Reject potential option injections over ssh #6636
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This function returns true if the string starts with a `-` as that could be used to inject options into commands we execute.
If you pass along something like `-oProxyCommand=...` as the hostname, we would pass that along to ssh unbeknownst to us and potentially also the user, if they were asking a tool to recursively clone submodules. This is the same fix as mainline git although they don't separate the username and host for ssh so ours looks like it's checking more.
Like in the previous commit and in git, we reject a path that looks like an option to avoid injection into the command we ask the remote to execute.
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Oops I fat fingered the mobile app and marked this for ready for review. 😅 |
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OK I think we're good to go now. |
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Thanks @carlosmn -- sorry for the delay here. I was thinking that |
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Yes, that namespace make sense, I was just trying to fit it into the existing ones. |
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Thanks Carlos! |
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Like git (and basically everyone else, that was a fun CVE) did a while ago, we need to reject urls that might inject options into ssh which could cause it to execute arbitrary commands instead of what we mean for it to execute.
This is on the yet-unreleased exec-based transport so a public PR should be fine.
As git does, we also reject suspicious paths which may be trying to inject options into the command we ask the remote to execute. This is out of an abundance of caution.
I'm opening this up as a draft as we should have at least a little bit of testing there.
I put the function in with the
netones because I couldn't think of where to put it. git puts it with some path functions but our organisation is different.