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Dra. Alicia Girón González
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Publicaciones
Africa in the 21st Century

México, 2023
Africa in the 21st Century

Nombres: Gázquez Iglesias, José Luis, editor. | Sacristán, Javier, editor.

Título: Africa in the 21st Century / José Luis Gázquez y Javier Sacristán,
coordinadores.
Descripción: Primera edición. | México : Universidad Nacional Autónoma de
México, Programa Universitario de Estudios sobre Asia y África, 2023.
Identificadores: LIBROUNAM 2185704 (libro electrónico) | ISBN 9786073072700
(libro electrónico).
Temas: África -- Historia -- 1960- . | África -- Condiciones sociales -- Siglo XXI. |
África -- Integración económica. | Regionalismo -- África.
Clasificación: LCC DT30.5 (libro electrónico) | DDC 960.32—dc23

Africa in the 21st Century

Esta investigación, arbitrada por pares académicos,
se privilegia con el aval de la institución editora

Primera edición: febrero de 2023

DR © 2023. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

Programa Universitario de Estudios sobre Asia y África
Filosofía y Letras 88, Copilco Universidad,
Coyoacán, Ciudad de México.

Coordinación de Humanidades
Circuito Mario de la Cueva s/n, Ciudad Universitaria,
Coyoacán, 04510, Ciudad de México

ISBN: 978-607-30-7270-0
Cuidado de la edición: Andrea Reyes
Diseño de portada: Yussef A. Galicia Galicia

Esta edición y sus características son propiedad

de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

Prohibida su reproducción parcial o total por cualquier medio sin autorización escrita
de los titulares de los derechos patrimoniales
Impreso y hecho en México / Made and printed in Mexico
 Contenido

Introduction 9

I. Development from a Western Perspective: Impacts and

Consequences of the Prevailing Model

Regional Cooperation or Universal Capitalism:

A Polanyian View of the Rising African Continent 19
Wesley C. Marshall

Environmental degradation,
conflicts and human displacements in Africa 35
Milton Muñoz

West African Transnationalism

and the Externalization of eu Borders 45
José Luis Gázquez

II. Regional Integration, Cooperation and Changes in Economy

Throughout Modern History

Agriculture and Food Security in the Context of Continental

Cooperation in Africa. Policies and Challenges
for the African Continental Free Trade Area 61
Paulina Berumen

Sub-Saharan Africa in
the Global Crossroads of Financialization 81
Alicia Girón

VII
The Reconfiguration of the
Banking Sector in Angola and Mozambique (2000-2016) 97
Monika Meireles

III. Social Issues, Gender and the Construction of New Perspectives

African Women’s Political Empowerment

towards Gender Equality 117
Arlin Rivas

Ni Uhuru? Mau Mau and Nationalism in Kenya 141

Javier Sacristán

Tuareg Representations and Rebellions in Azawad:

Geopolitical Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Mali 157
Adriana Franco

The Ubuntu Philosophy and the Political Uses

of the Past and History: the Gacaca Courts
and Post-apartheid South Africa 193
Marco Reyes

VIII
 Introduction

This book is the product of an academic effort made by different institu-

tions in the world. It is also one of the most significant steps that unam
has taken to open spaces for African studies in the institution. The Afri-
can Colloquium was a two-day international event aiming to showcase
and disseminate current research conducted by renowned academics
who are devoted to studying Africa in a wide array of issues.
Each of these topics was discussed in the 8 panels of the colloquium
and has a reason to find a place as a chapter in this book. It is imperative
to study global history from an African perspective, not only because
its own history was erased as one of the consequences of European im-
perialism and colonization during the nineteenth and first half of the
twentieth century. As it has been proven, German philosopher G.W.F.
Hegel, among other Western philosophers, played an important role in
legitimizing the colonial and imperial undertakings of European powers.
In his book, Philosophy of History, he denied African societies had a past
and were trapped in a stage of eternal barbarism. Even though there has
been extensive work in Western thought to deconstruct this vision of the
continent, its effects are still present in the academy as well as in Afri-
can states and their international relations, not to mention media and
popular representations in Western countries. In this sense, it remains
essential to continue studying Africa, its history and its societies within a
critical perspective.
With relation to contemporary political constructions, the fact that
most African nation-states only gained political independence and

9
10 Africa in the 21st Century

international sovereignty less than 63 years ago, poses the problem of

state and nation construction within the framework of globalization and
the role of the state in the global economic order. Nevertheless, research-
ers of African politics still consider important to analyze and discuss
processes of state development and the construction of a national iden-
tity in the postcolonial period during which the political systems that
emerged after decolonization have faced the material and economic im-
pact of military conquest and colonization. In fact, due to recurrent crises
and the deepening of dependency relations between former colonies and
metropoles since independence, postcolonial theory in social sciences
has emerged as a framework to explain these phenomena in a context
where neoliberal globalization has accentuated crisis scenarios with the
failure of structural adjustment programs imposed by the imf and the
wb since the late 1970s. In this framework of persistent and generalized
state crises and in some cases state failure, the new millennium has also
brought hope to the continent thanks to peak economic growth rates re-
corded by some African countries during the first and second decades of
the twenty-first century. This viewpoint is shared by Carlos Oya, Spanish
researcher based at the School of Oriental and African Studies in Lon-
don, who delivered the colloquium’s keynote conference entitled “Africa
and Economics in the Twenty-First Century”. Based on several countries,
he discussed the opportunities and disadvantages of industrialization
processes in the continent.
Another essential issue in contemporary African Studies is research
focused on diaspora, mobility and transnational dynamics, both inside
and outside of the continent. Since the centuries of slave traffic and even
before, Africa has witnessed important human displacements originating
on a regional, continental, or world basis. While it remains important
to recognize and investigate the historicity of African migrations, it is
imperative to analyze current flows related both to environmental chal-
lenges and economic and political factors.
As the relevance and legitimacy of the nation-state is both questioned
and challenged by global economic and cultural forces, it has become cru-
cial to develop anthropological approaches sensitive to ongoing spatial
 Introduction 11

and territorial reconfigurations at the regional and local level for a critical
understanding of the dynamics occurring in the continent.
In this sense, anthropological approaches to Africa in this volume in-
tend to study some cases as the Tuareg rebellion or the pentecostalization
of social life in African states like Benin. These phenomena open new per-
spectives for studying the history and present of the continent through
social, cultural and political practices that go beyond the orthodox and
Eurocentric accounts of African historical and contemporary polities.
As for the role of arts and cultures, inasmuch as investment in these
two interrelated areas is seriously taken into consideration by the acad-
emy as providers of insights to enrich theories in the social and political
fields, we will be able to obtain higher or better understandings of Afri-
can realities and therefore counter misperceptions and misconceptions
product of Western bias and stereotypes that continue to negatively im-
pact knowledge about the continent through distorted and colonial or
imperial representations of it. In their presentation, specialists on this
panel remarked the importance of continuing decolonizing knowledge
by deconstructing and critically examining the Western episteme by
which the African continent and its cultures have come to be known
while highlighting the need for a systematic recovery of African sources,
oral or written, for scientific research purposes.
Finally, another topic that has received much scholar attention in
recent years and that plays an ever-greater role around theoretical and
political issues concerning African Studies besides decolonization and
deconstruction is the task of de-gendering the role of women in both
African Studies and African political societies. Long time concealed not
only by Western imperialism and colonialism but by a great number of
patriarchal pre-colonial African societies, women’s dynamics, collective
action, and political participation are now widely recognized as local
development and social forces as well as part of state government appara-
tuses in a large number of African countries. These are the reasons why
the colloquium also enjoyed the participation of specialists centered on
the issue of developing critical feminist and gender approaches in Africa
and beyond.
12 Africa in the 21st Century

This book attempts to give testimony of the intellectual effort un-

dertaken by the participants at the colloquium and also tries to prove
the need of deepening our understanding of Africa’s political, social, and
cultural problems in order to advance scientific knowledge, not only at
unam but also at other academic institutions across Mexico, Latin Amer-
ica and the world. Nowadays, our university has specialists who can more
than contribute to the global discussion about Africa. This is why one of
the main goals of the University Program of Studies on Asia and Africa
(pueaa) is to gather these specialists in order to build cooperation and
collaboration strategies that can add to the development of African stud-
ies in Mexico and abroad.
Mexico, like other Latin American countries, has a lot of histori-
cal similarities with African nations. In the twenty-first century, we are
bound to start deconstructing our own fundamental knowledge about
the continent in order to introduce our students into critical perspectives
of the African continent that can allow them to think and study their own
country or region through different lenses. In this respect, it is striking to
observe and realize cultural connections and mutual influences through
musical expressions and exchanges in both sides of the Atlantic. One ex-
ample of this can be found in the translation of the popular Mexican song
“El Rey” to Swahili, one of the most important and spoken languages of
Africa.
Mexico needs to recognize the contribution of millions of Africans
brought by force to America and the Caribbean during the centuries of
slave trade. Our country is now home to approximately 1.2 million people
of African descent who recently have been constitutionally recognized as
members of the Mexican nation. This represents one of the major reasons
why unam has engaged in developing an approach to the continent that
looks forward to recognizing our African past in order to have a better
understanding of ourselves.
The fulfillment of this academic activity was fundamental to the
Mexican academy. The discussions held between Mexican participants
and those coming from other countries will certainly have a very posi-
tive impact on African Studies research being carried out at unam, and
 Introduction 13

incentivize collaboration between institutions for the creation of interna-

tional works. The global context needs the academy to start contributing
to politics, and Mexico is the perfect example. As a Global South country,
Mexico must develop and strengthen South-South links and overall co-
operation to foster critical research and build bridges with other south
countries and regions.
This book has ten chapters. In the first one, Wesley Marshall analyzes
the idea of Africa as the continent of the future from Polanyi’s standpoint.
Using the author’s political framework, Marshall demonstrates that Afri-
ca can change its path and become the continent of the future. With the
shift in financing structure, this work talks about the possibility of a new
economics that can be (both) human and nature-friendly.
For most African countries, it is urgent to change some of their po-
litical and economic policies because in many cases they possess huge
natural resources whose exploitation do not benefit their populations
but must face its consequences such as climate change, environmental
degradation and migration flows. In his chapter, Muñoz explains many
characteristics pertaining to African migration. While almost all of these
flows occur in a context of generalized environmental transformation
due to climate change and global warming (i.e. countries of the Sahel
sub-region have faced increasing desertification since the 1970s) others
stem from serious damage caused by capitalist activities like extraction
and exploitation of natural resources. This is why the causes of migration
have become imperative in order to both change the migration policies
in host countries and change developmental and cooperation schemes
that would allow rehabilitating local economies by providing employ-
ment and investment opportunities that go beyond mere extraction and
exploitation activities.
However, African migrations have had an enormous impact on Eu-
rope, where they are perceived by public opinion as a political, social and
cultural problem. Even though South-North migrations are statistical-
ly less significant than the movement of people at the continental level,
flows coming from Africa (or other southern country) have a strong po-
litical impact on host countries where far-right nationalist parties build
14 Africa in the 21st Century

their discourse and policies around migration issues. In the third chap-
ter, José Luis Gázquez discusses how West Africa, especially the Sahelian
sub-region that has historically been characterized as a free-movement
and transnational space for circulation of highly diverse populations, has
recently been subjected to the European Union policy of externalization
of borders. These policies are built by conditioning development funds to
the securitization of borders in countries of origin which in turn has re-
sulted in an increased militarization and clandestinization of traditional
migratory routes and, more importantly, they have rendered them even
more dangerous making the Saharan desert an open-air graveyard, same
as the Mediterranean Sea has become a submarine burial ground due to
this kind of policies.
Within this context, in order to stop migration, African governments
are searching for economic policies that could provide better life condi-
tions for their citizens. In this sense, the African Union is negotiating a
Free Trade Area that is analyzed by Paulina Berumen in her paper. She
discusses how this new African Union Will project is an essential tool in
building food security all along the continent. It is believed this initiative
will boost development in different sectors of African economies. How-
ever, it will be necessary to understand how each African country will
implement this agreement for the benefit of the rural sector.
The Free Trade Area is a measure for changing the prevailing eco-
nomic conditions in the continent. In Alicia Giron’s research, the reader
can understand how the new financial flows are being directed to Africa
in order to reroute investments after the crisis. This period gave Africa an
essential role in the industrialized world that can be seen in the Chinese
investments in the region. This investigation demonstrates that Europe,
India, and China are becoming the continent’s main international play-
ers, regarding it as an area of opportunity.
If it is true that the economic models imposed by Western interna-
tional economic institutions to practically all African countries since the
early 1980s have proven to be a failure and that a deep structural change
is needed in order to revert the situation the same can be said about the
conditions of women in the region and their political involvement. In this
 Introduction 15

vein, Arlin Rivas stresses the participation of women in African politics.

Women continue to face structural difficulties that hinder strengthening
their participation and political leadership, thus limiting their influence
on decision-making and the affirmative action’s to integrate a strategy
aimed to underpin women’s participation and empowerment in politics.
She centers on Namibia, Rwanda, and South Africa to demonstrate the
gap between men and women and the need for increasing women’s par-
ticipation in decision-making.
Women have been forgotten in African history. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to revisit the process of decolonization in the continent. The Mau
Mau was a crucial agricultural rebellion in Kenya. This historical event
determines the national identity after independence. Javier Sacristán talks
about the division in the political class and the structures that dictate who
was a Kenyan and who was a rebel. The Mau Mau rebellion was the first
step to independence in 1963, and it was until the 21st century that the
Kenyan government started to rescue their memory.
Monika Meireles analyzes the changes in the bank system in Angola
and Mozambique from 2000 to 2016. She explains the changes before
the global crisis in 2008 and after it. It is worth remembering that ac-
cording to specialists, this was one of the most significant crises; thus
the compelling need for changes in the global bank system. Angola and
Mozambique were not the exception, which makes this contribution es-
sential to understand the development of this event in Africa.
The economy is intimately related to the conditions of some com-
munities along the continent. Adriana Franco talks about the Tuareg
rebellion and the political changes in Mali. The history of these people
in northern Africa is about a tribe that protects their traditions against
globalization and the changes in the world. The differences in social and
territorial representations of the Tuareg portray them as a danger to the
West, legitimizing the violence used against them.
Finally, Marco Reyes talks about the Ubuntu philosophy using the
cases of Mandela’s Moral Regeneration Movement and the Gacaca Courts.
While it may seem that Reyes centers his attention on two specific cases,
this is an illustrative example of how Africans understand their history.
16 Africa in the 21st Century

To Africans, history is useful and vital, and it can be the best tool to stop
violence in some communities. It is necessary for governments in Africa
(and elsewhere) to adopt elements of the Ubuntu philosophy or other
similar philosophies of the region (or elsewhere) that conceive human
relationships as a way of managing them differently from the triumphant
individualism of the West.
In this book, the reader will find outstanding contributions regarding
Africa authored by academics of different countries and institutions. It is
one of the first endeavors of pueaa to trigger an understanding of Africa
from the South.
pueaa was created by unam’s current president, Enrique Graue. It
is a fundamental effort this university has undertaken to gather experts
in these two regions. The program’s main objective is developing a mul-
tidisciplinary group of specialists to ultimately strengthen academic ties
between Mexico, Asia and Africa.
As editors of this book, we are grateful to all the collaborators of this
work. We especially thank Wendy Santiago, since without her participa-
tion and support, this book would not have seen the light.

José Luis Gázquez y Javier Sacristán

 I. Development from a Western
Perspective: Impacts and Consequences
of the Prevailing Model
 Regional Cooperation or Universal
Capitalism: A Polanyian View of the Rising
African Continent
Wesley C. Marshall

Abstract

In 1945 Karl Polanyi published an essay entitled “Universal Capi-

talism or Regional Planning”, which analyzes the possibilities of the
coming new global order according to the “tendencies” of the ma-
jor world powers’ foreign policies. Polanyi correctly identified the
moment as a “turning point” in world history and was in fact uncom-
monly prescient in describing the United States’ “utopia” of restoring
the 19th century liberal world order. Based on his own criteria, Po-
lanyi also claimed that this utopia of re-establishing a global market
order could never be met. Indeed, restoring the 19th-century liberal
order during the past fifty years has placed tremendous strains on
markets, societies and the environment, bringing humanity closer to
the absolute limit that Polanyi places on such a utopian project—the
survival of human civilization. In recent years, as market failures and
rapidly accelerating ecological disasters prompt the worry of schol-
ars and populations alike, Polanyi’s framework becomes ever more
relevant. Much like in 1945, today the world is at another turning
point. Using Polanyi’s analytical framework, this chapter argues for a
distinct path for Africa as a continent.

Introduction

In recent years, the term anthropocene has gained prominence in de-

scribing how human activity now determines the fate of the planet and

19
20 Africa in the 21st Century

has also become a source of debate. The title of a 2016 book (Moore)
names one such debate: Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Under a Polany-
ian perspective, the term capitalocene is appropriate, as disembedded
capitalism will destroy nature, humankind, and money— the three false
commodities for Polanyi. As market forces have greatly outstripped
their antithetical forces of social protection in recent decades, poverty
has directly led to environmental disaster and overpopulation, while the
militarization required for market expansion has created a vast nuclear
arsenal that hangs like Damocles’ sword over the head of humanity.
Proponents of the capitalocene perspective place emphasis on the
turning point that humanity faces. In this chapter, we focus specifically
on Africa. Accepting the capitalocene hypothesis and that the “developed
world” must soon chart a different path if widespread destruction is to be
avoided, this chapter argues that Africa likewise cannot follow a similar
course as that of the historical “development” of the global center. This is
not to say that Africa must stay poor so that the rest of the world can enjoy
higher living standards. To the contrary, this is to propose another form
of development different from the models of the global north, which did
achieve greater material wealth for the majority of its populations, but at
a high and unsustainable cost to all. The spirit of this chapter’s argument
is to discuss a development model that will first serve Africa’s multiple
national interests safeguarding the interest of human survival as a result.
Within this context, this chapter aims to discuss the many paths that
lie ahead of Africa at this historical crossroads. In the global spread of
capitalism, sub-Africa has always been treated as a backwater, where the
interest of global corporations has traditionally focused on the export of
primary goods —particularly oil— but not on the creation or control of
deep national markets. In recent years, the advance of China’s outward
expansion has sharpened the interest of the largest global corporations
to the threat of losing influence in the region. Such interest is also due to
a demographic boom which projects Africa to bestow more new people
than any other region in the world over the next few decades.
The destiny of what promises to be the world’s largest emerging
market is often framed as being determined by external forces: western
 Regional Cooperation or Universal Capitalism: A Polanyian View of 21
the Rising African Continent

interests versus Chinese expansion. However, as we argue in this chap-

ter, such binary debates exclude a third option that we claim better
accommodates the general interests of Africa and humanity as a whole:
cooperative regional self-government. Such an argument follows the in-
tellectual guide of Karl Polanyi —here introduced in his mentioned 1945
article, with other of his ideas subsequently introduced in the chapter—,
which discusses the theoretical and historical antecedents to this third
option. Situated within Africa’s current situation, this chapter offers sev-
eral guidelines as for how it would be best followed.

Revisiting 1944 from today’s perspective

Africa’s position at the crossroads today is reminiscent of the crossroads

in which the world found itself at the end of World War II. Two opposing
sides had clearly emerged in the us bloc and the Soviet bloc, with the us
bloc being simultaneously at a fork in the road. Polanyi’s cited 1945 article
clearly outlines the two options facing the us bloc and global capitalism,
while treating the Soviet Union (ussr) as a bit of a mystery. As this chap-
ter will assert, the role of China today is very similar to that of the ussr
at the time. However, we first focus on 1944 and the intellectual battle
that would lead to the “golden age” of capitalism, in which international
finance was organized under the ethos of state-to-state cooperation.
In 1944 both The Great Transformation and The Road to Serfdom
were published. The first convincingly makes the argument that leaving
people, nature, and money to the custody of the market can only lead
to their destruction— what we would understand today as ecological
disaster, financial collapse, and social degradation. The second book
earned Von Hayek the 1974 Nobel prize in economics for arguing that
societies must submit to market forces if civilization is to be preserved.
With the historical perspective of over seventy years since these books
were written, the intellectual victory of Von Hayek and the restructur-
ing of the global economy to the needs of a universal market through
the process of financial globalization has meant that the possibility of
22 Africa in the 21st Century

economic organization based on national general interests and effec-

tuated through the state has been written out of existence. Today, the
debate described in this chapter is all but forgotten in forums of public
policy debate.
While Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation (1944) can be seen
as the great counter to The Road to Serfdom (1944), it has never had its
moment in the (public policy) sun, as Von Hayek’s work did. Indeed, Von
Hayek’s great intellectual enemy was not Polanyi, but rather Keynes, and
for good reason. Keynes was an intellectual leader of the zeitgeist of the
time, and the belief that the war was the great enemy of humanity, and
once over, the next greatest enemy—unemployment—should be tackled
head on. Furthermore, it was Keynes’s intellectual leadership that brought
about the Bretton Woods international financial system.
The establishment of this system was an exception in the history of
capitalism and was the foundation of its golden age. This system was
historically novel as its the architects and governing actors were the na-
tional states rather than private banks. Under the formal gold standard
or today’s informal dollar standard, the globe is an international space for
finance: (almost) any country can access loans from private banks in fi-
nancial centers such as New York, London, or Paris. This was very much
less the case under the Bretton Woods regime, under which the world
was divided into national spaces of production. Finance was entrusted to
national private and public banks, and fiscal (as opposed to monetary)
policy was the favored tool for controlling prices and distributing nation-
al wealth. Due to the structure of the system —which ensured that banks
could not profitably bet against customers— as well as adequate regula-
tion and supervision, there were no banking crises in the Western World
during the “golden age”.
Today’s financialized globalization, or the restoration of the universal
market, had its first major victory in the de-pegging of the Dollar from
gold in 1971, marking the beginning of what Noemi Klein has termed “di-
saster capitalism”, or what one of the material authors of the de-pegging
of the Dollar —Paul Volcker— has termed “controlled disintegration”
(Volcker, 1978, p. 2). As the “golden age” gave way to the “the leaden age”
 Regional Cooperation or Universal Capitalism: A Polanyian View of 23
the Rising African Continent

(in the words of Joan Robinson), and whatever we could call the most
recent age, the western world has returned to one of radical financial un-
certainty, wild price swings, and ever increasing wealth inequality.
Polanyi and Seccareccia (2016) have discussed the similarities be-
tween today’s financial architecture and the gold standard. Much like the
gold standard, the structure of today’s global financial system has assured
that a handful of global banks —haute finance in Polanyi’s words— and
their vast network of market and non-market actors, can safely assure
profits for themselves and impoverish the masses. The impacts on peace,
population, and ecology have been great. If Africa is fully incorporated
into this system, humanity has little future.
Today’s bank-led global financial architecture has destroyed itself
by the pervasive fraudulent practices that corrode the most essential el-
ement of banking: trust. In Polanyi’s time, the haute finance-led order
sowed the seeds of its destruction in a different fashion. Even after the
2007-2009 crisis, conventional wisdom still holds that today’s global fi-
nancial architecture is designed for stability. The centuries-old argument
that the market is the best form of pricing and distributing goods and
services and that government planning can only distort such processes
have yet to be vanquished. Nevertheless, it is certainly untrue, be it today
or a century ago:

This Utopian conception failed in practice, as it was bound to do; and

the gold standard was destroyed by the unemployment that it caused.
In fact, the new methods of “foreign economy” which have superseded
the gold standard are incomparably more effective for the purposes of
international co-operation. With their help we are able to solve prob-
lems which were formerly intractable. Among these are the distribution
of raw materials, the stabilizing of prices, and even the ensuring of full
employment in all countries (Polanyi, 1945).

With seven decades of hindsight, we can appreciate Polanyi’s wisdom

and also identify the natural experiment that has occurred during the
decades since its writing.
24 Africa in the 21st Century

Polanyi is correct in highlighting the very poor history of econom-

ic functionality under the “free market” prior to the Bretton Woods
system. Under this system of international government planning that
“superseded the gold standard”, the Bretton Woods system offered an
umbrella of financial stability to all countries that did not exist before
and has not existed since. It is without exaggeration that we can say
that the golden age was a parenthesis in the history of international
planning, a break from the norm of universal capitalism, be it in the
form of the open gold standard before it or the veiled us dollar stan-
dard after it. If measured by the frequency and depth of financial crises,
unemployment, investment and production, the natural experiment of-
fers conclusive proof of which system is more effective under the stated
goals of both regimes.
As mentioned, the possibility for a framework of international co-
operation to protect the multiple national interests from global private
finance is not up for debate today. In the popularized form of academic
debate, it is curious how various principles of national economic man-
agement are excluded, while others are falsely included. For example, the
extremes of free market capitalism and communism are often used to
frame the debate, although neither of them have —nor can— exist in
modern economies. Similarly, managing an economy around the princi-
ples of protecting the general and national interest is swept aside under
the pejorative narratives of populism and protectionism. In both aca-
demia and popular economics, the middle ground pragmatism of Keynes
and Polanyi are either omitted or contorted beyond recognition.
As today’s academic debate is not sincere, in order to analyze a third
path for Africa today, we must return to the debates of yesteryear. With
the benefit of more than half of a century of hindsight, it is much easi-
er to identify the key arguments behind the policies that they spawned,
and the basic considerations around which they revolve. Shedding all
insincere arguments, the questions of who controls the system and to
what ends become fundamental. Accepting the fact that all markets are
social constructions with nothing “natural” about them, and that “lais-
sez faire is planned” (Polanyi-Levitt, 2013, p. 150), then we are left with
 Regional Cooperation or Universal Capitalism: A Polanyian View of 25
the Rising African Continent

considerations of mere planning and organization: what type of system is

more suited to the goals proposed by which group of people.
Keynes argues against the free market order as proposed in the The
Road to Serfdom, in the form of a personal letter to Von Hayek:

I come finally to what is really my only serious criticism of the book.

You admit here and there that it is a question of knowing where to draw
the line. You agree that the line has to be drawn somewhere [between
free-enterprise and planning], and that the logical extreme is not pos-
sible. But you give us no guidance whatever as to where to draw it. In a
sense this is shirking the practical issue. It is true that you and I would
probably draw it in different places. I should guess that according to my
ideas you greatly underestimate the practicability of the middle course.
But as soon as you admit that the extreme is not possible, and that a line
has to be drawn, you are, on your own argument, done for since you are
trying to persuade us that as soon as one moves an inch in the planned
direction you are necessarily launched on the slippery path which will
lead you in due course over the precipice. I should therefore conclude
your theme rather differently. I should say that what we want is not no
planning, or even less planning, indeed I should say that we almost cer-
tainly want more. But the planning should take place in a community
in which as many people as possible, both leaders and followers, wholly
share your moral position. Moderate planning will be safe if those car-
rying it out are rightly orientated in their own minds and hearts to the
moral issue. This is in fact already true of some of them. But the curse
is that there is also an important section who could almost be said to
want planning not in order to enjoy its fruits but because morally they
hold ideas exactly the opposite of yours, and wish to serve not God but
the devil [...] (Keynes, 1944).

This quote is of importance for two reasons. First, Keynes reveals the
academic dishonesty of Von Hayek by his shirking of “the practical is-
sue” that who controls planning, governs. As Keynes understands, the
neoliberal argument against government is not against all planning and
regulation, but rather against governing in the general interest. Corporate
planning and regulation —manifested in the gold standard of centuries
26 Africa in the 21st Century

past or the dollar standard of today— are permitted and omitted by neo-
liberalism. Keynes therefore takes Von Hayek’s “shirking the practical
issue” to its logical conclusions that planning will be done by those who
“wish to serve not God but the devil.”
The second important point that Keynes insists upon is morals. At
the extreme ends, either “free markets” and the corporations behind
them can do all the planning, according to their private interest and mor-
als, or society can do all the planning, according to the general interest
and popular morals. As Von Hayek argues in The Road to Serfdom, the
general population can never attempt to govern the market, much less
understand money, if civilization is to be preserved. Polanyi argues the
contrary point: that if the “free market” is not governed by society, then it
will destroy all over which it governs. As to defining the general interest,
Kari Polanyi states of her father that “He finds in the writings of Rousseau
support for his contention that the ultimate foundation of government
must rest on that reservoir of wisdom, knowledge, tradition, and com-
mon sense of the people that is the popular culture” (Polanyi-Levitt,
2014, p. xii).

Africa’s external forces

In Polanyi’s times, when speaking of the ussr, he stated that “she may still
prove herself a true daughter of the French Revolution” (Polanyi, 1945).
The same could be said of China today; it would also appear that the new
upstart to the capitalist order is the most intriguing. In a sense, this is log-
ical. Post-revolutionary China is now a consolidated political actor, with
a fairly well defined and steady character, but is still a new one, especially
as compared with the us. Chinese outward projection is even more re-
cent. Yet in another sense, there has been a great deal of misinformation
regarding this expansion.
Announced at the end of 2013, the Silk Roads or officially the Belt
and Road Initiative (bri) of the Chinese government is a clearly expan-
sionist program aimed solely at market expansion through the creation
 Regional Cooperation or Universal Capitalism: A Polanyian View of 27
the Rising African Continent

of new infrastructure. Towards the end of 2019, and despite many claims
to the contrary, this is largely true in both theory and practice. At the
present time, it would appear that the us block’s only real reaction to the
Silk Roads project has been in the media. When the pink tide began to
be washed out in 2014, it appeared to signal that the us was updating
the Monroe Doctrine, and would not permit “populist” governments in
Latin America to increase commercial and financial ties as many pink
governments had done. Yet what appeared to be a proxy war in Latin
America between us and Chinese interests has not materialized as of to-
day, as after the ouster of many of these governments, commercial ties
with China continue strong.
Throughout mainstream corporate media, a constant claim is that
China is setting up debt traps for recipient companies. At this point, there
is no evidence to these claims. The deals do involve debt, but they do not
appear to have been made under fraudulent or coercive terms. As shown
by the recent history of Latin America, more than any other region, the
us has laid many debt traps under both coercive and fraudulent terms.
Regarding the region as a whole, the original debt has been paid over
many times; yet, it will never be paid off in full under current terms.
More recently, the conflict between Huawei and the us government
has brought up another issue related to China’s infrastructure expansion;
its technological expansion. Throughout the world, the fifth generation
(5g) of cellular network technology, very much connected to traditional
infrastructure, has opened new spaces for competition and dispute. The
us has accused China of using Huawei to spy on foreign actors and even
in a Wall Street Journal (2019) article of using espionage in order to med-
dle in local African politics. Much like in the case of foreign debt, the us
would appear to be projecting its sins upon its rivals. The Obama presi-
dency came into direct conflict with both the German (Financial Times,
2013) and Brazilian presidents (Reuters, 2014) for the National Security
Agency’s corporate espionage in the first case, and corporate and state
espionage in the second. Nothing of the sort has arisen against Huawei,
despite what is surely a close monitoring of the situation.
28 Africa in the 21st Century

The accusations of both debt traps and espionage have at their heart
the suspicion of imperialist intentions, understood as a political control
over a foreign country with the extraction of resources as the primary
motive. As of today, the official Chinese position that these deals are
always nonpolitical and based on mutual gain—the essence of state-to-
state cooperation—cannot be refuted. This could certainly change, much
as the character of the us bloc could in theory.
The argument of this article is that regardless of a change in us or
Chinese foreign policy towards Africa, a regional African policy would
give the continent greater bargaining power. Even if China maintains a
purely commercial relationship with its African partners, as Africa’s trade
and financial relationships with China deepen, markets will be trans-
formed, and differences will appear, and negotiating as a block is always
advantageous. If either the us or China take a more keen political inter-
est in Africa, maintaining self-sufficiency and sovereignty become much
more vital. However, the case for regional cooperation goes far beyond
strategies to deal with foreign commerce and protection from more di-
rect external threats. In all moments, a regional financial framework can
assure monetary abundance and directly combat poverty and ecological
degradation.
In recent decades, Latin America went further than any other region
in the global south to plan and construct a regional financial architec-
ture with these goals in mind. With the rollback of the pink tide, these
initiatives have been suspended indefinitely. However, these experiences
are nonetheless valuable in the African context. The Ecuadorian plan for
the Banco del Sur envisioned a Bretton Woods system, but on a regional
level. All countries would maintain their local currencies, but external
trade would be carried out in a regional currency. The balancing of na-
tional currencies against the regional currency would be done through
exchange rate adjustments by a regional monetary fund, and a regional
development bank would finance and oversee investments in infrastruc-
ture and other priority areas. Under a regional central bank with global
weight, the regional currency can be stabilized relative to more dominant
 Regional Cooperation or Universal Capitalism: A Polanyian View of 29
the Rising African Continent

currencies, and then individual national central banks can further buffer
any variance between the regional currency and the national currency.
Such a regional financial architecture could be deepened in many
ways. The regional development bank can work with national and local
development banks to channel loans into projects that regional, national,
and local governments deem priority. Under a financial architecture that
permits the pooling and coordination of regional finance, recent devel-
opments in both the theory and practice of digital currencies point to
ways to align spending with public policy goals with far greater efficacy
than in the past (Andresen, 2014).
Within a framework of extra-market cooperation, a wide range of
opportunities also arise in which countries of the region can balance
strengths against weaknesses. In recent Latin American experience, the
exchange of Cuban doctors for Venezuelan oil is a prominent example.
Other similar exchanges have occurred and many more are possible.
Unlike market mechanisms that hide governance issues, this type
of cooperation requires openly political decisions: what the equivalency
of workers for national resources should be; what the priorities of de-
velopment banks ought to be; what the exchange rate between national
currencies, and between them and the regional currency would be, and
the same between this and international currencies, etc. As argued by
Keynes and Polanyi, the guidance of local morals and cultures will have
to be the basis for the exercise of political sovereignty in the context of
regional cooperation.
Having the priorities of trade and markets, and of money and finance,
well within the confines of local and national morals and cultures in no
way guarantees that decisions will be harmonious with long-range social,
political, and ecological goals. However, having these decisions made
outside of these confines almost certainly guarantees that such goals will
never be taken into serious consideration. Foreign capital arrives to make
a profit, not to improve local conditions. The two can indeed coincide,
but it is only out of coincidence and not out of an alignment of inter-
ests emanating from similar goals. Keynes offers a historically pertinent
warning:
30 Africa in the 21st Century

But experience is accumulating that remoteness between ownership

and operation is an evil in the relations between men, likely or cer-
tain in the long run to set up strains and enmities which will bring
to naught the financial calculation. I sympathise, therefore, with those
who would minimise, rather than with those who would maximise,
economic entanglement between nations. Ideas, knowledge, art, hos-
pitality, travel— these are the things which should of their nature be
international. But let goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and
conveniently possible; and, above all, let finance be primarily national
(Keynes, 1933).

