Pieter Bonte
ESILV, Ingénierie, Department Member
- Ghent University, Bioethics Institute Ghent, EmeritusVrije Universiteit Brussel, Faculty of law, Emeritusadd
- Bioethics, Disability Studies, Anthropology of the Body, Virtue Ethics, Personal Identity, Authenticity, and 32 moreTranshumanism, Personal and Moral Autonomy, Human Enhancement, Doping, Gifted and Talented, Talent, Human nature, Naturalistic Fallacy, Is-ought problem, Meaningfulness, Nihilism, Humanism, Secular Humanism, Freethought, Philosophy of Nature, Enhancement, Ethics of Enhancement, Meritocracy, Existentialism, Death & Dying (Thanatology), Birth, Leisure, Motivation (Psychology), Posthumanism, Speciesism, Moral Character, Euthanasia, Eugenics, Technological Unemployment, Homo Ludens, Procreative Ethics, and Philosophy of Technologyedit
- PhD in applied ethics. Current position: lecturer at the École supérieure d'ingénieurs Paris - La Défense, l'ESILV. P... morePhD in applied ethics. Current position: lecturer at the École supérieure d'ingénieurs Paris - La Défense, l'ESILV. Preparing a trade publication on the use of biotechnology in pursuit of equal biological opportunity.
Visiting Researcher positions: Oxford University, Uehiro Center for Practical Ethics; Yale, Interdisciplinary Center for Bioethics; the Hastings Center, New York: Université de Montréal, Centre de Recherche en Éthique
Education: MA Phil (Ghent University), LLB (Vrije Universiteit Brussel), French (C2, Fondation Sorbonne), Digital Business Management (EMS, attendance)
After my PhD I founded two ecological event cafés in Brussels: Muntpunt Grand Café (°2017) next to the opera and Bar Pilar (°2019) on the edge of the VUB campus. Call it a move from applied ethics to actually trying to do good in the messy "real world", as well as a way to side-step financial and intellectual dependency on the academic powers that be.
After five years in business I am now glad to bring learning, teaching and, perhaps, writing back to the forefront of my daily activity.edit
Addresses the question of should sports revolve around natural talent or should athletes be allowed to enhance their bodies with biotech? Clarifies the distinction between arguments on doping itself and circumstantial arguments... more
Addresses the question of should sports revolve around natural talent or should athletes be allowed to enhance their bodies with biotech?
Clarifies the distinction between arguments on doping itself and circumstantial arguments about its safety, accessibility, research & development, etc.
Provides both philosophical and sociocultural views on the valuation of natural talent and enhanced ability
The book provides an in-depth discussion on the human nature concept from different perspectives and from different disciplines, analyzing its use in the doping debate and researching its normative overtones. The relation between natural talent and enhanced abilities is scrutinized within a proper conceptual and theoretical framework: is doping to be seen as a factor of the athlete’s dehumanization or is it a tool to fulfill his/her aspirations to go faster, higher and stronger? Which characteristics make sports such a peculiar subject of ethical discussion and what are the, both intrinsic and extrinsic, moral dangers and opportunities involved in athletic enhancement? This volume combines fundamental philosophical anthropological reflection with applied ethics and socio-cultural and empirical approaches. Furthermore it presents guidelines to decision- and policy-makers on local, national and international levels.
International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, Vol. 52
Introduction: Human nature as a promising concept to make sense of the spirit of sport.-
Part I Conceptual and Theoretical Framework.
- Jan Tolleneer and Paul Schotsmans, Self, other, play, display and humanity. Development of a five-level model for the analysis of ethical arguments in the athletic enhancement debate.
- Christian Lenk, Is human enhancement unnatural and would this be an ethical problem?.
- Pieter Bonte, Dignified doping: truly unthinkable? An existentialist critique of ‘talentocracy’ in sports.
Part II Transgressing the limits of human nature.
- Eric Juengst, Subhuman, superhuman, and inhuman. Human nature and the enhanced athlete.
- Trijsje Franssen, Prometheus on dope. A natural aim for improvement or a hubristic drive to mastery?.
- Darian Meacham, Outliers, freaks, and cheats. Constituting normality in the age of enhancement.
Part III The normative value of human nature.
- Andreas De Block, Doping use as an artistic crime. On natural performances and authentic art.
- Andrew Holowchak, Something from nothing or nothing from something?. Performance-enhancing drugs, risk, and the natures of contest and of humans.
- Mike McNamee, Transhuman athletes and pathological perfectionism. Recognising limits in sports and human nature.
Part IV Socio-cultural and empirical approaches.
- Marianne Raakilde Jespersen, “Definitely not for women”. An online community’s reflections on women’s use of performance enhancing drugs in recreational sports.
- Denis Hauw, Toward a situated and dynamic understanding of doping behaviors.
- Tara Magdalinski, Restoring or enhancing athletic bodies. Oscar Pistorius and the threat to pure performance.
Part V Practices and policies.
- John Hoberman, Sports physicians, human nature, and the limits of medical enhancement.
- Bengt Kayser and Barbara Broers, Anti-doping policies: choosing between imperfections.
- Roger Brownsword, A simple regulatory principle for performance-enhancing technologies. Too good to be true?
Clarifies the distinction between arguments on doping itself and circumstantial arguments about its safety, accessibility, research & development, etc.
