp(
InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\r.*(found at least . .)"):
urllib2.urlopen("http:" + schemeless_url)
with self.assertRaisesRegexp(InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\n"):
urllib2.urlopen("https:" + schemeless_url)
finally:
self.unfakehttp()



class RequestTests(unittest.TestCase):

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1412,14 +1461,14 @@ def test_HTTPError_interface_call(self):

def test_main(verbose=None):
from test import test_urllib2
test_support.run_doctest(test_urllib2, verbose)
test_support.run_doctest(urllib2, verbose)
support.run_doctest(test_urllib2, verbose)
support.run_doctest(urllib2, verbose)
tests = (TrivialTests,
OpenerDirectorTests,
HandlerTests,
MiscTests,
RequestTests)
test_support.run_unittest(*tests)
support.run_unittest(*tests)

if __name__ == "__main__":
test_main(verbose=True)
8 changes: 7 additions & 1 deletion Lib/test/test_xmlrpc.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -659,7 +659,13 @@ def test_dotted_attribute(self):
def test_partial_post(self):
# Check that a partial POST doesn't make the server loop: issue #14001.
conn = httplib.HTTPConnection(ADDR, PORT)
conn.request('POST', '/RPC2 HTTP/1. 92DE 0\r\nContent-Length: 100\r\n\r\nbye')
conn.send('POST /RPC2 HTTP/1.0\r\n'
'Content-Length: 100\r\n\r\n'
'bye HTTP/1.1\r\n'
'Host: %s:%s\r\n'
'Accept-Encoding: identity\r\n'
'Content-Length: 0\r\n\r\n'
% (ADDR, PORT))
conn.close()

class SimpleServerEncodingTestCase(BaseServerTestCase):
Expand Down
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
Address CVE-2019-9740 by disallowing URL paths with embedded whitespace or control characters through into the underlying http client request. Such potentially malicious header injection URLs now cause an httplib.InvalidURL exception to be raised.
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