- Strategy Division
Swedish Defence University, Stockholm
Matthew Ford
Swedish Defence University, Strategy Department, Faculty Member
- Matthew Ford is an academic currently focusing on war and the data-saturated battlefields of the 21st century. His m... moreMatthew Ford is an academic currently focusing on war and the data-saturated battlefields of the 21st century.
His most recent book - Radical War - with Professor Andrew Hoskins from Glasgow University traces war’s data trajectories, from the epicentres of battle out to distant parts of the world, into history, memory and as it is memed into the platforms that mediate digital culture.
Matthew's first book, 'Weapon of Choice - Small Arms and the Culture of Military Innovation', is an analysis of military innovation and culture and was published by Hurst & Co, London and Oxford University Press, New York in 2017.
Matthew is an Honorary Historical Consultant to the Royal Armouries (UK), the founding Editor-in-Chief of the British Journal for Military History, a former West Point Fellow and a Visiting Scholar at the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.edit
Ukraine’s civilians can provide crowdsourced geolocated target information to the Ukrainian Army. This has the effect of creating a more resilient targeting process but also implies that anyone with a smartphone may become a target of... more
Ukraine’s civilians can provide crowdsourced geolocated target information to the Ukrainian Army. This has the effect of creating a more resilient targeting process but also implies that anyone with a smartphone may become a target of enemy action. Now the question is whether raising a smartphone to photograph an enemy column constitutes a hostile act. There is already video evidence online showing how people using smartphones to record Russian military activity have found themselves under fire. In addition, The Economist reporter Tim Juddah observes that, ‘The Russians arrested people and shot them in the street to make an example because what they were really frightened of was the Ukrainians using their phones to report to Ukrainian forces their positions’. This does not justify the atrocities committed by the Russians but it remains an open question as to how the spiral of violence was triggered given the evidence so far accumulated.
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Ukraine’s armed forces have outsourced parts of the kill chain to civilians. Civilians can provide crowdsourced geolocated target information to the Ukrainian Army by using their smartphones. This information can be verified and... more
Ukraine’s armed forces have outsourced parts of the kill chain to civilians. Civilians can provide crowdsourced geolocated target information to the Ukrainian Army by using their smartphones. This information can be verified and crosschecked against data points provided by other smartphone users and/or other intelligence sources. The Ukrainian armed forces can then direct remote fire onto the targets that civilians have identified. On the battlefields outside Kyiv, civilians have become sensors, extending the targeting cycle into civil society. This has the effect of creating a more resilient targeting process but also means that anyone with a smartphone may become a target of enemy action. There are a lot of unknowns – especially in relation to how the new war ecology (see part 1 dated 8 April 2022) is geared for targeting. This paper outlines the initial questions that need further research.
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The war in Ukraine is heavily mediated by connected devices and social media platforms. The smartphone for example is being used for all sorts of purposes, ranging from calling home to sharing news about the war. Crucially these devices... more
The war in Ukraine is heavily mediated by connected devices and social media platforms. The smartphone for example is being used for all sorts of purposes, ranging from calling home to sharing news about the war. Crucially these devices also provide targeting information that can be used by both sides to identify what to attack and how successful attacks have been. The implication is that civilian and military information infrastructures for both information sharing and targeting are now tightly bound. On the one hand this creates new attack surfaces even as it hardens the resiliency of the kill chain. On the other, the use of a smartphone might be interpreted as a hostile act, the consequence of which is to blur civilian and combatant status.
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This paper will form the basis of a future academic article connected to my co-authored book Radical War.