Provides both philosophical and sociocultural views on the valuation of natural talent and enhanced ability
The book provides an in-depth discussion on the human nature concept from different perspectives and from different disciplines, analyzing its use in the doping debate and researching its normative overtones. The relation between natural talent and enhanced abilities is scrutinized within a proper conceptual and theoretical framework: is doping to be seen as a factor of the athlete’s dehumanization or is it a tool to fulfill his/her aspirations to go faster, higher and stronger? Which characteristics make sports such a peculiar subject of ethical discussion and what are the, both intrinsic and extrinsic, moral dangers and opportunities involved in athletic enhancement? This volume combines fundamental philosophical anthropological reflection with applied ethics and socio-cultural and empirical approaches. Furthermore it presents guidelines to decision- and policy-makers on local, national and international levels.
International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, Vol. 52
Introduction: Human nature as a promising concept to make sense of the spirit of sport.-
Part I Conceptual and Theoretical Framework.
- Jan Tolleneer and Paul Schotsmans, Self, other, play, display and humanity. Development of a five-level model for the analysis of ethical arguments in the athletic enhancement debate.
- Christian Lenk, Is human enhancement unnatural and would this be an ethical problem?.
- Pieter Bonte, Dignified doping: truly unthinkable? An existentialist critique of ‘talentocracy’ in sports.
Part II Transgressing the limits of human nature.
- Eric Juengst, Subhuman, superhuman, and inhuman. Human nature and the enhanced athlete.
- Trijsje Franssen, Prometheus on dope. A natural aim for improvement or a hubristic drive to mastery?.
- Darian Meacham, Outliers, freaks, and cheats. Constituting normality in the age of enhancement.
Part III The normative value of human nature.
- Andreas De Block, Doping use as an artistic crime. On natural performances and authentic art.
- Andrew Holowchak, Something from nothing or nothing from something?. Performance-enhancing drugs, risk, and the natures of contest and of humans.
- Mike McNamee, Transhuman athletes and pathological perfectionism. Recognising limits in sports and human nature.
Part IV Socio-cultural and empirical approaches.
- Marianne Raakilde Jespersen, “Definitely not for women”. An online community’s reflections on women’s use of performance enhancing drugs in recreational sports.
- Denis Hauw, Toward a situated and dynamic understanding of doping behaviors.
- Tara Magdalinski, Restoring or enhancing athletic bodies. Oscar Pistorius and the threat to pure performance.
Part V Practices and policies.
- John Hoberman, Sports physicians, human nature, and the limits of medical enhancement.
- Bengt Kayser and Barbara Broers, Anti-doping policies: choosing between imperfections.
- Roger Brownsword, A simple regulatory principle for performance-enhancing technologies. Too good to be true?
Should sport revolve around natural talent or should athletes be allowed to enhance their bodies with biotech? As many commentators have noted, it seems that the contemporary doping debate is in urgent need of more in-depth investigations... more
Should sport revolve around natural talent or should athletes be allowed to enhance their bodies with biotech? As many commentators have noted, it seems that the contemporary doping debate is in urgent need of more in-depth investigations of these issues. Ultimately, the most vexing problems posed by doping do not seem to be about health or fair play – although doping clearly does pose momentous problems on those fronts too. But if some forms of doping would be made available in an adequately healthy and fair way, they would probably still cause much concern – concern about doping itself would persist, no matter how much its circumstances would be tidied up.
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Research Interests: Law, Criminal Justice, Ethics, Applied Ethics, Bioethics, and 15 moreInformed Consent, Medical Ethics, Autonomy, Medicine, Medical and Research ethics, Police and criminal justice ethics, Prisons, Humans, Castration, Inquiry, Coercion, Coercive Treatment, Criminals, Personal autonomy, and Chemical Castration
Research Interests: Applied Ethics, Obesity, Folic acid, Medicine, Genetic counseling, and 15 morePregnancy, Humans, Genetic Testing, Female, Male, Genetic Screening, Beneficence, Parents, Parental Responsibility, Moral Obligations, Adult, Preconception Care, Clinical Protocols, Procreative beneficence, and Congenital abnormalities
In several jurisdictions, sex offenders may be offered chemical castration as an alternative to further incarceration. In some, agreement to chemical castration may be made a formal condition of parole or release. In others, refusal to... more
In several jurisdictions, sex offenders may be offered chemical castration as an alternative to further incarceration. In some, agreement to chemical castration may be made a formal condition of parole or release. In others, refusal to undergo chemical castration can increase the likelihood of further incarceration though no formal link is made between the two. Offering chemical castration as an alternative to further incarceration is often said to be partially coercive, thus rendering the offender’s consent invalid. The dominant response to this objection has been to argue that any coercion present in such cases is compatible with valid consent. In this article, we take a different tack, arguing that, even if consent would not be valid, offering chemical castration will often be supported by the very considerations that underpin concerns about consent: considerations of autonomy. This is because offering chemical castration will often increase the offender’s autonomy, both at the time the offer is made and in the future.
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Throwing some light on the (eugenic) dark side of antidoping
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Réflexion sur l'égalité des chances corporelles et le 'talentocratie'.
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Background The preventative paradigm of preconception care is receiving increasing attention, yet its boundaries remain vague in three respects: temporally; agentially; and instrumentally. Crucially, it remains unclear just who is to... more
Background
The preventative paradigm of preconception care is receiving increasing attention, yet its boundaries remain vague in three respects: temporally; agentially; and instrumentally. Crucially, it remains unclear just who is to be considered a ‘potential parent’, how soon they should take up preconception responsibilities, and how weighty their responsibilities should be.