In order for such a sentiment to not define the bri as proto coloniza-
tion and condemn its fate to one creating “evil in the relations between
men”, we must remember that Keynes is speaking of capitalist expansion,
which, as mentioned before the quote, has profit as its goal. At the current
historical juncture, Chinese spending on the bri is state to state. Profit
does not need to be a goal. However, the deepening of the project will cer-
tainly open new spaces for profit that will be filled by actors led by profit.
Yet even the opening of capitalist markets between China and Africa
does not make the bri/5g inherently antagonistic to African interests.
From the vantage point of a new project which could move forward in
a number of directions, Galbraith’s maxim that the type of system is
sometimes less important than how it is run is perennially important.
However, there are also many ways that Africa-China financial commer-
cial and financial relationships can be structured. Ownership and reach
of commerce are two key elements.
One the one extreme, if African markets were shaped to offer the
greatest benefits for local interests, then Keynes’s above quote offers
wise advice. In order to minimize “economic entanglement between na-
tions”, finance would have to be primarily national. As long as the basic
agreement is that African governments pay Chinese companies to build
infrastructure projects better and cheaper than they could, the entan-
glement is relatively little. In this case, the bri/5g would act only as an
umbrella under which mutually beneficial markets interact infrastruc-
ture in its most essential terms.
 Regional Cooperation or Universal Capitalism: A Polanyian View of 31
the Rising African Continent

With regards to the reach of commerce, Keynes recommends for

“goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possi-
ble”. If the export of African goods —even if they be mostly agricultural
products— can create a wider customer base for local producers, and
if rural production can be conducted in environmentally sustainable
ways, commerce to China should only serve the general interests. If on
the other hand, the bri only serves to flood local markets with cheaper
goods, allowing both governments and national companies to be pulled
into the orbit of the Chinese economic system as satellites, then China
could perhaps perfect the colonialist model first employed in Africa by
the Europeans, and then the Americans, by extracting the region’s wealth
without a shot fired. In this case, China would have betrayed the French
Revolution in the global south and would have evolved into the latest
global superpower. If this is not the case, China will have created the first
successful south-south, state-to-state global infrastructure project that
can serve as a protective umbrella under which national economies con
flourish under conditions of financial autonomy.

Conclusions

The choices available to Africa are presented much like they are for the
rest of the world: some type of “free market” capitalism or some type
of socialism-communism. The third alternative of regional planning be-
tween mixed economies is left out of almost all policy debates. As this
chapter has argued, this third route not only makes the most sense in
theory, but in historical practice as well. Much as the international state-
to-state cooperation embodied in the Bretton Woods financial system
provided an umbrella of financial stability that allowed countries to
pursue their own goals of development and created the golden age of
capitalism, China can provide a commercial umbrella under the bri and
a technology umbrella under 5g that would likewise allow Africa to pur-
sue local, national, and regionally determined goals. As we have argued,
a regional financial architecture is crucial for Africa under any future
32 Africa in the 21st Century

scenario, and Latin America has provided several important examples of

how this could operate.
If financing can be structured in order to serve the general interests
of local populations and not the private interests of foreign market pow-
ers, there are multiple paths that African development can take that are
harmonious with both nature and human wellbeing. Lifting hundreds
of millions out of poverty does not need to rely on industrial growth as
has happened in the past. Enlightened wealth creation can only happen
under the conditions of political and economic sovereignty based on
local culture and morals, and does not need to be at loggerheads with
the environment. Indeed, aiding the environment offers a great source
of meaningful employment, and with full financial sovereignty to invest
in whatever local general wills see fit, there are no technical obstacles.
Once freed from the paper shackles of monetary scarcity, eliminating
poverty—certainly the best route to reducing population strains and
the specter of war—becomes not only possible but an imperative. As
the rising continent, the route that Africa takes will determine the fate
of humanity.

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ments-spy-on-political-opponents-11565793017
 Environmental degradation, conflicts and
human displacements in Africa

Milton Muñoz

Abstract

In addition to the high levels of poverty and sociopolitical disputes,

degradation of the environment in certain African regions is influ-
encing the generation of armed conflicts and the growth of human
displacements.
The degradation of the environment, in particular desertification,
is related to factors such as over-cultivation, overgrazing, deforestation
and the use of inappropriate irrigation systems. This situation causes
the displacement of social groups to other territories, and in some cas-
es, beyond the borders of their States, which leads to sociopolitical and
even armed conflicts that in turn originate the expulsion of population.
This paper will review the link between climate change and en-
vironmental degradation resulting in the expulsion of populations,
especially in the Saharan area.

Climate change, environmental degradation, and human

displacement

Climate change, which is the product of climatic alterations attributed di-

rectly or indirectly to the activities carried out by mankind that change the
composition of the global atmosphere, has generated a series of harmful
effects on both natural ecosystems and the environment of the socio-eco-
nomic, health, and welfare systems of human beings (un, 1992, p. 3).

35
36 Africa in the 21st Century

This phenomenon is due to the gradual increase in global warm-

ing, mainly caused by the burning of fossil fuels, deforestation and some
methods of agricultural exploitation. These human activities performed
from the mid-18th century until our times have increased the volume
of greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide) dis-
charged into the atmosphere (Conde, 2013, p. 17).
The average temperature of the earth’s surface has increased more
than 0.6 degrees Celsius since the last decades of the nineteenth centu-
ry and is predicted to grow again between 1.4 and 5.8 degrees by 2100
(unic, 2019), which will mean shrunk polar caps, sea level rises, more in-
tense rains and longer droughts, intensified ecosystem degradation and,
of course, human displacement.
Despite the opposition of skeptics and the interests of politicians and
businessmen—such as Jair Bolsonaro and Donald Trump—, available
scientific evidence1 shows that global warming influences the availabil-
ity of natural resources, the migration of birds and some fish, a change
in growth and flowering seasons of vegetation, the displacement of sev-
eral species to other regions or higher latitudes, as well as changes in
the abundance and composition of the communities in the ecosystems
(Conde, 2013, p. 21).
The increase in tsunamis, cyclones, and droughts that climate change
entails is affecting several regions of the world and jeopardizes the subsis-
tence of millions of people forced to leave their places of origin, either to
save their lives from contingencies or because land degradation prevents
them from continuing with productive activities.
Human displacement due to environmental causes has been on the
rise since the end of the 20th century and at the outset of the new millen-
nium. However, in the specialized literature and among the specialized
agencies of the United Nations, it is still discussed whether those who
suffer from this situation should be considered migrants or environmen-
tal refugees.

1 See the reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) since 1990 at
https://www.ipcc.ch/ar6-syr/
 Environmental degradation, conflicts and human displacements in Africa 37

Migrants or environmental refugees?

The way in which processes and actors are named is essential to im-
plement policies that call for attention; however, since the 1970s, a
discussion—still unfinished—began on how people displaced owing
to environmental causes should be considered. Despite not voluntarily
deciding to leave their place of origin—as they are obliged due to natu-
ral disasters or the depletion of resources—they are not persecuted for
“race”,2 religion, nationality reasons, political ideas or for belonging to a
specific social group.
Traditionally, the international migrant has been considered as a per-
son who freely decides to leave their country of origin for “reasons of
personal convenience” and without the intervention of external factors
that oblige them to do so” (iom, 2006, p. 41). This situation allows States
to determine admission or expulsion policies for foreigners, according
to their own interests and without greater commitments than those con-
cerning the protection of migrants’ human rights, regardless of whether
their status is regular or undocumented.
And although the International Organization for Migration (iom,
2019, p. 130) has recently reformulated the concept to underline that mi-
grants are all persons who move outside their habitual place of residence,
either within a country or through an international frontier, temporarily
or permanently, and for various reasons, including environmental ones,
in practice nation-states conceive of migration as an individual or col-
lective attempt to improve social and material conditions, so they can
encourage their arrival, prevent entry or make expulsions, according to
their interests.
In the meantime, when the refugee figure is granted, the receiving
State agrees to guarantee the safety of persons, employment, health ser-
vices, housing, etc., and the beneficiary or beneficiaries cannot be taken

2 Biologically speaking, there is only one race among humans, the only thing that changes is
skin tone.
38 Africa in the 21st Century

out of the country of destination, in accordance with the Convention on

the Status of Refugees of 1951, and its 1967 Protocol.
Due to the above, the displaced who cross borders for environmental
reasons remain in limbo because international law does not recognize
the figure of environmental refugees, although they are often people who
a) lack the protection of their States of origin, b) are outside the borders
of their countries of birth, and c) have left their homes because there are
threats against their lives—in this case, as a product of natural disasters
caused by climate change. The three conditions are considered to grant
traditional refuge, but the last one makes reference to the existence of
persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, political ideas
and gender, as set forth in the Convention monitored by the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees (unhcr).
There have been some attempts to conceptualize people displaced for
environmental reasons since the 1970s. For example, natural ecosystem
analyst, Lester Brown, introduced the term environmental refugee in his
book Twenty-two Dimensions of the Population Problem, originally pub-
lished in 1976. Subsequently, Essam El Hinnawi further developed the
concept in a 1985 report addressed to the United Nations Environment
Program (unep, 2017), and pointed out that environmental refugees were
forced to leave their traditional habitat due to environmental disturbanc-
es—either natural or artificial—and whose existence was at risk or saw
their quality of life seriously affected.
iom, on the other hand, began working on the issue since the 1990s
and as of 2007 defined migrants as environmental persons such as people
or groups that “because of sudden or progressive changes in the envi-
ronment that adversely affect their life or living conditions, are forced to
leave their habitual places of residence, or decide to do so, either tempo-
rarily or permanently, and that they move within their own countries or
abroad” (iom, 2007).
None of the conceptualizations proposed so far—environmental ref-
ugee, climate refugee, or environmental migrant—are tacitly endorsed in
the international legal framework, which makes it difficult to properly
treat people who are forcedly displaced for climatic reasons.
 Environmental degradation, conflicts and human displacements in Africa 39

Map 1. Sahel Region

Source: The Conversation.com, available at http://theconversation.com/sahel-region-africa-72569

Meanwhile, global warming continues escalating with deglaciation,

irregular rainfall, and increasing droughts, making food security and
population displacement part of the international scene in the decades to
come, especially if one considers that 44 percent of the world’s population
lives within 150 kilometres from the coast (iom, 2009, p. 15).
Some of the regions that could face most problems in the following
decades as a consequence of climate change and in terms of internal and
transnational human displacements are Latin America, Southeast Asia
and Sub-Saharan Africa, being the latter analyzed below along with some
future projections.

The situation in Africa and some of its most dramatic cases

The African continent is rich in cultural and territorial diversity with its
tropical rainforests and the Sahara, bringing about varied realities and
40 Africa in the 21st Century

situations in African countries. Contrastively, increasing deforestation,

accelerated loss of animal and plant species, and rainfall patterns widely
affected by climate change are hitting the continent.
Only from 1970 to 2014, Africa lost 50% of its biodiversity (wwf,
2018, p. 48) and the most impacted area is the Sahel, which is a tran-
sition ecoregion between northern Sahara and the Southern Sudanese
savannah, and where the desert is expanding southward with serious
consequences for several states, including Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and
Nigeria. The latter country is the most populated in the region (190 mil-
lion people) and suffers from the siege of the radical group Boko Haram.
In this regard, it is worthwhile noting that in several regions armed
conflicts develop, 40% of which have been related to the exploitation of
natural resources, from water and wood to diamonds, gold, oil, and var-
ious minerals in the last 60 years (cear, 2018, p. 4). The control of such
commodities in Central and Eastern Africa finances activities of armed
groups, leading to the forced displacement of millions of people.
The impacts on the environment caused by armed conflicts sharp-
en human displacements given the pollution generated by oil spills and
chemical products when in combat, not to mention “looting of natural
resources by the armed forces, desertification, hoarding of land for the
occupation of military personnel or the destruction and pollution of ma-
rine and terrestrial ecosystems” (cear, 2018, p. 5).
The African continent is home to the largest number of armed con-
flicts in the world, 13 of 33; 7 of which are considered of high intensity
(ecp, 2017, p. 15), and the control of natural resources is at the heart
of the disputes. The clearest example is that of Darfur (Sudan), where
rival groups fight energy sources, fertile lands, and drinking water. Sim-
ilar situations are seen in areas of Libya, Chad, Somalia, South Sudan,
and Egypt.
This double situation—climate change (with human actions) and
numerous armed conflicts—makes the continent particularly sensitive,
which also has little resilience to adapt and respond to the consequences
of forced displacement.
 Environmental degradation, conflicts and human displacements in Africa 41

Figure 1. People Displaced by environmental causes in the worst scenario

by 2050

Sub-Saharan South Asia Latin America

Region 40 million 17 million
86 million

Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank data (2018a, XV-XVII).

Conclusions and the outlook for the following years

In the world, there are around 260 million people living in places oth-
er than those of their birth (desa, 2017), which represents just over 3
percent of the world’s population. unhcr (2019), for its part, recogniz-
es that there are 70 million displaced people in the world due to armed
conflicts and persecutions, nearly 30 million of whom are under the fig-
ure of refuge. In addition, there are about 10 million stateless persons;
nevertheless, it is difficult to clearly locate those people displaced by en-
vironmental causes.
Despite the above, non-governmental organization Internal Dis-
placement Monitoring Centre (idcm, 2016) estimated that only in 2015
almost 20 million new displacements were registered in 113 countries
due to natural disasters.
These figures are compelling for the elaboration of public policies that
allow addressing the different challenges that human mobility entails, es-
pecially in the face of what is to come, since the projections towards 2050
indicate that there will be 400 million “traditional” migrants in the world
and about 143 million displaced by environmentally related causes.
42 Africa in the 21st Century

The World Bank (2018a, xv-xvii) believes that by 2050, in the worst
case scenario, there would be about 86 million people leaving their homes
in the sub-Saharan region due to climate change, while South Asia and
Latin America would experience 40 and 17 million of displaced persons
each.
And while it is true that there are coastal cities in developed countries
that could be affected by sea level rises, the reality indicates that the three
aforementioned regions are the most susceptible to suffer the ravages of
nature and the consequences of human activity (desertification, defor-
estation, contamination of cold mantles, lack of food) and they are also
the least able to deal with a humanitarian emergency of these dimensions.
Climate change poses a great paradox: underdeveloped countries
will be the most affected by it whereas the largest producers of green-
house gases and major consumers of the planet’s natural resources, that is
the most developed countries, will not be as adversely harmed.
The reality facing Africa today is pressing and the future is even
more complicated when considering that the continent will have an ex-
ponential population growth in the next three decades, and countries
such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and
Ethiopia will be among the eight with the highest population in the world
(World Bank, 2018b),3 which will imply challenges to access natural re-
sources and eventual internal, regional, and transcontinental human
displacements.
There are many fronts that must be addressed in the short, medium
and long term. To begin with, it is necessary to overcome the theoret-
ical-legal discussion and thus have a specific international framework
that contemplates rights for those people displaced due to environmental
causes. Multilateral cooperation is also required to generate sustainable
development in the continent, as well as the real commitment to prevent
companies from continuing to exploit natural resources irrationally and
at the expense of indigenous populations.

3 The list of the most populated countries is completed by India, Pakistan and the United States.
 Environmental degradation, conflicts and human displacements in Africa 43

Two more elements that are essential to avoid a catastrophic scenario

in Africa are the pacification of the continent—which includes creating
conditions to prevent the emergence or continuation of radical groups
such as Boko Haram—and meeting the goals set in the Paris Agreement,
which entered into force in 2020, seeking to prevent the temperature on
the planet from continuing to rise, even despite the non-participation of
countries such as the United States.

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44 Africa in the 21st Century

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wwf, 75 pp.
 West African Transnationalism and the
Externalization of eu Borders

José Luis Gázquez

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to contrast how the historical free mobility
of people from Sahel and West African countries in general has been
undermined by migration policies adopted both by the usa and the
European Union during the last decades. This policy has been charac-
terized by its coercive and restrictive impact in the free movement of
people, causing high human costs in the Mediterranean Sea, the Sahara
Desert or the jungle in Central America.
Since the time of the Great African Empires, the Sahara and Sahel
countries in general have been transit hubs for migration flows at the
continental and intercontinental level. One of the most striking exam-
ples of these historical transnational communities due to its historical
depth is Islam. The presence of Islam in West Africa goes back to the 7th
century when the continent received Islam from Arab cultures from the
Middle East. For centuries, Islamic societies have been reproduced by
cultural elements that cut across borders in a constitutive way. The Um-
mah is at the same time a political community and a geographical space
linked together by religious belief. In contrast with the secular European
nation-state introduced and imposed in the last quarter of the 19th cen-
tury, territories under the rule of Islam neither promoted the separation
of the religious and political spheres nor the centralization of power nor
a sharp definition of borders determining political and cultural adscrip-
tion to the nation. This favored the development of economic exchange
systems such as the trans-Saharan trade system that existed before the
borders imposed by European conquest and colonization but that con-
tinued to bypass them in the colonial and postcolonial periods.

45
46 Africa in the 21st Century

Introduction

Free movement has been a prominent historical feature of the peoples

and cultures of the West African sub-region instead of a space character-
ized by its subjection to the politics of surveillance and control of human
mobility. Since the time of the Great African Empires, the Sahara and
Sahel countries in general have been transit hubs for migration flows at
the continental and intercontinental level. The most striking example of
these historical transnational communities due to its historical depth is
Islam. The presence of Islam in West Africa goes back to the 7th century
when the northwestern area of the continent received Islam from Arab
cultures from what today is known as the Middle East under the West-
ern perspective. Regarding the Sub-Saharan region of the continent, the
presence of Islam dates back to the 11th century when the Almoravide
conquests made their way into the territory of contemporary Mali. For
centuries, Islamic societies have been reproduced by cultural elements
that have crossed borders in a constitutive way. The Ummah is at the
same time a political community and a geographical space linked togeth-
er by religious belief. In contrast with the secular European nation-state
introduced and imposed in the last quarter of the 19th century and the be-
ginning of the 20th, territories under the rule of Islam neither promoted
the separation of the religious and political spheres nor the centralization
of power nor a sharp definition of borders determining political and cul-
tural adscription to the nation. This favored the development of economic
exchange systems such as the trans-Saharan trade system that existed
before the borders imposed by European conquest and colonization but
that continued to bypass them in the colonial and postcolonial periods.
In a more contemporary vein, it is possible to mention the existence of
several regional igos such as the ecowas —founded in 1975 with the
Lagos Treaty —that have promoted free movement of populations within
a regional space comprising a number of West African States.
The aim of this paper is to show how free mobility of citizens of Sahel
or West African countries in general has been undermined by the migra-
tion policy of externalization of borders adopted by European countries
 West African Transnationalism and the Externalization of eu Borders 47

and the European Union since the last quarter of the 20th century and
during the first two decades of the 21st century. This policy has been
characterized by its coercive and restrictive nature, causing human ca-
tastrophes in the Mediterranean and even more so in the migrant routes
across the Sahara Desert. The construction of the Sahel countries as the
first (or last depending on the perspective) border of the eu is in fact the
result of both the rise of xenophobia and exclusive nationalism (expressed
since the 1980s in the emergence of the far-right ideology and parties all
over Europe) and the push for always tighter and stronger border control
regarding migrants coming from countries outside the eu.

Brief history of eu’s Migration Policy

In the aftermath of World War II, Europe was demographically and ter-
ritorially devastated and thus in need of importing labor from elsewhere
in the continent. Colonial powers like France and Great Britain managed
to stimulate flows from Africa and Asia to boost population growth and
the economy while at the same time, recognized sovereignty of the new
independent nation-states. In the case of France, the postwar years until
1974 were characterized by a steady growth of the economy as well as the
need for migrants to fill the labor market. Les trente glorieuses, spanning
the period between 1945-1974 were years when open borders migration
policies in France and Germany were adopted following the needs of the
reconstruction program and the aid received by the usa.
However, from 1974 onwards, the worldwide financial crisis ignited
by the Oil Shocks in the Middle East signaled a change in the orienta-
tion of migration policies toward former colonial populations; the latter
meanwhile had become politically independent units (nation-states) while
remaining strongly dependent on external economic support. The chang-
es that this crisis entailed tightened restrictive migration policies based
on increased border controls and surveillance at the territorial limits of
states and identity checks to “suspicious” populations (basically police ha-
rassment towards racially defined target populations). A milestone event
48 Africa in the 21st Century

in the further European migration evolution towards this direction is un-

doubtedly the Schengen Agreement (1986) and the abolishment of internal
common borders among the member countries, leading to the beginning
of the external border construction process to make a distinction between
those citizens who belong to the area’s member states and those who aren’t,
as they come from third countries. It should be added that the restrictive
character of migration policies adopted by European countries such as
France and Germany, was fueled electorally by political parties such as the
National Front that build their political discourse through constructing
a negative image of immigration, especially that originating from former
colonial territories. As shown by the following statement made in June 6,
1989 at the National Assembly in Paris by Prime Minister of socialist Pres-
ident François Mittérand, Michel Rocard, even left political parties were
forced to adopt defensive positions on the issue of international migration:
“Il y a, en effet, dans le monde trop de drames, de pauvreté, de famine pour
que l’Europe et la France puissent accueillir tous ceux que la misère pousse
vers elles…il faut résister à cette poussée constante” (Rocard, 1989).1
Next year, with the Schengen convention, the area constituted by
its member states meant that the management of migrant population
worked as if it were a single state with common visas and external bor-
ders but no internal control among them.
It is precisely the Schengen Area that has been subject to two migra-
tion crises since its implementation in 1995. The first one took place in the
middle of the first decade of the 21st century when mainly West African
migrants started arriving at Spanish coasts in the Canary Islands hoping to
gain access to Europe. Some African countries developed a strong mobile
culture among their 1980s youth with the economic crisis of postcolonial
state and the lack of opportunities it has caused since then. The wish among
the Senegalese youth for instance, can be grasped with the slogan Barça am
barsakh2 that equaled economic success with being able to reach Europe,

1 This allocution was to be recalled by public opinion in a more cynical manner: “On ne peut
pas accueillir toute la misère du monde”, “We cannot welcome all the misery of the world”
(Deborde, 2015).
2 Wolof: “Go to Barcelona or die”
 West African Transnationalism and the Externalization of eu Borders 49

deemed as Eldorado (a place to seek fortune) and as Fortress Europe. Since

the 1990s, there has been a great number of shipwrecks of fishing boats
being used to transport mostly young migrants to the Canaries or other
insular European territories. Cayucos, pateras or pirogues, the ships used
by African migrants to try to desperately get to the Canaries since the first
decade of the millennium still can be considered an example of West Afri-
can transnationalism adapted to the current global economic and political
juncture. Historically, fishing has been an element that drives integration of
societies and communities. However, during the last three decades, the ex-
ploitative nature of fishing practices by European industrial vessels has had
a negative impact on the sustainable fishing practices of local populations
who have been forced to enter informal economic networks of clandestine
migration as the boats are increasingly used as transport in the dangerous
journey from West African coasts to the Canary Islands.
One of the most important consequences of the escalation (or more
precisely the perception of escalation) of these migratory flows since then
has been the adoption of the externalization of borders strategy. These
strategies are deployed both by reinforcing and supplying equipment for
border surveillance (in this case the eu’s southern border) and by sign-
ing bilateral agreements to contain flows at the borders of countries of
transit or origin in exchange for development funds. Bilateral agreements
between individual countries also follow the logic of externalization of
borders (for example, Spain-Senegal agreements of 2005) and in practice
they have consisted of expulsion agreements.
We can number some consequences of this way of handling the issue
of increased migration coming from countries and regions that are not
members of the eu, such as the growth in the numbers of repatriation
and expulsion procedures not respecting the human rights of migrants,
refugees, or asylum seekers, or the criminalization of migrants and rad-
icalization of nationalist discourses built on an alleged disruptive or
negative effect these flows may have on local identities and societies.
Ten years later, the solution for the refugee’s crisis provoked by the
Syrian conflict in the Middle East was basically the same though at an-
other scale. It consisted of displacement and reinforcing the European
50 Africa in the 21st Century

border at its eastern limits by providing funds to the Turkish government

in order to contain migrants in its territory.
Undoubtedly, the most tragic consequence of this kind of migration
policy is the clandestinization of informal networks that provide trans-
portation services to people without the documentation required for
international travelling and the criminalization of humanitarian ngos
(Open Arms) that try to provide relief to people in danger on board this
kind of vessels. This in turn has made out of the Mediterranean Sea a
submarine graveyard for all the boats that have shipwrecked without be-
ing rescued. Another actor worth mentioning in the framework of these
migration crises is Frontex or the European Border and Coast Guard
Agency. Established in 2005 in Warsaw, this eu agency was created to
watch the Schengen Area in coordination with border coast guards of
member states. Since its creation, Frontex has been a major actor policing
the external borders of the eu and a major recipient of funds for doing so.
While the main goal of this kind of border control agencies has been the
deterring effect they could have in dissuading future migrants, the result
has been the opening of new routes that entail more dangers to its users.

South-North, South-South migrations

At this point and for the purposes of this paper, it is worth mentioning that
the menacing perception of migrations that European societies have of the
phenomenon are also built on several misperceptions about it. First of all,
South-North migrations are not as overwhelming as media and far-right pol-
iticians’ rhetoric affirm. In fact, as the World Bank’s statistics indicate, only
26% out of a total of 23.2 million migrants live in oecd countries and 88.4%
of West African migrants live in countries of the same region (Puig 2018, p.
3). This data in fact denies the racist/paternalist discourses about “landslides”,
“waves”, “invasion” of migrants and refugees coming to Europe. There are
not millions of people waiting to get to Europe. In fact, as several authors
have shown, presenting migration as an “irrational or desperate” act helps to
justify the nation-states’ obsession with border control (Calavita, 2005; Doty,
 West African Transnationalism and the Externalization of eu Borders 51

2003). It is worth highlighting that prior to the Schengen Agreement in the

mid-1980s, African migration to Mediterranean countries such as Spain or
Italy—that in the last half century were countries of departure of labor mi-
gration—was neither perceived as a political nor social issue. While African
migrants had no rights, they were not subject to legal discrimination and
therefore were not considered irregulars or illegals. That did not mean that
they enjoyed any benefits linked to the status of citizenship or that they were
not exploited in the black labor market of the burgeoning southern Medi-
terranean economies of Italy and Spain during the 1980s and 1990s. Within
the framework of Schengen, the twin categories of legal and illegal migrants
were implemented at the regional level by the signatory countries to deal
with flows stemming from non-member states.

Latest developments of eu Migration policy: The importance of Niger

But even if this characterization of migrations from African and Middle

East countries is based on false myths about the negative economic and
identitarian impact migration has on national identity and economies, it
works both for maintaining an economic and political order based on a
framework that links security and development concerns of poor countries
together in order to justify assistentialism and international intervention
through Development and Humanitarian ngos, while justifying and le-
gitimizing a defensive stance toward migration and an aggressive posture
towards migrants in host countries. It is on this basis, where poor countries
are seen as a source of international insecurity, that externalization strate-
gies are deployed linking security and development issues together.
It is in this context that the geo-strategic importance of Niger lies.
Three quarters of its territory are located in the Sahara Desert. It be-
longs to the sub-region of the Sahel, which means “border” or “frontier”
in Arabic. As the Soninke fishermen link for instance several societies in the
western coast of Africa, or as the displacement of other ethnical or religious
societies during slave traffic and commerce times, the Sahara Desert has also
been more of a crossroads, a historical intersection, a transit distributer of
52 Africa in the 21st Century

people and cultures for centuries despite characterizations made of it as an

impenetrable barrier of desolation and hostility. In 2018, Niger was ranked
as the poorest country of the world occupying the last position in the Human
Development Index (undp, 2018, p. 25), and 45% of its population lives un-
der the international threshold of poverty established at usd 1.90/day. While
it could be argued that this economic and social postcolonial development is
the result of a number of factors and actors such as the extractive nature of
colonialism and capitalist firms searching to gain access to strategic resources
such as uranium, the latest issue surrounding the security of this country and
others in the region is the securitization of migratory flows crossing through
the desert trying to get to the Mediterranean Sea and then to Europe.
However, since 2015, after the eu’s summit held in Malta for stopping or
taming the number of arrivals, the geostrategic importance of Niger has in-
creased, particularly the city of Agadez, a historical example of the social and
cultural work connections in desert regions as is the case of Sahara and Sahel
countries. After the Malta summit, this feature of the city was recognized by
Federica Mogherini—High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission—when
she stated the following: “We have agreed to reinforce our presence in Niger
because 90% of the migrants from West Africa pass through this country.
Only by working with the countries of origin and transit will we succeed
in facing the causes of migration”. eu ambassador in Congo-Brazaville, Raul
Mateus, estimates that Niger was in 2016 the first recipient of European aid
per capita and its government received enormous amounts of money to act as
the policeman of the movement of people in the Sahel. Since the Malta sum-
mit, the government of Mahamadou Issoufu has received €610 million from
the eu and European countries such as Germany, France, Italy or Spain. Of
the €1,800 million of European aid for Africa, only 30 million were destined
to fight against poverty in Niger (Puig, 2018).
As it has been stated, the West African sub-region has been historically
characterized by its mobile cultures that do not attach the same importance
to borders delineating territories where a sovereign central authority gov-
erns. With the process of European colonization of the continent during
the 19th century and with the creation and introduction of international
 West African Transnationalism and the Externalization of eu Borders 53

borders and jurisdiction (mainly international recognition of sovereign in-

dependent states) that were to remain after political independence, West
African societies of the Sahel sub-region remained highly mobile and
transnational connections were very common within and across countries.
As late as the second decade of the 21st century, it is possible to argue that
transnationalism among societies of West African Sahel states was fostered
by technological evolutions such as cell phones and gps systems. It should
be added that Europe was not even the main destination of migrants for
decades. Opportunities existed in other African countries such as Libya
under Qaddafi’s dictatorial regime that deemed as desirable a destination
as European countries. Hausa’s popular saying among young people during
the 1990s is a proof of this: “Libya kaman turai”3 (Puig, 2018).
However, the two migratory crises the eu has experienced over the
last two decades, the rising importance of the definition and securitiza-
tion of its external southern borders, and the fall of Qaddafi’s regime are
all factors of how the desert region of the Sahel, and more precisely Niger,
has become the first international European de facto border, the country
responsible for the externalization of the southern border of the eu.
Between 2014 and 2017, the iom estimated that more than 14,000
people died in the Mediterranean Sea. Many of them first crossed the
Sahara Desert in dire conditions facing extreme temperatures, constant
dangers, overcrowding situations, abandonment and death. Until now,
there are no official statistics about disappearances in the desert but it
is estimated that the Sahara has become an open-air graveyard of many
migrants (Puig, 2018). As stated before, many of them had the Maghreb
countries as their destination, so it is misleading to think that all migrants
had the European countries as their primary destination. However, due
to the provision of funds, Niger has implemented a series of measures for
the securitization of migration at its borders. In 2017, the iom reported
a decrease in the number of migrants in transit from Niger of more than
100%. The following are some of the consequences.

3 Hausa: Libya like Europe.

54 Africa in the 21st Century

Consequences of border externalization politics

Migrations do not stop. The persistence of this phenomenon that takes place
not only in the context of African-European migrations but also in other re-
gions of the world is a proof of this despite multiple restrictions imposed by
externalization policies adopted by the eu to manage human mobility from
African countries. Numbers are overestimated because migrants escape con-
trols and are forced to assume bigger risks. Some of the concrete measures
of the securitization of the migratory process in Niger include the arbitrary
confiscation of vehicles and indiscriminate arrests constituting violations of
the free movement protocols such as those of ecowas and uemoa.
Another consequence of the politics of externalization is the increased
militarization and blocking of traditional transnational routes. At this point,
it is important to mention that the whole process of securitization of migra-
tions in the Sahel occurs against the background of an increased insecurity
and activity of non-state military actors operating in the desert setting. The
spread of radical and violent jihadism is also an element to take into consider-
ation since the fall of Qaddafi in Libya, and since the conflict and the de facto
collapse of the Malian state in 2012. The proliferation of this kind of military
actors has in turn amounted to a more authoritarian approach to control the
movement of populations wishing to have the opportunity for crossing the
Mediterranean and arrive in some European country. eucap Sahel, a mis-
sion with a budget of €63.4 million, advises and trains Nigerien authorities
on security issues such as terrorism, organized crime, and, since 2016 on the
elaboration of techniques and procedures for controlling and better fighting
against irregular migration. One of the techniques that seriously disrupt the
mobile capacity of populations is the occupation of water wells in the desert
routes, which in turn makes them take more dangerous alternative routes.
In sum, the securitization of the European southern border through its ex-
ternalization and deployment in transit countries has unchained increased
illegalization, criminalization, and clandestinization of all kinds of mobility in
Niger, even the traditional kinds, with economic local actors making a living
out of transporting people to international borders without crossing them.
 West African Transnationalism and the Externalization of eu Borders 55

Last but not least, the increased militarization of migrations under

the guise of development aid has not been a successful mechanism to
break the relationship between insecurity and poverty and flagrant viola-
tions of human rights.
As some studies and journalistic chronicles have shown, there is a
growing proportion of African migrants in the number of overall mi-
grants trying to cross the Mexican southern border in order to continue
towards the northern border and ultimately the usa. In contrast with
the situation of Central American migrants, Africans are in a more vul-
nerable condition because some of them come from countries that do
not have diplomatic representation in Mexico. This is only one of the
multiple legal problems African migrants must face in Mexico during
their transit to the usa, having to deal with a hostile and xenophobic
environment toward migrations. In the context of usa-Mexico relations,
the latter’s southern border with Central America has become also the de
facto southern usa border with Latin America. However, the politics of
externalization is not exchanged for development aid but rather imposed
by menacing the Mexican government to contain migration at its south-
ern border in order to avoid a rise on tariffs and trade if it fails to do so.