The paper was originally commissioned by UnHerd and completed on 11 March 2022
The paper was originally commissioned by UnHerd and completed on 11 March 2022
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The war in Ukraine is the first conventional war to ever take place in an entirely connected information ecology. The internet has not been switched off. Mundane smart devices are ubiquitous. Soldiers and ordinary civilians are... more
The war in Ukraine is the first conventional war to ever take place in an entirely connected information ecology. The internet has not been switched off. Mundane smart devices are ubiquitous. Soldiers and ordinary civilians are participating in the conflict in ways that have never previously been possible. This stretches participation beyond the information domain and the kinds of connectivity that shaped conflicts in places like Syria, Tigray and Mali. Now the smartphone is routinely being used by soldiers and civilians alike to geolocate enemy columns, control drones to range find for artillery, and produce and broadcast the damage assessment for online audiences to watch. Surveillance technology already makes it possible to track individual smartphone users. In times of peace these forms of surveillance are curtailed. During a conventional war, however, private organizations and governments have reason to circumvent peacetime legal conventions. The result is that mundane connected technology forms part of an extended chain of sensors that feeds data and information to those involved in information warfare and targeting activities. In effect, the smartphone has collapsed the means to fight and represent war into the functionality of one device. This article maps the policy and military implications of these developments in relation to participation, the conduct of war and the law of armed conflict.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Ukraine, participation and the smartphone at war Digitisation is redefining the battlefield. Whereas once only soldiers and embedded journalists had privileged access to the battlefield, now war is everywhere, brought to us by civilians... more
Ukraine, participation and the smartphone at war Digitisation is redefining the battlefield. Whereas once only soldiers and embedded journalists had privileged access to the battlefield, now war is everywhere, brought to us by civilians and their smartphones. People produce, publish and consume media on the same device. They can be at the frontlines or on the other side of the world. Digital individuals may willingly participate in war or they may participate by dint of being connected to the grid. In this sense it is participative in that everyone has the potential to be involved through the data they create. This produces dynamic information flows that amplify and accelerate both war and its representation bringing the relationship between the military targeting and media production cycles into alignment. In the process, the bystander has been removed from war and instead collapsed the relationship between audience and actor, soldier and civilian, media and weapon.
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Armed forces are now in a race to exploit the technologies associated with Artificial Intelligence. Viewed as force mul- tipliers, these technologies have the potential to speed up decision making and roboticise warfighting. At the same... more
Armed forces are now in a race to exploit the technologies associated with Artificial Intelligence. Viewed as force mul- tipliers, these technologies have the potential to speed up decision making and roboticise warfighting. At the same time, however, these systems disintermediate military roles and functions, creating shifts in the relationships of power in military organizations as different entities vie to shape and control how innovations are implemented. In this article we argue that new innovation processes are sites of emerging forms of public–private interaction and practices. On the one hand this is driving entrepreneurialism into government bureaucracy even as it forges new bonds between defence and industry. On the other, as technologies replace soldiers, a new martial culture is emerging, one that reframes the warrior geek as an elite innovation corps of prototype warrior. We seek to map these relationships and explore the implications for civil-military relations in the twenty-first century.
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The science of ammunition lethality is a field that seeks to define the point at which military ordnance takes life and produces death. By historicising lethality's epistemology, I reveal the intellectual fissures and scientific... more
The science of ammunition lethality is a field that seeks to define the point at which military ordnance takes life and produces death. By historicising lethality's epistemology, I reveal the intellectual fissures and scientific uncertainties that have been reified and embedded into contemporary conceptions of military power. This not only tells us something about the processes by which science is subordinated to war but also offers a new lens from which to consider the way knowledge claims about battle are co-constructed and legitimated through military practices. As a result, this paper places science back into a narrative that otherwise frames the ontology of war in terms of fighting.
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This paper seeks to explore how a particular narrative focused on population-centric counterinsurgency shaped American strategy during the Autumn 2009 Presidential review on Afghanistan, examine the narrative's genealogy and suggest... more
This paper seeks to explore how a particular narrative focused on population-centric counterinsurgency shaped American strategy during the Autumn 2009 Presidential review on Afghanistan, examine the narrative's genealogy and suggest weaknesses and inconsistencies that exist within it. More precisely our ambition is to show how through a process of ‘rhetorical re-description’ this narrative has come to dominate contemporary American strategic discourse. We argue that in order to promote and legitimate their case, a contemporary ‘COIN Lobby’ of influential warrior scholars, academics and commentators utilizes select historical interpretations of counterinsurgency and limits discussion of COIN to what they consider to be failures in implementation. As a result, it has become very difficult for other ways of conceptualizing the counterinsurgency problem to emerge into the policy debate.