Discussion
In this paper, we argue that a normal potential parent of reasonable prudence has a moral duty to adequately optimize the conditions under which she or his reproductive partner will conceive, though a proportionality calculus calls for toleration of several forms of preconception behavior that are non-ideal from the perspective of reproductive risk. We distinguish between five categories of potential parents to which different duties of preconception care should be ascribed. This framework is advanced to assign preconception care responsibilities with more precision than is often done in the current debate on preconception care. We conclude by applying our theoretical framework to three types of preconception care interventions: consumption of folic acid; keeping one’s weight under control; and engaging in preconception genetic screening. Our analysis shows that the literature on preconception care often glosses over crucial distinctions between different types of potential parents and uses a notion of preconception beneficence that may be overly demanding. Nevertheless, preconception moral duties will often be weighty and reluctance to accept such duties on account of the burden they impose do not warrant preconception insouciance.
Summary
To avoid misplaced responsibility ascriptions in the growing field of preconception care, distinctions must be made between different types of potential parents to whom different degrees of preconception responsibility apply. We present such a preliminary framework and bring it to bear on the cases of folic acid consumption, obesity and genetic testing.
The preventative paradigm of preconception care is receiving increasing attention, yet its boundaries remain vague in three respects: temporally; agentially; and instrumentally. Crucially, it remains unclear just who is to be considered a ‘potential parent’, how soon they should take up preconception responsibilities, and how weighty their responsibilities should be.
Discussion
In this paper, we argue that a normal potential parent of reasonable prudence has a moral duty to adequately optimize the conditions under which she or his reproductive partner will conceive, though a proportionality calculus calls for toleration of several forms of preconception behavior that are non-ideal from the perspective of reproductive risk. We distinguish between five categories of potential parents to which different duties of preconception care should be ascribed. This framework is advanced to assign preconception care responsibilities with more precision than is often done in the current debate on preconception care. We conclude by applying our theoretical framework to three types of preconception care interventions: consumption of folic acid; keeping one’s weight under control; and engaging in preconception genetic screening. Our analysis shows that the literature on preconception care often glosses over crucial distinctions between different types of potential parents and uses a notion of preconception beneficence that may be overly demanding. Nevertheless, preconception moral duties will often be weighty and reluctance to accept such duties on account of the burden they impose do not warrant preconception insouciance.
Summary
To avoid misplaced responsibility ascriptions in the growing field of preconception care, distinctions must be made between different types of potential parents to whom different degrees of preconception responsibility apply. We present such a preliminary framework and bring it to bear on the cases of folic acid consumption, obesity and genetic testing.
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Doping scandals can reveal unresolved tensions between the meritocratic values of equal opportunity + reward for effort and the ‘talentocratic’ love of hereditary privilege. Whence this special reverence for talent? We analyze the... more
Doping scandals can reveal unresolved tensions between the meritocratic values of equal opportunity + reward for effort and the ‘talentocratic’ love of hereditary privilege. Whence this special reverence for talent? We analyze the following arguments: (1) talent is a unique indicator of greater potential, whereas doping enables only temporary boosts (the fluke critique); (2) developing a talent is an authentic endeavor of ‘becoming who you are’, whereas reforming the fundamentals of your birth suit via artifice is an act of alienation (the phony critique); (3) your (lack of) talent informs you of your proper place and purpose in life, whereas doping frustrates such an amor fati self-understanding (the fateless critique). We conclude that these arguments fail to justify a categorical preference for natural talent over integrated artifice. Instead, they illustrate the extent to which unsavory beliefs about ‘nature’s aristocracy’ may still be at play in the moral theatre of sports.
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Commissioned by the Dutch Association for Bioethics for publication in Platform voor Bio-Ethiek (in Dutch) 1. Staat van het debat: van gescherm met holle rechten naar een rijke filosofie van authenticiteit 2. Authenticiteit op twee... more
Commissioned by the Dutch Association for Bioethics for publication in Platform voor Bio-Ethiek (in Dutch)
1. Staat van het debat: van gescherm met holle rechten naar een rijke filosofie van authenticiteit
2. Authenticiteit op twee spitsen gedreven"
1. Staat van het debat: van gescherm met holle rechten naar een rijke filosofie van authenticiteit
2. Authenticiteit op twee spitsen gedreven"
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As the reach of medical technology continues to expand, not only the goal of healing is being reached but beyond that the enhancement of the human body and mind also becomes a reality. Examples can be found in advanced prostheses,... more
As the reach of medical technology continues to expand, not only the goal of healing is being reached but beyond that the enhancement of the human body and mind also becomes a reality. Examples can be found in advanced prostheses, neurofarmaceuticals,genetic technologies and other fields. The ethical value of this enhancement medicine is being debated fiercly. Often the debate takes the form of a so-called ‘bio-conservative’ stance as opposed to a ‘transhumanist’ position. Transhumanists argue for the fundamental right to ‘morphological freedom’: every individual has, in principle, the right to determine for himself the shape and functions of his own body and every intrusion on this fundamental right – the blanket prohibition on any kind of enhancement medicine being the prime example hereof – has to be accompanied by strong ethical or societal arguments. Bioconservatives often argue precisely for such a general and universal prohibition, often based on intrinsic ethical arguments concerning the goodness of human nature and the unacceptability to freely alter this nature, even if such a choice is based on the sincere personal wish of an informed and socially responsible individual. I focus on these intrinsic arguments concerning the goodness of enhancement. I analyse the bioconservative arguments to conclude that they are incoherent and sometimes even internally inconsistent. Blindness for the responsibility of non-intervention plays a key role here. Furthermore I argue that the fundamental right to morphological freedom should logically be protected in any liberal democratic ethical theory. None the less, as the biological mold of human nature becomes a field of our own cultural agency, our natural passions dissolve as a source of spontaneous motivation. Thus the reality of ever-deepening morphological freedom confronts us with a new existential shock which has not yet been brought into clear focus and which poses a profound challenge for much of modern day discourse on motivation and choice.