Border regimes and practices

As Komarova and Hayward assert, “border regimes demonstrate the

diffuse operation of borders as networked systems of rules that regulate
behavior and are activated by the mobility of people and things at a va-
riety of scales” (2019, p. 542). As for Berg and Ehin, (2006, p. 55) they
identify three basic dimensions of a border regime: functions, governance
and openness/closure. Another important aspect to point out about the
border regime of externalization by the eu is that while it centers on reg-
ulating behavior at the borders, this kind of regimes are also rooted in the
capacity to control behavior away from the borderline.
What Achille Mbembe calls “bodies as borders” and technology of
surveillance capitalism at the service of restrictive migration policies can
56 Africa in the 21st Century

actually be considered a border practice, that is, the process by which

certain bodies are marked as having rights for unfettered mobility while
others are marked, identified, and destined to immobility or forced dis-
placement. The digitalization of dna data eventually inscribes the border
in the bodies of migrants even before boarding a plane that crosses in-
ternational boundaries. This kind of procedures of profiling certain
candidates to migrate is becoming one of the central features of the way
migratory movements are being governed globally. Here, technology
plays a pivotal role as it is put at the service of the strategy of externaliza-
tion of borders even in the home country of future migrants.
This feature of the contemporary migrations regime is only one of
the proofs of how global inequalities in mobility are being built based
on nationality. As Wihtol de Wenden (2017, p. 169) states, “ the border
regime is different according to nationality and the chosen migratory di-
rection, from North to North (same rights), from North to South (easy
entry but limitation of certain rights like access to nationality in many
cases), from South to South (easy entry but few rights) and from South to
North (difficult entry but progressive access to the same rights as nation-
als depending on the length of stay)”.
Clearly, one of the main advantages of a migration policy based on
externalization of borders is that it happens far away from the scrutiny of
societies comprising the eu, in exception zones where human rights are
not respected. In fact, as some authors have shown, the more guarded a
border is, the more it is profitable for human trafficking criminal organi-
zations and mafias to operate.
Together with digitalization and management of biometric data at
the service of policing the profile and identity of populations, contem-
porary migrations and security regimes require the use of other type of
technology for tracking or sensing movement such as ground sensors,
radars, thermal imaging, drones, etc. Here as well it is possible to observe
how military technology has been put to work to govern and manage
population movements, enhancing the free movement of certain popula-
tions using data-gathering and classification systems while disrupting or
hindering that of other kinds of people.
 West African Transnationalism and the Externalization of eu Borders 57

Conclusion

Conditioning international aid for development to the adoption of these

kinds of migration policies has favored the strengthening of mafias and
human traffickers and even terrorist networks they are supposed to fight.
In a world where the capacity to survive has become intrinsically associ-
ated with the capacity to move, both the politics of externalization of borders
and borderization of bodies compartmentalize and segment people’s iden-
tities, obstructing historic connections created by mobile and transnational
cultures. One of the biggest paradoxes of the African continent in terms of
the mobility of its societies and populations is that what used to be tradition-
al, transnational spaces like West Africa through historical political systems
and networks, now face the reality imposed by the 19th century Europe-
an colonialism and its more perdurable legacy: the international territorial
border. The African state system consists of 54 independent states which
amount to 216 international borders considering the northern, southern,
eastern, and western territorial limits of each nation-state.
The politics of externalization of borders and its concrete practices
clearly are a phenomenon that deserves much more scholar, media, and
political attention as the process by which the dynamics of externaliza-
tion of borders are spread among nations and populations of the South.

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Africa. Policies and Challenges for the African
Continental Free Trade Area
Paulina Berumen

Abstract

The recent rethinking of the economic and commercial dynamics in

Africa to promote an increased dynamics of economic and commer-
cial development on an intracontinental level supposes evaluating the
economic and developmental capacity of the agricultural, commercial
and self-sufficiency sectors with regard to the African proposal of Af-
rican Continental Free Trade Area (afcfta) as a priority axis of this
initiative. What is the current condition of the agricultural sector and
food security within the continent? Does the current perspective set
out by public policies on agriculture and food security on national and
sub-regional levels contribute to boosting agricultural production and
commercialization in the continent? How can agriculture make an
impact on continental food security under afcfta? What are the chal-
lenges of afcfta facing a proposal for agricultural development and
fighting food insecurity? This paper seeks to present the main actors
and sectors of this field, the policies and challenges that agriculture
represents within this intracontinental cooperation agreement, and
evaluate its contribution in terms of food security.

Introduction

The current continental economic and commercial agenda in Africa has

as its priority developing the economy through intracontinental trade to

61
62 Africa in the 21st Century

strengthen economic dynamics, benefiting infrastructure, industry and

commercial exchanges, labor, and education.
This continental agenda is anchored in the objectives of the newly cre-
ated African Continental Free Trade Area, which intertwines its objectives
with the agendas of the sub-regional trade organizations of the continent.
Although this economic and commercial initiative is presented as a
mechanism that will boost development in different sectors of the Af-
rican continent’s economy, it also raises questions about central aspects
for its development, including the agriculture and food security sectors,
which are closely linked to the field of rural development and which are
cross-cutting axes of any proposal for development.
One of the challenges in the afcfta agenda is to make the dynam-
ization of intra-continental trade converge with the development of the
farming sector while strengthening food security, sectors closely linked
by a rural population that depends on agricultural economy, be it small
or medium scale. Thus, we can ask ourselves, what is the proposal in ru-
ral development policy, agricultural production, and food security in this
first stage of launching afcfta?
In an attempt to provide elements that can reply to such a question,
this paper will briefly present the collaborative dynamics of the countries
in the continent, such as the regional cooperation and integration strate-
gy as an articulating mechanism of the recent initiative on a commercial
order and the role that both agriculture and food security have in these
sub-regional economic organizations based on the objectives of afcfta.

Sub-regional cooperation: an economic strategy of independent life

The tradition of the African continent in regional cooperation sought to

meet the demands of decolonization economic policies and the apartheid
system—in force until 1994 in South Africa—as well as the economic pol-
icies of independent life against the world market. (Ochozias, 2013, p. 48).
Meanwhile, with regards to political interest, in 1963, the Organization of
African Unity (oau) was born, among other things, as an international
 Agriculture and Food Security in the Context of Continental Cooperation in Africa. 63
Policies and Challenges for the African Continental Free Trade Area

projection platform for newly independent countries (Azamiou, 2016, p.    47).

In the economic arena, the challenges of independent life were transferred
to the practice of regionalism which followed the Pan-Africanist ideal based
on the aspiration of shared values, collective autonomy for development,
and economic independence (Ochozias, 2013, p. 49), and now, within the
framework of the consolidation of independence, of guiding principles of the
continent’s current Regional Economic Communities (recs).

Regional Economic Communities

Since 1960, and in the first two decades of the 21st century, regional
cooperation and integration initiatives have created eight sub-regional
organizations recognized by the African Union that promote economic
and commercial matters: Community of Sahel-Saharan States (cens-
sad), Common Market for Southern Africa (comesa), East African
Community (eac), Economic Community of Central African States
(eccas), Economic Community of West African States (ecowas), In-
tergovernmental Authority on Development (igad), Southern African
Development Community (sadc) and Arab Maghreb Union (uma).
The evolution of each organization results from their regional ob-
jectives, their flexibility to change and respond more effectively to the
changing international commercial demand considering their regional
economic advantages, to the need to cope with the international mar-
ket—to which their raw materials are mainly aimed—and the objective of
seeing in cooperation and integration strategies a continental mechanism
to develop some sectors. In that sense, afcfta, as the commercial propos-
al for continental integration, considers that:

“Regional integration is about getting things moving freely across the

whole of Africa. This means getting goods to move more easily across
borders; transport, energy and telecommunications to connect more
people across more boundaries; people to move more freely across
frontiers, and capital and production to move and grow beyond na-
tional limits” (Economic Commission for Africa (uneca), 2016, p. 3).
64 Africa in the 21st Century

Map 1. Regional Economic Communities

eac
● CEN-SAD ● ECOWAS
cen-sad ● COMESA ● IGAD
igad
● EAC ● SADC
● ECCAS ● UMA

● EAC ● Algeria
●● Angola
Burundi
●● Benin
Kenya
● IGAD ● Botswana
Rwanda ●● Burkina Faso
● CEN-SAD Uganda Djibouti
●●● Burundi
Benin Kenya Eritrea
United Republic ●● Cabo Verde
Burkina Faso Liberia of Tanzania Ethiopia
eccas ● Cameroon
Cabo Verde Libya Kenya ●● Central African Republic
Central African Mali Somalia ●● Chad
Republic Mauritania Comoros
South Sudan ●
Chad Morocco ● Congo
Sudan
Comoros Niger ●● Côte d’Ivoire
Uganda
Côte d’Ivoire Nigeria sadc ●●● Democratic Republic of the Congo
São Tomé ●●● Djibouti
Djibouti
and Principe ● ECCAS
●● Egypt
Egypt Senegal Angola
● Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea Sierra Leone Burundi
●●● Eritrea
Gambia Somalia Cameroon ●● Ethiopia
Ghana Sudan Central African Republic ● Gabon
Guinea Togo Chad ●● Gambia
comesa Tunisia
Guinea-Bissau Congo ● SADC ●● Ghana
Democratic Republic Angola ●● Guinea
of the Congo Botswana ●● Guinea-Bissau
Equatorial Guinea Democratic Republic ●●●● Kenya
Gabon of the Congo ● Lesotho
Lesotho ●● Liberia
Rwanda
●●● Libya
São Toméecowas
and Principe Madagascar
● Madagascar
Malawi
● Malawi
● COMESA Mauritius ●● Mali
Burundi Mozambique ●● Mauritania
Comoros Namibia ●● Mauritius
Democratic Republic Seychelles ●● Morocco
of the Congo ● Mozambique
South Africa
Djibouti ● Namibia
Swaziland
Egypt ● ECOWAS ●● Niger
United Republic
Eritrea Benin of Tanzania ●● Nigeria
Ethiopia ●● Rwanda
Burkina Faso Zambia uma
●● São Tomé and Principe
Kenya Cabo Verde Zimbabwe ●● Senegal
Libya Côte d’Ivoire ● Seychelles
Madagascar Gambia ●● Sierra Leone
Malawi Ghana ●● Somalia
Mauritius Guinea ● South Africa
Rwanda Guinea-Bissau ● South Sudan
Seychelles ●● Sudan
Liberia
● UMA ● Swaziland
Sudan Mali Algeria ●● Togo
Swaziland Niger Libya ●● Tunisia
Uganda Nigeria Mauritania ●● Uganda
Zambia Senegal Morocco ●● United Republic of Tanzania
Zimbabwe Sierra Leone Tunisia ● Zambia
Togo ● Zimbabwe

Source: Economic Commission for Africa, 2016, p. 13.

This objective reinforces the continental need to break the distinctive

cycle of African economies during their independent life: extraverted devel-
opment, which favors the extraction of raw materials under explicit demand
 Agriculture and Food Security in the Context of Continental Cooperation in Africa. 65
Policies and Challenges for the African Continental Free Trade Area

from developed economies by offering prices well below their value and the
value of human labor of women, men and children in Africa. This system has
put African countries in a situation where their raw materials and agricultur-
al products (coffee, cocoa, tea, banana, to name a few) are not only extracted
but looted, specifically marked by the relations between the countries of the
African continent and the so-called ex-metropolis, today gathered in the
European Union (eu). Decades under this African continental economic
system of trade with the eu gave way to privileged relations with the ex-me-
tropolis. These relations were based on various agreements starting with the
Yaoundé Conventions (1964-1969, 1969-1975) aiming to provide Europe
with raw materials, then followed by the Lomé Conventions (1975-2000)
seeking to change the productive priorities of the continent from industri-
al development to agricultural work (Moreno, 2019, p. 16), and finally the
imposition of Structural Adjustment policies on African countries to reduce
spending on rural development and agricultural production, affecting food
security and continental commercial dynamics. In addition, the World Trade
Organization (wto) policies of 1995, under the scope of the new multilateral
relations, marked the direction of world and African trade on the intracon-
tinental level and beyond. As Chang points out, all these polices from New
Conventional Wisdom (Washington Consensus) “have produced very poor
outcomes in most countries in terms of growth, equality, stability and pover-
ty” (Chang, 2012, p. 6).
For their part, proposals for economic development from Africa were
expressed in the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development
of Africa (1980), and strategies such as the Abuja Treaty (1991) refor-
mulated and promoted recs in order to strengthen regional integration
(Békolo-Ebé, 2001, p. 84) with a view to a future continental integration,
which has translated into today’s afcfta.
Thus, in less than 60 years—coupled with the process of access to in-
dependent life—African economies have gone through swift processes that
seek to adapt or meet international financial, economic and commercial re-
quirements, in many cases resulting in a neglect of local socio-economic and
commercial needs. In that context, the effectiveness and contribution of recs
to regional and continental development have been continually questioned
66 Africa in the 21st Century

given the participation of the states in more than one of these sub-regional
organization initiatives, being interpreted as one of the weaknesses of recs
and as a series of political situations that violate the security and develop-
ment of the peoples of Africa. Under these current circumstances, the level
of effectiveness of these economic communities is measured by the Africa
Regional Integration Index “which aims to be an accessible, comprehensive,
practical and results-focused regional integration tool that focuses on the
policy level and on-the-ground-realities”, (uneca, 2016, p. 12). The index
aims to measure five socioeconomic dimensions and sixteen indicators. The
five dimensions are: trade integration, regional infrastructure, productive
integration, free movement of people, and financial and macroeconomic in-
tegration (uneca, 2016, p. 11).
The table shown below presents the average performance (from 0 to
1) of each rec (2016) under these five dimensions.

Table 1. Average performance under the five dimensions

Dimension Free Financial and

Trade Regional Productive
movement macroeconomic
integration infrastructure integration
rec of people integration
cen-sad 0.353 0.251 0.247 0.479 0.524
comesa 0.572 0.439 0.452 0.268 0.343
eac 0.780 0.496 0.553 0.715 0.156
eccas 0.526 0.451 0.293 0.400 0.599
ecowas 0.442 0.426 0.265 0.800 0.611
igad 0.505 0.630 0.434 0.454 0.221
sadc 0.508 0.502 0.350 0.530 0.397
uma 0.631 0.491 0.481 0.493 0.199
Average
of eight 0.540 0.461 0.383 0517 0.381
recs
Source: Economic Commission for Africa, 2016, p. 16.

According to the Africa Regional Integration Index (uneca, 2016, p. 16),

the results of the eight sub-regional organizations in the five measurements
 Agriculture and Food Security in the Context of Continental Cooperation in Africa. 67
Policies and Challenges for the African Continental Free Trade Area

are variable and, to a large extent, this is related to the heterogeneity of the
national economies participating in each rec. cen-sad presents its highest
performance average in financial and macroeconomic integration; given the
nature of its customs barrier elimination policies, comesa and eac’s high-
est advance is in trade integration; eccas holds a high average in financial
and macroeconomic integration followed by trade integration; ecowas has
very representative averages in several sectors but its free movement of peo-
ple policies place it, with respect to the other recs, at a very high average in
such a field, followed by financial and macroeconomic integration and very
closely to trade integration and regional infrastructure. These results present
ecowas as the sub-regional organization that maintains a balance in the per-
formance of the five dimensions, except for productive integration, which
is below average. On the other hand, igad shows an above the average per-
formance in regional infrastructure followed by trade integration; and sadc
presents a balanced activity in the free movement of people, trade integration
and regional infrastructure sectors. With regard to uma, its best performance
is in trade integration (above average) and in the free movement of people,
regional infrastructure, and productive integration.
At the continental level—as also shown at the end of the table—after
summing the performance of recs in all five dimensions, the free move-
ment of people reveals a very positive progress, strongly influenced by
the good performance of ecowas and sadc, regions made up of fifteen
countries each. In this regard, it is also worth noting that ecowas has the
most populous country on the continent, Nigeria, with almost 200 mil-
lion people. In addition, Nigeria together with South Africa are the two
economically representative countries of ecowas and sadc, respectively.
Due to these characteristics, both become poles of economic reference
and migratory attraction, generating significant human displacements at
the intra-regional and intra-continental levels.
Despite the advances measured in these recs, analyses by the Eco-
nomic Commission for Africa (eca) estimate that the raw material
export system currently yields only an intra-African trade of between
14 and 16%. This translates into two major items in continental trade:
exports to outside Africa with non-extractive exports and extractive
68 Africa in the 21st Century

exports accounting for 24% and 76% each; and exports within Afri-
ca, where non-extractive exports represent 61% and extractive exports
amount to 39% (uneca, 2018, pp. 2-3).
This shows that the free trade dimension index has favored policies
that expedite the elimination of customs barriers between the countries
within the recs—hence the need to incorporate countries belonging to
other recs to privilege customs policies that expedite the export of raw
materials from the sub-regions first and from the continent later. How-
ever, this has not promoted a dynamic and expansive production and
consumption trade that articulates the advantages of the recs to meet the
continent’s needs and, above all, that does not make it dependent on the
import of products, particularly foodstuffs. In this sense, one of the ar-
eas visibly affected by this commercial strategy is agricultural production
and its imminent impact on food security.
This dependence on food has had very marked moments throughout
the independent life of African countries. A clear example is the impact
of Structural Adjustment, which, by reducing international financial aid,
quickly led African countries to importing agricultural products (Béko-
lo-Ebé, 2001, p. 87). For its part, the global economic crisis of 2008-2009
triggered a rise in food prices in the long term. Other aspects associated
with “poor performance of agriculture” are related with structural and
technological constraints, unfavorable external economic environment,
and inappropriate policy and institutional frameworks (Chang, 2012, p.
2), with climate change testing people’s resilience every time. These crises
have also revealed the still insufficient response from regional mech-
anisms or national policies to cope with these situations that result in
the impossibility of having sufficient and permanent access to food, the
loss of crops and food production modes, and small or medium scale
economic self-sufficiency—agriculture, poultry farming, aquaculture,
livestock among others. All this has prompted, among other things, diffi-
culties in resuming and recovering productive life regardless of the sector
and scale, combined with other complications such as access to medical
services, the restoration of public services, and the normalization of ed-
ucational, labor, institutional and bureaucratic activities, to name a few.
 Agriculture and Food Security in the Context of Continental Cooperation in Africa. 69
Policies and Challenges for the African Continental Free Trade Area

Development

Initiative and creation of afcfta

As a result of the above, the commitment towards a continental trade

agreement becomes a necessary initiative devised as a mechanism that
drives and accelerates the way in which basic food products are a tangible
reality for Africans in “ordinary” times and, of course, under unprece-
dented and urging circumstances.
Based on the eight recs and their performance in the five so-
cio-economic categories mentioned above, the creation of afcfta is also
supported as a strategy to transform the way trade is usually undertaken
in the continent. This would reflect as a transition from mobilizing nearly
16% of trade within the continent to 52.3% of intra-continental trade “by
eliminating import duties” due to tariffs that favor trade outside of Afri-
ca much more than within. In that sense, this new development strategy
of the African Union places the recs as the pillars of a more inclusive
and strengthened proposal in its historic regional integration model, lean-
ing towards a greater positive commercial impact within the continent.
afcfta, for its part, can be “a flagship Project of Agenda 2063 of the Afri-
can Union” (uneca, 2018, p. 4), projecting itself as the scaffolding of the
eight sub-regional economic organizations and expanding the spectrum
of its continental activity, as “consolidating this continent into one trade
area provides great opportunities for trading companies, businesses and
consumers across Africa, and the chance to support sustainable develop-
ment in the world’s least developed region” (uneca, 2018, p. 1).
Other aspects lying behind the creation of afcfta are the projections
showing it will have an African market of 1.2 billion people, calculating a
gross domestic product of 2.5 trillion dollars in all of the 55 countries in
the continent, and the demographic factor, estimating that the continental
population will reach 2.5 billion by 2050, thus contributing to an avail-
able labor force and an important consumer market (African Trade Policy
Centre (atpc)-Economic Commission for Africa (eca), 2018, p. 1). How-
ever, the demographic factor that can be seen as a “demographic bonus” or
70 Africa in the 21st Century

“favorable human resource” also involves a series of challenges for nation-

al governments and sub-regional organizations: food security, education,
employment, housing services, infrastructure, and transport. Nevertheless,
the African Union (au) seems to be anticipating these needs by promoting
the creation of afcfta as a mechanism that articulates national policies,
and those policies of sub-regional and continental order as well. The needs
of access to food in many regions of the continent are an immediate matter
to address and a right to guarantee. In tune with this process, the au has
committed to the United Nations 2030 Agenda to advance and comply with
the Sustainable Development Goals: decent work and economic growth,
the development of industry, food security, and affordable access to health
services (African Trade Policy Centre (atpc)-Economic Commission for
Africa, 2018, p. 5), which are intertwined with the need to address the cur-
rent food (in)security situation in the continent.

The state of food security in Africa, 2018:

growing undernourishment

The African continent, as diverse and vast as it is with its 55 countries, does
not present a homogeneous map in the way its population accesses food.
The un’s Food and Agriculture Organization (fao) 2018 Food Security and
Nutrition in the World report highlights the difficulties of people around the
world to eat properly, with special emphasis on one of the aspects of food
insecurity: the prevalence of undernourishment in 21% of the population in
Africa, that is, 256 million people of Africa’s total population (1,400 million)
by 2019, being followed by Asia with 11% (fao, 2018, pp. 2-3).
At present, food insecurity is no longer expressed exclusively as a situation
of “hunger”. The fao report (2018), shows that the state of food insecurity is
manifested in undernourishment, understood as severe food deprivation.
In other words, “in poor countries, a fall in food consumption below the
minimum level even for a year or two may have serious irreversible negative
consequences for long-term productivity of many people due to irreversible
falls in nutrition and, for children, education” (Chang, 2012, p. 9).
 Agriculture and Food Security in the Context of Continental Cooperation in Africa. 71
Policies and Challenges for the African Continental Free Trade Area

The report underlines the particular situation in sub-Saharan Afri-

ca, a region where one out of five people has been chronically deprived
of food in 2017 (fao, 2018, p. 3). The reasons are well known: climate
change issues—droughts, cyclone flooding—, rising food prices, insuf-
ficient inputs, or difficulties in accessing economic means to produce or
access their food, and the demographic growth trend are some of the
most obvious causes, in addition to political instability or different types
of conflict and forced intra-regional displacement and refuge.
Due to the onslaughts of nature, human conflicts and basic food
trade, people experience a permanent state of vulnerability. The ques-
tion is how to articulate the policies of these areas so that they converge
on a multi-sector and multi-level government model, favoring specific
policies, though joining them to others that by nature relate and assume
a multi-sector dimension. This articulation is one of afcfta’s challenges
during its second configuration stage.
The process that should give way to food security, at least from the har-
monization of multi-sectors and multi-level government public policies
has different ruptures that in summary produce the following outcome:
“The dynamics of undernourishment prevalence, combined with rapid
population growth, leads to a dramatic increase in the total number of
undernourished people [which] increased from 181 million in 2010 to
almost 222 million in 2016, with a 22.6% increase in six years and ac-
cording to current projections, it may have continued to increase, to more
than 236 million, in 2017 ” (fao, 2018, p. 4). An fao fact to consider in
this scenario is that, out of the total number of people with prevalence of
undernourishment, women have a higher probability of being affected,
up to 0.4% (fao, 2018, p. 10), which is relevant if we consider it is actually
women who are the engine of food production in the continent.
The annual reports drafted by fao and other international and local
organizations reveal striking numbers but the causes and their replication
over the years show a permanent rupture all along the process among lo-
cal, national and sub-regional governments. The immediate needs of their
populations is also evident, as they are repeatedly exposed to permanent-
ly vitiated factors and practices. Examples of this are local or regional
72 Africa in the 21st Century

conflicts, uncertainty about the behavior of the different political forces and
subsequent corruption, and the multiple actors who either individually or
corporately move under particular economic interests at the expense of the
work of Africans, regardless of age, sex or condition of reality, generating
chronic exploitation and poverty and impacting their state of food (in)secu-
rity. All of the above couples with the fully intended distancing or omission
on the part of the local to national ruling elites, and is accentuated by the
coercive inability of Africa’s sub-regional or continental agencies, given that
sub-regional, continental or international directives are no more than a
mere framework of reference in national policies with no coercive mandate.

Public policies on agriculture and food security: from a national to

regional, continental and international level

As part of the process to create and consolidate afcfta, there are still
ongoing negotiations for the inclusion of African countries, and the strat-
egies for the different sectors (industry, commerce, agriculture) have not
yet been revealed. However, the first expectations announced as part of
afcfta’s rationale for agriculture are: “Agricultural countries can gain
from satisfying Africa’s growing food security requirements. The nature
of many agricultural food products means that they are particularly re-
sponsive to improvements in customs clearance times and logistics that
are expected of afcfta” (African Trade Policy Centre (atpc)-Economic
Commission for Africa (eca), 2018, p. 4).
Whatever the result may be, it is anchored to regional and continen-
tal commitments, such as the 2030 Agenda and the 2063 Agenda, both
highlighting the development of the peoples of Africa, agriculture, food
security, and rural development as a result.
These general objectives have to find a point of convergence with the
Afcfta framework objectives focused on easing and eliminating customs
tariff barriers to circulate goods and services in an accessible, equitable
and dynamic way within the continent under the following protocol:
elimination of duties and quantitative restrictions on imports; imports
 Agriculture and Food Security in the Context of Continental Cooperation in Africa. 73
Policies and Challenges for the African Continental Free Trade Area

shall be treated no less favorably than domestic products; elimination of

non-tariff barriers; cooperation of customs authorities; trade facilitation
and transit; trade remedies, protection for infant industries and general
exceptions; cooperation over product standards and regulations; technical
assistance, capacity-building and cooperation (African Trade Policy Cen-
tre (atpc)-Economic Commission for Africa (eca), 2018, p. 7)
Harmonizing the objectives of the United Nations 2030 Agenda and
those of afcfta involves devoting efforts to intertwine different levels of
action into national, regional, continental and international public policies
that not only ensure access to food but also other sectors closely linked to
it: support for the economy based on agriculture and food production,
property and/or access to land, access to water and its equitable distribu-
tion, as well as access to markets as a result of reducing or eliminating fees.
Regional continental policy platforms in line with those of the inter-
national order are presented as the framework of reference for national
policies. However, national policies in almost all sectors are subject to a
range of variables that tend to dilute their nature, transforming or hin-
dering nodal aspects of these public policies, as in the case of agricultural
development and food security policies.
With less than a year after the creation of afcfta and its gradual ratifi-
cation by African countries, in this paper we are only able to highlight the
importance that the treatment of the agricultural sector receives in this con-
tinental commercial framework and, therefore, the state of food (in)security
in the continent from now on. In terms of economic redevelopment through
African intra-continental trade, some aspects to be considered are imposed:
rurality, the field-based economy and the dependence and importance that
food security represents, the demographic transformation in the continent,
as well as the impact of intra-continental migration.

Rurality of the continent

fao estimates that, unlike the tendency of the world population to urbanize,
sub-Saharan Africa is a fundamentally rural region. This organization asserts
74 Africa in the 21st Century

that sub-Saharan Africa maintained 62% of its population in rural areas in

2015. Continental urbanization is a recent trend and this transitional process
will continue taking place towards the late 2030s. (fao-cirad, 2018, p. 20).
As such, rurality is a reality to be addressed in public policies con-
cerning agricultural production and food security in the three areas of
action (industry, commerce, agriculture), a reality that is closely linked
to the population growth trend in the continent, intra-regional and off-
shore migration of young Africans, as well as the feminization of rural
areas. fao, in that sense, reveals that 70% of the agricultural workforce
are women who produce 90% of all food.

Agriculture

The above data reveal the importance of agriculture in the dynamics of food
sustenance and the economic life of short circuits or medium-range trade.
Food provision in rural areas responds primarily to family food subsistence,
community and, sometimes, intra-community trade. This is linked to anoth-
er relevant and prevailing factor in rural Africa: access to land property and
use. As mentioned before, 90% of food production is carried out by wom-
en. Such production occurs using very small-scale house-garden production
models in a plot close to the family housing area, a community garden or
school garden. There are also other medium-scale and export-trade models
of agricultural production in the rural environment. Each of these three lev-
els of production require a clear-cut approach according to their role. In the
words of Paalberg (2013), “despite the growth of international food markets,
roughly 90 percent of all food never enters international trade. It is still con-
sumed within the same country where it was produced. In poor agricultural
countries, a great deal of the food supply is still consumed within the same
community that produced it, or even by the same individual who produced
it” (Paalberg, 2013, p. 4). Hence, it is important to ask ourselves whether na-
tional (countrywide), sub-regional (recs) and continental (afcfta) policies
will maintain a rural dynamic where food subsistence prevails or if this new
continental cooperation and integration arrangement can begin to move
 Agriculture and Food Security in the Context of Continental Cooperation in Africa. 75
Policies and Challenges for the African Continental Free Trade Area

political wills and economic forces to generate and organize human and
material resources to change the current state of food (in)security within
the continent.

Migration

Intra-African migration, from one rural area to another, mainly favored

by seasonal work opportunities such as large-scale and export agriculture,
mining and others, begins to raise new questions regarding future public
development rural policies. One of the relevant aspects of this migration
phenomenon is the estimated rural density growth of up to 100 inhabitants
per square kilometer by 2050 (fao, 2018, p. 20). Considering that not all ru-
ral areas have the same productive advantages, population density is very
uneven. What consequences can this phenomenon have? With regard to the
agricultural sector, tensions can be foreseen over modes of production, regu-
lation of land ownership, access to water and basic welfare services.
According to the fao study, the population growth trend in Africa
will significantly influence the demand for work as, by 2030, 378 million
people will be of working age, about 220 million of whom will reside
in rural areas (fao, “Afrique rurale en movement”, 2018, p. 20). These
data suggest the urgent need to articulate multi-sectoral and multi-player
public policies on different government levels and regional and continen-
tal mechanisms.
The demand for work versus the supply of employment of the
population growth-rural area binomial becomes a necessary aspect to
address. Another element is the attention to the vast gap between ex-
tra-continental export agriculture, in the hands of a few versus house
garden or community garden agriculture as a recurring livelihood.
Both aspects necessarily influence the reconfiguration of rural spaces.
As mentioned by Paarlberg (2013), “[…] food production in Africa to-
day is far below the known potential for the region” (Paarlberg, 2013,
p. 15). He asserts that African farmers today use almost no fertilizers,
only 4% of their cropland has been irrigated, most of the cropped area
76 Africa in the 21st Century

in Africa is not yet sown with seeds improved through scientific plant
breeding, governments spend about 5% of their budget on agriculture
but 60% of their population depends on the farming sector when it
comes to income and employment. Consequently, “Africa is failing to
keep up with population growth not because it has exhausted its poten-
tial but instead because too little has been invested in developing that
potential” (Paarlberg, 2013, p. 15).
The question now is how, from the new afcfta initiative, will national
and sub-regional policies, together with continental strategies set the guide-
lines for the imminent reconfiguration of these spaces? How to strengthen
agricultural and livestock activity and, at the same time, diversify produc-
tive opportunities that ensure sufficient availability in quality and quantity of
food? How to move from a passive, forgotten and polarized vision of the ru-
ral area to one in which it and its growing population are an advantage to the
continent’s own internal development for a more stable and sufficient pur-
chasing power, not only to access food but all goods and services? For now,
the way the continent is being reoriented in its demographic scope and urban
and rural reconfiguration, coupled with the initiative to change the course of
the commercial dynamics exporting raw materials, involves a series of inclu-
sive decision making. The participation and visibility of Africans cannot be
subordinated exclusively, in the best case, to polling. A horizontal dialogue
has to be promoted to assume the changes and challenges (old and new) that
include both the public and private sectors, civil society organizations and
the participation of each person in the continent. In parallel to afcfta, it is
urgent that the mechanisms already provided in the recs and the au provide
institutional certainty of the decisions and conditions to participate in this
reconfiguration of the continent, accelerating the path towards peace and
political stability.