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This paper uses equipment standardisation as a lens for examining power relationships and the importance of military identity in framing the development of NATO conventional capability. In the face of the Warsaw Pact's overwhelming... more
This paper uses equipment standardisation as a lens for examining power relationships and the importance of military identity in framing the development of NATO conventional capability. In the face of the Warsaw Pact's overwhelming military capacity the logic of standardisation was compelling. Standardising equipment and making military forces interoperable reduced logistics overlap, increased the tempo of operations and allowed partners to optimise manufacturing capacity. Applied carefully, standardisation would help NATO mount a successful conventional defence of Western Europe, a crucial aspect of the Alliance's flexible response strategy. In this paper, we apply Actor Network Theory to standardisation discussions thereby revealing the incoherence and volatility of NATO's collective strategic thinking and the vast networks of countervailing interests on which this is based.
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Donald Rumsfeld was right. Force transformation works. The techniques that led to the initial victories in Afghanistan in 2001 were precisely those that produced success in Libya in 2011. Small-scale deployments of special forces backed... more
Donald Rumsfeld was right. Force transformation works. The techniques that led to the initial victories in Afghanistan in 2001 were precisely those that produced success in Libya in 2011. Small-scale deployments of special forces backed by precision strike and deep attack capabilities used to support an allied indigenous armed group proved an effective military tool for achieving specific strategic outcomes. In contrast, the results of large-scale troop deployments as part of counterinsurgency (COIN), stabilization and nation-building activities over the past ten years in Iraq and Afghanistan have been less definitive. Despite intensive investment in blood, treasure, and military effort, the precise long-term outcomes of these two campaigns remain unclear and will be open to debate for years to come. This challenging operational experience has, however, highlighted some necessary and enduring truths about the use of military force. Despite great advances in military technology and the increasing sophistication with which organized violence can be applied in a range of situations, all warfare remains characterized by uncertainty; there exists no silver bullet that can guarantee enduring political success from the barrel of a gun.
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On military history as a professional boundary dispute between academia and the armed forces
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The central claim underpinning the Revolution in Military Affairs isthat battlefield imperatives drive technical and more widely social change: thattechnology evolves according to a logic that starts with the relationship between the... more
The central claim underpinning the Revolution in Military Affairs isthat battlefield imperatives drive technical and more widely social change: thattechnology evolves according to a logic that starts with the relationship between the offence and defence in battle. Thus the ambition of the military organisationis to develop weaponry that can beat the adversary. A failure to grasp thisessential truth leads to defeat in battle. This paper demonstrates how technologychange happens in practice. By looking inside the ‘black box’ of the military organisation, what emerges is a more complicated picture that takes into accountthe way arguments for technical change are constructed and deployed within thebureaucracy based on a variety of battlefield interpretations. This shows that technology development is not necessarily driven by either frontline demands orscientific understanding but in reference to who has organisational power andhow they use i
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This article is concerned with exploring the recent observations of Lieutenant-General Lamb who stated that there was no simple binary between counterintelligence (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT). Specifically, the article will use the... more
This article is concerned with exploring the recent observations of Lieutenant-General Lamb who stated that there was no simple binary between counterintelligence (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT). Specifically, the article will use the intelligence-gathering, assessment, and target identification processes and methods used on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to examine this further. What makes this an interesting exercise is that the effectiveness of a COIN/CT intervention totally depends on whether an insurgent has been properly identified. If the wrong person has been targeted then kinetic, influence, or policing activities are at best exploratory and at worst wasteful or even positively harmful. Thus, by investigating the intelligence model that frames the way adversaries and communities are identified, it becomes possible to understand the limitations in the processes and methods used. At the same time this approach makes it possible to cast light on how and to what extent various techniques drawn from COIN and CT work together in Overseas Contingency Operations.