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Human enhancement technologies put us at liberty to materially remake ourselves from our appearance over our physical capacities right down to our own mental activity: we are becoming ʻself-shaping animalsʼ through and through.... more
Human enhancement technologies put us at liberty to materially remake ourselves from our appearance over our physical capacities right down to our own mental activity: we are becoming ʻself-shaping animalsʼ through and through. Proclaiming a moral duty not to transform our human nature – a duty to be and remain an unmodified homo sapiens – ʻbioconservativesʼ consider the enhancement enterprise unnatural and dehumanizing, to be condemned and according to some even outlawed. This paper denies that such a duty exists by adding the following arguments to the often heard naturalistic fallacy objection: (1) human nature may come to hinder our pursuit of worthy goals, (2) evolution made us ʻcrooked timber, out of which no straight thing can be madeʼ, if not for the help of enhancement technologies, (3) even if we could consider ourselves ʻwell-created beingsʼ, nothing should hold us back to ennoble ourselves even further, (4) our default biological determinations are in principle even more estranging to us than the insertion of artifacts in ourselves, and finally (5) in principle, there is greater unfairness in the ʻnatural lotteryʼ than in a well-guided policy of ʻenhanced equalityʼ. This battery of arguments deeply undermines the belief that there is a ʻduty to be naturalʼ. However, this does not imply that human enhancement ipso facto becomes a laudable undertaking, nor that human nature should be ignored altogether when deciding how to improve our lot. It does, however, discredit the notion that there are ethical reasons to categorically conserve our homo sapiens nature, come what may.
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... Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: Record Details. Record ID, 1057565. Record Type, misc. Author, Pieter Bonte [002002311887] - Ghent University Pieter.Bonte@UGent.be. Title, Wat de Verlichting heeft overschaduwd... more
... Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: Record Details. Record ID, 1057565. Record Type, misc. Author, Pieter Bonte [002002311887] - Ghent University Pieter.Bonte@UGent.be. Title, Wat de Verlichting heeft overschaduwd - Pleidooi voor meer vuur. ...
Slick TEDx video on its way
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Natural Talent as a Fitness Signal and Doping as Misleading Mimicry. In The Mating Mind, Geoffrey Miller has recast the notion of ‘fair play’ in sports in a Darwinian light, making this supposedly ethical notion appear as anything but:... more
Natural Talent as a Fitness Signal and Doping as Misleading Mimicry.
In The Mating Mind, Geoffrey Miller has recast the notion of ‘fair play’ in sports in a Darwinian light, making this supposedly ethical notion appear as anything but: “Sports rules are considered ‘fair’ insofar as they produce the highest correlation between a competitor’s fitness and his or her likelihood of winning.” Andreas De Block and Siegfried Dewitte have provided more Darwinian argument, defending the thesis that human sports establish a reliable prestige hierarchy loosely based on Darwinian fitness. Meanwhile, in the doping debate, there is growing consternation about the true motives of the zero-tolerance, absolutist anti-doping fervour of a.o. the World Anti-Doping Agency. Eric Juengst, for instance, argues that there is nothing ethical about “glorify[ing] genetic disparities to the extent of prohibiting their abatement when biomedicine provides the ability to do so”. To the contrary, he judges that to be “anachronistic and slightly ominous”. To substantiate such suspicions, I marshal historical evidence to show that for instance Pierre de Coubertin, founder of the modern Olympics, explicitly declared his Olympism to be meant as a religious veneration of the ‘true, natural aristocracy’. Also, the early eugenicists and social Darwinists saw potential in sports as ways to transparently and publicly discern who was ‘of superior stock.’ I go on to argue that doping behaviour shares some features with mimicry strategies, and that anti-doping efforts may be an intolerant crack-down on such mimicry from the interest in having ‘fair’ sports remain a transparent display of proxies for fitness. I denounce that interest as profoundly a- or un-ethical, defending instead Malcolm Gladwell’s point that in principle, doping should be ethically lauded as “the means by which pudgy underdogs [can] compete with natural wonders.”
In The Mating Mind, Geoffrey Miller has recast the notion of ‘fair play’ in sports in a Darwinian light, making this supposedly ethical notion appear as anything but: “Sports rules are considered ‘fair’ insofar as they produce the highest correlation between a competitor’s fitness and his or her likelihood of winning.” Andreas De Block and Siegfried Dewitte have provided more Darwinian argument, defending the thesis that human sports establish a reliable prestige hierarchy loosely based on Darwinian fitness. Meanwhile, in the doping debate, there is growing consternation about the true motives of the zero-tolerance, absolutist anti-doping fervour of a.o. the World Anti-Doping Agency. Eric Juengst, for instance, argues that there is nothing ethical about “glorify[ing] genetic disparities to the extent of prohibiting their abatement when biomedicine provides the ability to do so”. To the contrary, he judges that to be “anachronistic and slightly ominous”. To substantiate such suspicions, I marshal historical evidence to show that for instance Pierre de Coubertin, founder of the modern Olympics, explicitly declared his Olympism to be meant as a religious veneration of the ‘true, natural aristocracy’. Also, the early eugenicists and social Darwinists saw potential in sports as ways to transparently and publicly discern who was ‘of superior stock.’ I go on to argue that doping behaviour shares some features with mimicry strategies, and that anti-doping efforts may be an intolerant crack-down on such mimicry from the interest in having ‘fair’ sports remain a transparent display of proxies for fitness. I denounce that interest as profoundly a- or un-ethical, defending instead Malcolm Gladwell’s point that in principle, doping should be ethically lauded as “the means by which pudgy underdogs [can] compete with natural wonders.”