Conclusion

Following the initiative to create afcfta, some considerations prove rele-

vant in the formulation of national and continental public policies to face
 Agriculture and Food Security in the Context of Continental Cooperation in Africa. 77
Policies and Challenges for the African Continental Free Trade Area

the current disadvantageous situation many sectors of the continent are

undergoing along with its reconfiguration to take place in no more than
a decade. The harmonization of public policies on the different govern-
ment levels is a difficult discussion since they do not follow an ascending
or descending order of formulation or action, but it is important to rec-
ognize that afcfta’s second creation and consolidation stage involves
further discussion regarding topics that are a priority when it comes to
favor cross-continental trade.
In that sense, food security is a catalytic policy to improve the devel-
opment of other priority sectors, hence the need to transcend the reading
of statistics and trends and act more comprehensively. Appealing to the
historic political will of African governments in regional cooperation
and integration initiatives, a committed and much needed framework of
action is urgent, one that articulates the various levels of government,
economic parties and, in this particular case, stakeholders of the agricul-
tural sector at national and sub-regional and continental levels.
The 2030 and the 2063 Agendas need to find in recs and afcfta
mechanisms that support the design, formulation and implementation
of national public policies, where these become a part of the articulated
cycle of regional and continental cooperation and integration work, be-
ing consolidated in the African continent. The strengths revealed in the
Africa Regional Integration Index in each rec are now the starting point
for harmonizing policies that, on the one hand, articulate from local to
continental mechanisms and, on the other, boost trade as a trigger for
development as projected in the 2063 Agenda.
This agenda has challenges to address in parallel with the multi-sec-
toral level and the different stakeholders involved, and that includes
international parties that are taking a relevant presence in decisive sec-
tors of regional development such as infrastructure—a nodal aspect in
the dynamization of continental commerce—with China as an a active
player, for example.
Part of the task of the continent’s agendas also involves diversifying eco-
nomic and income activities beyond agriculture, without neglecting them.
On the contrary, given the demographic and reconfiguration trends and
78 Africa in the 21st Century

demands of the rural environment, it becomes a priority to return to the na-

ture of the countryside to invest in its human and productive potential and
not leave this sector in the hands of local or international monopolies, par-
ticularly in food production. Paarlberg (2013) underlines: “most agricultural
land in Africa is legally under the control of governments rather than indi-
vidual farmers” (Paarlberg, 2013, p. 25). Therefore, since 2007 investors from
China, India, South Korea and states in the Persian Gulf have seen “land in
Africa as potentially useful for the production of both food and biofuels”
(Paarlberg, 2013, p. 25). Hence the importance of an open and institution-
ally framed participation to secure property rights, economic compensation,
land management and land use, as well as access to water, and making fi-
nancing and technical training facilities available. The rural should not be
synonymous of poverty as it has been for the countries of Africa or Latin
America. It should not fade into oblivion, and the disadvantageous condi-
tions under which most small and medium producers operate should not
be normalized any longer. These are some guidelines to consider in the next
policies arising from recs and afcfta that can be linked to the public poli-
cies of African states.
If rurality is a reality in the African continent, it must become,
through the articulation of multi-sectoral policies, an agent of change
and an engine of the new continental commercial proposal that renews
the agricultural sector and improves the state of security of the continent
as a sine qua non towards development for the fulfilment of such a conti-
nental integration project.

References

African Trade Policy Centre of the Economic Commission for Africa

(Comp.) in association with the African Union Commission. (2018),
“African Continental Free Trade Area. Questions & Answers”. ua-un-
eca-atpc.
Azamiou, B. (2016), “De la oua a la ua: ¿un simple cambio de nombre?”,
in Valentin L. y Adonon, F. (coords.), Organización de la Unidad
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Policies and Challenges for the African Continental Free Trade Area

Africana-Unión Africana, 50 años después: seguridad, conflictos y

liderazgos. Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí, pp. 39-55
Békolo-Ebé, B. (2001), “L’intégration régionale en Afrique: caractéris-
tiques, contraintes et perspectives”, in Mondes en développement, no.
115-116, pp. 81-88.
Chang, H. (2012), “Rethinking public policy in agriculture-lessons from
history, distant and recent”, in Chang, H. (ed.), Public Policy and
Agricultural Development. Routledge.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (2018), “The
State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World. Building Climate
Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition.” fao.
Organisation des Nations Unies pour l’Alimentation et l’Agriculture (fao)
& Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique
pour le Développement (cirad). (2018), “Une Afrique rurale en
mouvement. Dynamiques et facteurs des migrations au Sud du Sa-
hara”, fao-cirad.
Moreno, S. (2019), “El impacto de la integración regional africana dentro
del marco de Asociación ue-acp y su implicación en las relaciones
post-Cotonú 2020”, Madrid, Instituto Universitario de Estudios Eu-
ropeos. Documento de Trabajo. Serie Unión Europea y Relaciones
Internacionales, no. 87/2019.
Ochozias A. Gbaguidi (2013), “Cinquante ans d’intégration régionale en
Afrique: un bilan global”, Techniques Financières et Développement
2013/2, no.111, pp. 47-62
Paarlberg, R. (2013), Food Politics. What everyone needs to know. En-
gland, Oxford University Press, 2013.
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (uneca) (2016), “Af-
rica Regional Integration Index”. Report 2016; uneca-bad. Available
at: https://www.integrate-africa.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Docu-
ments/ARII-Report2016_EN_web.pdf
uneca (2018), “African Continental Free Trade Area. Questions and
answers”. Addis Ababa: un. Available at: https://au.int/sites/default/
files/pressreleases/34053-pr__au_member_countries_create_histo-
ry_at_the_afcfta_extraordinary_summit_in_kigali_f.pdf
 Sub-Saharan Africa in the Global
Crossroads of Financialization

Alicia Girón

Africa Rising, Africa continues to rise, but

let’s not deceive ourselves. Africa is a com-
modities play, and so when you are building
that Africa Rising narrative, there was
also the issue of commodities. But lots of
countries have also begun to diversify.

Kganyago, imf, 2018

Abstract

Sub-Saharan Africa, from the post-crisis period, has been presented

as a fundamental piece to the Silk Road, accompanied by American
interests and former European colonies. The bases for economic inte-
gration have even been created to adapt to a new development model
based on deepening the productive and financial circuits of large in-
ternational corporations. Austerity policies, growing indebtedness, the
informal economy, and the wave of migrations towards Europe passing
through the Mediterranean question the nascent democracies where
social reproduction conflicts arise. The axis of this essay is to ponder
on the following question: to what extent can sub-Saharan Africa im-
plement, in the future, a development model sustained through equity
without jeopardizing social reproduction, but at the same time being
a global player? The purpose of this paper will be to first analyze the
relationship between financialization and globalization in a region of

81
82 Africa in the 21st Century

strategic natural resources; second, to examine social reproduction in

the face of an austerity project that limits development in all possible
areas; third, the development of sub-Saharan Africa in the commodity
futures market and the financial fragility that it represents in the face
of price volatility within the international financial market; and finally,
the complexity of the insertion of sub-Saharan Africa in an internation-
al context that calls the fulfillment of the 2030 Agenda into question.

Introduction

The post-crisis period has reoriented the financial flows of new actors by
promoting new paths for financial circuits, mainly from emerging coun-
tries. Wamboye and Alehegn (2017) analyze the importance of foreign
direct investment in Africa from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Af-
rica (brics). Even the investment from the countries of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd) in this region collapsed,
between 2008-2012, from $34 billion to $15.7 million. At the same time, the
Official Development Assistance (oda)1, which meant almost 50 percent
for low-income countries in Africa, displayed a steady decline in the total
financial flows this continent receives. Meanwhile, the share of total foreign
direct investment (fdi) from the brics in Africa increased from 8 to 12
percent between 2009 and 2012 (African Economic Outlook, 2014). Chi-
na has invested the most during the post-crisis period, which makes it the
main investor in emerging countries. Between 2004 and 2013, the annual
fdi growth rate increased 50 percent and in 2016 alone 64 new investment
projects were announced. Overall, there was a 1,400 percent increase in
annual growth rates in comparison to the previous year (African Economic
Outlook, 2017). The importance of Africa as a player on a global scale is
noticeable when taking these figures into account. It was no accident that
President Xi Jinping’s welcome speech at the G20 Summit introduced the

1 “This applies especially to bilateral aid from oecd countries. The share of oda in total exter-
nal flows declined from 37% in 2002-06 to 28% in 2012-16. Nevertheless, aid from China and
other emerging partners is growing rapidly” (African Economic Outlook, 2017, p. 46).
 Sub-Saharan Africa in the Global Crossroads of Financialization 83

need for the industrialization of Africa to achieve its development (Xi Jin-
ping, 2016). Hence the importance of focusing on the following key points:
the financialization process, the strong internationalization of the price of
sub-Saharan African commodities in the financial markets, and the wealth
of its natural resources sought not only by emerging countries but also by
European colonies. The 2020 African Economic Outlook (aeo) showed
that the continent’s economies are growing well, above the global average.
The report projected a steady growth trend in Africa from 3.4% in 2019 to
3.9% in 2020 and 4.1% in 2021 (African Economic Outlook 2020).

Financialization and Globalization

This essay addresses financialization, one of the most important and

used terms in economic forums in the past decade. Before fully focus-
ing on what is to be the insertion of sub-Saharan Africa in the context
of financialization, it is necessary to draw on a theoretical framework to
understand and define this concept in order to show why it is important
for this region to encourage an autonomous development based on an
industrialization project that adds value to the main export products and
makes it less dependent on commodity prices that are determined in in-
ternational financial markets.
Several authors have devoted themselves to define financialization.
Epstein, one of the most prominent, mentions that financialization re-
sponds to the “...growing role of financial reasons, financial markets,
financial actors and financial institutions in the operations of the local
and international economy” (Epstein, 2005, p. 3). Even authors such as
Guttman mention that the current Great Crisis has been “the first sys-
temic crisis of a new financial regime driven by accumulation2, and as

2 Guttman (2008, p. 1) explains that, in recent years, the existence of a qualitatively different
type of capitalism has been recognized and has received the names of “heritage capitalism”
(Aglietta, 1998), growth regime driven by finance” (Boyer, 2000) or “accumulation regime
dominated by finance” (Stockhammer, 2006). Regardless of its name, it is a fact that the new
regime is managed by finance.
84 Africa in the 21st Century

such, an important test of the tension for the total infrastructure of fi-
nancial markets” (Guttman, 2008, p. 1). Financialization is a process
that goes beyond financial deregulation, which is accompanied by the
process of economic deregulation where commercial and development
banks gradually blur in development financing operations, leaving an in-
creasing number of institutions such as funds pensions, mutual funds,
hedge funds, private equity funds, and institutional investors operate in
financing from a profitability perspective. Under such an approach, debt
securities become a priority in credit operations, which creates strong
speculation in the sale of prices of future commodities that become de-
rivatives and, in turn, strong financial speculation.
For the last 25 years, capitalism driven by finance has spread to
such an extent that half of humanity has been integrated into the pri-
vate market economy primarily through development financing (Girón
and Chapoy, 2009). As seen in this paper, the financialization of export
products from sub-Saharan Africa is looking at showing the causal rela-
tionship between the process of exporting natural resources, be these oil,
gas, uranium, aluminum, cotton, and all those resources whose prices are
not determined by the producer but by the large corporations involved
in financial markets and that determine the sovereignty of nations. This
relationship has developed to such an extent that many prices of export
goods defined as commodities are traded in financial markets as part of a
financialized accumulation regime, as described by Chesnais in his book
‘Finance Capital Today: Corporations and Banks in the Lasting Global
Slump’ (Chesnais, 2016).
The prices of export commodities in sub-Saharan economies and
their integration into the international financial system have had an im-
pact on the countries’ income and, therefore, on public spending, but
mainly on social spending. If, alongside the degree of public indebted-
ness with institutional investors—with foreign investment adding to the
latter —then exporting economies face serious difficulties; that is, not
only payments to creditors and low commodity prices but also the impact
of the social reproduction crisis.
 Sub-Saharan Africa in the Global Crossroads of Financialization 85

Financialization, integration, and financial markets

From the processes of deregulation and economic and financial liberal-

ization in the eighties and the continuous stabilization plans implemented
in developed economies and today’s emerging countries, a continuous
process of double-movement integration deepened. The process is un-
derstood as the dependence of both exporting and importing countries,
where product prices became dependent on the interests of institutional
investors in financial markets. This integration process set the founda-
tions for globalization and the global village where economic fragility
gradually permeated countries to the extent that many of the decisions
regarding exports and import prices were defined by large buyers world-
wide, affecting a process where the countries producing the same product
could compete.
As this essay intends to prove, the determination of prices is beyond
the control of producers and consumers. It is, therefore, the great finan-
cial institutional investors who determine prices in the financial markets.
The competition among countries that manufacture the same product
causes prices to rise or fall depending on the world’s supply or demand
and to the detriment of another country whose competitive strength is
lower. In turn, the increasingly strong integration of export products,
mainly commodities, in the international financial market permeated
an economic fragility that is difficult to contain through governments’
public policies and, in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, in countries with
recent independence processes.
Ayküz mentions how “…the fortunes of Emergent Development
Economies (edes) traditionally varied with conditions in international
commodity markets because of their dependence on commodity exports.
However, global financial conditions have increasingly become a stron-
ger influence because of their deepened integration into the international
financial system, financialization of commodities, and mutually reinforc-
ing impulses between international financial and commodity markets,
described as commodity-finance nexus. There has been a strong correla-
tion between commodity prices and capital inflows to edes in the new
86 Africa in the 21st Century

millennium, and growth in the South has gone up and down with them”
(Akyüz, 2017, p. 2).
Therefore, sub-Saharan Africa is strategic to study financialization
through the relationship between export products and financial markets.
unctad considers a country is ‘export-commodity dependent’ when “…
more than 60 percent of its total merchandise exports are composed of
commodities. Given that commodity dependence can have a negative
impact on a country’s economic development, it is extremely important
to monitor the evolution of such dependence in countries throughout
the world. In particular, detailed statistics on commodity dependence
provide an invaluable tool for a comprehensive analysis of its causes and
consequences, and contribute significantly to the policy debate about
measures necessary to address it in the short and long terms” (unctad,
2019, p. iv).
For example, from 1990 to 2018, 27 commodities went through a
structural change in the sub-Saharan region, from exporting raw materi-
als and food to energy, metals, and minerals. A gradual evolution whose
transition can be explained by the role that China has given to Africa as
a provider of strategic resources could be regarded in two ways: the first
responds to the development of the Chinese economy itself during the
last decades, where the increase in productivity led to absorbing a greater
amount of natural resources, with Africa being one of its main energy
suppliers; the second deals with the recent Chinese expansion all around
the world, highlighting, on the one hand, the development of the tech-
nological industry which needs to provide itself with mineral and metal
resources and, on the other, the need to keep the construction industry
active as one of the engines of economic growth, increasing the impor-
tance of the Silk Road in China’s long-term plans. The following table
shows the commodities produced in the sub-Saharan region according
to the World Bank classification.
The unctad report also considers developing countries are depen-
dent on commodities and as for Africa “...89 per cent of sub-Saharan
African countries are commodity-dependent, compared to two thirds of
the countries in the Middle East and North Africa, half of the countries
 Sub-Saharan Africa in the Global Crossroads of Financialization 87

Table 1. Sub-Saharan Africa. Commodities Productions, 1990-2018

Commodity Groups Commodity

Coal
1 Energy Crude Oil
Natural Gas
Cocoa
2 Agriculture Coffee
Tea
Coconut oil
Fishmeal
Palm oil
Oils and meals
Palm kernel oil
Soybean oil
3 Food Soybeans
Maize
Grains
Sorghum
Bananas
Other Food Oranges
Meat beef
Cotton
4 Raw materials
Tobacco
5 Fertilizers Potassium chloride
Aluminum
Copper
6 Metals & Minerals Iron ore
Nickel
Zinc
Gold
7 Precious Metals
Platinum
Source: World Bank, 2019.

in Latin America and the Caribbean, and half of the countries in East
Asia and the Pacific. On the other hand, only a quarter of countries
in South Asia and in Europe and the Central Asia region are consid-
ered commodity-dependent, while there are no commodity-dependent
88 Africa in the 21st Century

countries in North America” (unctad, 2019, p. 3). Therefore, the caus-

al relationship between financialization and commodity-dependent
developing countries (cddcs) is decisive for economic policy man-
agement, being countries that are not integrated by “...the division of
labor, but the geographical division of specific stages of the production
process in global supply chains, supported by the dominance of foreign
direct corporate investment financed by cross-border financial inte-
gration of geographically distinct national financial markets” (Kregel,
2019, p. 4).

Characterization of commodities during the last three decades

(1990-2017)

The predominance of commodities in the sub-Saharan region has de-

termined their economic evolution and development. The hypothesis
presented in this section allows demonstrating how the insertion of this
region in the process of internationalization has determined the economic
development of the countries by internally determining the dependence
on export prices and economic development from decision-dependent
public policies outside territorial sovereignty.
Table 2 shows the five main commodities per decade. During 1990-
1995, the region’s commodities were mostly agricultural products, such
as coffee, tobacco, black tea, and cotton. Also, the export of energy such
as oil (oils), and minerals like coal began in this span. Although these ex-
ports represented 6.1 billion dollars, that accounted for only 0.1 percent
of the region’s gdp by 1995. However, in 2000 commodities were struc-
turally changing their participation at an international level. This time,
energy and minerals were placed as the main commodities of the region,
leaving agricultural products in second place. During this year, the most
important commodities were those derived from oil, especially oils, with
a 7.6 percent share in gdp and with an export value of 30.8 billion dollars.
In 2005, despite the fact that petroleum products remained as the main
commodity, there is a noticeable decrease in their export value, dropping
 Sub-Saharan Africa in the Global Crossroads of Financialization 89

Table 2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Top Commodities Production

by Selected Year

Year Commodity Billion usd % GNP Million tons

Tobacco, not stemmed 0.15 0.04 0.05
Tobacco, stemmed 0.13 0.04 0.04
Coffee 0.05 0.01 0.05
1990

Tea 0.05 0.01 0.04

Cotton 0.00 0.00 0.02
Total 0.38 0.11 0.20
Coal 1.56 0.44 N/A
Coffee 1.40 0.40 0.57
Petroleum oils 1.39 0.39 13.52
1995

Cocoa 1.21 0.34 0.86

Cotton 0.58 0.16 0.36
Total 6.15 1.73 15.30
Petroleum oils 30.08 7.67 19.12
Petroleum derivatives 3.32 0.85 16.55
Coal 1.26 0.32 68.02
2000

Cocoa 1.18 0.30 1.45

Coffee 1.03 0.26 0.86
Total 36.86 9.40 105.99
Petroleum derivatives 8.05 1.06 24.98
Petroleum oils 6.02 0.79 15.40
Coal 3.18 0.42 72.50
2005

Cocoa 2.53 0.33 1.71

Aluminum 2.07 0.27 1.22
Total 21.85 2.87 115.81
Petroleum oils 128.64 9.42 132.47
Petroleum derivatives 12.48 0.91 20.03
Gold, semi-manufactured 6.34 0.46 0.00
2010

Iron ores 5.59 0.41 53.79

Coal 5.32 0.39 69.07
Total 158.37 11.59 275.36
Petroleum oils 36.66 2.20 107.87
Gold, semi-manufactured 7.26 0.44 0.00
Cocoa 4.54 0.27 1.61
2015

Petroleum derivatives 4.29 0.26 8.93

Coal 3.90 0.23 N/A
Total 56.65 3.40 118.41
Petroleum oils 28.77 1.86 76.07
Gold, semi-manufactured 10.95 0.71 0.00
Cocoa 6.00 0.39 2.05
2016

Gold 5.34 0.35 0.00

Natural gas 4.08 0.26 135.45
Total 55.14 3.57 213.58
Petroleum oils 46.95 2.81 120.76
Gold, semi-manufactured 9.33 0.56 0.00
Cocoa 6.27 0.38 2.77
2017

Gold 6.17 0.37 0.00

Coal 5.55 0.33 80.69
Total 74.26 4.45 204.22
Source: Own elaboration with data from wits, World Bank , http://bit.ly/2LmNREH
90 Africa in the 21st Century

to 8.05 billion dollars and representing 1.6 percent of gdp. New com-
modities were introduced, such as aluminum, with a value of 2.7 billion
dollars.
It is necessary to point out 2010 was the peak of commodity exports
for the sub-Saharan region. The total share of the first five commod-
ities reached 11.6 percent of gdp and a value of 158.4 billion dollars.
These comprise energy (petroleum oils and other derivatives), miner-
als (coal), and metals (gold and iron). During 2015, there was another
decrease in commodity exports, 56.6 billion dollars with a gdp share of
3.4 percent, a change with respect to 2010 of 93 percent and 94 percent,
respectively.
Finally, in 2016 and 2017 the region’s commodities once again
brought back agricultural products, specifically cocoa although energy
and metals still contributed with the largest share. Overall, variations in
their shares with relation to gdp are observed, however, they are lower
than in previous years, thus going from 3.4 percent in 2016 to 4.4 percent
in 2017.
The following table displays the main export and import partners for
sub-Saharan Africa over the past thirty years. Like commodities, part-
ners in the region have changed their commercial participation from one
decade to another. Firstly, between 1990 and 1995, it may be observed
that the United States positioned as the main export destination of the
region with a market share of 14.3 percent of total exports. Likewise, this
country positioned as the third import destination competing with Euro-
pean countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, with
Japan as the only Asian partner during those years. The close commercial
relations with European countries, the United States, and Japan repre-
sented 20 percent stakes respectively until 2000.
The entry of China to the World Trade Organization in 2001 was
the necessary platform to make its formal leap into the internationaliza-
tion of Chinese production in international trade. During 2005, the close
commercial relations with the sub-Saharan region deepened both direct
and indirect investments from China into the region, accompanied by a
greater share of exports, which represented 4.3 percent of the total and a
 Sub-Saharan Africa in the Global Crossroads of Financialization 91

Table 3. Sub-Saharan Africa: Top 5 Exports and Imports Partners

by Selected Year

Exports Imports
Year Partner Billion usd Participation (%) Partner Billion usd Participation (%)
us 0.10 14.25 South Africa 0.19 16.74
France 0.10 13.99 France 0.19 16.59
1990

Germany 0.09 12.90 uk 0.16 13.85

Japan 0.07 10.57 Japan 0.08 6.90
uk 0.07 9.74 Germany 0.07 6.33
uk 3.59 8.25 Germany 5.43 11.68
us 3.37 7.72 uk 4.38 9.42
1995

France 2.37 5.43 us 4.20 9.04

Japan 2.32 5.33 Japan 4.00 8.61
Germany 2.22 5.09 France 3.70 7.96
us 17.15 20.87 South Africa 6.54 9.88
uk 6.87 8.36 Germany 5.18 7.83
2000

India 4.78 5.82 us 5.16 7.79

France 4.59 5.59 France 4.77 7.21
Spain 3.65 4.45 uk 4.67 7.05
uk 11.28 11.32 South Africa 11.15 8.79
us 10.90 10.94 Germany 9.89 7.80
2005

Japan 6.01 6.03 China 9.65 7.61

China 5.74 5.76 France 8.41 6.63
Netherlands 5.47 5.49 us 7.21 5.68
us 50.44 16.24 China 35.21 12.75
China 44.65 14.38 South Africa 21.40 7.74
2010

India 18.46 5.95 us 21.06 7.62

South Africa 14.09 4.54 Germany 13.45 4.87
Netherlands 11.81 3.80 France 13.21 4.78
China 25.10 13.79 China 38.19 16.25
India 10.39 5.71 South Africa 20.24 8.61
2015

us 9.98 5.48 India 12.73 5.42

South Africa 7.85 4.31 Germany 12.14 5.17
Switzerland 7.81 4.29 us 11.00 4.68
India 13.93 8.44 China 38.22 17.64
us 11.23 6.80 South Africa 14.71 6.79
2016

China 10.32 6.25 us 12.68 5.86

South Africa 9.24 5.60 India 12.66 5.84
Switzerland 7.36 4.46 Germany 12.55 5.79
India 19.68 9.28 China 37.39 16.42
China 18.52 8.73 South Africa 14.89 6.54
2017

us 14.92 7.03 Germany 13.44 5.90

Netherlands 9.62 4.53 India 13.15 5.77
Spain 8.46 3.99 us 11.74 5.16

Source: Own elaboration with data from wits, World Bank, http://bit.ly/2LmNREH
 92 Africa in the 21st Century

Table 4. Sub-Saharan Africa: Top Commodities by Region

and Selected Year

Year Commodities Billion usd Top exporters

1990 N/A N/A N/A
1995 Petroleum oils 1.34 Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo
Central Africa

2000 Petroleum oils 2.99 Cameroon, Gabon

2005 Petroleum oils 5.4 Cameroon, Gabon
2010 Petroleum oils 52.2 Angola, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo
2015 Petroleum oils 33 Angola, Cameroon
2016 Cocoa 0.68 Cameroon, Sao Tome
2017 Petroleum oils 6.19 Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo
1990 N/A N/A N/A
1995 Coal 1.56 South Africa
Southern Africa

2000 Coal 1.26 South Africa, Eswatini

2005 Coal 3.18 Botswana, South Africa
2010 Copper 4.6 Botswana, Namibia
2015 Petroleum derivatives 2.74 Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa
2016 Petroleum derivatives 2.08 Botswana, Namibia, South Africa
2017 Petroleum derivatives 2.41 Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa
1990 N/A N/A N/A
1995 Cotton 0.33 Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Niger, Togo
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali,
2000 Cotton 0.57
Niger, Togo
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali,
2005 Cotton 0.84
West Africa

Niger, Togo
2010 Petroleum derivatives 11.4 Coast of Ivory, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal
2015 Petroleum derivatives 1.15 Benin, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Niger, Senegal, Togo
Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, The Gambia, Ghana,
2016 Petroleum derivatives 1.18
Nigeria, Senegal, Togo
2017 Petroleum derivatives 1.34 Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo
1990 Coffee 0.05 Madagascar, Malawi
Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Uganda,
1995 Coffee 0.88
Malawi
Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi,
2000 Coffee 0.09
Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia
Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi,
East Africa

2005 Coffee 0.69

Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania,
2010 Tobacco 1.10
Zambia, Zimbabwe
Burundi, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mauritius, Uganda,
2015 Tea 0.23
Tanzania, Zimbabwe
Burundi, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda,
2016 Tea 0.24
Uganda, Tanzania
2017 Tobacco 1.64 Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zimbabwe

Source: Own elaboration with data from wits: World Bank, 2019.
Note: The values in billion dollars are the sum of values of the commodity among the countries
of the region for the each year.
 Sub-Saharan Africa in the Global Crossroads of Financialization 93

value of 5.7 billion dollars. Meanwhile, imports placed China as the third
country of origin with a 7.6 percent share in the region’s total figures.
This situation, on the one hand, intensified as of 2010, when China
followed the United States as an export partner of the sub-Saharan re-
gion, with a 14 percent share in total exports. In 2015, China was placed as
the main export and import destination of the region, leaving the United
States in third place in both cases. In 2016 and 2017, taking into account
the development of the Belt and Road Initiative (bri), relations between
the sub-Saharan region and China remained close. This is explained first-
ly, by China’s demand for raw materials, mainly rare earths and secondly,
because of the development of infrastructure projects in the region, which
shows the importance of maintaining a continuous commercial flow.
On the other hand, Table 4 shows the main commodities exported
by each of the regions that shape the sub-Saharan Africa region: Central,
Southern, Western, and Eastern Africa. In general, there is a specializa-
tion in exports by region. Central Africa specialized in energy, especially
petroleum products from 1990 to 2017. Meanwhile, over the same years,
the Southern region concentrated its exports mainly on minerals such as
coal, metals such as copper, and energy, such as petroleum products. In
contrast, the East and West participated in raw materials, mainly cotton,
coffee, tea, and tobacco. Thus, the importance of commodities for the
development of the region lies in the income that countries can obtain
through their exports, mainly withholdings.

Final Considerations

Having analyzed the exports of sub-Saharan Africa’s main export prod-

ucts and the relationship with the financialization process, this essay
presents a hypothesis built on the survival of these countries thanks to
greater direct investment, increased external indebtedness, deepening the
relationship of their products’ export prices, and the causal relationship
between exporting and importing countries and European countries and
China and India, which are the main importers of sub-Saharan products.
94 Africa in the 21st Century

Drawing a relation between financialization and global neoliberalism

in a region of strategic natural resources takes us to a second issue: social
reproduction versus an austerity project that limits development by all
means. Thirdly, we can analyze the development of sub-Saharan Africa
in the commodity futures market and the financial fragility it represents
in the face of price volatility in the global financial market, placing the
region in a complex puzzle where sub-Saharan Africa faces the global
world that calls the fulfillment of the 2030 Agenda into question.

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 The Reconfiguration of the Banking Sector in
Angola and Mozambique (2000-2016)

Monika Meireles

Introduction

The crisis of 2007-2008 has led financial globalization and the financial
deregulation process from previous decades to new paths. For many het-
erodox analysts, this was the first major financialization crisis. It is worth
remembering that, on September 15, 2018, ten years had elapsed since the
bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers bank, a milestone that marked a credit
crunch in interbank fund markets due to the wide interconnection amongst
them. Considering that the regulatory authority focused on the enormous
leverage in bank operations (commercial, investment, and full-service
banks), a series of new regulations has been implemented in the sector. As a
result, capital requirements are continuously increasing, as provided in the
Dodd-Frank Act and in other rules suggested in Basel III (Correa, 2013).
Since then, major global banks, whose headquarters are mainly based in
Global North economies, reduced their rhythm of international expansion
by consolidating branches and closing subsidiaries (especially in the Global
South), and even reconsidering the dimension of their domestic operations.
It is clear therefore that finance relations between central and peripheral
economies are being reconfigured. In addition, the so-called “new financial
actors” have appeared in the financial horizon, for example, new regional
financial actors that are part of a bank capital internationalization modality
that favors the regional expansion circuit over the global one.

97
98 Africa in the 21st Century

It must be noted that the major global banks still are absolute lead-
ers in terms of the asset volume controlled domestically and abroad in
the continuous capital internationalization process. Nonetheless, in pe-
ripheral economies (especially, Africa and Latin America), new regional
financial actors are widely present. As a result, the foreign bank profile
and the relationship with domestic banks have changed. Inferring that
the traditional dependency relationship between local and foreign finan-
cial oligarchies is merely readjusting in light of these events would not
be an exaggeration (Meireles, 2015). Among new regional financial ac-
tors, it is worth noting the participation of pan-African banks (imf, 2014)
—banking entities whose headquarters are located in an African country,
but have active branches in other countries in that region—.
The foregoing does not mean that traditional banks are no longer
important. Major commercial banks and banking companies still are the
more traditional agents within the financial ecosystem. In other words,
even though it was somewhat “wounded” by the crisis, universal banking
or full-service banking (that is, banks operating within the convention-
al commercial banking sector —characterized by the “entry” of deposits
and the granting of loans to clients, but also those participating in long-
term investments, brokeraging share/certificate placement in the stock
market, and managing the opulent asset portfolio of select third parties)
is still critical in understanding an economy’s financial dynamics. Thus,
understanding the changes that this bank has undergone in the ways
(trends) it operates is especially crucial in assessing credit access condi-
tions and development financing in peripheral countries.
In truth, the way those trends appear is neither even nor homogeneous
in peripheral countries. If we consider the African continent, for instance, we
will come to realize that the agendas vary from one sub-region to the next.
An analytical instrument allowing a more adequate approach to the “re-
gional trend” abstraction level entails creating typologies that cover groups
of countries whose behavior is similar, by considering specific key variables;
for example, the availability of bank credits for the domestic private sector
and the behavior of the most important banks. The first step to start creat-
ing typologies anchored in a review of recent banking history and to start
 The Reconfiguration of the Banking Sector in Angola and Mozambique (2000-2016) 99

building the foundation to speak more adequately about regional trends

based on those typologies entails conducting a comparative analysis between
countries. Therefore, in this paper we will compare the particularities of two
countries in the region: Angola and Mozambique.
Contemporary financing conditions in the peripheral economies
mentioned above are characterized by a unique combination of the new
business model of traditional banks and the arrival on scene of new re-
gional financial actors, which is not only contributing to a profound
foreign banking reconfiguration within the banking sector in each rel-
evant region (World Bank, 2018), but is also forcing us to make urgent
questions that had neither been made before nor had they been analyzed
by heterodox economists from previous generations. Yet, they demand
an update in view of the novel processes mentioned.
In that regard, we may list some of our research questions: What are the
“virtuous connections” between finance and economic development? Does
daily private banking operation intend that a credit fulfill a “social duty” or
is it more closely related to valuation circuits that hardly adhere to the “real
sector” of an economy? Do credit dynamics and the composition of the
banking sector in peripheral economies promote financing for productive
investments stimulating an inclusive development pattern? How does credit
granting by megabanks to the productive sector behave? How does the trend
towards increasing bank capital concentration and centralization redefine
the power held by major banks operating in African countries characterized
by a low level of institutional strength?
Naturally, this chapter does not seek to find clear-cut responses to the
questions posed here, which are rather broad and complex. Nonetheless,
based on the questions asked above, we seek to assert that, in light of fi-
nancialization, since the resources managed by major private banks have
increased (interestingly enough, together with a change in their business
models), a new oligopoly competition round in the sector has threatened
development financing conditions in African economies.
In a little more detail, in this scenario, where the tension has re-
newed given the acutely increasing competition amongst major
financial groups and given the tendency to reduce profitability on
100 Africa in the 21st Century

account of the bank regulations implemented following the crisis, an

extremely dangerous behavior is being stimulated, as it favors ongoing
financial innovation and disproportionate speculation. Consequently,
instead of prioritizing the creation and/or strengthening of a financial
environment committed to financing productive activities, generating
employment, and promoting socio-economic development, financial
fragility is being exacerbated.
To organize the presentation of the main arguments put forward in
this paper, this chapter is divided into three sections following the in-
troduction. The first section makes reference to heterodox economic
literature regarding the behavior of major banks at a time of financial
deregulation, and the challenges posed for the socio-economic develop-
ment of peripheral economies under these circumstances. The second
section focuses on the analysis of recent changes and the current con-
figuration of banking systems in the chosen countries. A series of final
remarks are made in the third section.