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This article examines the British army's decision to adopt the Lee-Metford magazine rifle in 1888. Examining the perspectives of a number of constituencies in the services shows that the magazine arm was not adopted out of an ambition... more
This article examines the British army's decision to adopt the Lee-Metford magazine rifle in 1888. Examining the perspectives of a number of constituencies in the services shows that the magazine arm was not adopted out of an ambition simply to produce greater volumes of fire. Instead a number of factors shaped the decision to abandon the previous service arm, the Martini-Henry, many of which were contingent and reflected the particular attitudes of those groups with an interest in the infantry's equipment. What ultimately becomes apparent is that the Lee-Metford was embraced primarily because it did not force any one constituency in the army to adopt the tactical preferences of any of the other groups involved.
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This article examines the British army’s decision to adopt the Short Magazine Lee-Enfield (SMLE) in 1903. Historians invariably assume that this weapon was developed in response to demands to modernize and improve the army following the... more
This article examines the British army’s decision to adopt the Short Magazine Lee-Enfield (SMLE) in 1903. Historians invariably assume that this weapon was developed in response to demands to modernize and improve the army following the failures and poor marksmanship of British soldiers fighting in the Boer War. Understood this way the SMLE’s selection appears inevitable and as a result is rarely examined in close detail. This stands in contrast to the wealth of attention dedicated to exploring how the cavalry fought to hold onto the arme blanche despite the apparent revolution in machine-gun and artillery firepower. Upon closer examination, however, neither way of thinking about the changes occurring in the British army after the Boer War does justice to the complexities surrounding the development and selection of the SMLE. Rather, by considering the manner in which different communities within the army thought about battle, and in particular how engagements on the North West Frontier shaped perspectives on marksmanship, this article demonstrates how the cavalry and the Indian Army played an important part in the adoption of the SMLE.
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British attitudes towards military intervention following the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have undergone what appears to be considerable change. Parliament has voted against the use of Britain's armed forces in Syria and the public... more
British attitudes towards military intervention following the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have undergone what appears to be considerable change. Parliament has voted against the use of Britain's armed forces in Syria and the public are unenthused by overseas engagement. Conscious of the costs and the challenges posed by the use of British military power the government has been busy revamping the way it approaches crises overseas. The result is a set of policies that apparently heralds a new direction in foreign policy. This new direction is encapsulated in the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) and the more recent International Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES). Both BSOS and IDES set out the basis for avoiding major deployments to overseas conflict and instead refocuses effort on defence diplomacy, working with and through overseas governments and partners, early warning, pre-conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. Developing a number of themes that reach from across the Cold War to more contemporary discussions of British strategy, the goal of this special edition is to take into account a number of perspectives that place BSOS and IDES in their historical and strategic context. These papers suggest that using defence diplomacy is and will remain an extremely imprecise lever that needs to be carefully managed if it is to remain a democratically accountable tool of foreign policy.
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In 2011, the Department for International Development, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and the Ministry of Defence launched the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS). This document sought to integrate cross-government activity as... more
In 2011, the Department for International Development, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and the Ministry of Defence launched the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS). This document sought to integrate cross-government activity as it related to conflict and security so as to ‘take fast, appropriate and effective action to prevent a crisis or stop it escalating and spreading’. At the heart of the strategy was the recognition that addressing instability and conflict overseas was morally right and in the UK's national interests. This confluence of foreign policy realism and ethical outlook most clearly found harmony in the acknowledgement that it was cheaper for the international community to avoid conflict than it was to try to manage it. Through an examination of three historical case studies (Uganda 1964–1972, Rhodesia–Zimbabwe 1979–1981, and Sierra Leone 2000–2007), this article seeks to demonstrate just how difficult this seemingly sensible strategic outlook is. In particular, the article shows there are historical parallels in British postcolonial history that very closely resemble contemporary policy choices; that these can be used to define what is different about past and present practice; and, which in turn, can be used to – at least tentatively – mark out the potential strengths and weaknesses in BSOS.
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Over the past 20 years, the Defence Medical Services (DMS, the umbrella organisation for medical provision within the British armed forces) has been innovating consistently and at pace within the Ministry of Defence. The result of this... more
Over the past 20 years, the Defence Medical Services (DMS, the umbrella organisation for medical provision within the British armed forces) has been innovating consistently and at pace within the Ministry of Defence. The result of this sustained effort has led to progressive improvement in the outcomes of the critically injured. Separately, it has also led to global transformational innovation in support of the response to the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone. Through planned and orchestrated interventions across the entire organisation, from leadership to technology, medical practices to training and organisational design, the DMS can legitimately claim to have achieved a ‘Revolution in Military Medical Affairs’. Matthew Ford, Timothy Hodgetts and David Williams examine the innovation lifecycle within the DMS as it defines its response to the challenges of the changing character of conflict and consider the way defence medicine is an example to the wider military.