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Fondation Brocher & université de Zürich
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Bracketing non-intrinsic questions of safety and social circumstance, I argue that the profound alteration of one’s given nature (Entartung) for its own sake, for instance by ingesting chemicals or implanting prostheses, can be a very... more
Bracketing non-intrinsic questions of safety and social circumstance, I argue that the profound alteration of one’s given nature (Entartung) for its own sake, for instance by ingesting chemicals or implanting prostheses, can be a very sensical endeavour. It could be virtuously undertaken to authentically reflect the causa sui or even imago dei dignity of man (Bildung), which stems from the peculiar predicament of finding one’s existence precede any essence. Acknowledging oneself as such can have an ‘unbearable lightness’ to it. It reveals one to be absurdly circular and deeply responsible. An animalistic “sureness of physical selfhood” – which, as Walter Berglund laments in Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom, would deliver us from foundationless freedom and ruthless responsibility – is lost. Authentic commitment to human(ist) dignity, however, should keep us from trying to regain such ‘sureness’ by warping ourselves into a self-deceptive self-understanding as ‘creature’ or as ‘animal’ in order to feel cradled, guided and excused be a ‘given’ particular nature. To better resist copping out and caving in to such temptations of ‘freeing ourselves from freedom’ by 'following our nature', perhaps we do right to deeply mark our animal flesh with an indelible mark of our own will - for instance by merely symbolically piercing or tattooing one's skin, as it might be overzealous to engage in more distortive acts of self-creation solely for the sake of bearing testimony to one's foundationlessly free predicament. This is not to say that further Entartung-Bildung might not be highly worthwhile and deeply dignified. On the contrary. The poetics of autopoiesis could be sublime.
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If doping would be done in a sufficiently healthy, candid, autonomous, wise and fair way, would doping be OK? If so, all wrongs would lie in doping abuses, namely when done with too much health risks, deceit, coercion, fecklessness and... more
If doping would be done in a sufficiently healthy, candid, autonomous, wise and fair way, would doping be OK? If so, all wrongs would lie in doping abuses, namely when done with too much health risks, deceit, coercion, fecklessness and unfairness. I will briefly advocate this important point – already made by many others – only to proceed to the further argument that under certain circumstances, perhaps nobody can exemplify human(ist) dignity and existential(ist) authenticity better than that modern witch, the doping sinner. Advancing in three ironical steps, I will press this iconoclastic argument as far as possible. Doping will serve as a prime example, but the argument is relevant to all profound self-alterations via the deep integration of artifice within one’s own body – by way of ingestion, injection, implantation or otherwise. In a first irony, I argue that the values marshalled in many intrinsic denunciations of doping – character, authenticity, solidarity, humility, virtue and dignity – can just as well provide powerful support for it – perhaps to the point of morally mandating it. From a humanist-existentialist self-understanding, which I take to be the most plausible outlook on life, moral character and authenticity demand that one does not imagine one’s biological constitution to be a responsibility-relieving excuse or a purpose-providing exhortation – no matter how psychologically gratifying that would be.. Instead, our god- and nature-forsaken human condition should be acknowledged and if possible, testified of in practice. What better way to do so than to supplant some fundamental part of one’s natural blueprint with an artefact of one’s own volition, enabling oneself to realize an existence that is originally and authentically one’s own? Affirming Leon Kass’ dictum that “an untroubled soul in a troubling world is a shrunken human being”, I concur that we must not manipulate our self-understanding so as to blind ourselves from discomforting but true aspects of the human predicament, for instance via a helping of Aldous Huxley’s wellbeing-inducing drug Soma. However, in a second irony an analogy can be made between Soma and the more traditional opiate of religion. One could argue that by fabulating some (crypto-)creationist or teleological self-understanding and thinking one lives meaningfully by following the cues of one’s biology, in a sense one dopes oneself into a inauthentic and morally unwarranted state of existential comfort. In a third and final irony, I again wholeheartedly affirm the widespread anti-enhancement worry that for all the health, ability, beauty and welfare that the human enhancement enterprise may bring, we will be enhancing ourselves into a state of increasingly acute existential perplexity. Indeed, as the determinants that shape and drive our existence become increasingly up for grabs, the plausibility of a prefabricated meaning to our existence crumbles, and our self-understanding becomes increasingly circular. I argue therefore that Bill McKibben is right in fearing that “should we ever escape our limits [and become ‘everything’] we will become – nothing.” However, I take this experience of existential vacuity to be at the heart of the human tragedy. I conclude that we must above all not see ourselves as creatures of Nature, God or Fortune who live meaningfully by executing their directives. Sharing the core values and concerns of Kass and McKibben, my conclusion is the polar opposite to theirs. We ought to openly affirm our god- and nature-forsaken condition and, ideally, wilfully estrange ourselves from our default biology to testify of our (unfortunate but true) condemnation to be free. To a significant extent, it would make us a Homo Ludens come full circle: living a life of our own devise, in bodies of our own devise.