Theoretical Framework: the bank in the financial deregulation era

In post-Keynesian readings, as regards the 2007-2008 crisis, emphasis has

been made on the way the us bank operated, which has undergone a dramatic
change since financial regulation was in place, given the rise of an institution-
al structure able to control and monitor banking activities more closely and
effectively since the Roosevelt era. In that respect, the 1993 Glass-Steagall Act
was the cornerstone of these measures. When this law was repealed (actually,
it was abolished as a result of the enactment of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act,
also called the 1999 financial system modernization act), a financial deregu-
lation process that had been in the making for the past decades was approved,
triggering a financial deregulation boom (Dymski, 2014).
In line with this reading, which appears to be a lot more heterodox,
in lieu of a more efficient financial sector, legal amendments followed the
rules of a rougher competitive game amongst newly created megabanks
(Dymski, 2011). These “too-big-to-fail” entities are banking institutions
 The Reconfiguration of the Banking Sector in Angola and Mozambique (2000-2016) 101

whose strength —in terms of solvency and liquidity— must be secured

by the government, given that, in case either of them goes bankrupt,
such a fall would drag the entire system on account of those institutions’
size, importance, and broad connection with other economic agents. As
a result, the stability of the national —or even international— financial
system as a whole would be jeopardized.1
In this process, where bank capital concentration and centralization are
increasing, the banks have become “too-big-to-fail” entities, and major bank
operations and business models have evolved. The changes in how banks
used to operate when banking activity was performed in ways that deemed
to be in line with what is conventionally understood as banking business,
and the way in which banks currently operate —where megabanks are “too-
big-to-go-bankrupt” financial companies— translate into an environment
characterized by new regulatory challenges. Undoubtedly, new regulations
that limit megabank power are needed if a financial system —that is some-
what stable and less likely to be the fulcrum of a crisis that rapidly spreads
throughout the entire economic system— is to be built. Nonetheless, prior
to discussing the modalities of a regulatory structure, better understanding
of how the banking system has actually changed is paramount.
Inspired by Cömert et al. (2016, pp. 11-12), we have summarized in
four points the banking operational changes that occurred at a time of
financial regulation until the megabanking era: a) the “too-big-to-fail”
idea has encouraged banks to take greater risks; b) the easiness with
which risks are transferred, through shadow banking, thickens the flanks
through which the financial fragility of bank institutions may increase;
c) managerial data about the quality of the transactions that a bank is
performing is transmitted to a lesser extent between the local and central

1 From a more institutional perspective and following a more specific methodology to determine
which would be the global megabanks, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) —together with the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and national authorities— identifies Glob-
al Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) on an annual basis (since 2011). Supervising and
regulating these megabanks becomes increasingly complex and less effective, as it requires
thinking, above everything else, on ways to hinder financial entities from growing and assem-
bling colossal market segments [Mastromatteo and Esposito, 2016].
102 Africa in the 21st Century

management of major banks; and d) the income of the banking sector is

increasingly more dependent on the fees obtained from the purchase and
sale of third-party resource positions rather than the difference between
a passive and an active interest rate.
A wave of mergers was an expression of typical monopolist compe-
tition practices in the banking sector, where the purchase of a bank by
another is essentially carried out with two purposes that are not mutu-
ally exclusive: a) expanding the client/consumer database and increasing
market share by absorbing the client portfolio of the merged bank; and
b) maintaining a local market position and preventing another competi-
tor entering that market. In economic literature, mergers that take place
mainly for this reason are called defensive mergers (Dymski, 1999).
As regards central economies, Cömert et al. (2016) have actually doc-
umented that, in the megabanking era, the main profitability source of a
bank business is no longer the difference between active and passive in-
terest rates; in other words, the earnings that were typically obtained from
the difference between the remuneration given to savings account hold-
ers and the payments made by clients who acquired a loan lost ground in
relation to the earnings made through the fees on novel financial trans-
actions, such as fund management and/or other types of third-party cash
management transactions (Wray, 2009).
When mapping bank mergers and megamergers in emerging countries
(Girón, 2007), we may realize that the phenomenon worsened in the 1990s,
when considerable institutional changes took place, mainly due to political
pressure from the lobbying by prominent national and international bankers.
Likewise, at a microeconomic level, daily bank operation was also adverse-
ly affected, especially in relation to banks operating in emerging countries
(Dymski, 2002). In addition to these factors, major bank headquarters un-
derwent changes that defined the strategy for branch operations.
To further reflect on this matter, let us reconsider the main points that
heterodox literature the world over has highlighted as resulting from a
change of era—from financial regulation to financial deregulation: a) the in-
corporation of megabanks as a result of the concentration and centralization
of the sector’s capital, and as a consequence of the fact that the same entity
 The Reconfiguration of the Banking Sector in Angola and Mozambique (2000-2016) 103

may now freely operate as both a commercial and an investment bank; b) the
nature of bank earnings, which are increasingly dependent on transactions
that generate fees (such as transactions in derivatives markets and/or foreign
exchange markets stemming from a difference in loan rates for productive
activities); c) ongoing financial innovation, which catapults the securitiza-
tion-leverage-risk trinomial to unprecedented levels; and d) outsourcing
risks, a practice consisting of incorporating new companies with the purpose
of eliminating, from a bank’s balance, bank asset deals whose risk is not in
line with reminiscent bank regulations. This practice greatly inflates shadow
banking, as shown by the nearly indecipherable tangle of shadow banking-re-
lated transactions (Prates and Farhi, 2015).

Angola and Mozambique: financial deepening, bank profitability,

and major bank concentration

Political instability in Angola’s economy was rather high during the war for
its political independence (1961-1975) and by the end of the civil war (2002)
that erupted between three main separatist groups: The People’s Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (mpla, in Portuguese), the National Liberation
Front of Angola (fnla, in Portuguese), and the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (unita, in Portuguese). It is no coincidence that the
fight for gaining control over natural resource exploration (diamonds and
oil) geographically and acutely determined conflict zones. The most dramat-
ic gdp fall (6.9%) occurred precisely when the civil war ended; that is, when
the result of almost fifty years of virtually uninterrupted war was communi-
cated as final (El País, 2013).
Given that the armed conflict had ended, that there was an agenda for
reconstructing the country’s infrastructure, and that the door was open to
foreign investors to participate in national oil activities, there was a rapid
growth in the following years (El País, 2013). By 2007, Angola hit a historic
record in terms of gdp: it registered a 22.7% rate, which had been driven by a
considerable growth in oil production (El País, 2007). In light of those “strato-
spheric” growth rates, the fact that the gdp had reached 13.8% in 2008 was
104 Africa in the 21st Century

already quite worrying (however, in that same year, developed economies

had strongly resisted the effects of the international financial crisis). None-
theless, in 2009, the red flag became obvious as growth had merely reached
2.4%. Hence, it became evident that Angola was not disconnected from the
global deceleration trend. In the following years, the country’s annual growth
remained between 3 and 4% (this figure was slightly higher than the global
average, yet extremely lower than the path it had followed for six years prior
to the crisis), until, in 2016, due to the combination of a new outbreak of
internal political tension and a decrease in the price of oil at an international
level, the country’s economy experienced a negative growth rate of 0.7%.2
In turn, the independence war in Mozambique encompassed several
guerrilla movements, among which the Mozambique Liberation Front
(frelimo, in Portuguese) must be noted, as it lasted from 1964 to 1974
(however, the country’s official independence was acknowledged un-
til 1975). In addition, anticommunist paramilitary forces were already
gaining strength around those dates; in that regard, the Mozambican Na-
tional Resistance (renamo, in Portuguese) deserves special mention, as
it would later become an important political force within the nation (in
this respect, it must be noted that both political parties have been and still
are the main actors in Mozambique’s political arena). Once this stage had
ended (in 1975), Mozambique went through several phases or histori-
cal periods: from a “real socialism” perspective —with Samora Moises
Machel (1975-1986)— until it reached a “market economy” stage, whose
foundations were rather fragile. According to Peter Gastrow and Marcelo
Mosse (2002), an actual “market economy” phase started in 1987; howev-
er, it consolidated two years later, following the end of the civil war, and
once democratic elections took place for the first time.
Owing to these considerations, we will now analyze recent changes
and the current configuration of banking systems in the chosen coun-
tries. Certain basic economic and financial indicators from Angola and

2 According to the imf [2018], Angola was severely damaged by the international decline of oil
prices. From 2015, the country’s growth decreased due to a strong deceleration in the oil sec-
tor, coupled with the loss of dynamism in the industrial, construction, and service sectors, all of
which were forced to adjust to private consumer cuts and the fall of public investment levels.
 The Reconfiguration of the Banking Sector in Angola and Mozambique (2000-2016) 105

Mozambique are analyzed, especially during two key moments: a) the

pre-crisis period (2000-2007) and b) the post-crisis stage (2008-2016).
It must be noted that the gdp growth rate of African countries rose
exponentially in relation to other economies around the world, in spite of
the crisis. It is also worthwhile highlighting that Angola and Mozambique
are two of the African countries with the highest growth rates; hence, af-
firming that their spectacular economic dynamics is among the highest
in the world would be far from an exaggeration. However, we should not
forget that economic growth is different from socio-economic develop-
ment, and that there is a mass of obstacles preventing the growth of an
underdeveloped economy from translating into a sustained improve-
ment of its population’s social conditions (Nega and Schneider, 2016).
Therefore, it is no surprise that, even though the gdp of both countries
increased considerably, social indicators are not encouraging. To illus-
trate this, the Human Development Index (hdi) value in Angola is 0.533,
while Mozambique’s is 0.418; those values position each country at 150
and 181 out of 188 assessed countries.
Simply put, even though their growth has been substantial, these
figures translating into the improvement of development indicators still
poses a great challenge. Available financing sources and the conditions
under which credits and loans are granted to investment projects are two
among the main components necessary to achieve economic develop-
ment. In this regard, the organization of the banking system becomes
increasingly important when discussing the financial structure needed to
design a successful development strategy.
With that in mind, we will now briefly and comparatively discuss
the composition of the banking sector considering capital sources, cred-
it dynamics, and bank profitability in Angola and Mozambique. In that
regard, a critical balance about how these variables condition socio-eco-
nomic development possibilities will be made.
Continuous political tension and civil unrest until the beginning of
year 2000 in these two African countries partially explain the low finan-
cial deepening level prior to the crisis. According to Graph 1 —which
shows the internal credit volume granted to the private sector as a gdp
106 Africa in the 21st Century

percentage—, it may be observed that, towards the beginning of the de-

cade, the indicator barely reached 2% of Angola’s gdp; years later, the
credit volume had reached 10.6% by 2007. Two years later, this indicator
had nearly doubled (it reached 21.9% in 2009) and would remain at that
level until 2016. With relation to Mozambique, as shown is Graph 1, it
may be clearly noted that, similar to Angola, there was a significantly
greater increase in internal credit granting to the private sector, yet a lot
more intense in the post-crisis period. In fact, from 2000 to 2007, the
credit volume in Mozambique went from 14.4% to 11.6% of the gdp; by
2015, it had reached a maximum of 35.1%. However, there would be a
slight decrease in 2016 (34.5%) due to the difficulties related to sover-
eign public debt. Regardless, the values mentioned here are extremely
low when compared to other economies (even those known as “emerging
economies”); nonetheless, they constitute a significant increase for the
path both countries had historically followed.
In the post-crisis scenario, there has been a generalized decrease in
the profitability of the traditional banking sector as a result of the new
regulations that increased capital requirements. In Graph 2, we used the
profitability indicator obtained from the average profits made by banking
activities over capital stock before taxes (Return on Equity, roe). As a re-
sult, such a decrease may be noted in Angola and Mozambique. In Angola,
bank roe went from 21.6% in 2002 to nearly 48% six years later. Following
the crisis, this indicator varied between 17 and 20%. In September 2016,
five banks in Angola (among them, Banco de Poupança e Crédito, bpc)
were decapitalized and had to meet prudential requirements (imf, 2018).
In the case of Mozambique, bank roe was 34.9% in 2002, and it reached
an outstanding figure of 61.35% in 2004. If, in the pre-crisis period (2007),
it recorded 42.83%, following the crisis the numbers would be much low-
er (such as 18.78% in 2015). It must be mentioned that, regardless of the
decreasing trend in banking profitability following the crisis, the figures
obtained by banks in African countries are impressive, especially because it
is known that bank roe in central economies is usually below 10%.
When analyzing bank composition in Angola and Mozambique in
greater detail, a more accurate insight into its dimension and importance
 The Reconfiguration of the Banking Sector in Angola and Mozambique (2000-2016) 107

Graph 1. Angola and Mozambique’s Domestic Credit to Private Sector,

2000-2016 (Percentage of gdp)

40
Angola Mozambique
35

30

25

20

15

10

0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2011
Source: Made by the author based on data from the World Bank (2018) World Development
Indicators

Graph 2. Angola and Mozambique’s Bank Return on Equity (roe before tax)
2002-2015

70 Angola Mozambique

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2012

2013

2014

2015
2011

Source: Made by the author based on data from the World Bank (2018) Global Financial Development
108 Africa in the 21st Century

in the local economies may be obtained, together with a more accurate

notion of what “too-big-to-fail” institutions would be in those econo-
mies. Both countries share a history of bank transformation: the bank
used to be state-owned (it even was a part of the structure of the socialist
regime implemented there) and, in the 1990s, it was mainly owned by
Portuguese, Pan-African, and domestic private capital.
In Charts 1 and 2, we listed five major banks in 2016; their asset vol-
ume in the corresponding local currencies; how much their individual
assets represent from total bank sector assets; and lastly, their percentage
size in relation to gdp. In Angola, adding the assets of all five major banks
results in an amount equivalent to 41.24% of gdp, while the figure in
Mozambique is 60.49%, both of which are extremely relevant. In Angola,
the three main banks are: Banco de Poupança e Crédito (bpc), Banco
Angola de Investimentos (bai), and Banco de Fomento Angola (bfa).
BCP was founded in 1956. Since then, this bank has been the strongest in
the country, as it holds assets representing 20.44% of share in the bank-
ing sector. Close to 75% of its shares remain in the hands of the Angolan
government. In turn, bai controls 15.69% of the assets of the sector. Its
greatest shareholder is Sonangol, a state-owned company that supervis-
es oil and natural gas production within the country. The third place is
occupied by bfa, which was founded in 1990 as a representation office
of the Foreign Promotional Bank (Banco de Fomento Exterior, bfe), and
which came to be controlled by Banco Português de Investimento (bpi)
in 1996. Currently, it holds 15.09% of total banking sector assets. In turn,
the main banks in Mozambique are: Banco Comercial e de Investimentos
(bci), Millennium bim-Banco Internacional de Moçambique (bim), and
Standard Bank. The bci started operating in 1996; currently, the majority
shareholder is Caixa Geral de Depósitos Group, which is Portuguese and
held 31.08% of the sector assets in 2016. The second position is occupied
by Millennium bim-Banco Internacional de Moçambique on account of
its asset size. This bank is also a private bank linked to a Portuguese group
that controls 29% of all the assets in the country’s banking system. Lastly,
the Standard Bank is the first Pan-African bank that started operating in
1967 and that holds a market asset share of 17.27%.
 The Reconfiguration of the Banking Sector in Angola and Mozambique (2000-2016) 109

Chart 1. Angola: Five Biggest Banks Bases on Assets (2016)

Assets Share in the

% of
Nº Bank (Millions of Banking
gdp**
Kwanzas) Sector (%)
1 Banco de Poupanca e Crédito 1,778,202 20.44% 11.40%
(bpc)
2 Banco Angolano de 1,365,685 15.69% 8.76%
Investimentos (bai)
3 Banco de Fomento Angola (bfa) 1,312,879 15.09% 8.42%
4 Banco BIC 1,027,033 11.80% 6.59%
5 Banco Millenium Atlantico 948,454 10.90% 6.08%
(bma)*
Total 5 Major Banks 6,432,253 73.92% 41.24%
Total Banking Sector 8,701,457 100.00% 55.79%
Source: made by the author based on each bank’s financial reports, Análise ao setor bancário
angolano (kpmg, several years) and Angola: Banca em enálise (Deloitte, several years).
Notes: *Formerly, Banco Privado Atlantico (bpa).
**Estimate based on World Economic Outlook Database (ifm, 2017)

Chart 2. Mozambique: Five Biggest Banks Bases on Assets (2016)

Assets Share in the

% of
Nº Bank (Millions of Banking
gdp**
Meticals) Sector (%)
1 bci 143,433 31.08% 20.87%
2 bim 133,780 28.99% 19.47%
3 Estándar Bank 79,696 17.27% 11.60%
4 Moza Banco* 31,369 6.80% 4.57%
5 Barclays 27,374 5.93% 3.98%
Total 5 Major Banks 415,624 90.06% 60.49%
Total Banking Sector 461,506 100.00% 67.17%
Source: made by the author based on data from Associação Moçambicana de Bancos and kpmg:
Pesquisa do sector bancário (several years).
Notes: *Amount of assets corresponds to year 2015.
110 Africa in the 21st Century

As we have been able to discover, together with political stability

and banking service deepening, a truly relevant issue for the African
countries under study is the presence of foreign banks, especially the
Pan-African bank and the reminiscence of the banks that belong to Por-
tuguese bank groups.

Final remarks

This paper sought to delve into the construction of a perspective based on

heterodox literature about the role played by credits, the dynamics of the
contemporary banking sector, and the main characteristics of emerging fi-
nancial markets. Emphasis was made on the African region, mainly through
an analysis of Angola and Mozambique. It is worth noting that this paper
did not simply apply the discussion conducted in other countries to pas-
sively adopt their key concepts without carrying out an analysis as regards
peripheral economies. Precisely because of that, the intention was to iden-
tify the varied ways in which national banking systems have been created
based on different development styles that come about also considering the
influence of that variable. In addition, it proposed that a reflection be made
on the recent bank restructuring process that has taken place in those coun-
tries, and that the way in which financial instability in the region increased
as a result of bank concentration and centralization be discussed.
In a rather summarized way, this essay sought to question issues such
as: a) deregulated finance behavior in the capital flow of emerging markets;
b) the way in which international megabanks and national banks partici-
pating in the organization of financial systems in the Global South operate;
c) the way in which bank operations have modernized, which are the ser-
vices that are actually offered and provided; d) how the ongoing financial
innovation observed in the world bank takes place in the day-to-day activ-
ities of banks in peripheral economies; and e) what role the credit and the
banking sector play in the construction of development alternatives.
Lastly, if we consider that banks should essentially create purchasing
power to finance investment projects leading to economic development
 The Reconfiguration of the Banking Sector in Angola and Mozambique (2000-2016) 111

(Schumpeter, 1996 (1912)), we may clearly understand the social role played
by credits. Only that way —generating more favorable credit conditions for
actual development financing— will banking activity be justified to the eyes
of society. In addition, we have considered the discussion revolving around
the way in which new development challenges become more complex in an
era characterized by a steep internationalization of financial and monopolist
capital through transnational banks. Therefore, transnational banks operat-
ing in peripheral countries disrupt the conditions for designing a successful
national development strategy, as it requires that “the decision center be in-
ternalized” and, hence, that there exists an ability to “propel oneself ” on the
path to development [Furtado, 1964 (1961); our translation]. This critical
component has been irrevocably altered by the presence of private foreign
capital banks—whether traditional or those from the Global South—, given
that the autonomy in essential decision-making processes (including deci-
sions in the political and economic arena) must always submit to a rationale
that does not truly coincide with national development needs.

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 III. Social Issues, Gender
and the Construction of New
Perspectives
 African Women’s Political
Empowerment towards Gender Equality

Arlin Rivas

There is no chance for the welfare of the

world unless the condition of the women is
improved. It is not possible for a bird to
fly on one wing.

Swami Vivekananda

Historically, women have been marginalized from government struc-

tures that determine political and legislative policies. Their participation
in political life is fundamental since it is one of the conditions for dem-
ocratic construction, and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals
(sdgs) is also a step towards achieving gender equality (Inter-Parliamen-
tary Union, 2008).
In the last 20 years, there has been an accelerated increase in wom-
en’s political participation in national parliaments around the globe as
the world average almost doubled from 11.3% in 1995 to 22.1% in 2015
(Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2015). As a result, three countries that hold
the top places in the world ranking of women’s political representation in
parliament have emerged: Rwanda, South Africa and Namibia. Rwanda,
with 61.3%, is positioned as the first place in the world while South Africa
and Namibia have 42.7% and 46.2%, ranking tenth and sixth in women’s
political representation in parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2019).
Studies seeking to understand women’s political participation
have mostly focused on observing whether they have achieved greater

117
118 Africa in the 21st Century

incorporation into the political arena and if they are equally represent-
ed, however, there are political phenomena of social relevance such as
the implementation of policies aimed to establish greater gender equality
known as affirmative actions, which have been left relegated in the back-
ground. In order to analyze the progress of women in the field of political
participation, it becomes necessary to examine the social and political
context where that battle is fought in terms of female empowerment.
In the first decade of this century, the governments of Africa have sought
to introduce affirmative action measures in order to achieve greater degrees
of participation in decision-making areas (Rodríguez, 2008). Despite the
progress made and the increase in women’s political participation, the hope
to attain political empowerment and a more gender-sensitive agenda are far
from being realized. According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Gen-
der Gap Index that measures political empowerment, the gap between men
and women remains wide. In 144 countries, only Iceland has closed more
than 70% of its gap; Nicaragua, Rwanda, Norway and Finland have crossed
the 50% threshold, South Africa and Namibia do not exceed 30%, and 34
countries, from all regions of the world, have closed their gap less than 10%
(Global Gender Gap, 2017), which means that political empowerment has
not increased despite a higher political participation.
Women continue to face structural difficulties to strengthen their
participation and political leadership, (un Women, 2015) limiting their in-
fluence on decision-making and affirmative actions capable of integrating
a strategy to strengthen their participation and empowerment in politics.
Considering that parity prioritizes gender equality and that, spe-
cifically sdg 5 aims to advance gender equality based on women’s
empowerment (un Women, 2017), it is necessary to know how much
progress has been made and what are the main obstacles faced to achieve
full political empowerment. To get to these results, the first section
presents a brief overview of the context of women’s empowerment and
political participation in Rwanda, South Africa and Namibia; the sec-
ond section analyzes the provisions emanating from their parliaments
to empower women. The third section visualizes the institutional culture
of parliaments as a process that affects women’s empowerment, as these
 African Women’s Political Empowerment towards Gender Equality 119

parliaments are not sensitive to gender. Finally, some reflections and fu-
ture lines of research are presented.

Women’s political participation and empowerment

It was in 1970 when the concept of women’s empowerment became

relevant, demanding a change in the social models of the time that im-
peded their participation in social and political life. Women’s movements
promoted the term empowerment, which came with a very complex defi-
nition, having different connotations and meanings; however, it can be
better explained as the process of generating and developing capacities to
exercise control over life by expanding choice; it is also linked to self-con-
fidence, knowledge, skills, attitudes and the inherent voice (Batliwala,
1997). The empowerment of women is defined as “a process through
which women increase their ability to configure their own lives and their
environment; an evolution in women’s awareness of themselves, their sta-
tus and their effectiveness in social interactions” (Schuler, 1998, p. 31),
and it is that interaction and cooperation that achieve to configure their
environment, allowing them to empower themselves.
The empowerment of women begins with an increase in political
participation in decision-making positions, but it cannot stop there.
Influential positions must be harnessed to make a difference in the de-
cision-making process, thus exercising affirmative actions—that seek
to compensate for the historical practices of discrimination against
women—in order to achieve greater degrees of participation in deci-
sion-making areas (Rodríguez, 2008).
According to Kabeer (1999), the empowerment of women has three
dimensions through which it can be measured: resources, agency, and
achievements. Resources include having access to these and serve to improve
the ability to exercise them. Agency is the ability to define the objective of
influencing a negotiation to finally accomplish actions and results. It is also
an individual’s capacity that is supported by an institutional change (United
Nations Development Programme (undp), 2012), regarding interventions
120 Africa in the 21st Century

that have to do with empowering and participating in a particular group.

Additionally, it can reach multiple dimensions (social, political, cultural,
economic, individual and collective), making it necessary to know the ob-
ject of study: the empowerment of women in the political dimension.
Women’s political empowerment is understood in this article as a
process of expansion of skills and abilities in the development of strategic
decisions to organize and mobilize social changes that will transform the
context of the political arena, responding to their needs and concerns
in a scenario that has created disadvantages in the control and access to
resources, agencies and achievements through their political participa-
tion, which influences actions, processes and results (Rivas, 2019). In that
sense, political participation of women is fundamental to legally endow
laws that empower women in politics. For research purposes, political
participation means the presence of political positions in parliament for
the process of formulating and implementing affirmative actions to in-
fluence results that empower women in politics.

Women in National Parliament

There is a tendency to think that political participation of women in

parliaments is higher in developed countries or full democracies1. In the
United States, Russia and Korea, women’s participation ranges between
15% and 19.5% only, in Germany and France, it is around 30%, while in
sub-Saharan countries it amounts to 42% to 61.3% (see Annex 1).
The increase in women’s political participation in African countries is
largely explained by the introduction of different gender quotas, which were
implemented in the elections of Rwanda, South Africa and Namibia in 2010,
2006 and 2013 respectively. Rwanda established a constitutional quota of 30%;

1 The Democracy Index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil lib-
erties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Based on
their scores on 60 indicators within these categories, each country is then classified as one of
four types of regime: full democracy; flawed democracy; hybrid regime; and authoritarian
regime (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017).
 African Women’s Political Empowerment towards Gender Equality 121

South Africa and Namibia legislated voluntary quotas of no less than 50%,
which matches the periods where their increase has been the highest, as an
indication of the effectiveness of the laws placing more women in parliament
(see Graph 1). There has been an increase in women’s political participation
between 10 and 22 % in the last 15 years. In this way, sustained progress has
been rapid in increasing the numbers of women in parliamentary represen-
tative positions, which is also due to an increase in educational opportunities
and promotional activities undertaken by women’s movements that have had
a positive impact on the participation of women in national parliaments.

Graph 1. Women’s Political Participation in National Parliaments

80 Rwanda South Africa Namibia

70 63.8
61.3
60 46.2
48.75
50 41.5 42.7
29.8
40
26.4 25.6
30

20

10

0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union 2004-2019.
Note: Percentage of women in parliament positions in the elections from 2004 to 2019. The mini-
mum gender quota for Rwanda is represented in black and the grey line shows the cases of South
Africa and Namibia.

In the early 1990s, women actively participated in the liberalization

and reform movements for the democratization of African countries,
and also promoted the formation of women’s leadership in the region.
Such is the case of the African National Congress (anc) and the Women’s
League, which conducted a campaign for the parties to adopt a gender
quota of a minimum of 50% and thus ensure the participation of women
in elections. In addition, they succeeded in getting political parties to get
involved in gender issues by creating commissions (Ashiagbor, 2005).
122 Africa in the 21st Century

South Africa gained 10.75% from the 2004-2009 elections; in con-

trast, Namibia had a setback of 2.56%. However, in the elections from
2009 to 2014, for the first time in its history, Namibia exceeded the 40%
in its chamber, earning 21.89% in the 2009 election, while South Africa
lost 0.96%. Nowadays, both countries keep percentages above 40% (see
Graph 1). In the case of Rwanda, the percentage of women in the 2003
elections was 48.8%, earning 7.5% in the 2008 and 2013 elections; in 2014,
it reached 63.8%, while in 2018-2019 it lost 2.5% and stood at 61.3% (see
Graph 1), As shown, this rate had been on the rise for 15 years, until 2018,
when there was a slight decrease.
While it is established that the structure of the parliament of South
Africa and Namibia may have at least 50 percent women, in the last three
parliamentary elections (2004, 2009, and 2014) they have not exceeded
44.5% (see Graph 1). In the case of Rwanda, it has doubled the established
constitutional quota percentage since the implementation of quotas began.
There is a tendency to assume that higher political participation
means greater political empowerment; in that sense, the Global Gen-
der Gap Report by the World Economic Forum measures gaps between
women and men in political empowerment2 to ascertain the influence of
political participation and how it is visualized in the gaps.
From 2006 to 2009, there was an increase in the political empower-
ment index of 0.1234 for South Africa, and Namibia saw an increase of
0.0244 (see Graph 2). Nevertheless, in 2014 they recorded a decrease
of 0.0523 and 0.0209 each. It can be seen that political empowerment of
women in Namibia has gained strength since 2017 as it grew by 0.1425
compared to 2014.; despite this, it holds the 26th position worldwide. In
the case of Rwanda, information is available only since 2014, with a score
of 0.4762. It managed to surpass its 50% empowerment gap by 2017, be-
coming second in the ranking of the countries that have most closed the
political empowerment gap (see Annex 2).

2 It measures the gap between men and women at the highest level of political decision-making
through the ratio of women to men in ministerial positions and the ratio of women to men in
parliamentary positions. The highest possible score is 1 (parity) and the lowest possible score
is 0 (imparity) (Global Gender Gap, 2017).
 African Women’s Political Empowerment towards Gender Equality 123

On the other hand, South Africa has a declining trend since 2009.
It has been asserted that although there are few public policies or laws
that empower women, they are actually obsolete for the reality they face
today. Despite the great advance behind the increase of women in parlia-
ment in some countries, there is still a long way to go, as this progress has
not been accompanied by political empowerment. Parity is still very low,
and even though Rwanda is second in overcoming 50% of its gap world-
wide, the question is then if that percentage will remain as the highest for
the country to close its gap.

Graph 2. Women’s Political Empowerment in Rwanda, South Africa

and Namibia

1 Rwanda South Africa Namibia

0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6 0.539
0.497
0.4492
0.5
0.3773 0.375 0.369
0.4 0.3258
0.3
0.172 0.1964 0.1727
0.2
0.1
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2020

Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Global Gender Gap-World Economic Forum,
2006-2020.
Note: Regarding the empowerment index, the closer it is to 1, the more empowerment there is.
Information is available since the beginning of the report in South Africa and Namibia; there is
information about Rwanda since 2014 only. There is no information in 2019. The grey line repre-
sents overcoming 50% of the political empowerment gap.

Affirmative action’s strategy to women’s empowerment

According to Alda Facio (2000), affirmative action starts from the recogni-
tion of the historical inequality of power and enjoyment of rights between
124 Africa in the 21st Century

women and men, forcing the State to take a series of special temporary mea-
sures to accelerate the achievement of gender equality without these being
discriminatory expressions for men. In other words, women and men do not
have the same opportunities for socially constructed causes and, therefore,
the enforcement of neutral rules leads to unequal results, hence the need to
implement concrete affirmative actions to counteract this.
In short, affirmative action seeks to implement a series of actions in-
tended to substantively modify political culture understood as the set of
values, beliefs, behaviours, symbols, and common and shared experienc-
es which allow developing a unified way of political culture that has been
“dominated by the values and characteristics considered masculine such
as assertiveness, aggressiveness, competition, achievement orientation,
independence, and the search for power, based on control and aspects
that highlight dominance and strength” (Ramos, 2005, p. 41).
Hence the importance of underlining the need to implement effective
affirmative actions aimed to develop and strengthen women’s leadership. In
addition to the existing actions—such as gender quotas—seeking to guarantee
a minimum presence of women in the spaces of political representation will
provide them with the capability of effectively exerting influence on the defi-
nition of the public agenda and therefore the adoption of political decisions.
Several affirmative actions have been carried out in cooperation in
the international arena, one of which is the Solemn Declaration on Gen-
der Equality in Africa, a non-binding commitment adopted in 2004 that
covers six thematic areas: health, peace and security, governance, human
rights, education, and women’s empowerment. With relation to the last of
these areas, the heads of state and government have pledged to report an-
nually on their progress in incorporating the gender perspective. Despite
making such commitments, no state has fully reported on implementa-
tion, and no studies have been conducted to date to evaluate the Protocol
(Kombo, Sow and Jama Mohamed, 2013).
Another affirmative action is the adoption of the Gender Policy and
the African Union (au) Action Plan in 2010, whose objectives are to adopt
a rights-based development approach through evidence based on deci-
sion-making and encourage reorientation of existing institutions using
 African Women’s Political Empowerment towards Gender Equality 125

data and performance indicators disaggregated by gender. The main

purpose is to guide the process of gender mainstreaming and women’s
empowerment to influence procedures, policies, and practices which will
accelerate the achievement of gender equality. Therefore, the policy of-
fers a framework “to establish standards and criteria required to monitor,
evaluate and ensure the follow up of progress realized in mainstream-
ing gender equality and empowerment of women in a regular manner”
(African Union, 2009, p. 9), and Member States of the au have to report
annually on progress made in gender mainstreaming.
The plan also establishes measures to hold institutions accountable
and responsible for the implementation of policies; and one of the plan’s
commitments is the creation of a favourable and stable environment to
ensure that all political statements and decisions aim to eliminate per-
sistent barriers to reach gender equality and women’s empowerment. In
the same way, the African Union developed a Strategic Plan for Gender
Integration (gmsp), which mainly seeks to periodically review shared
quotas and representations to increase the participation of women in de-
cision-making by establishing gender-sensitive political and governance
policies and adopting affirmative action programs.
In that same year, the African Women’s Decade (2010-2020) was
declared with “grassroots approaches to gender equality and women’s em-
powerment,” which emphasizes the bottom-up approach to development
and builds on 10 priority issues that seek to empower women in Africa.
Theme 9 focuses on women in decision-making positions in the legisla-
ture, the judiciary and the executive, and in reaching the principle of parity
of the African Union (African Union, 2010). Likewise, the African Union’s
heads of state and government declared 2015 as the year of women’s em-
powerment and development towards Agenda 2063 (African Union, 2016).
The Women Gender Directorate Development (wgdd), created in
2002 at the Office of the Presidency of the auc, promotes gender equality
in Africa and within the African Union, and oversees the development and
harmonization of gender-related policies. In 2016, the gender meeting was
held, making special emphasis on the following: a) evaluate the progress of
women’s participation in politics, public offices and the judiciary, identify
126 Africa in the 21st Century

the challenges and barriers that impede their effective participation, and
develop strategies to accelerate the role of women and their leadership
agency, b) raise awareness and develop a common strategy for the imple-
mentation of 2016 as the year of Human Rights, c) involve practitioners,
legislators and activists to review the implementation of the women’s politi-
cal participation agenda, learn from experiences and challenges, and reflect
on what is needed to accelerate implementation and monitoring.
Meanwhile, it is essential to know what parliaments are doing as in-
stitutions to encourage and promote public gender equality policies that
respond to an action pursuing women’s political empowerment. A clas-
sification and analysis of three categories of measures towards political
empowerment will be applied to the case study:

1. Precepts intended to promote equality in women’s political par-

ticipation.
2. Issued resolutions for the elimination of discrimination against
women’s political participation.
3. Provisions that dictate to monitor the effectiveness and enforce-
ment of equality policies on women’s political participation.