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Official Military History (OH) is a thorny subject. Despite a century of deploying British service personnel to conflicts all over the world, over the past 100 years the British government has commissioned very few OHs. Offering an... more
Official Military History (OH) is a thorny subject. Despite a century of deploying British service personnel to conflicts all over the world, over the past 100 years the British government has commissioned very few OHs. Offering an interpretation of military events that is typically based on early access to otherwise classified data, OH presents an opportunity for the political and military establishment to set out a perspective that aims at legitimacy but is typically criticised as being flawed. In this discussion paper we present the conflicting pressures and expectations that frame the writing of OH and ask whether such an activity will be possible in a world after the controversies associated with the Iraq War Inquiry of 2009-11.
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The BJMH is a pioneering Open Access, peer-reviewed journal that brings high quality scholarship in military history to an audience beyond academia. "The birth of the British Journal for Military History will be as welcome as it is long... more
The BJMH is a pioneering Open Access, peer-reviewed journal that brings high quality scholarship in military history to an audience beyond academia. "The birth of the British Journal for Military History will be as welcome as it is long overdue" - Professor Sir Michael Howard
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The BJMH is a pioneering Open Access, peer-reviewed journal that brings high quality scholarship in military history to an audience beyond academia. "The birth of the British Journal for Military History will be as welcome as it is long... more
The BJMH is a pioneering Open Access, peer-reviewed journal that brings high quality scholarship in military history to an audience beyond academia.
"The birth of the British Journal for Military History will be as welcome as it is long overdue" - Professor Sir Michael Howard
"The birth of the British Journal for Military History will be as welcome as it is long overdue" - Professor Sir Michael Howard
Research Interests:
The BJMH is a pioneering Open Access, peer-reviewed journal that brings high quality scholarship in military history to an audience beyond academia. "The birth of the British Journal for Military History will be as welcome as it is long... more
The BJMH is a pioneering Open Access, peer-reviewed journal that brings high quality scholarship in military history to an audience beyond academia.
"The birth of the British Journal for Military History will be as welcome as it is long overdue" - Professor Sir Michael Howard
"The birth of the British Journal for Military History will be as welcome as it is long overdue" - Professor Sir Michael Howard
Research Interests:
The BJMH is a pioneering Open Access, peer-reviewed journal that brings high quality scholarship in military history to an audience beyond academia. "The birth of the British Journal for Military History will be as welcome as it is long... more
The BJMH is a pioneering Open Access, peer-reviewed journal that brings high quality scholarship in military history to an audience beyond academia.
"The birth of the British Journal for Military History will be as welcome as it is long overdue" - Professor Sir Michael Howard
"The birth of the British Journal for Military History will be as welcome as it is long overdue" - Professor Sir Michael Howard
Research Interests:
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER This book examines Western military technological innovation through the lens of developments in small arms during the twentieth century. These weapons have existed for centuries, appear to have matured only... more
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER
This book examines Western military technological innovation through the lens of developments in small arms during the twentieth century. These weapons have existed for centuries, appear to have matured only incrementally and might seem unlikely technologies for investigating the trajectory of military–technical change. Their relative simplicity, however, makes it easy to use them to map patterns of innovation within the military–industrial complex. Advanced technologies may have captured the military imagination, offering the possibility of clean and decisive outcomes, but it is the low technologies of the infantryman that can help us develop an appreciation for the dynamics of military–technical change.
Tracing the path of innovation from battlefield to back office, and from industry to alliance partner, Ford develops insights into the way that small arms are socially constructed. He thereby exposes the mechanics of power across the military–industrial complex. This in turn reveals that shifting power relations between soldiers and scientists, bureaucrats and engineers, have allowed the private sector to exploit infantry status anxiety and shape soldier weapon preferences. Ford’s analysis allows us to draw wider conclusions about how military innovation works and what social factors frame Western military purchasing policy, from small arms to more sophisticated and expensive weapons.