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In his influential rejection of human enhancement The Case against Perfection, Michael Sandel warns that embracing the enhancement enterprise would entail becoming burdened with a “responsibility explosion”, as it may overwhelm us with... more
In his influential rejection of human enhancement The Case against Perfection, Michael Sandel warns that embracing the enhancement enterprise would entail becoming burdened with a “responsibility explosion”, as it may overwhelm us with decisional responsibilities over who we are and how we are embodied. I argue that Sandel is right in drawing out this distressing implication. Beyond this initial agreement, however, I develop a diametrically opposed argument about the question whether this responsibility explosion can – in good faith – be evaded. Sandel argues that such an evasion is possible, and as an evasive strategy he suggests that one take up a self-understanding of oneself as a creature to whom nature, God or fortune has meaningfully given an embodiment. To Sandel, this giftedness is key: as it grounds human dignity, it must be acknowledged, appreciated and conserved. Comfortably, this self-conception also relieves one of the “moral burden” of the responsibility explosion. However, there seems to be something philosophically conspicuous about that comfortable coincidence. I argue that such a self-conception cannot be rationally maintained, as one cannot choose to outsource the moral burden of decisional responsibility to any of the three ‘higher powers’ Sandel lists. Instead, the burden of ‘finding oneself at liberty’ can only be undone via self-deception about the human condition – by deceiving oneself into thinking that one does not have some of the freedoms and decisional responsibilities that one de facto does have. I conclude that certain popular arguments about the inviolability of one’s given human nature, while steeped in the rhetoric of human dignity, may in fact themselves be rather undignified choices for the false comforts of feeling existentially cradled and happily exculpated. To arrive at this profoundly ironic conclusion, I critically draw on Giovanni Pico della Mirandolla’s foundational declaration of human(ist) dignity, on Jean-Paul Sartre’s notion that the defining (and dignifying) trait of humanity lies in being “condemned to be free”, and on empirical and psychological studies on cognitive dissonance, the Just World bias and deresponsabilization strategies. If my argument holds, some notions of ‘inviolability’ that dominate today do in fact themselves violate human(ist) dignity to its core. The ethic of giftedness would undermine human dignity as understood within humanistic and existentialist thought: that man is condemned to be free and must accept (some form of) responsibility over all he finds in his (potential) sphere of agency, without excuse and without any pre-existing ‘givens’ to go by. Sandel and like minds then seem to be proposing that we make the one choice we cannot make as a matter of fact, and must not make in the name of human(ist) dignity: we may be foundationlessly free, but not so free as to be able to deny our freedom in good faith.
"Esthetische chirurgie, doping of pillen die het gemoed verfrissen en het verstand aanscherpen - dergelijke 'verbeterkundes' worden door verlichte types doorgaans met argwaan, zo niet met afschuw bekeken. Vrijheid, Gelijkheid,... more
"Esthetische chirurgie, doping of pillen die het gemoed verfrissen en het verstand aanscherpen - dergelijke 'verbeterkundes' worden door verlichte types doorgaans met argwaan, zo niet met afschuw bekeken. Vrijheid,
Gelijkheid, Verbondenheid? Die verbeterkunde lijkt wel de Anti-Verlichting.
(1) In plaats van bevrijding, legt zij ons een druk op om te conformeren aan dwingende schoonheids- en prestatieidealen. Wie weigert mee te doen, komt niet meer aan de bak, noch economisch noch erotisch.
(2) In plaats van gelijkheid, drijft zij een nog diepere, en misschien wel ultieme wig tussen rijk en arm. Via de verbeterkunde kunnen de rijken zich *biologisch *beginnen onderscheiden van de armen. Zij worden slimmer, mooier en sterker, terwijl de armen zich moeten behelpen met wat de natuur hen heeft toegeworpen.
(3) In plaats van verbondenheid, dreigt zo'n scheiding van de lijven ook met een diepe scheiding van de geesten gepaard te gaan. De geschiedenis leert dat een kleine schakering in huidpigment al kan volstaan om systemen van racisme en apartheid op te bouwen. Wat belooft dit voor een wereld waarin werkelijk relevante 'raciale' verschillen in capaciteiten zullen ontstaan?
Echter, minstens even wraakroepend als deze drievoudige Anti-Verlichting, is het feit dat we via een beetje Vrij Onderzoek ook redelijke argumenten kunnen aandragen voor het volstrekte tegenbeeld: de verbeterkunde als Ultra-Verlichting.
(1) Verbeterkunde sterkt dan de vrijheid, omdat het ons eindelijk toelaat om werkelijk onze eigen schepper te worden: de ultieme vrijheidsstrijd tegen biologisch determinisme. Het biedt ons ook een sterk wapen in de strijd tegen verdrukkende normen van natuurlijkheid en normaliteit, bijvoorbeeld door transseksualiteit of lesbisch ouderschap mogelijk te maken.
(2) Verbeterkunde sterkt dan de gelijkheid, omdat het ons eindelijk toelaat om de oer-ongelijkheid wat rechter te trekken: de zinloze natuurlijke loterij waardoor de een met allerlei talenten wordt gezegend, velen in de middelmatigheid blijven steken en anderen met allerlei zwaktes, ziektes en handicaps worden teneergedrukt. Alleen via verbeterkunde kan ooit een project van 'gelijke *natuurlijke *kansen' worden aangevat, en kan de heerschappij van de 'natuurlijke aristocratie' worden doorbroken.
(3) Verbeterkunde sterkt dan de verbondenheid, omdat het ons eindelijk toelaat onze verbondenheid te laten steunen op niet-raciale, niet-biologische gronden. Niet de evolutionaire toevalligheid dat wij allemaal lid zijn van de biologische *homo sapiens *club is dan de (racistische? Speciesistische?) grondslag voor burgerzin en solidariteit, maar wel het feit dat wij doorheen het mensen- en dierenrijk diepgaande diversiteit aanvaarden, en ons met elkaar verbonden voelen vanuit het besef dat wij allen voelende, bewuste wezens zijn."