Rwanda

Rwanda’s government has developed and implemented the “2020 Vision”,

which maintains a strong commitment to achieve the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (mdgs), one of whose main objectives is to achieve gender
equality and women’s empowerment. Strong political will in Rwanda has
led to significant positive advances in the provisions to promote equality
in participation. Coupled with the aforementioned gender quotas, the
Rwandan government established a national gender policy that seeks to
incorporate the gender perspective into its projects, reinforcing the com-
mitment of public institutions at the highest level—including the Office
of the President, the Office of the Prime Minister and the National Gen-
der Agency. to implement gender equality undertakings.
 African Women’s Political Empowerment towards Gender Equality 127

Regarding the elimination of discrimination against women in

political participation, the Rwandan constitution maintains a precept
in article 15 and 16 Protection against discrimination of any kind
(Rwanda’s Constitution, 2015) and an article that promotes freedom
to join a political organization where no Rwandan will be subject to
discrimination on the grounds of belonging to a particular political or-
ganization, or not belonging to a political organization (Chapter VI.
Political organizations. Article 55). As well, gender-sensitive laws have
been enacted, such as Law No. 59/2008 on Prevention and Punishment
of Gender-based Violence.
Finally, in what concerns the supervision and enforcement of equal
political participation policies, Rwanda established the Rwanda Women
Parliamentary Forum (1996), which a) advocates for the promotion of the
gender principle of equality and the empowerment of women in politics,
programs and budgets; b) ensures that the laws that are enacted are gen-
der-sensitive; c) boosts momentum for a transformative gender agenda
at national, regional and international levels; d) has created commissions
led by women on health and education issues in a way to develop the ca-
pacity of the members. Likewise, the National Women’s Council (2003)
was created and has three axes: a) Mobilization of women to participate
in different development programs in Rwanda, b) Development of wom-
en’s capacities for effective empowerment, c) Advocacy for the resolution
of women’s problems and an Internal Gender Audit (2009), established
by its constitution with the mission of empowering women and acceler-
ating their participation in development.

South Africa

South Africa maintains 4 measures to promote equality in women’s po-

litical participation: a) quotas legislated at the national level, b) voluntary
quotas adopted by political parties, c) a South African Local Government
Association, and d) a Discussion Committee on the situation of women
in the diplomatic service.
128 Africa in the 21st Century

The quotas legislated at the national level were established from the
implementation of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act
(1998) providing the parties must try to ensure that 50% of the candidates
of the party list are women in the elections for local assembly, however, its
wording only encourages, but does not bind the parties to adopt a system
for proportional representation seats.
In voluntary quotas adopted by political parties at the national level,
the African National Congress (anc) party remains the only party that
practices voluntary quotas, first establishing a quota of 30 percent before
the 1994 parliamentary elections. In 2006, the anc adopted 50 percent;
the party statute stipulates “the provision of a quota of no less than fifty
percent of women in all elected structures” (anc Constitution, Article 6).
The quota was extended to the national elections in 2009.
Likewise, it is worthwhile highlighting the importance of the South
African Local Government Association (salga), which has pioneered
the inclusion of acts to exert pressure to incorporate more women in local
government leadership positions. A similar discussion committee is held
regarding women in the diplomatic service and the search for measures
that boost their political empowerment. With relation to measures to elim-
inate discrimination against women in political participation, the country
has a law against harassment and political violence against women, one of
the few constitutions that contemplate such laws.
Section three deals with measures to monitor the effectiveness and
enforcement of equality policies on women’s political participation under
two dimensions: a) The Commission for Gender Equality (cge) and b)
Women Empowerment and Gender Equality Bill.
cge came into existence after the Seventeenth Amendment Act in 2013
on the empowerment of women and gender equality, helping to establish a
legislative framework for the empowerment of women, to align all aspects
of laws and the implementation of women’s empowerment-related laws
and the appointment and representation of women in decision-making
positions and structures, and to provide related information. It also states
that there must be at least 50 percent representation and significant partic-
ipation of women in decision-making positions and structures.
 African Women’s Political Empowerment towards Gender Equality 129

Chapter 4 of the Women Empowerment and Gender Equality Bill

(Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2013) addresses governance,
powers of ministers and gender units. In order to promote the empower-
ment of women and the achievement of substantive gender equality for
women, the bill stipulates that the Minister may: a) develop frameworks
for the promotion of women’s empowerment and gender equality, b) re-
quire the development and implementation of plans and measures by
public bodies and private entities designated for the promotion of wom-
en’s empowerment and gender equality in compliance with this bill and
the submission of such plans and measures for consideration, review and
guidance by the Minister, c) monitor and evaluate progress on women’s
empowerment and gender equality.

Namibia

Namibia has 3 provisions to promote equality in the political participa-

tion of women: a) quotas legislated at the subnational level, b) voluntary
quotas adopted by political parties, and c) the Promotion of the Welfare
of the People.
The first quota of women legislated at the subnational level in Na-
mibia was established in the Local Authorities Act of 1992, stipulating
that in the election of any municipal council or town council with 10 or
fewer members, party lists must include at least 2 women. In the case of
a municipal council consisting of 11 or more members, party lists must
include the names of at least 3 women. In 1997, these figures increased
to three and five, respectively, and in 2002 this rule was made applicable
to future elections (Frank, 2004, p. 88, LeBeau and Dima, 2005, p. 84).
With relation to the voluntary quotas adopted by the political parties,
in August 2013, the ruling party in the National Assembly—South West
Africa People’s Organization (swapo)—adopted a 50% gender quota that
will be applied to all political parties at national and regional structures.
The last provision promoting the welfare of people set forth in the Na-
mibian Constitution establishes the enactment of legislation to guarantee
130 Africa in the 21st Century

equal opportunities for women, so that they can fully participate in all
spheres of the Namibian society, including politics. The measures to elimi-
nate discrimination against women in political participation and monitoring
the effectiveness and enforcement of equality policies on women’s political
participation only include one mechanism that addresses Apartheid and
affirmative action, and sets out the enactment of legislation and the im-
plementation of enacted policies and practices, taking into account that
women in Namibia have traditionally suffered special discrimination and
need to be encouraged and trained to play a full, equal and effective role in
the country’s political, social, economic and cultural life.
Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia (Namibian
Constitution, 2014) guarantees equality before the law and the right to
non-discrimination on the grounds of sex. The constitution is considered
one of the few instruments that thoroughly use gender neutral language.
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on
the Rights of Women in Africa was ratified in 2004. The Namibian gov-
ernment recently signed and ratified the sadc Protocol on Gender and
Development, and it has also implemented several new policy measures.

Gender-sensitive parliaments to achieve political empowerment

Throughout Africa, women face a series of barriers to develop their full

potential, from restrictive cultural practices to discriminatory laws. In
this sense, it is necessary to underline that the restrictions on political
participation that women are subject to are not determined by their indi-
vidual qualities (aptitudes, personality and personal abilities), but are an
expression of a political culture that legitimizes and enhances male values
and establishes unequal opportunities in the exercise of citizenship, the
result of which is the general tendency for women’s political participation
to concentrate in grassroots positions, while leadership, higher status and
highly valued positions are occupied mostly by men.
It is also necessary to implement effective affirmative actions that de-
velop and strengthen women’s leadership, in addition to the existing ones,
 African Women’s Political Empowerment towards Gender Equality 131

especially in gender quotas, a mechanism implemented in different coun-

tries—including Mexico—to guarantee a minimum presence of women
in spaces of political representation, aiming to effectively influence the
definition of the public agenda and the adoption of political decisions.
When entering the political arena in positions of popular representation,
women are confronted with a world where their legitimacy is sometimes
questioned due to unfavourable conditions that hinder them from fully
exercising their position and consolidating their political empowerment.
Resistance to women in parliament can take different forms such as in-
sults, sexist comments, intimidation, and harassment/political violence, all of
which are unacceptable practices and have no place in political culture.
Political harassment against women has three main characteristics:
a) it is directed against women because they are women, b) it can take
a sexist form, c) it tries to discourage them from actively participating
in policymaking. Violence against women parliamentarians is exercised
in traditional political spaces, such as parliamentary premises, district
offices and places for holding political rallies, as well as in new spaces for
debate created by social media.
The perpetrators of violence do not circumscribe to the circle of
political adversaries only. Women parliamentarians can be harassed or
assaulted by male colleagues from their own parties (Inter-Parliamenta-
ry Union, 2016) because parliaments are not gender-sensitive, making it
impossible for women to achieve full political empowerment.
Parliaments cannot be considered inclusive until they can take pride
in including the full participation of women. Parliaments that are gen-
der-sensitive do not tamper such broader participation of women and
constitute a positive example for society as a whole. The inclusion of
women in political decision-making is not only a matter of women’s
right to equality and participation in public affairs but also of leveraging
women’s resources and potential to determine political and development
priorities that benefit societies and the community in general (Inter-Par-
liamentary Union, 2008) since the active participation of women, on an
equal footing with men, at all levels of decision-making is indispensable
to attain equality, sustainable development, peace and democracy.
132 Africa in the 21st Century

Improving the inclusiveness of parliaments is a multifaceted chal-

lenge that impacts everyone. There are factors that affect the adoption
of gender-related legislation: a) support from the ruling party, b) support
from parliamentarians, c) number of women in parliament, d) support
from the opposition party.
In addition to the need to give democracy a greater and more decisive
boost, there is a need for a greater number of women, stronger infrastruc-
ture from a gender perspective, as well as stronger policies and legislation
on gender equality. The Inter-Parliamentary Union (2012) has stipulat-
ed an action plan that outlines 7 sections intended to make parliaments
more gender-sensitive and thus achieve the political empowerment of
women: a) increase the number and presence of women in parliament; b)
develop and strengthen an appropriate legal framework on gender equal-
ity; c) mainstream gender equality throughout all parliamentary work
d) incorporate the gender perspective in parliamentary tasks and ensure
that all parliamentarians—men and women—share the responsibility to
promote gender equality; e) improve gender-sensitive infrastructure and
parliamentary culture infrastructure, f) encourage political parties to de-
fend gender equality and g) enhance the gender sensitivity of, and gender
equality among parliamentary staff. It is in this way that political partici-
pation of women is considered fundamental to influence the agenda and
make parliaments more gender-sensitive to achieve their empowerment.

Conclusions

Historically, women have been excluded from political participation and

governance. The need to guarantee women’s political participation rights was
acknowledged at the end of the 20th century. Thanks to the commitment of
various international actors and agreements, women’s political participation
in Rwanda, South Africa and Namibia has increased in the last 20 years. De-
spite great progress has been made so far, it has not been accompanied by
political empowerment. Only Rwanda exceeds 50% of its political empow-
erment gap, while South Africa and Namibia do not exceed 30%. These gaps
 African Women’s Political Empowerment towards Gender Equality 133

remain very wide and well reflect a very low level of political parity. While in-
creasing the political participation of women in decision-making areas such
as parliament is a form of political empowerment, it is necessary to exercise
political power effectively through legislative and supervisory frameworks to
transform the socio-political context of women, since the importance of em-
powering women is to promote political pluralism by encouraging equality
through a balanced substantive representation in public and political life and
to attain sustainable development, peace and democracy.
In spite of the publicly declared commitment of the international com-
munity to equality and reducing the gender gap in the political sphere,
women’s empowerment still is a very distant reality. The prevalence of cul-
tural and traditional practices in many countries remains an obstacle. The
political class continues to give low priority to solving the problems and ob-
stacles that prevent women from participating in equal conditions to men,
tending to keep on reproducing the same patterns of power that reflect a
resistance to integrate women as political subjects, and thus excluding them
in decision making. Actual equality in practice is still an aspiration. Political
violence is an issue that has been relegated and significantly affects the partic-
ipation and political empowerment of women. Although South Africa is one
of the few countries worldwide whose constitution provides an endorsement
against harassment and political violence against women and a framework
for its enforcement, this is found in a sub-section of domestic law and not as
a separate legal and binding instrument. It only classifies and defines politi-
cal violence, but does not propose a framework to penalize it. In the case of
Rwanda and Namibia, there is a lack of political will of the parties to open
spaces, coupled with resistance to recognizing political violence in the law.
There is still a long way to go, and whenever there are barriers that limit
women’s exercise of rights and acts of violence against them, no progress can
be made to achieve full political empowerment.
In South Africa and Namibia, the presence of women in parliaments has
increased exponentially thanks to the introduction of quotas legislated at the
national and subnational levels and the voluntary quotas adopted by the par-
ties. However, in terms of strengthening its legal framework, there is a gap
in Namibia to provide for laws on gender equality and non-discriminatory
134 Africa in the 21st Century

measures, which are essential to achieve progress in the political empower-

ment of women. It is also crucial to update and include frameworks related
to gender mainstreaming. On the other hand, South Africa, being one of the
few countries that has a law on political empowerment and gender equali-
ty, should update its legal framework. Since 2009, political empowerment of
women has decreased. Nevertheless, an updated framework does not mean
such a decrease will stop, but at least in the short term this can translate into
a mechanism to achieve greater degrees of empowerment. In Rwanda, al-
though it is true that there are commissions led by women, they address
downgraded issues of low importance to the national agenda such as health
and education—compared to economic and security issues—that only have
a mere consultative status.
It is very important to note that gender equality is not guaranteed
by simply having women in parliament. Instead, it depends on how
sensitized and aware of gender issues the parliament, its policies and in-
frastructure are. It is paramount for parliaments to analyze in detail the
masculinity of the institution, studying culture, customs and practices
regarding the day-to-day functioning of the institution, for example, the
sexist nature of procedures, language, rituals or ceremonies.
The gender system affects political relations, creating a glass ceiling3
not in having limited access to political positions of representation in
parliament—since it is not the case in Rwanda, South Africa and Namib-
ia—but in women encountering barriers to be active actors in making
public policies that empower them politically, establishing a sticky floor
by only being part of parliament but unable to influence decision-making
because of such obstacles.
Achieving a seat in parliament is the first handicap to overcome. Once
elected, women parliamentarians face a set of new problems such as finding
their own place in parliament and acquiring influence in policy-mak-
ing processes. Therefore, the election of more women parliamentarians is

3 Term that refers to the barrier imposed by prejudice and discrimination when women have
less opportunity to exercise leadership even if they have the same or even higher professional
careers than men. (Eagle y Carli, 2004).
 African Women’s Political Empowerment towards Gender Equality 135

not equivalent to empowering women in politics. Parliaments and their

members must become gender-sensitive, and only through a partnership
between men and women can we implement a common platform to achieve
women’s political empowerment, which is necessary to close the current
political empowerment gap that is in fact projected to be fully closed in 107
years from now if the situation remains the same.

Annexes
Annex 1. Women’s Political Participation 2019

Source: Own elaboration based on data from Inter-Parliamentary Union (2019) made on map-
chart.net. Notes: Percentage of Women in National Parliaments

Annex 2. Women’s Political Empowerment Gap 2020

Source: Own elaboration based on data from World Economic Forum and Global Gender Gap
(2020) made on mapchart.net. Notes: Empowerment index, on a scale of 0-1 where the closest to
1 equals more empowerment.
136 Africa in the 21st Century

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Ni Uhuru? Mau Mau and Nationalism in Kenya

Javier Sacristán

Abstract

This article analyzes how the independent state of Kenya has tried to
build its own national identities based on its past and specifically on the
rebellion of the Mau Mau. The objective is to look at how politicians
employed memory in this episode of Kenyan history to build absolute
unity in society. The main focus is trying to explain how the people
how fought for land and freedom, the ones how fought for Uhuru, have
been reminisced by the official history, and how they integrate nation-
alism in current Kenya. The search for identity as a nation starts with
colonialism, and the question is if the Mau Mau rebellion can break the
ethnic and gender barriers in building nationalism.

Introduction

The objective of this article is to explain the contribution of the Mau Mau
rebellion in the construction of national identity in Kenya. In order to
achieve it, the first step is to define the terms nationalism and ethnicity.
Numerous authors in the twentieth century have written about nation-
alism and identity. In recent times, the Mau Mau topic has been a point
of interest because in Kenya, after its independence in 1963, Mau Mau
has been rescued in the historical memory of the Kenyan people. Those
who fought for Uhuru are demanding the British government to obtain
compensation for the time when they suffered violence. Other reasons
for this resuscitation of Mau Mau include that the government is starting

141
142 Africa in the 21st Century

a project named “Corner of the Heroes;” the dilemma is who will be in

that corner.
What happened in the 1950s is still a topic of discussion. Mau Mau
has become an excellent example of the use of memory as a form of po-
litical legitimation. It is therefore necessary to explain the political use of
memory and the problems it can provoke in a social setting.
In 1956, the British government struggled with the difficult problem
of taking care of its settlers in Kenya because Africans could return to
violence at any moment, so having an army there was too expensive. The
Mau Mau never asked for the independence of Kenya, but history recog-
nizes that this rebellion was crucial to accomplish it.
The intention is to prove that Mau Mau has not been forgotten despite
the politicians in Kenya who tried to do so for a long time. Hence, this rebel-
lion had an essential role in the construction of the Kenyan identity and the
values of the Kenyan society. The importance of this study is giving another
perspective of the process of nationalism construction in Kenya.

Nationalism

One of the authors who tried to define nationalism was Krzysztof

Jaskulowski (2010, pp. 289-303). He talks about eastern and western na-
tionalism. In the words of this author, nationalism is “the idea of a chosen
people, the emphasis on a common history and future, national messian-
ism, and the supreme loyalty to political unity” (Jaskulowski, 2010, p.
292). Nationalism came from unity, but in the case of Africa, nationalism
is a collective identity.
Another relevant author is K. R. Minogue (1968, 246 pp.) who ex-
plains that in the 17th century, the concept of nationalism referred to a
specific group of people, making the concept exclusivist. This concept
tries to include everyone in a determined geographic space. Those people
had and still have a wish for belonging to a group, so they form a nation.
In Africa, the colonies started when the Europeans held the Berlin
Conference in 1885. The limits that they defined at the time were the
 Ni Uhuru? Mau Mau and Nationalism in Kenya 143

same in independence, and it will be the work of their leaders to build

identity searching common aspects in people of different ethnic groups
(Kohn and Sokolzy, 1968, p. 104).
Nationalism is an ideology that promotes a collective identity; the
people in one specific space understand their state and believe that the
government is making the best decisions to benefit them. Nationalism
forms an identity and people can even put their life at risk to defend it.

Memory

When historians started to professionalize, memory was a negative factor

in such a discipline. No historian could trust in the things that some so-
cial groups may remember or not because those social groups had their
own interests and political objectives. The first step in professionalizing
history was the search for objectivity, and memory did not have a share
in it.
More recently, history and memory have bonded, and many scholars
started to work in this concept, and more precisely in the idea of col-
lective memory. The concept of collective memory was academically
reviewed in the early twentieth century (Lee Klein, 2011, p. 112). Histori-
cism defines memory as a primitive form that is contrary to the historical
consciousness because memory is the first step of history but does not
analyze the process or the event. However, memory cannot be seen as the
opposite of the historical discourse, because it contributes to construct-
ing both itself and this discourse and can be a central part of the latter.
Scholarly memory can show how some cultures construct their his-
tory; an example is that in some eras, historians use oral traditions to
deepen into history and a key element in this tradition is memory. Nev-
ertheless, memory became a category of history that gathers a lot of other
concepts as myth and folklore. Memory is an instrument, but it is neces-
sary for official history.
The new use of memory is remaking historical imagination (Lee
Klein, 2011, p. 114), including open memory boundaries to history, and
144 Africa in the 21st Century

giving this discipline new participation in politics. In the case of the Mau
Mau, the memory of those who were a part of the rebellion will be crucial
in the construction of nationalism.

The construction of an identity

Before talking about nationalism in Kenya, it is necessary to consider

this country was living in a post-conflict society that had recently gained
its independence. This idea is essential as, in this context, people like
Jomo Kenyatta had the necessity of making a national identity because
independence has to come along with peace. Nevertheless, Kenya expe-
rienced the same ethnic situation as that of all the African countries and
saw a division caused by the Mau Mau war, making it hard for the State
to find common ground for nationalism.
Before the State of Emergency in 1952, Kenyan writers like Wuny-
abari O. Maloba conceived national identity had to arise from literature
and would go through constant change (Maloba, 1998). After World War
I, a feeling of unity came to life thanks to the oppression of the colonial
institutions and the rebellion to fight it unfolded in written words.
The Gikuyu were searching for power, security, and integrity, but it
would not be until World War II that they were to find a reason to de-
mand those principles, and it was when they fought against the British
Army in the war. The problem was that the educated elite were the ones
who started the political fight. As Fanon (1973, p. 38) asserted, those
elites have the European way of thinking, and they never believed in vi-
olence as a means.
Even though they believed in demonstrations, they did not believe
in armed practices. An example of that was Harry Thuku, a man who
was detained by the British army because of his political activities against
the colonial government. When he got detained, many women went out-
side the jail to show that they were against his detention. The police fired
into the crowd, and this riot went down in history as the Harry Thuku
Riot. Before the Mau Mau, the colonial elite was the center not only of
 Ni Uhuru? Mau Mau and Nationalism in Kenya 145

nationalism but also of history. The riots of Harry Thuku in the year of
1922 are considered as the first steps towards constructing identity, but
are also the first example of the problem of forgetting.
Several authors have discussed the Mau Mau myth. The idea of the
rebellion as a myth shows the political problem that the Mau Mau fight-
ers and this specific event represented to the newly independent nation
of Kenya (Friedman, 1995). It is necessary to dismiss the idea of seeing
the rebellion as a myth because that fight had an essential contribution
to the historical process of independence and seeing it as a myth does not
do justice to it. The institutions in power at the time wanted to forget the
rebellion, so using the Mau Mau as a myth was the first step to forget be-
cause they were not heroes; they were a myth of violence and blood.
It seems that the first contribution of the Mau Mau is the idea
of Africans against Europeans; even though the rebellion lost the
war, the fighters demonstrated that Africans could raise their voice
against the exploitation of the settlers. The Mau Mau gives pride to Ken-
yans, but then they were pitted against political interests, and people such
as Jomo Kenyatta that was trying to improve the economy of his country,
needed to erase them from history (Baer, 1956).
The first step in the problem of nationalism is memory. National
identity emerged from history, and history has to demonstrate who is
the ideal Kenyan; people who fought for their land were in the memory
of people same as those who fought for freedom. The Mau Mau move-
ment was a rebellion with an agricultural objective (Berman, 1991). The
government of Jomo Kenyatta debases their participation in the process
of independence because they were violent, but that violence made the
security of the settlers untenable for the British Empire.
During the war, some Mau Mau regarded Kenyatta as a hero because
he was in jail.1 On the other hand, some former fighters think that he
does not have any relation to the war because, in those years, he was in
jail, and he did not believe in violence. Nevertheless, Kenyatta was the

1 The British Empire thought that he was the leader of the rebellion and he was detained with
some leaders of the KANU.
146 Africa in the 21st Century

first president to try to forget the fight of those years; despite being in jail,
he never denied the relation with the Mau Mau because being in a colo-
nial jail would give him a better reputation. In 1963 the ones who did not
believe in him saw a man that was searching power rather than freedom.
The state was trying to sell the land, which was the reason for a fight.
The songs of the war played an essential part in the first steps to forge
nationalism. Thus, it is necessary to understand them to understand this
process and its political implications.
Some songs of the Mau Mau can give the first steps of identity in the
rebellion (Wa Kinyatti, 1990). The song Tell the Elders to Keep Quiet says that
the young will take their lands with guns and will return the peace to the
elders. So those who fought with the Mau Mau will have the authority to say
that they want to help their fathers and grandfathers and the young that do
not do anything or only study have to be in worse conditions than them. The
settlers were in Kenya to eat the people. They wanted to take all they needed
but young people were tired and they started to defend their property.
Another element that can be found in the songs is anti-colonialism.
When the British Came (Wa Kinyatti, 1990) is a song saying that the Brit-
ish came to Kenya with oppression only; this feeling of no civilization
started after World War II. The British arrived in Kenya talking about
civilization, but when a lot of African soldiers were sent to the war, they
saw that white people had the same problems that Africans had.
Nevertheless, not all the elements of nationalism come from Mau
Mau, the song May Imperialism Perish Forever (Wa Kinyatti, 1990) talks
about Chege wa Kibiru, a man who lived in the 18th century and talked
about the arrival of Europeans. He said that men like a small pale-colored
frog would arrive in their lands, and with their magical wands that throw
fire they would defeat the Gikuyu warriors. He also talked about the ne-
cessity of defeating those men and throw them back from the place where
they arrived. Chege was a model for the Mau Mau warriors because, to
them, he was the first Gikuyu that wanted to fight white people, and it
seemed that he had magic powers.
In this same song, we can see the worry of parents about the little kids
and their need to grow in freedom, that is one of the reasons why they took
 Ni Uhuru? Mau Mau and Nationalism in Kenya 147

up arms. People who sing about the future generations will have a problem
when they do not receive recognition in history. The Mau Mau did not take
the matunda ya uhuru, the fruits of freedom, because they were violent, but
without that violence, the Kenyans would not have achieved independence.
Even though many people condemned such violence, they also know that
“full independence can only be brought about by revolution” (Anonymous,
1982, p. 13). One of the things that contribute to the idea of violence was
the oath necessary to be part of the Kenyan Land and Freedom Army. A lot
of Gikuyu people were forced to take the oath. Some authors saw the oath
as an element of the political identity of the Gikuyu (Anonymous, 1982, p.
13). It was a form of coercion and prevention of betrayal.
With independence in 1963, the black bourgeoisie took power. Jomo
Kenyatta was the first president, but he even was in jail because the Brit-
ish government thought he was one of the leaders of the Mau Mau; his
government gave many benefits to the loyalists and to the white settlers.
Those who fought for uhuru forgot they needed to buy the land, and no
bank would lend them money. They cannot sue the loyalists for torture
because the loyalists were in the government, so they were condemned to
oblivion. Kenyatta said that Uhuru was not enough, Kenyans needed to
be economically equal in order to have a nation (Branch, 2009, p. 179).
The time of Kenyatta was the time of uhuru na kazi, freedom and
work. However, who were working the land? The landowners were those
who fought the Mau Mau rebellion with the British army, and those who
were working were Mau Mau rebels who suffered torture in the camps
and their situation did not change. They had another problem, and it was
that those who tortured them were working in the Kenyatta government
so they could not demand justice.
Kenyatta claimed that social divisions would end with love, peace, and
union (Branch, 2009, p. 179). This element of Kenyatta’s speeches shows
that his government and the negotiation for independence left a lot of
social differences, those who were in jail during the war did not have any-
thing, and the government did not help them because they were selling
land. Kenyatta knew that the loyalists were working with him, so he need-
ed to build union and forgiveness in the country (Savage, 1970, p. 519).
148 Africa in the 21st Century

The white settlers saw in Kenyatta some protection (Savage, 1970, p.

519). Their land remained in the hands of the same owners, the Mau Mau
fighters did not obtain anything, and the government recognized their
properties. Kenyatta saw the Mau Mau as a sickness that had to be forgot-
ten. When he said all of them fought for uhuru, for freedom, he said that
Mau Mau had no special participation in history, and he even said that it
was necessary to forget that kind of violence.
In 1967, four years after independence, Kenyatta tried to Africanize
Kenya but without affecting the white settlers. The only way was giving
the Kenyans the option to buy land, but the soldiers of the Mau Mau did
not want to buy the land that the white settlers had taken from them.
In the process of Africanization, the role of history and memory is fun-
damental. The government had the job of thinking who had to be a hero.
The image of someone who gave the country independence would become a
model of behavior and moral, but when a government thinks about making
a monument, it is necessary to ponder who will be considered a hero.
If Kenyatta tried to forget those who fought for uhuru—because to
him all the people fought for it—trying to build a nationalist identity be-
comes complicated. One question is who is qualified to decide who will
lie in the Corner of Heroes. Who decides what a hero is? Some loyalists
work for the government, and they think that people who were murdered
by the Mau Mau are those who deserve this monument. On the other
hand, the Mau Mau rebels hope that people like Dedan Kimathi will fi-
nally be recognized by the government not only with a statue, but by
being buried as a hero, because a ceremony like this will give much rec-
ognition to their fight.
Ngugi Wa Thiong’o has many novels that analyze and make critiques
of independent Kenya and the relation with the fighters for freedom. In
The Trial of Dedan Kimathi (Githae Mugo and Wa Thiong’o, 1976) the
reader can find the Kenyan identity beyond the ethnic identity. It seems
that the Mau Mau were not fighting for the Gikuyu but for the freedom of
Kenya. In the beginning, the author analyzes the problem of memory in
Kenya; in any official capacity, the questions are who the heroes were and
why nobody is writing about them. The analysis returns to the idea of the
 Ni Uhuru? Mau Mau and Nationalism in Kenya 149

model, like all nations of Kenya have to have a model, but when Kenyatta
negotiated the independence and many loyalists stayed in power, memo-
ry became a political question.
The British government said that this rebellion was purely tribal and
had no reason to be, but in the book of Wa Thiong’o, lieutenant Kimathi
was a person who always had an answer (Githae Mugo y Wa Thiong’o,
1976, p. 13). So, for Ngugi Wa Thiong’o, the war had an objective, and he
tried to show how this war contributed to the independence. In The Trial
of Dedan Kimathi, the reader can see a moment when an old lady who
used to transport weapons for the Mau Mau in the forest talks to two little
boys. The old lady tries to explain the Kenyan model: a person who has to
cooperate with others that have to work for a better life for all generations
(Githae Mugo y Wa Thiong’o, 1976, p. 46).
It may seem that the Mau Mau weren’t able to deal with civilization and
they didn’t search the benefit of Kenya. However, in history they fought
against the exploitation of the British government and part of their contri-
bution to nationalism was an identity against the British even though the
government negotiated independence with the British settlers to maintain
the status quo. For Ngugi Wa Thiong’o the fighters were forgotten, but
there is no reason to consider the Mau Mau rebels an essential part of the
Kenyan nation. It is necessary to insist as Berman does “that Mau Mau
was a modern, rational, and nationalist political movement, not a tribalist
reaction, and that the fighters of the Land and Freedom Army had fought
a glorious struggle for national liberation” (Berman, 1991, p. 46).
Another element in the novels of Wa Thiong’o were the people who
took the weapons to the forest or who sold the bullets (Wa Thiong’o,
1987). Those like in the poem of Berltot Brecht were a fundamental part
of history, but without their names they were forgotten. In the novels
where all kinds of people transport weapons to the forest, Wa Thiong’o
presents this action as a collaboration to Kenya and its freedom. It is clear
that Kenya needs to recognize this participation and also start to for-
get ethnic divisions. The Kenyans were colonized because imperialism
introduced ethnic identities as an element of division and made all Af-
ricans fight among themselves. To this author, nationalism was not only
150 Africa in the 21st Century

Kenyan; it seems that in order to fight against European imperialism all

Africans had to collaborate.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to say that Ngugi Wa Thiong’o wrote with
a political objective, which is why he was in jail during the government
of Arap Moi. The emblematic novelist always made critiques about the
politics of independent Kenya and Kenyatta’s goal that sought to forget
the Mau Mau.
History, in general, had forgotten the role of women, or maybe want-
ed to forget it, and Kenya is not the exception. In order to include all the
society in nationalism, it is necessary to remember women. African his-
tory has to review and rethink women in the process of decolonization
and in politics after independence (Santoru, 1996).
Colonialism brought the idea that women were needed at home and
for having kids. Independent states tried to maintain this policy which is
still present in Kenya and will only change when historians work out the
role of women in rebellions like the Mau Mau. In the last days of rebellion,
many men were killed or detained at camps, so their wives and daughters
started to take control of the rebellion. On the other side, we have to think
about their importance in the rebellion and in the Gikuyu society.
Women became more politically aware in colonialism because they
saw what happened to their sons and husbands, and that is the reason
why they joined the Mau Mau, which has made it hard to determine the
role of women in the Gikuyu society.
Before the rebellion, women were working for the settlers, so when
the State of Emergency started, they had a connection with the Europe-
ans; (Santoru, 1996) even though many women did not have an active
part in the rebellion, they gave the Mau Mau information about the Brit-
ish army and ammunition. It is clear that inside nationalism in Kenya the
participation of women was forgotten and those who are interested in
rescuing the history of the Mau Mau have to think about the actions of
those that were not considered in history, women included.
The Gikuyu society was not divided only by loyalists and Mau Mau.
The British army treated some civilians who celebrated the State of
 Ni Uhuru? Mau Mau and Nationalism in Kenya 151

Emergency as rebels, the only ones who weren’t tortured were those who
participated with the army or the traitors that ignored the oath.
When the war ended, one has to think where the fighters for uhuru
were. Those who lost the war were afraid of the condition they would
have after it because the loyalists of the British army were in better con-
ditions and will be in power after independence. The fighters did not
have money or land; instead, those who tortured and killed them were
in power.