This book examines Western military technological innovation through the lens of developments in small arms during the twentieth century. These weapons have existed for centuries, appear to have matured only incrementally and might seem unlikely technologies for investigating the trajectory of military–technical change. Their relative simplicity, however, makes it easy to use them to map patterns of innovation within the military–industrial complex. Advanced technologies may have captured the military imagination, offering the possibility of clean and decisive outcomes, but it is the low technologies of the infantryman that can help us develop an appreciation for the dynamics of military–technical change.
Tracing the path of innovation from battlefield to back office, and from industry to alliance partner, Ford develops insights into the way that small arms are socially constructed. He thereby exposes the mechanics of power across the military–industrial complex. This in turn reveals that shifting power relations between soldiers and scientists, bureaucrats and engineers, have allowed the private sector to exploit infantry status anxiety and shape soldier weapon preferences. Ford’s analysis allows us to draw wider conclusions about how military innovation works and what social factors frame Western military purchasing policy, from small arms to more sophisticated and expensive weapons.
Research Interests:
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER Allied Fighting Effectiveness in North Africa and Italy, 1942-1945 offers a collection of scholarly papers focusing on heretofore understudied aspects of the Second World War. Encompassing the major campaigns of... more
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER
Allied Fighting Effectiveness in North Africa and Italy, 1942-1945 offers a collection of scholarly papers focusing on heretofore understudied aspects of the Second World War. Encompassing the major campaigns of North Africa, Sicily and Italy from operation TORCH to the end of the war in Europe, this volume explores the intriguing dichotomy of the nature of battle in the Mediterranean theatre, whilst helping to emphasise its significance to the study of Second Word War military history. The chapters, written by a number of international scholars, offer a discussion of a range of subjects, including: logistics, the air-land battle, coalition operations, doctrine and training, command, control and communications, and airborne and special forces.
Allied Fighting Effectiveness in North Africa and Italy, 1942-1945 offers a collection of scholarly papers focusing on heretofore understudied aspects of the Second World War. Encompassing the major campaigns of North Africa, Sicily and Italy from operation TORCH to the end of the war in Europe, this volume explores the intriguing dichotomy of the nature of battle in the Mediterranean theatre, whilst helping to emphasise its significance to the study of Second Word War military history. The chapters, written by a number of international scholars, offer a discussion of a range of subjects, including: logistics, the air-land battle, coalition operations, doctrine and training, command, control and communications, and airborne and special forces.
Research Interests:
This thesis is concerned with the design and development of British infantry rifles. The specific weapons considered are the Lee-Metford (LEME) first introduced in 1888; the Short Magazine Lee-Enfield (SMLE) brought into service in 1904;... more
This thesis is concerned with the design and development of British infantry rifles. The specific weapons considered are the Lee-Metford (LEME) first introduced in 1888; the Short Magazine Lee-Enfield (SMLE) brought into service in 1904; the Experimental Model No.2 (EM2) briefly designated the Rifle No.9 Mk.I in 1951; and the Section Small Arms Post 1980 (SA80) issued to troops in 1986.
Over the past twenty years academic literature has demonstrated that technological determinism has persistently crept into accounts of technical change. By consistently leaving human agency out of the equation, technology has appeared to evolve autonomously and to have determinate effects. Whilst studies of civilian technologies have shown that this way of seeing has serious flaws, very little has been undertaken to show how the same issues arise in a military context. The approach adopted here explicitly aims to highlight and avoid problems of technological determinism by putting human choice back into the story of British rifle design.
This is achieved through the identification of key personalities and social groups who had a perspective on, and an interest in, the development of the various systems. Having identified the key actors, their views on each artefact are explored. What emerges is that different groups see a particular technical solution differently. The arguments about what must be included in, and what is irrelevant to, a design of rifle are as a result exposed for further examination. The eventual weapon that emerges from these debates can be seen as a negotiation among the various parties: an artefact around which various perspectives coalesce. What transpires is a detailed picture of the tactical problems each weapon attempts to resolve. This not only indicates how various groups see the battlefield problem but also describes how these same actors want the infantry to fight.