Gelijkheid, Verbondenheid? Die verbeterkunde lijkt wel de Anti-Verlichting.
(1) In plaats van bevrijding, legt zij ons een druk op om te conformeren aan dwingende schoonheids- en prestatieidealen. Wie weigert mee te doen, komt niet meer aan de bak, noch economisch noch erotisch.
(2) In plaats van gelijkheid, drijft zij een nog diepere, en misschien wel ultieme wig tussen rijk en arm. Via de verbeterkunde kunnen de rijken zich *biologisch *beginnen onderscheiden van de armen. Zij worden slimmer, mooier en sterker, terwijl de armen zich moeten behelpen met wat de natuur hen heeft toegeworpen.
(3) In plaats van verbondenheid, dreigt zo'n scheiding van de lijven ook met een diepe scheiding van de geesten gepaard te gaan. De geschiedenis leert dat een kleine schakering in huidpigment al kan volstaan om systemen van racisme en apartheid op te bouwen. Wat belooft dit voor een wereld waarin werkelijk relevante 'raciale' verschillen in capaciteiten zullen ontstaan?
Echter, minstens even wraakroepend als deze drievoudige Anti-Verlichting, is het feit dat we via een beetje Vrij Onderzoek ook redelijke argumenten kunnen aandragen voor het volstrekte tegenbeeld: de verbeterkunde als Ultra-Verlichting.
(1) Verbeterkunde sterkt dan de vrijheid, omdat het ons eindelijk toelaat om werkelijk onze eigen schepper te worden: de ultieme vrijheidsstrijd tegen biologisch determinisme. Het biedt ons ook een sterk wapen in de strijd tegen verdrukkende normen van natuurlijkheid en normaliteit, bijvoorbeeld door transseksualiteit of lesbisch ouderschap mogelijk te maken.
(2) Verbeterkunde sterkt dan de gelijkheid, omdat het ons eindelijk toelaat om de oer-ongelijkheid wat rechter te trekken: de zinloze natuurlijke loterij waardoor de een met allerlei talenten wordt gezegend, velen in de middelmatigheid blijven steken en anderen met allerlei zwaktes, ziektes en handicaps worden teneergedrukt. Alleen via verbeterkunde kan ooit een project van 'gelijke *natuurlijke *kansen' worden aangevat, en kan de heerschappij van de 'natuurlijke aristocratie' worden doorbroken.
(3) Verbeterkunde sterkt dan de verbondenheid, omdat het ons eindelijk toelaat onze verbondenheid te laten steunen op niet-raciale, niet-biologische gronden. Niet de evolutionaire toevalligheid dat wij allemaal lid zijn van de biologische *homo sapiens *club is dan de (racistische? Speciesistische?) grondslag voor burgerzin en solidariteit, maar wel het feit dat wij doorheen het mensen- en dierenrijk diepgaande diversiteit aanvaarden, en ons met elkaar verbonden voelen vanuit het besef dat wij allen voelende, bewuste wezens zijn."
Decisive, pressing reasons underlie the fight against doping abuses in sports and the defense of a humane ‘Spirit of Sport’ (SoS): health, fair play and the ethic of authenticity are at stake. The World Anti Doping Agency believes these... more
Decisive, pressing reasons underlie the fight against doping abuses in sports and the defense of a humane ‘Spirit of Sport’ (SoS): health, fair play and the ethic of authenticity are at stake. The World Anti Doping Agency believes these two struggles to be intrinsically intertwined: all doping practices (DPs) violate the SoS, and the SoS cannot tolerate a single DP. However, this sweeping denunciation seems too clear-cut to do justice to the facts of human enhancement technology (HET) in sports. Seeking to strengthen the fight against doping abuses by sharpening its focus, I argue that (1) certain overlooked or misconstrued DPs can be considered as not merely permissible but positively dignified methods for acquiring athletic skill, under the strong proviso that they are undertaken as virtuous explorations of bodily virtuosity; (2) the common view that the SoS is about “virtuous perfection of natural talent [NT]” (Murray, 2009) could be a ‘talentocratic’ position rooted in a fixed ‘Vitruvian’ view of human perfection and a discriminatory “Nietzschean view of justice, according to which it is unfair if those who are less fit (…) rob the genuinely strong Übermensch of his genetic advantage.” (Tännsjö, 2009: 325). I oppose such talentocratic views to a non-Vitruvian, non-Nietzschean alternative which is even tougher on cheating and health risks, evades talentocratic bias, and is in a crucial sense conservative, restaurative even: it builds on the humanistic art of living tradition to critique sport as paid profession and industry, as well as all cultism of ‘perfection’ and ‘purity’. Curiously but consistently, it also promotes virtuous (and thus prudent) explorations of bodily virtuosity guided not by biological blueprints, but by humanist virtues. This goes to show that critiques on the intrusive crack-down on each and every DP need not root in some ‘thin libertarian ethic’ of untouchable individual rights and ruthless free-for-all competition, as a tenacious straw man argument would have it. The ‘thick and restaurative humanistic ethic’ presented here should prove a more formidable opponent both for such thin libertarianism and for WADA’s apparent talentocratic bias.
References
Murray, T. 2009. “In Search of an Ethics for Sport: Genetic Hierarchies, Handicappers General, and Embodied Excellence”, in Performance–Enhancing Technologies in Sports: Ethical, Conceptual, and Scientific Issues (Murray and Maschke, eds.), chapter 11. John Hopkins University Press.
Tännsjö, T. 2009. “Medical Enhancement and the Ethos of Elite Sport”, in Human Enhancement (Savulescu and Bostrom, eds.), chapter 14. Oxford University Press.