Conclusion

It is clear that part of the contribution of nationalism of the Mau Mau is

anti-colonialism, but it is also true that another heritage of the rebellion
that can be found in Kenyan identity is the existence of more than one
nationalism in Kenya (Odhiambo, 2003).
Even though there is more than one nationalism, it was not con-
structed by those who ate the matunda ya uhuru.2 The nationalism that
could be found in Kenya, like all constructions of nationalism in the
world, is about identity and not about who has access to state privileges.
In the work of Ngugi Wa Thiong’o we find another idea of nation-
alism. This author shows that the Mau Mau had a clear idea of Kenya,
they fought for the nation even before it existed, and they fought for the
freedom of a nation, but when the black bourgeoisie took power, when
the nation was finally there, they started to be forgotten.
The government of Kenyatta forgot the fundamental part of the move-
ment. Constitutionalists, those who fought a legitimate fight in colonial
politics, were those who took power, and when the State of Emergency
started, they condemned the fight of the Mau Mau because they went
beyond the legitimate fight. The reader has to think about the past of
Kenyatta. He lived in Great Britain with privileges that the Kenyan soci-
ety did not have.

2 Fruits of freedom.
152 Africa in the 21st Century

Actually, nationalism in Kenya is divided between those who think

that the Mau Mau made a great contribution to nationalism or those who
think that they were only assassins that did not want the development of
the British. Even Ngugi Wa Thiong’o thinks that the loyalists that worked
in the government did not participate in the construction of a Kenyan
identity, they were after the money that buys everything.
So, who must be in the Corner of Heroes? Who is a model of Ken-
yan nationalism? People such as Tom Mboya who helped detainees
or those who have power and determination of forgetting the Mau Mau
and their role in history? After the murder of Mboya in 1969, some people
have recognized his role in the fight for freedom of speech. Tom Mboya is
recognized as a Pan-Africanist and not as a collaborator of the Mau Mau
(Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, 2006, p. 8).
For Atieno Odhiambo (2003), there is more than one nationalism,
and it is true, but it is essential to think which nationalism is ruling in
Kenya in order to analyze the new project of the Corner of the Heroes. It
is possible to find a lot of ideas of nationalism in one nation, but the peo-
ple in power have the privilege to build a nationalism where they seem
like heroes. The government always constructs the identity of a nation,
so the elite decides who had a share in history and who did not. We can
find in the opposition another vision of who can have or who deserves
the privileges of freedom.
Anti-colonialism is a vital part of nationalism as long as the Mau Mau
are considered in it because if they are not, the idea of anti-colonialism
does not exist; people like Kenyatta was trying to make peace with colo-
nialism rather than fight it.
One of the problems of nationalism in Kenya is the vision of history.
In this specific case, it is the way of how people remember the Mau Mau.
Some people see the Mau Mau as the government of Kenyatta saw them.
Some people think that the Mau Mau were the good ones and the loyal-
ists the bad ones:

The chronicle of atrocity and bestiality perpetrated by British soldiers

and their Kenyan lackeys lives on in the minds of our parents. Some
 Ni Uhuru? Mau Mau and Nationalism in Kenya 153

day soon their testimony must become part of our national heritage
(Anonymous, 1982, p. 11).

There are many ways to see this. We can find Gikuyu in the Mau
Mau, but we can find Gikuyu in the loyalists of the British Army. With
the Mau Mau, one can find people without a job, and these people were
not fighting for uhuru. They were fighting for something for them and
their family, and even for revenge against a settler; they fought for per-
sonal problems.
The Gikuyu in power forgot the fight of other ethnic groups, and
they think that those who can have the benefits of Uhuru are only
them, ethnic groups like the Masai that fought with them, and now
independent Kenya has no concerns. It is the work of historians to
review the Mau Mau war and try to recognize the role of those who
were not Gikuyu.
The construction of a national identity in a recently independent
country is hard. The problems in Kenya came with a war where the set-
tlers hardly participated. Those who fought were Kenyans, the ones who
believed in the Mau Mau, and the ones that did not believe in them. The
British provided soldiers but actually the ones who were killed were Ken-
yans at de hands of other fellow Kenyans.
This article intended to make a contribution to the discussion of
nationalism in a country that has had a problem of identity since its inde-
pendence. When someone walks in the street and sees the man that killed
his father in war, the problem of making those men work together and see
each other as equals is hard even though the Mau Mau are gaining a role
in history as a rebellion against the settlers, thanks to whom Kenya is free.

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Kimathi, London: Heinemann International, 85 pp.
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tura, 667 pp.
 Tuareg Representations and
Rebellions in Azawad: Geopolitical Dynamics
of Conflict in Northern Mali
Adriana Franco

Abstract

Tuareg and Azawad representations have led the Malian government

to justify the insecurity and systemic violence in which Tuareg have
lived. However, this has fostered Tuareg rebellions against the Malian
government in 1963, 1990, 2006-2007, and 2012. The last two insur-
rections have been re-operationalized by France and the us to expand
their presence in the area, which shows that the Sahara-Sahelian re-
gion is becoming a geostrategic space for both countries. Therefore,
this study aims to answer the following questions: How are France and
the us territorializing their interest in the area? And what is the link
of the re-operationalization of these conflicts within the production
of space and Tuareg representations? Critical geopolitical perspectives
will be used to respond to them and to show that Western production
of Azawad and Tuareg representations have allowed France and the us
to protect their interests in the Sahara-Sahelian region.

Keywords: Tuareg, Azawad crisis, conflict, horizontal inequalities and

identities, systemic violence, production of space.

Introduction

In January 2012, members of the National Movement for the Liberation

of Azawad (nmla) started attacks against the Malian government in Tes-
salit, Aguelhok, and Ménaka (Perret, 2014, p. 37) and on April 6, they

157
158 Africa in the 21st Century

declared the independence of Azawad, located in northern Mali (Raf-

fray, 2013, p. 80). One month earlier, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo led
a coup d’état in the south of the country against Amadou Toumani Touré
(att), the so-called soldier of democracy by Western nations (White-
house, 2012, p. 44). These events took international actors by surprise
because the Western narrative held that Mali was a “model of democra-
cy” since the 1992 elections (Penney, 2013). Nonetheless, the conflict in
Mali should not be considered as unexpected because of the systematic
violence that Malians were living.

Map 1. Tuareg areas

Own elaboration (Boilley, 1999)

 Tuareg Representations and Rebellions in Azawad: Geopolitical Dynamics 159
of Conflict in Northern Mali

Crisis in northern Mali in 2012 was not only a consequence of the state’s
inability to provide welfare to the population, but also an effect of the capital-
ist system of domination, which requires inequalities or uneven development
to reproduce itself (Smith, 2008, p. 134). Besides, this crisis demonstrates that
Azawad in particular and the Sahara-Sahelian zones in general are becoming
geostrategic spaces for France, the United States, China, and other foreign ac-
tors. However, in this study, I will focus on the territorialization of the French
and American interests as these countries have re-operationalized the last two
Tuareg rebellions in northern Mali to strengthen their presence in this area.
In this paper, I will describe how Tuareg social and territorial rep-
resentations have differed from Western characterizations and how the
latter ones have been used to legitimize the violence against the former. I
will identify some of the causes of the Tuareg rebellions and analyze some
tendencies and actions to determine why Azawad is becoming a geostra-
tegic space when there is no confirmation of the existence of “strategic
resources” in this territory. Critical geopolitical perspectives will be used
to achieve these objectives and to explain the dialectic relationship be-
tween the production of space and societies, which has been fundamental
in the operationalization and re-operationalization of Tuareg rebellions.
I will divide the article into four parts. In the first one, I will not only
analyze the Tuareg representations fostered mainly by the Malian, French
and American governments, but also their own social and territorial
images to identify the contradictions between both productions. In the
second one, I will describe the exclusion, inequalities, and the system-
ic and direct violence in which Tuareg have lived since independence.
Then, I will explain the linkage promoted by the West between Tuareg/
Azawad and terrorism. And finally, I will study the crisis in northern
Mali, emphasizing the interests of the us and France.

The dialectical construction of Azawad and Tuareg

Tuareg are semi-nomadic groups living in parts of the Sahara-Sahelian

area. They are one of the oldest groups inhabiting these regions (Hagan &
160 Africa in the 21st Century

Myers, 2006, p. 16; Rodd, 1926, p. 29; Salama, 1981, p. 521); nevertheless,
their culture, like all cultures, is not static and has changed over the years.
Before the French colonization, Tuareg could freely move in the desert,
an action that was fundamental to their survival because it allowed them
to search for food, water, and shelter. It was also a system of defense and
resistance facing foreign aggressions (Tamboura, 2016, p. 42). However,
with the Berlin Conference (1884-85), Europeans imposed fixed borders
in the entire African continent and Tuareg were divided by the territorial
space of five countries. Therefore, they are nowadays dwelling “the cen-
tral Sahara mountain ranges of the Ajjer in Libya, the Hoggar in Algeria,
the Adagh in Mali, the Aïr in Niger, and the interior bend of the Niger
river in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso” (Lecocq, 2004, p. 89).
In Mali, Tuareg are located in the northern part of the country, in a
region they call “Azawad”. During the colonial period, Tuareg were rep-
resented as rebel soldiers who opposed the imperial project, and after the
independence of Western African countries this image persisted. There-
fore, they were considered as an obstacle to the national project and the
modernization and development of the new States (Hagberg & Körling,
2012, p. 115). As a result, the government has excluded them from politi-
cal, economic, social and cultural power (Girons, 2008, pp. 20-23).
For this reason, Tuareg have faced the Malian regime in 1963, during
the 1990s, in 2006-2007, and in 2012. However, during the last two strug-
gles, the interests and roles of external actors, such as France and the
United States, have been fundamental in the development and re-opera-
tionalization of the conflicts. Since the 21st century, Tuareg have also been
represented as terrorist and extremist groups, which has legitimized the
continuation of the systemic and direct violence used against them.

Tuareg identities and the images created by the West

Identity has been one of the elements of cohesion for Tuareg assertions.
Thus, it is important to know how Tuareg represent themselves and how
they have been projected in order to understand their demands. Identities
 Tuareg Representations and Rebellions in Azawad: Geopolitical Dynamics 161
of Conflict in Northern Mali

are constructed through a process of recognition at three levels: with the

self, with the community, and with the otherness. Therefore, identities
are not unidirectional constructions; they are not only formed by the
own vision of the ‘me’ or the ‘us’, but also by the way in which alterity sees
the ‘other’ (Bhabha, 1994). Identities are indeed internalized by a com-
munity or an individual and are often linked with power and political
games. Identity is a “feasible project of historical construction and not
just the confirmation of what has been, [it is] tension towards the future
and something more than a frozen past” (Cerutti, 1998, p. 133).
Identities are built by different factors, one of which is the origin of
the group or person. Studies have determined that Tuareg have a North
African or a Middle Eastern origin (Hagan & Myers, 2006, p. 16; Rodd,
1926, p. 29; Salama, 1981, p. 521). Nonetheless, a more relevant element
for the construction of their identities is the language. In fact, according
to Lecocq, the origin is not the essential factor for the constitution of Tu-
areg identities. Actually, for Tuareg, the language is the most important
element of their temust or identity (2004, p. 89), which can be reflected in
the way they called themselves: “Kel Tamasheq”, which means “the ones
who speak Tamasheq” (Benjaminsen, 2008, p. 826).
Another important component to conceive and constitute identity is
the way the ‘other’ sees the ‘us’ or the ‘me’. As previously written, Tuareg are
one of the oldest groups inhabiting the Sahara Desert, and even though they
called themselves “Kel Tamasheq”, Arabs and subsequently Europeans have
called them ‘Tuareg’ (Rodd, 1926, p. 32). Despite the fact that the religion of
Tuareg is Islam, ‘Tuareg’ is an Arabic word which means ‘abandoned by God’
(Moraleda, 2013, p. 2). This connotation can be explained not only because
they adopted Sufism, but also because they mixed their own beliefs and prac-
tices with this religion, constituting a new system of beliefs, which is rejected
by the orthodox Islamic perspective. In spite of the external origin of the
word, I will use the word ‘Tuareg’ to refer to this sociocultural group, as they
have reappropriated and reframed the term.
When analyzing societies that we consider opposed to ‘ours’, it is
common to ignore, dismiss or idealize “the other”. When Europeans
interacted with different cosmogonies after the establishment of the
162 Africa in the 21st Century

capitalist system, they did not try to understand “the other”. Therefore,
Europeans considered their cosmogony as the superior and ideal one,
arguing that the one of the ‘others’ was in a state of barbarism (Toledo,
1996). Hence, they justify the colonization asserting that they were go-
ing to civilize those primitive people. However, although they claimed to
help and assist the ‘other’, what they did was to establish a social classifi-
cation that rejected any alternative lifestyle. Therefore, they represented
the ‘other’, and in this case the “African”, as an evil, cruel, and uncivilized
being. Nevertheless, the “representations of the Orient tend to have more
to do with ‘the West’ than with the ‘real Orient’” (Lunacek, 2010, p. 191).
Following this line, Tuareg were misrepresented and misunderstood for
the benefit of Europeans and their political projects. When people think
of Tuareg, the image that comes to their mind is one of a man with a blue
veil covering all his body except for his eyes, riding his camel or standing
on a dune (Ag Assarid, 2009, p. 174). Indeed, they have been called the
“blue people” because the indigo dyed clothing colors their skin. And even
though this can be the image of a specific Targui1 in a defined context, Tu-
areg are not just that, and they do not only dress in blue, they also use white
and black veils, and they cover their bodies depending on their age class as a
symbol of honor (Rasmussen, 1995). Nevertheless, this shows that they have
been idealized and that their identities have been standardized and immo-
bilized, fostering a misunderstanding of their lives and practices. Likewise,
they have been conceived as people opposed to modernization and develop-
ment because they do not fit in western reality.

How to understand the desert?

The representation of the otherness will be more problematic when their

ways of life are conceived as opposed by those who describe it. Living
in the desert and nomadism were two practices completely opposed to
Western conception; yet, both are fundamental for Tuareg identities.

1 Singular of Tuareg.
 Tuareg Representations and Rebellions in Azawad: Geopolitical Dynamics 163
of Conflict in Northern Mali

Geography and culture enrich each other with the interaction of human
beings, who modify them to survive and improve their quality of life.
Geography is a science of synthesis that considers geographic space as
a product and producer of human activity (Lefebvre, 2013, p. 56) so that it
cannot detach itself from the culture and identity of the populations that
reside in it. Culture is, “at any moment in the life of society (whether an
open or a closed one), the more or less conscious result of economic and
political activities, the more or less dynamic expression of the relationships
prevailing in that society. On one hand between man (considered individ-
ually or collectively) and nature, and on the contrary, between individuals,
groups of individuals, social strata or classes” (Cabral, 1974, p. 13).
To Europeans, the desert was a hostile place for life. To them, the des-
ert is a dead space; nevertheless, Tuareg have a close relationship with the
desert, it is even argued that they know the desert as sailors know the sea.
In fact, there is a Tuareg story, which tells of the times when they settled in
the Sahara. The narrative explains that other human groups had already
tried to dwell in the desert, but the claims of the Saharan environment
making it hard for human survival terrified them, and they left, but Tu-
areg stayed (Ag Assarid, 2009).
The representation of space is essential to understand the geopo-
litical dynamics within a territory (Lacoste, 1993). Therefore, social
space should be understood as a dialectic process, where every mode of
production requires a precise production of space (Lefebvre, 1991, pp.
26-31). Tuareg are strongly tied to the desert, and they do not consider
this environment as an obstacle to their lives because even though the
desert is a dry habitat, “there is always water around 80 meters deep” (ag
Assarid, 2009, p. 172).
Before colonization, the socioeconomic system of Tuareg was mobile
(Davidson, 1977, pp. 556-561). In this way, unlike Western conceptions,
space is not perceived as a static location. “The space is mobile – the
desert is a sea of inner sand that connects more than it separates the dif-
ferent human anchor points. The oases, towns of the desert, are built not
on water points, but at the intersection of Saharan trade routes” (Arfaoui,
2016, p. 4). Tuareg also have a different concept of “home” because it does
164 Africa in the 21st Century

not correspond to a definitive location but to a “regular cycle of places in

time” that coincide with the locations where the camp is set and where
the beloved ones are (Lecocq, 2010, p. 56).
However, Tuareg have appropriated and produced space, and despite
the idea that nomadism is rootless, Tuareg have claimed the desert as
“theirs” (Raineri & Strazzari, 2015, p. 252). The Sahara Desert is “their”
territory, where “moving means agency, actively negotiating within the
global space. Mobility has always been a crucial factor in acting suc-
cessfully in the Sahara” (Fischer and Fischer, 2010, p. 2). Consequently,
nomadism not only stems from a survival necessity to get resources, but
it is also a philosophy of life (Fischer, 2010, p. 15).
For Tuareg, private property, indispensable for capitalist repro-
duction, did not exist. However, there was a system, which was called
“rights of way” where every human unity was “associated with a territory,
included in another larger territory, over which it has priority rights al-
though not exclusive” (Claudot-Hawad, 1999, p. 5). This meant that the
group could use the available resources in that territorial space. The local
chief managed these resources for the benefit of all the community, but
neighboring groups could also use the wealth of the territory on demand
(Idem). The reason is that territory is conceived as communal land, and
no one had the right to keep another person out from what the territo-
ry has, especially because of the necessity of water in that environment.
However, “the foreigners” have the duty to ask permission, and to pass
giving a tribute for protection. These actions were seen as a matter of
respect and recognition between different communities and not as a hi-
erarchical system of domination (Raineri & Strazzari, 2015, pp. 252-253).
This conception coincides with the Tuareg cosmogonic representation
where the universe is perceived in motion. Elements, humans, animals,
plants, things, and even the smallest particles follow a cycle whose end
marks the beginning of a new cycle, until their fusion in the cosmic fluxes.
Anything that is capable of interrupting the nomadic path recreating the
movement of the universe threatens the perpetuity of this world. Nomad-
ism appears in this context as a “natural” necessity, therefore eternal and
universal, inscribed in cosmic laws. (Claudot-Hawad, 1999, p. 98).
 Tuareg Representations and Rebellions in Azawad: Geopolitical Dynamics 165
of Conflict in Northern Mali

Tuareg in Mali live in Azawad, whose main biomes are the desert and
the savannah. This region covers an area of 827,000 km2 and represents
two thirds of Malian territory. In 2010, it had approximately 1,300,000 in-
habitants, equivalent to only 8.6% of the total population of the country,
and a population density of three to five persons per square kilometer.
This territory is divided into three regions: Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. Its
soil is a rocky desert with volcanic mountains, the rains are not abundant,
and the transport infrastructure is scarce, although there is one airport in
Kidal and another in Gao (Barnet, 2015, pp. 15-18).
One of the main sociocultural groups of Azawad are Tuareg, who are
located throughout the eastern part of the region. There are also ethnic
Arabized groups in the West and Peul (Fula), Songhay, and Dogon in the
South. According to figures obtained by Raffray, in 2012 Tuareg repre-
sented 30% of the population of Azawad. In the southern region of the
State of Mali, there are groups such as the Bozo and the Dogon in the
area bordering Azawad; Senoufu and Bomu to the east; Soninkes and
ethnically Arabized peoples in the north; Toucouleur and Khassonké to
the west; and Malinkes and Bambaras to the south (Raffray, 2013, p. 12).
Although Azawad is located primarily in the desert and has been opposed
to the “useful south” (Perret, 2014, p. 93), there are salt mines in operation,
recognized deposits of gold, uranium, magnesium, lead and zinc (especially
in Kidal), and mines of phosphates in exploitation. In the Niger River, there
are areas of fishing and rice cultivation, while in the center and south of Aza-
wad animal husbandry and farming—mainly millet and sorghum—prevail
(Gonin, 2013, p. 14). There may be oil fields in the Taoudeni area, northwest
of Azawad; however, their exploitation would be challenging and costly by
cause of the area in which they are located (Barnet, 2015, p. 16).

The independence of Mali: systemic violence and horizontal

inequalities

The European project in Africa was institutionalized by the creation

of the State, where heterogeneity has been seen as a non-favorable
166 Africa in the 21st Century

condition for the development of the inhabitants of the territorial

space, which it controls (Raffestin, 1980, p. 22). The establishment
of state borders differentiates the people that are dwelling within and
the person who lives out of the territorial space. This action seeks to
give cohesion to the former, ranking the latter as a threat. Thus, “the
positive image of ‘us’ requires the negative image of the ‘other’” (Lu-
nacek, 2010, p. 191), and in this way, the subjectivity of the ‘other’ is
not recognized (Santos, 2012, p. 166).
Nevertheless, not all the people dwelling in the State are recognized
as part of the ‘us’, and even though Tuareg inhabit Mali, they were seen as
an obstacle and menace to the stability of the new country. Before analyz-
ing the inequalities and systemic and direct violence in which they have
lived since independence, it is necessary to answer the next question. If
Tuareg were considered closer to Europeans (because they were thin, tall
and had phenotypic traits more similar to European traits) unlike the Af-
ricans of the South (Rodd 1926, p.46), why did the French decide to grant
independence to the people of the South?

The “racial factor”

The hierarchy established by the Europeans in Africa was based, prin-

cipally, on skin color. This classification determined the productive
activities that each sociocultural group could perform because of a “ra-
cial factor”. In this way, if the color of your skin had “whiteness” then
your social status could also be high. However, Echeverría (2007) argues
that modernity, which is inherent to capitalism, requires the presence of
blanquitud, i.e. an ethical and “civilizing” condition based on Western
ideas and not on racial factors. People could obtain blanquitud through
Western education. Therefore, people with different phenotypic traits
were accepted if European ideas and practices were incorporated in their
minds (2007, pp. 2-4).
Thus, some forms of otherness are considered appropriate and are
tolerated because “they support and perpetuate the unequal relations
 Tuareg Representations and Rebellions in Azawad: Geopolitical Dynamics 167
of Conflict in Northern Mali

of power (...). But when other forms of otherness are articulated and
they break the boundaries of the already defined dominant-dominating
identities, they are perceived as subversive and are therefore rejected or
repressed” (Jabardo, 2012, p. 310). Tuareg resisted the French coloniza-
tion not only through armed conflict, but also by refusing to pay taxes
and send their sons to French schools (Girons, 2008, p. 74). Therefore,
even though Tuareg had more “whiteness” than their neighbors of the
South, the “black” Bambara and Malinke had blanquitud, which was
more important to keep the French interests after independence. In 1960,
“when independence came, Tuareg were scattered over different states. In
each state they felt marginalized, with less power and wealth than other
citizens” (Abdalla, 2009, p. 3).
The European colonization project caused contradictions in Africa
because of the interests of Europeans, who didn’t promote an intercul-
tural dialogue but exploited the resources and people who they “found”
in those places. This project engendered new economic, political, cul-
tural, and social problems owing to the destruction and modification of
systems and institutions that were already there. Consequently, coloni-
zation generated a new elite, which controlled a territory delimited by
rigid boundaries consistent with the idea of the State. Nevertheless, these
boundaries were artificially created, and even though, as Touval (1966)
argued, some Africans joined the colonial project and were willing to
adhere to the oppressive rule, they did not represent the majority of the
population.
The maintenance of the State, as established by Europeans, even af-
ter independence, encouraged the continuity of the transfiguration and
transformation of the identities in the new countries, pre-eminently due
to the hierarchical organization which denied the histories of the “unas-
similated”. The real problem was that “every ruling class tries to use the
state machinery to organise itself and disorganise the oppressed (...) In
fact, the colonial power turned nationality into an organising principle
for both the state structure and economic life, thereby institutionalising
it” (Mamdani, 1984, p. 1048).
168 Africa in the 21st Century

Horizontal Inequalities and Violence: The first two rebellions

After independence, Modibo Keita became the first president of the

Republic of Mali. Keita promoted an anti-colonialist discourse to give
meaning to Malian nationalism (Ake, 1981, pp. 176-177). Tuareg were
excluded from this plan as Keita’s regime associated them with the colo-
nial forces because of their “whiteness” (Lecocq, 2010, pp. 78-85). Keita
reduced the representation and power of the amenokal, Tuareg leaders,
and forbade nomad associations (Boilley, 1999, p. 304). Some Tuareg were
integrated into the Malian government; however, “if they want to have a
position in the political or economic environment they must speak in
French, Bambara, Hausa or Arabic” (Kohl and Fischer, 2010, p. 5). Keita
also forced Tuareg sedentism (settling of a nomadic population), set high
taxes on them and fostered Mande culture to the detriment of Tuareg and
other sociocultural groups’ culture (Hagberg & Körling, 2012, p. 115).
For Tuareg, Keita’s policies were perceived as illegitimate not only be-
cause they were excluded from political power, but also because Keita’s
group did not defeat them in battle, and because independence did not
bring them what they hoped: liberation from a foreign rule. (Lecocq,
2010, p. 121). Therefore, Tuareg rebelled against the Malian government
in 1963. The reasons for this uprising were not that the people of the
South and Tuareg were different or incompatible, but that there were
Horizontal Inequalities (HIs) among them.
Theories of HIs consider four dimensions of inequalities: econom-
ic (access and ownership of assets, employment opportunities, and
income), social (access to services like health and education), politi-
cal (participation in government institutions, including the army), and
cultural (recognition and respect for cultural practices, language and re-
ligion) (Stewart, 2008, p. 13). Thus, they analyze the multidimensionality
of inequalities emphasizing that sharp disparities between determined
sociocultural groups or identities will increase the likelihood of violent
conflict (Østby, 2008, pp. 144-148).
Tuareg rebellions can also be interpreted as a fight for their emanci-
pation to guarantee their security. Hence, they have fought against the
 Tuareg Representations and Rebellions in Azawad: Geopolitical Dynamics 169
of Conflict in Northern Mali

systemic violence that is “not only direct physical violence, but also the
more subtle forms of coercion that sustain relations of domination and
exploitation, including the threat of violence” (Žižek, 2008, p. 9). Tuareg
resistances had not been explained. Thus, their violent actions have been
condemned, and the rebellions have been linked to the non-institution-
alized “savage” violence (Echeverría, 1998, p. 5), omitting the exclusion,
insecurity and systemic violence in which they have lived. “The mod-
ern political sensibility is not horrified by all violence (…) what horrifies
modern political sensibility is not violence per se, but violence that does
not make sense. (….) Violence that cannot be illuminated by the story of
progress that appears senseless to us” (Mamdani, 2002, p. 132).
Alfellaga or the Tuareg rebellion of 1963 was brutally repressed. The
Malian army killed civilians, slaughtered the cattle and poisoned the wells
(Baryin, 2013, p. 28). People were reestablished in zones of poor productivity,
they were forced to work, and Azawad was put under military administration
(Raffray, 2013, p. 91). Tuareg conditions got worse because of the drought of
the seventies and eighties, and because of the regime’s corruption (Baryin,
2013, p. 28; Raffray, 2013, p. 47; Barnet, 2015, p. 58; Lecocq, 2010, p. 200).
However, during these years a new identity was configured: the ashumar.
Ashumar is a word used to describe young people who have left their fami-
lies to search for work, and it represents a social group, which is strange to its
country and to the States where they migrate (Bourgeot, 1990, pp. 140-144).
One hypothesis suggests that ishumar (singular of ashumar) comes
from the French word chômage, which means “unemployment” (Randall,
2005, p. 297), and some Tuareg highlight that ishumar means “the one
who supports” and that, therefore, this term is associated with physical
and psychological suffering. This word is also related to the Tamasheq
word ashammar, which is connected with “patience” (Girons, 2008, p.
32). The relevance of these meanings is that all refer to the social exclu-
sion, systematic violence, and HIs these young Tuareg suffer, highlighting
the marginalization of “Ashamur [who] ‘did not know where to go and
had no place in the world’” (Kohl, 2010, p. 152).
This situation was aggravated by the implementation of the Structural
Adjustment Programmes (saps), as the neoliberal policy “makes as if social
170 Africa in the 21st Century

injustice was not its ally but its enemy” (Echeverría, 1998, pp. 5-6). At the
beginning of the nineties, ashumar started a new rebellion (tanekra) against
this situation (Lecocq, 2010; Boilley, 1999). The response of the Malian re-
gime was, once again, indiscriminate violence against all the people in the
north of the country (Boilley, 1999, p. 467). The violence and conflict in the
north continued until 1996 and ended with the symbolic ceremony of “the
Flame of Peace” (Lecocq, 2010, p. 249).
This rebellion and a coup d’état in the South led by Amadou Toumani
Touré (att) in March 1991 fostered the international society to pressure
the leaders of the coup to conduct elections. After ballots were held, Al-
pha Oumar Konaré (aok) won the presidency (see Perret, 2014). From
that moment on, att was considered the “soldier of democracy” because
he “permitted” elections to happen (Lecocq, 2010, p. 260), and Mali was
described as the representative example of democracy for all Africa (Vil-
lalón & Idrissa, 2005, p. 49). Notwithstanding, democracy was reduced
to multiparty elections (Carothers, 2002, p. 7), because that was the price
that the political leaders in Africa had to pay to get international mone-
tary funding (Chabal, 2002, p. 449).
aok promoted a decentralization policy that in theory could re-
spond to Tuareg demands guaranteeing their autonomy. However, this
policy co-opted some local leaders and destroyed the organization of
the people of the north even more (Maïga, 2012, p. 81). After a reelec-
tion of aok in 1997, in 2002 presidential ballots were held and att was
elected (Whitehouse, 2012, p. 39). His government did not end with
the inequalities, violence or insecurity in Mali, on the contrary, he rein-
forced them. Indeed, with him, the representations of Tuareg started to
be linked with terrorism.

Azawad as a political project during the 21st century

“The Sahara and the Sahel are more and more being transformed into a
gateway for international politics and economic maneuvers” (Kohl and
Fischer, 2010, p. 1). Since the 21st century, these territories started to
 Tuareg Representations and Rebellions in Azawad: Geopolitical Dynamics 171
of Conflict in Northern Mali

become fundamental for an old but renovated “spatial fix” that attempts
to solve the crisis of capitalism to continue the reproduction of the sys-
tem. Harvey asked how the central dilemmas and contradictions of
capitalism could be resolved during the crisis of overaccumulation. The
answer was the “spatial fix”, which frees the overaccumulation of labor
power and capital through geographical shifts to control class struggles
and avoid devaluation and a profound crisis in a particular territory
(2001, pp. 312-344).
The Sahara and the Sahel are far away from the global centers (Kohl
and Fischer, 2010, p. 1). However, nowadays they are becoming core in
the context of the actual crisis of “scarcity”. The fact that it is currently
said that the exhaustion of particular resources is becoming critical in-
dicates that “more and more of our essential supplies will have to come
from places that are risky for reasons of geography, geology, politics, or
some combination of all three” (Klare, 2012, p. 29). Technology allows
representing scarcity in abundance (Lander, 2000, p. 28), and nowadays
one of the most hostile environments considered by Western States is
represented as a geostrategic space for the interests of countries such as
France and the United States.
“The territory is the political space par excellence” (Raffestin, 1980, p.
52), the center of wealth and power (the dominant space) which always
tries to mold the dominated areas. Sometimes the hegemonic subject
uses direct violence to reach this objective and reduce the resistance or
obstacles it faces when producing the space (Lefebvre, 2013, p. 108). Nev-
ertheless, although the dominant political space tries to assert itself as a
reality, it is just an abstraction (ibid, 149) that does not correspond to the
reality of the people dwelling in it.

Mali and the Global War on Terrorism

Since the September 11 attacks, the us imposed its war on terrorism all
around the world. After this aggression, the George W. Bush administration
considered the Sahara as a space of terrorism, even though at that moment
172 Africa in the 21st Century

there was no presence of terrorist groups in the region (Williams, 2012).