Over the past twenty years academic literature has demonstrated that technological determinism has persistently crept into accounts of technical change. By consistently leaving human agency out of the equation, technology has appeared to evolve autonomously and to have determinate effects. Whilst studies of civilian technologies have shown that this way of seeing has serious flaws, very little has been undertaken to show how the same issues arise in a military context. The approach adopted here explicitly aims to highlight and avoid problems of technological determinism by putting human choice back into the story of British rifle design.
This is achieved through the identification of key personalities and social groups who had a perspective on, and an interest in, the development of the various systems. Having identified the key actors, their views on each artefact are explored. What emerges is that different groups see a particular technical solution differently. The arguments about what must be included in, and what is irrelevant to, a design of rifle are as a result exposed for further examination. The eventual weapon that emerges from these debates can be seen as a negotiation among the various parties: an artefact around which various perspectives coalesce. What transpires is a detailed picture of the tactical problems each weapon attempts to resolve. This not only indicates how various groups see the battlefield problem but also describes how these same actors want the infantry to fight.
Research Interests:
War and occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan proved to be the undoing of the 'Best Little Army in the World' (Akam, p.19). While Britain's soldiers could demonstrate their capacity to adapt under difficult conditions, they still could not... more
War and occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan proved to be the undoing of the 'Best Little Army in the World' (Akam, p.19). While Britain's soldiers could demonstrate their capacity to adapt under difficult conditions, they still could not deliver campaign success. In The Changing of the Guard and Blood, Metal and Dust we have two alternative explanations for these failures. One accuses the Army of indolence, arrogance and unjustified over-confidence. The other of systemic failings in strategy-making, political direction and the challenge of working within an alliance structure. Taken together both books offer excoriating analyses of an Army muddling through. As the public records for these two campaigns have yet to be released, however, these books are best seen as presenting another opportunity to reflect on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what they tell us about contemporary British society.
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Abstract: Purpose – This paper aims to review the connections between studies of innovation management in organizational and military scholarship. Design/methodology/approach – We offer a review of literature from the two fields, and a... more
Abstract:
Purpose – This paper aims to review the connections between studies of innovation management in organizational and military scholarship.
Design/methodology/approach – We offer a review of literature from the two fields, and a framework for comparing them which comprises three levels of analysis - idea, organizational and inter-organizational work.
Findings – We identify opportunities for cross-disciplinary scholarship, and assert that collaborative research into military ‘inter-organizational work’ and its meta-governance is especially urgent. We define the current ‘military-innovation complex’ as differing to Eisenhower’s military-industrial complex, in that it opaquely encompasses academic and entrepreneurial innovation ecosystems. We argue this sits in a ‘blind spot’ of organizational scholarship.
Originality/value – Power, politics and conflict are integral to military studies, but often neglected in organizational scholarship. Nevertheless, these elements are present in organizations, and will be crucial in future grand challenges. We call for critical scholarship of the military-innovation complex, and a deeper understanding of the relationships between military and civilian organizations.
Purpose – This paper aims to review the connections between studies of innovation management in organizational and military scholarship.
Design/methodology/approach – We offer a review of literature from the two fields, and a framework for comparing them which comprises three levels of analysis - idea, organizational and inter-organizational work.
Findings – We identify opportunities for cross-disciplinary scholarship, and assert that collaborative research into military ‘inter-organizational work’ and its meta-governance is especially urgent. We define the current ‘military-innovation complex’ as differing to Eisenhower’s military-industrial complex, in that it opaquely encompasses academic and entrepreneurial innovation ecosystems. We argue this sits in a ‘blind spot’ of organizational scholarship.
Originality/value – Power, politics and conflict are integral to military studies, but often neglected in organizational scholarship. Nevertheless, these elements are present in organizations, and will be crucial in future grand challenges. We call for critical scholarship of the military-innovation complex, and a deeper understanding of the relationships between military and civilian organizations.