References
Murray, T. 2009. “In Search of an Ethics for Sport: Genetic Hierarchies, Handicappers General, and Embodied Excellence”, in Performance–Enhancing Technologies in Sports: Ethical, Conceptual, and Scientific Issues (Murray and Maschke, eds.), chapter 11. John Hopkins University Press.
Tännsjö, T. 2009. “Medical Enhancement and the Ethos of Elite Sport”, in Human Enhancement (Savulescu and Bostrom, eds.), chapter 14. Oxford University Press.
Dreigt aan de klassieke leus van de vrije gedachte volgend reactionair staartje te groeien?
Die Gedanken sind frei
... aber die Körper werden gekettet.
Die Gedanken sind frei
... aber die Körper werden gekettet.
Over de onderhuidse kloof tussen natuur- versus techniekverheerlijkend humanisme: breekt de humanistische beweging in twee?
"In keeping with the freethought creed of the South Place Ethical Society, "to thine own self be true", this talk seeks to shed light on a possible blind spot in the entrenched enhancement debate -- something that may disturb the comfort... more
"In keeping with the freethought creed of the South Place Ethical Society, "to thine own self be true", this talk seeks to shed light on a possible blind spot in the entrenched enhancement debate -- something that may disturb the comfort zones of both bioconservatives (with 'bioregressives' at the back end) and bioprogressives (with transhumanists at the far end) alike.
As the first highly effective human enhancement technologies (HETs) spread through society, allowing us to domesticate and recreate, bend and amend our own biology, a second wave of existentialist alienation may be starting to wash over society. The first wave smashed the external, divine realm as a moral compass, leaving the thinking person 'godforsaken' and on his own to figure out how to lead his life. To cope with this loss of divine direction, many 'sobered minds' found comfort in relying on their natural passions to provide a self-evident sense of purpose. This second existentialist wave, however, now comes crashing down on this internal realm of nature, on our own human nature -- smashing that as a moral compass as well. Thus the thinking person will be left thoroughly 'nature-forsaken', too. As a result, both externally and internally, we seem to be without a fixed, certain and self-evident lodestone to guide us out of absurdity and the confusion over what we should be doing with ourselves.
The only dignified reaction is to confront this situation head-on and not delude ourselves. In our humanist self-understanding, from Renaissance Mirandola over Enlightenment Kant to post-war existentialist Sartre, we have long considered ourselves beings who are at liberty to choose for ourselves our own nature. Sartre was right to end the humanist self-delusion, that this fundamental shape-shifting liberty of ours is an intrinsically 'happy' state. Au contraire: "Man cannot find anything to depend upon either within or without himself. Man is without excuse. He is condemned to be free." Indeed, our difficulty in finding a convincing, consistent drive to direct our lives is arguably one of the major causes of human grief and despair.
The bioconservative solution, although steeped in the language of 'dignity', seems positively undignified. Only with a mauvaise foi (bad faith) could we hold that it is somehow more authentic that a person is predetermined by the 'natural' factors bestowed on him by pitiless, pointless evolutionary processes, than by factors he himself chose to insert in himself. Bioconservatives are right to point out the profound debasement and disorientation that HETs bring about, but their proposal of 'nature cultism' can only make sense as a sad charade of cognitive dissonance, committing the freethinker's cardinal sin of (sub)conscious self-delusion, debasing us even more.
In turn, this talk poses the following question to transhumanists in the audience: How can you be so breezy about finding yourself so foundationlessly free, so ruthlessly responsible?"
As the first highly effective human enhancement technologies (HETs) spread through society, allowing us to domesticate and recreate, bend and amend our own biology, a second wave of existentialist alienation may be starting to wash over society. The first wave smashed the external, divine realm as a moral compass, leaving the thinking person 'godforsaken' and on his own to figure out how to lead his life. To cope with this loss of divine direction, many 'sobered minds' found comfort in relying on their natural passions to provide a self-evident sense of purpose. This second existentialist wave, however, now comes crashing down on this internal realm of nature, on our own human nature -- smashing that as a moral compass as well. Thus the thinking person will be left thoroughly 'nature-forsaken', too. As a result, both externally and internally, we seem to be without a fixed, certain and self-evident lodestone to guide us out of absurdity and the confusion over what we should be doing with ourselves.
The only dignified reaction is to confront this situation head-on and not delude ourselves. In our humanist self-understanding, from Renaissance Mirandola over Enlightenment Kant to post-war existentialist Sartre, we have long considered ourselves beings who are at liberty to choose for ourselves our own nature. Sartre was right to end the humanist self-delusion, that this fundamental shape-shifting liberty of ours is an intrinsically 'happy' state. Au contraire: "Man cannot find anything to depend upon either within or without himself. Man is without excuse. He is condemned to be free." Indeed, our difficulty in finding a convincing, consistent drive to direct our lives is arguably one of the major causes of human grief and despair.
The bioconservative solution, although steeped in the language of 'dignity', seems positively undignified. Only with a mauvaise foi (bad faith) could we hold that it is somehow more authentic that a person is predetermined by the 'natural' factors bestowed on him by pitiless, pointless evolutionary processes, than by factors he himself chose to insert in himself. Bioconservatives are right to point out the profound debasement and disorientation that HETs bring about, but their proposal of 'nature cultism' can only make sense as a sad charade of cognitive dissonance, committing the freethinker's cardinal sin of (sub)conscious self-delusion, debasing us even more.
In turn, this talk poses the following question to transhumanists in the audience: How can you be so breezy about finding yourself so foundationlessly free, so ruthlessly responsible?"