However, this allowed the us to deploy a greater presence in the territory.
In the document published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2000, be-
fore the war on terror was declared, the Full Spectrum Dominance was
described as a fundamental American strategy. This policy sought to
dominate all the spaces of the world and dimensions of life to deter any
real or potential threat to the tactic laws of power, i.e. dominate all the
spectrum, every space in the world (Ceceña, 2008, p. 86). In the docu-
ment “Joint Vision 2020” information was ranked as a necessary tool to
control the entire spectrum, and the use of drones was essential to obtain
and manage information (jcs, 2000, pp. 6-7) that could be useful for the
reproduction of the space and the disciplining of populations. That is the
reason why the presence of American drones in the area can be so harm-
ful to the population of the region, because as Foucault (2013) argued,
there is a dialectic relationship between knowledge and power.
Despite this speech and the military supremacy of the us, the coun-
try is incapable of controlling and dominating every single space in the
world. Therefore, the regime needs allies that “provide the formal and
informal bases that are the crucial stepping-stones for us power to tran-
sit the globe. The military power of these allies contributes modestly to
maintenance and exploitation of command of the commons” (Possen,
2003, p. 44), i.e., spaces of air and sea which do not belong to any country,
but which allows having a dominion of the world (ibid., 8).
In West Africa, this strategy was implemented through the Pan Sahel
Initiative, which in 2005 changed its name to The Trans-Sahara Coun-
terterrorism Partnership (tsctp), and also with the United States Africa
Command (africom) in 2007. Notwithstanding, these projects should
be justified because at the beginning of the 21st century there was no pres-
ence of terrorist groups in the area, as written above (Williams, 2012).
In 2003, The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat kidnapped 32
Europeans in an Algerian small town near the Libyan border (Beaugé &
Tuquoi, 2003). The kidnappings did not happen in one single moment
but from February 21 to April 11, 2003 (Keenan, 2009, p. 15). However,
this action strengthened the links between the us military forces and the
 Tuareg Representations and Rebellions in Azawad: Geopolitical Dynamics 173
of Conflict in Northern Mali

Algerian army with Bill Clinton and Bouteflika as heads of State (Barth,
2003, p. 681). Keenan argues that “there is evidence that the operation [the
kidnapping] was orchestrated by the Algerian intelligence services, the De-
partement du Renseignement et de la Securité (drs), with the complicity
of us military intelligence services, and that both El Para and Abdelhamid
abou Zai’d [leaders of the gspc] were drs agents” (Keenan, 2009, p. 14).
One fact that sustains this idea is that in 2003 the construction of an
alleged base for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (nasa)
was completed near the Algerian airport of Tamanrraset. Nevertheless, the
inhabitants of this area considered that this was a military base for the Central
Intelligence Agency (cia) (Barth, 2003, p. 679). Besides, “although formally
denied, the us has established military bases in northern Mali and is behind
the construction of Algeria’s huge new military base at Tamanrasset. The us
is also reported to have a gis satellite located above the triangle formed by
Mali’s three northern towns of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal” (Keenan, 2006,
pp. 763-764). Likewise, El Para was never imprisoned even though he was
in custody of the Algerian authorities (Algerian-Watch, 2008).
The representation of the Azawad in particular and the Sahara in
general as terrorist areas shows that “it is the strictly spatial dimension
of geography that grows in importance with the inexorable progress of
capitalist development” (Smith, 2008, p. 142). The production of Azawad
as a terrorist space also created a new image of the people dwelling there
because of the dialectic process between the space and its inhabitants,
which reshape the image of the Tuareg.
Though, why to associate the Sahara and Tuareg with terrorism?
Trumbull mentions that the interest in the desert focuses on three as-
pects: the fight against terrorism, the routes of organized groups, and
the resources that can be found there. However, in some cases, the first
two aspects have been modified or reproduced to boost the third one,
and now “the Sahara and the Sahel turn into an economic and political
playground [where] global players are looking for new resources to ab-
sorb the increasing consumption in the West” (Kohl and Fischer, 2010, p.
3), a spatial fix that does not emphasize on overaccumulation but on the
supposed scarcity of resources.
174 Africa in the 21st Century

During the so-called democratic government of att, Mali was a ref-

uge for members of gspc, which in 2007 changed its name to Al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (aqim). This was not a situation unknown to the
us, in fact “terrorism, religious extremism, and the proliferation of small
arms and light weapons were identified in 2004 by a usaid team as major
challenges facing Mali” (William, 2012, p. 42). Besides, some Malian and
Nigerian authorities blame att for having an agreement with aqim to
facilitate the liberation of foreign hostages (Bergamaschi, 2014, p. 355).
The terrorist image of the desert and Tuareg benefited both the local
African governments and the external forces because the former obtained
funding and the latter justified their military, economic and political pres-
ence in the area. During that century, Tuareg continued to be a threat to the
hegemony, which “to subsist and consolidate, required and requires to ratio-
nalize all aspects of social life, adapting them to its dictates according to the
very requirements of production, reproduction and accumulation of capital”
(Herrera, 2017, p. 29). Therefore, now that the resources of the desert are
becoming more necessary for the reproduction of capital, they need to repro-
duce the space to benefit the system from the outcomes of this action.

Tuareg and Gaddafi

The negative representation of Tuareg soon became to be associated with

one of the most important enemies of the United States in Northern
Africa: Muammar Gaddafi. After tanekra, Tuareg continued to live in a
deplorable situation where violence and inequalities were the permanent
conditions. “Oil- and gas-rich Libya, which direly needed a workforce to
advance its economy, offered them a potentially available opportunity to
earn a decent living, thus turning Libya into an attractive destination”.
(Ronen, 2013, p. 546). For the ashumar, Libya was a synonym of Europe,
and even though they were not well received by the Libyans in general,
they knew Gaddafi was their friend (Kohl, 2010, pp. 143-145).
Gaddafi identifies himself with Tuareg because of their nomadic or-
igin. Therefore, he respected their way of life, and he characterized them
 Tuareg Representations and Rebellions in Azawad: Geopolitical Dynamics 175
of Conflict in Northern Mali

as ‘the lords of the desert’ (Ronen, 2013, p. 546). “Gaddafi, proclaimed

that Tuareg were Libyan Arab tribes facing genocide in other countries.
He asked Tuareg to return to Libya” (Abdalla, 2009, p. 8) and he called
himself the ‘protector of Tuareg’ (Keenan, 2006, p. 762). Gaddafi’s Tu-
areg-friendly policy and the country’s relatively good social conditions
encouraged immigrants mainly from Niger and Mali to travel to Libya
(Kohl, 2010, p. 150).
“In February 1998, he thus established the Community of the Sahel
and Saharan States (comessa), which at that stage included Libya, Chad,
Sudan, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Tripoli, which assumed the finan-
cial burden involved, served as home to the organization’s headquarters
and Qaddafi himself was head of the organization” (Ronen, 2013, p. 548).
In 2005, he gave identity cards to allow Tuareg to enter Libya and move
freely there (Kohl, 2010, p. 147). Gaddafi also made them a core part of
his security forces, and Tuareg were the most loyalist guardians of the
regime (Ronen, 2013, p. 545). In 2006, he established a Libyan embassy
in Kidal (Ronen, 2013, p. 552).
That same year, a Tuareg rebellion broke out against the government
of att. Notwithstanding, authors such as Keenan doubt about its origin
and the relationship between that movement and Tuareg demands. Actu-
ally, he considers that the rebellion was fostered by the Algerian regime to
counter the regional power that Gaddafi was gaining. The strategy aimed
to blame Gaddafi of the rebellion in order to obtain funding from the us,
and in this way, Bouteflika could position himself as the regional leader.
Some arguments to support this hypothesis are that the rebellion was
started by Kel Ahaggar, who have worked closely with the Algerian secret
services, and that att did not repress the movement (Keenan, 2006, pp.
764-765).
In 2007, two Tuareg rebellions developed separately in Niger and
Mali. Keenan points out that these riots were caused by the damages
against Tuareg population produced by the expansion of the uranium
mines of Arlit and Akokan in Niger, which are controlled by a French
consortium named Areva (Keenan, 2013, pp. 79-93). Because of these
rebellions, on September 23 that year, some Tuareg from Mali and Niger
176 Africa in the 21st Century

declared the independence of a territory known as Tumoujaghan, which

corresponds to the spaces of northern Mali and northwestern Niger (Gi-
rons, 2008, p. 67). This project did not flourish; however, it is a precedent
for the Tuareg independence movement.
In Libya, the situation of Tuareg worsened in 2011 with the murder
of Gaddafi and the re-operationalization of the conflict in Libya by the
military forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato). nato’s
military intervention was a strategy to obstruct the self-help and de-
velopment projects that Gaddafi was fostering for his country and the
continent (Campbell, 2013). Besides, Tuareg were also directly affected
because they were associated with Gaddafi’s regime and therefore they
were targets of vengeance and violence by the opposite forces.
The Sahelian Tuareg ex-soldiers soon faced a socio-economic crisis,
in addition to militant harassment by the vengeful ex-rebel armed mi-
litias. Facing a broken economy, fearing for their well-being, and aware
that their shared Muslim identity with the Libyan population had proved
insignificant in offering them protection and a further basis of collabora-
tion, increasing throngs of Sahelian Tuareg crossed back into their native
countries (Ronen, 2013, p. 545).

Crisis in northern Mali

What happened in Mali in 2012 should not be considered a direct con-

sequence of the events in Libya, because in doing so we are once again
omitting all the violence and inequalities in which Tuareg were living.
According to the United Nations Development Programme (undp) data,
82.9% of Malians had vulnerable employment, and according to the
World Bank (wb), 8.1% of Mali’s population was unemployed since 2010,
and 43.6% of the population lived in poverty. Unemployment has been
most marked in the region of Azawad (Krings, 1995, p. 60); for example,
in Gao and Kidal it was three times higher than the national rate (Barnet,
2015, pp. 59-66). According to the World Food Programme, this region
was also under high risk of food insecurity, and by 2013, just over 75% of
 Tuareg Representations and Rebellions in Azawad: Geopolitical Dynamics 177
of Conflict in Northern Mali

the households in Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal, and Mopti were food insecure.
Timbuktu had the lowest primary enrollment rate in 2011, and only
59% of Malians lived within 15 km of a health center, and 46% had access
to potable water (Perret, 2014, p. 2013). In the region of Azawad, there
are only two hospitals, one in Timbuktu and another in Gao, while in
Kidal there are only four health centers (Barnet, 2015, pp. 59-66). Conse-
quently, in January, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
(nmla) attacked the Malian regime, and in April they declared the inde-
pendence of the northern region of Mali (Raffray, 2013, p. 80).
The international press did not describe the violence and inequalities,
and in general, Tuareg were portrayed as terrorists, justifying their sup-
pression by the Malian government (Abdalla, 2009, p. 8). “The classic old
colonial scenario of barbaric terror and demonization of Tuareg rebels in
Mali lay on the front pages of media outlets while the creation of the Re-
public of Azawad was declared on April 6, 2012, by the nmla (National
Movement for Liberation of Azawad)” (Claudot-Hawad, 2012, p. 3).
During the conflict, Iyag ag Ghali, a controversial Tuareg leader be-
cause of his links with the Algerian secret services, wanted a management
position in the nmla. However, the members of the movement denied
this demand. Thus, he decided to create his group: Ansar Dine (Pellerin,
2013, p. 842). In spite of the division, both organizations fought together
at the beginning, but the alliance was broken when the nmla declared
the independence in April, because Iyad ag Ghali wanted autonomy and
not independence and because he also wanted to impose sharia in the
area, while the nmla was a secular movement (Desert, 2013, p. 94-95).
Although the declaration of independence of a semi-nomadic group
can be contradictory, it is important to say that the creation of a State is a
geopolitical representation. Therefore, it can be confronted and construct-
ed in different ways according to the place and time in which it is designed
(Lacoste, 1985, p. 56). Tuareg cosmogonies and projects have changed over
time and the formation of a State could give them the tools to guarantee
their security and development in the context of international dynamics.
Therefore, images “are recomposed to form a spatial set whose denom-
ination is both the symbol and slogan of a geopolitical project which in
178 Africa in the 21st Century

principle can be cartographic” (Foucher, 2011, p. 191). Each society produces

its space (Lefebvre, 2013, p. 451), and the independence of Azawad was part
of the political project that Tuareg wanted to implement in order to change
their lives. Besides, obtaining recognition could also provide them with more
confidence that the Malian government would not violently repress them.

The re-operationalization of the conflict

During the crisis in northern Mali in 2012, the us tried to have a stronger
presence in West Africa. However, this scenario was not the best for the
interests of France even though they were allies, so the re-operationaliza-
tion of the conflict has been a complicated process not only because of
the low-intensity disputes of these two countries, but also because of the
presence of the Chinese interests in the area, which reflects a more direct
threat to the sake of the former actors.
Baryin (2003) argues that att, an associate of the French government,
had expressed concerns about the relationships between the Algerian and
American governments. Actually, in the middle of 2012, France led a confer-
ence to fight terrorism and the Algerian regime boycotted it (Keenan, 2013,
pp. 217-218). The American military bases that are deployed in West Africa
are small though numerous, and some of them are becoming permanent.
Likewise, the deployment of drones to study the continent has also increased
(Turse, 2015, pp. 12-38), and although this action seems militarily irrele-
vant, it is consistent with the policy of full spectrum and fundamental for the
knowledge and possible control of the territory.
The us military presence is not so visible because of the use of Private
Military Enterprises (pmcs), Special Operations Forces (sofs), secret fa-
cilities and the Creeksand Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Program, which was established in 2007, and which is linked to the de-
ployment of drones. Although in East Africa there are more American
military infrastructure and operational capabilities, the area that has seen
the largest military increase of us forces during the 21st century is the
Sahel (Moore & Walker, 2016, pp. 686-970).
 Tuareg Representations and Rebellions in Azawad: Geopolitical Dynamics 179
of Conflict in Northern Mali

Before the declaration of independence of Azawad, in the south,

Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo carried out a coup d’état against att in
March 2012, arguing that his group wanted to reestablish democracy and
peace in the north (Whitehouse, 2012, p. 44). Whereas att had links
with France, Sanogo was an ally of the us. Indeed, he had participated in
several us military training programs (Moore & Walker, 2016, p. 705).
The French government did not want to lose its position in Mali and
a president subjected to the Americans was not the ideal scenario to pro-
tect its interests in the area. Thus, France and the Economic Community
of West African States (ecowas) condemned the coup. In April 2012,
Sanogo, the National Council for the Recovery of Democracy and the
Restoration of the State (cnrdre) and ecowas started negotiations and
signed an agreement to return to a civil government. Hence, they named
Diouncounda Traoré as provisional president and Cheikh Modibo Diarra
as prime minister while elections were organized. Notwithstanding, nei-
ther had the support of the coup factions (Hagberg & Körling, 2012, p.
119), However, this was a better scheme for the French interests.
Meanwhile, in northern Mali, the nmla was gaining force until June,
when aqim, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (mu-
jao), and Ansar Dine took control of Azawad. In this way, Ansar Dine
commanded the area of Kidal, mujao Gao, and aqim Timbuktu (Peller-
in, 2013, p. 842). The presence of these groups permitted, once again,
the re-operationalization of the conflict in favor of France, because even
though the existence of terrorist groups was identified as one of the great-
est risks for the security in Mali since 2004 (Williams, 2012, p. 42), the
international society did not try to intervene until the declaration of in-
dependence of Azawad.
France intervened in the conflict justifying itself with the theory of
intervention by invitation and because of the authorization of the United
Nations Security Council (Bannelier, 2013, p. 856). This country deployed
Operation Serval in January 2013 (Raffray, 2013, p. 1). Paris incorporated
military forces from Chad and other African countries so that the French
were not identified as the intervening forces (Baryin, 2013, p. 79). The
alleged objectives of the Operation were to stop the Jihadist advance in
180 Africa in the 21st Century

the region, foster stability in Mali, protect French and Europeans in Mali,
and restore the territorial integrity of the country (Boeke & Schuuman,
2015, pp. 811-812).
The French Ministry of Defense indicated that the operation would
be transferred to Malian forces and the United Nations through the Unit-
ed Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
(minusma), but in August 2014 the French launched another Operation
known as Barkhane, whose primary objective was, according to the Min-
istry of Defense, to fight terrorism in West Africa. Therefore, the French
forces did not leave Malian territory (Bøås & Torheim, 2013, p. 418).

The relevance of the Sahara

The nmla project was against the plans of the national, regional and in-
ternational elite. France, Algeria, and Libya have sought to control Tuareg
rebellions to benefit themselves, dividing this sociocultural group and re-op-
erationalizing their demands (Claudot-Hawad, 2012, p. 4). For the Malian
regime and other African governments, the independence of the Azawad
was against their national projects, which are territorialized within the bor-
ders of the State. One of the main objectives of the African Union (au) is to
safeguard the national borders of the African member countries. Therefore,
the independence of Azawad was seen as a threat to the entire continent,
especially for those countries with Tuareg settlements, since they could also
appeal for the independence of the territory where they are dwelling.
The worsening of the crisis could mean that neither the French nor
the Americans could control the situation for their benefit, and that was,
from my point of view, the reason why the us let the French government
manage the military intervention. With the re-operationalization of the
conflict, the us and France wanted to take control of the territory, but to
do so they first needed to produce the space of the Azawad as a terrorist
area. “Accumulation of capital is perpetually deconstructing that social
power by re-shaping its geographical bases. Put the other way around,
any struggle to reconstitute power relations is a struggle to reorganize
 Tuareg Representations and Rebellions in Azawad: Geopolitical Dynamics 181
of Conflict in Northern Mali

their spatial bases” (Harvey, 1989, p. 238). Besides, if they control the ter-
ritory, they would also govern what is within this space (Herrera, 2017, p.
72), and in this way conduct the lives of Tuareg to reproduce the capitalist
system in the Sahara and, therefore, incorporate or eliminate them.

Map 2. us and French presence in West Africa

Own elaboration (Moore & Walker, 2016)

In addition, “the era for readily accessible oil and gas has come to an
end: from now on, vital energy supplies will have to be drawn from remote
and forbidding locations, at a cost far exceeding anything experienced in
the past” (Klare, 2012, p. 22). In this context, the Sahara is becoming
more and more important for the resources it possesses despite the arid
environment. According to ExxonMobile, its presence in West Africa
dates back to 1907 although during the 21st century they have strength-
ened it, especially in Chad. France also has oil projects in Mauritania,
182 Africa in the 21st Century

Algeria, Ivory Coast, and the Central African Republic through French
oil company Total (Lévêque, 2013). In 2003, China started to have influ-
ence in Tuareg areas when the Nigerian government signed an agreement
to let them explore, exploit, and market oil in the north of the country
(Grégoire, 2011).
Another reason why France did not want an independent Azawad
was associated with the uranium mines, which are controlled by Areva
in Arlit and Akoka, Niger, where there are Tuareg dwellers. These mines
provide 20% of the uranium required by France for its nuclear reactors,
which supply more than 70% of its national electricity (Boeke & Schuu-
man, 2015, pp. 811-812). The exploitation of Nigerian uranium by France
started in the 1970s. Nevertheless, in 2006 Niger let a Chinese compa-
ny led by a unit of China National Nuclear Corporation explore sites in
the Agadez-Temasna region to search for uranium (Boeke & Schuuman,
2015, p. 215). “Niger has long been a primary source of uranium and is
currently the world’s third-ranking exporter after Australia and Canada”
(Boeke & Schuuman, 2015, p. 214). Besides, the independence of Azawad
could also mean a vindication in the Tuareg areas of Niger, where France
exploits the uranium it needs.
The re-operationalization of the Azawad crisis is, in words of Klare,
the beginning of the “invasion of the world’s final frontiers”, and water is
going to play a fundamental role in the appropriation and control of this
resource. Groundwater resources are a crucial source of water supply for
many regions in Africa (Xuand & Braune, 2009, p. 21). One of Gadda-
fi’s projects, “The Great Man-made River”, was to take advantage of the
water resources of the Nubia aquifer, which is estimated to be the largest
source of fresh groundwater reserve in the world. However, after his mur-
der, the British Geological Survey (bgs) made this fact known, stirring up
the interests of water companies (Campbell, 2013, p. 91).
Africa concentrates 23% of all the fresh groundwater resources in the
world. Groundwater is the primary drinking water resource on the con-
tinent (MacDonald et al. 2012, pp. 1-7), and is clean water that requires
little treatment and is not depleted by droughts (MacDonald & Calow,
2009, p. 457). One of the problems with this type of water is that it does
 Tuareg Representations and Rebellions in Azawad: Geopolitical Dynamics 183
of Conflict in Northern Mali

not regenerate so easily. However, 30.1% of the water that can be used for
human consumption is underground, and only 1.2% corresponds to sur-
face water. The water of lakes and rivers represents 0.31% of all freshwater
in the world. Therefore, groundwater is 97.72 times the water obtained
from these sources. The remaining percentage is located in glaciers and
permafrost (68.7%) (usgc Water Science School). After the nato inter-
vention in Libya, “Western transnational corporations such as Bechtel
from the United States, Germany’s rwe, and France’s Veolia, Suez, and Ly-
onnaise des Eaux have been at the forefront of the call for privatization of
water resources. French companies such as Suez, Ondeo, and Saur control
more than 45 percent of the world’s water market. For these companies,
Libya and the region of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer should be within
the French sphere of influence” (Campbell, 2013, pp. 91-92).
These companies also benefited from the Malian crisis. Indeed, Suez
started the construction of a drinking water plant in Kalabancoro and
strengthened its presence in Mali since 2013 (Suez, 2016). In the long
term, this may be detrimental to the life of the population in the area
as “market hegemony hinders the human right to water due to market
inefficiencies which interfere with universal water provision” (Branco &
Henriques, 2009, p. 21). No organism can live or survive without water.
Nevertheless, the market does not care about social conditions, justice or
equality, it only seeks profit (Branco & Henriques, 2009, p. 29). Besides,
controlling their water resources can lead to biopolitical policies to regu-
late social reproduction. Notwithstanding, power also fosters resistances,
and Tuareg and the people of the desert continue to fight in order to es-
tablish their own sociopolitical and spatial project.

Conclusions

The crisis in northern Mali in 2012 is not just a consequence of the cor-
ruption and bad government of the Malian regime, but also a result of
the structural system of domination, which requires inequalities to re-
produce itself. This system was spread in Africa through the European
184 Africa in the 21st Century

colonization that made use of brutal violence to modify the social, politi-
cal, economic and cultural processes and dynamics of the people dwelling
in these spaces. Europeans classified the society and hierarchized it to
their benefit, and in this system skin color was one of the most important
elements to establish such hierarchy. However, blanquitud or the adop-
tion of European education, ideas, and values was more relevant than
“whiteness” to reproduce the relations of power after the independence
of Mali.
Accordingly, even though Tuareg phenotypic traits were more similar
to the ones of Europeans, they had no blanquitud, and their cosmogo-
nies have been fully opposed to the French ones, especially because they
were semi-nomadic groups with a sociopolitical organization that dif-
fered from the State, and also because they lived in an inhospitable area
according to Western standards. Besides, Tuareg produced and knew
their space, and that was another barrier to French colonial expansion.
With the independence of Mali in 1960, Tuareg stereotypes with which
Europeans had stigmatized them were preserved. Actually, they were
strengthened by the government of Bamako to legitimize the direct and
systemic violence committed against them.
Tuareg have faced multidimensional inequalities, i.e. political (they
have been excluded from government institutions or they have been as-
similated and divided), economic (they are unemployed, and they do
not have good job opportunities), social (access to health and education
services is low), and cultural grievances (the regime has forbidden their
language and has associated their ways of life with irrational violence).
Hence, they have rebelled in different moments to search for better life
opportunities. In these struggles, identity has become a unifying factor in
their fight, mainly because they have been represented as a threat to the
country’s stability and security. However, one of their greatest obstacles
now is their internal division.
Azawad has been the territory of the people with no place within the
social, political, economic, and cultural relations of Mali. The stigmati-
zation of these people and their space has justified the environment of
insecurity and violence in which this group has lived since its contact
 Tuareg Representations and Rebellions in Azawad: Geopolitical Dynamics 185
of Conflict in Northern Mali

with the French. Likewise, since the beginning of the 21st century, Tu-
areg rebellions have been re-operationalized for the benefit of the us and
France, and this action has been possible because of the production of the
Sahara and Azawad as terrorist zones, and the representation of Tuareg as
members or collaborators of terrorist groups such as aqim. Both France
and the us want to have a pre-eminent presence and influence in the area,
which accounts for the low-intensity conflicts they have had. Neverthe-
less, the Chinese presence has let them reach agreements where France
has had a leading role, however, the deployment of American drones can
change this situation in the future as knowledge gives power.
The independence of Azawad in 2012 endangered the national proj-
ects of Mali and the neighboring countries, as well as the interests of
international actors such as the us and France. Thus, the situation was
re-operationalized by these actors, who justify their intervention main-
ly because of the presence of terrorist groups (aqim, mujao, and Ansar
Dine). Even though they justified their interference with the objective to
guarantee security in the area, the reality is that these countries want to
dominate and control the territory in order to govern it and the people
dwelling in it. Oil, uranium and water are abundant in Tuareg regions,
and although the cost of exploration is high, it is now necessary to project
how they can be exploited and in this way overcome the actual capitalist
crisis. This will further threaten the lives of Tuareg population; neverthe-
less, they are still fighting and demanding justice and security to establish
and follow their own political project, and consequently achieve freedom
and a dignified life.

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 The Ubuntu Philosophy and the
Political Uses of the Past and History: the
Gacaca Courts and Post-apartheid South Africa
Marco Reyes

Introduction

After the 1994 genocide, Rwanda experienced a high economic growth.

During the first decades of the 21st century the gross domestic product
(gdp) per capita grew at an annual rate of about 5%, finally reaching 50%
above the level it had over the years before the genocide. At the end of
the genocide, poverty was estimated at 70%. However, in 2000, poverty
dropped to 59%, and then 57% in 2005 (Verpoorten, 2014, p. 1).
According to these figures, some authors like Booth and Goloo-
ba-Mutebi (2012, p. 9) considered that Rwanda’s recent economic growth
can be labelled pro-poor. Some writers such as Paul Collier regarded the
rapid growth and sharp poverty reduction as a “hat trick” (Verpoorten,
2014, p. 1). For some other analysts, Rwanda is an exemplary case of a de-
velopmental authoritarian state which is promoting private sector-based
development. For some analysts, on the other hand, twenty years after
the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has become an example of a country where
poverty has been reduced dramatically.1
Accordingly, women have taken some of the most important positions
inside state bureaucracy. The Rwandan government led by Paul Kagame has

1 Most of the inquiries about Rwanda are anchored on the idea of development and progress
as the only horizon possible. Economic success is therefore always evaluated according to the
evolution the country has managed to fulfill in reaching or getting closer to that economic
horizon. Some others emphasize the authoritarian nature of Paul Kagame’s regime to reach
“positive” economic and social indicators.

193
194 Africa in the 21st Century

also eliminated all ethnic affiliations from national identity documents al-
lowing everybody to become Rwandese before any other “ethnic” affiliation
(Castel, 2014, pp. 122-123). Other articles highlight the importance of the Ga-
caca Courts to generate an atmosphere of justice and reconciliation. Indeed, at
the end of the 20th century, many different governments such as South Africa
or Rwanda, started raising the concepts of memory, truth, justice, and recon-
ciliation to address social and political issues. Ubuntu was a rediscovered key
concept in post-apartheid South Africa to solve a number of problems inher-
ited by several regimes after a period of segregation or genocide.
The following pages will underline a series of elements: 1) Structural
Adjustment Programs (saps) that were implemented in the early 1980s in
Rwanda contributed severely to the unfolding of the genocide; 2) the po-
litical use of memory and reconciliation that Paul Kagame’s government
implemented after the genocide prevented any sort of criticism towards
economic and political policies. In this sense, Kagame presented an idea of
an idyllic Rwandan past that precluded any sort of rehabilitation of past con-
flicts. Reconciliation mechanisms made it impossible to review the effects
that neoliberal reforms had on the unfolding of the genocide. It also pre-
cluded any criticism to neoliberal reforms after the genocide; 3) the Ubuntu
philosophy that was used in South Africa as a tool that recovered the past in
order to reconcile the post-apartheid society was finally subsumed by the
logic of Rwandan state power, producing new forms of segregation.

Rwanda before the genocide

During the 1980s, International Financial Institutions such as the World

Bank and the International Monetary Fund considered Rwanda as a de-
veloping country model where citizens were committed to development.
Rwanda was indeed one of the African countries that implemented the
Structural Adjustment Programs very late.
The economic crisis experienced in Rwanda in the 1980s had several
effects: Rwanda’s major export product, coffee, fell from $144 million in
1985 to $30 million in 1993. “This greatly reduced the earnings of the
 The Ubuntu Philosophy and the Political Uses of the Past and History: 195
the Gacaca Courts and Post-apartheid South Africa

Rwandan State–whose foreign exchange earnings are still far more than
80 percent dependent on coffee and tea…” (Uvin, 1997, p. 106). Michael
Lipton (1988) raised the category of “ultra-poor” to refer to that segment
of society who are deprived from policies of economic growth and whose
income is spent mostly on food. Rwandan population in that socio-eco-
nomic status of “ultra-poor” was higher than 50%.
The coffee crisis severely hit the poorest and very small-scale farm-
ers. Rwandan foreign debt increased from very low standards in the
1980s to very steep figures. As a consequence, the Rwandan government
of Juvénal Habyarimana was obligated to undergo structural adjustment
programs. Juvénal Habyarimana had traveled to Washington to assure
his government and personal commitment to saps. Finally, in September
1990, an agreement was signed with the World Bank and the Internation-
al Monetary Fund. These institutions recommended the “retrenchment”
of the Rwandan state from omnipresence to very few social and econom-
ic functions: “The Bank itself proffered a structural adjustment credit of
90 million, the first tranche of which (55 million) was disbursed up to
September 1993, with the balance of 35 million ultimately canceled as the
reform programme broke down…” (Storey, 2001, p. 371).
The strategy of boosting coffee exports and reducing exports was
based on a Rwandese franc devaluation of 40% in 1989 and 40% more in
1993 (Uvin, 1997, p. 107). Given the economic crisis and the deployment
of saps during the 1990s, Rwanda experienced three different processes:
1) the rise of internal discontent especially among the Hutu, who were
excluded from the spoils of power; 2) the invasion of the Rwandese Patri-
otic Front mainly composed by the Tutsi who fled to Uganda at the end
of the 1950 decade; 3) the end of the cold war and the strong pressure on
democratization (Uvin, 1997, p. 108).
In this sense, for Chossudovsky (1996), the “demise of state institu-
tions” in Rwanda was caused by the policies implemented by the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund and the imposition of a struc-
tural adjustment programme in the early 1990s. The economic reforms
ended up destroying the economic activity and people’s livelihoods, fu-
eled unemployment and created a situation of generalized famine and
196 Africa in the 21st Century

social despair (Chossudovsky, 1996, pp. 366-367). Some people directly

connected with the state agencies such as parastatal enterprises, those
who ran economic development projects, and those inside the military
were getting richer while the mass of the population became poorer.

“The land available to ordinary cultivators actually diminished in some

regions as local officials appropriated fields for development projects
and as members of the urban elite bought out the poor, establishing
themselves as absentee landlords” (Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 45).

While the Akazu (little house in Kinyarwanda) and its small inner circle
of associates were thriving economically, a profound concentration of land
ownership was the most obvious manifestation of the asymmetrical process
of enrichment and impoverishment. For the majority of Rwandan popula-
tions, the benefits of being ruled by a Hutu government were diluting, and a
fracture between rulers and ruled was produced (Storey, 2001, p. 369).
After the shooting down of the aircraft carrying President Habyari-
mana in April 1994, the low-intensity warfare that had begun in 1990
resumed notwithstanding the Arusha Accords signed in August 1993.
Genocide and mass killings claimed more than a million Rwandan peo-
ple between April and July 1994. The Hutu extremist of Habyarimana’s
regime killed both Hutu moderates and Tutsi alike, including civil society
members considered allies of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (rpf).

“After its military victory in early July 1994, the rpf inherited a dev-
astated country. In human terms, the toll was horrendous: about 1.1
million dead, 2 million refugees abroad, over 1 million internally dis-
placed, tens of thousands of deeply traumatized genocide survivors and
over half a million ‘old caseload’ (i.e Tutsi) refugees returned in a chaot-
ic fashion” (Reytiens, 2004, p. 178).

All Rwandan political parties were included in the government with the
exception of Habyarimana’s single party (the National Republican Movement
for Democracy and Development, nrmd) and the radical extremist Hutu
 The Ubuntu Philosophy and the Political Uses of the Past and History: 197
the Gacaca Courts and Post-apartheid South Africa

Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (cdr), both of which were banned
because of their participation in the genocide. Therefore, after the genocide,
a strong presidential system was also introduced through some constitution-
al reforms. “The amended Fundamental Law was, in effect, a subtle piece of
constitutional engineering which attempted to mask the consolidation of the
rpf’s hold on political power” (Reytiens, 2004, p. 178). During the first days
of the rpf government, a great number of Habyarimana’s politicians, civil
servants and military were kept inside the rpf-led bureaucracy:

“It reiterated its commitment to a broad-based transitional government,

the rule of law, the formation of a national army open to all Rwandans and
dedicated to serve their interests. In that spirit, the rpf announced that it
was ready to share power with the Mouvement Démocratique Républic-
ain (mdr), the Parti Démocrate Chrétien (pdc), the Parti Démocratique
Islamique (pdi), the Parti Libéral (pl), the Parti Socialiste Démocratique
(psd), the Parti Socialiste Rwandais (psr) and the Union Démocratique
du Peuple Rwandais (udpr)” (Ndahiro et al., 2015, p. 74).

Nonetheless, according to Reytiens (2004, p. 180), this appearance of

inclusiveness disappeared shortly. Hutu and Tutsi survivors left Rwan-
da claiming violations of human rights and discrimination. The wave of
departures increased in the first years after 2000. Tutsi genocide survi-
vors declared they were being treated as second class citizens by the rpf,
which seemed to be more interested in a clear military victory than in
protecting Tutsi survivors.
The Arusha Accords, signed in 1993, had established a ten-year tran-
sition. As part of this process, provincial elections were held on March
6th, 2001. In fact, Paul Kagame had declared since 1995 that conducting
elections that allowed more political parties to participate would create
bigger problems. To Kagame, multi-partyism would never lead to a unit-
ed country (Misser, 1995). “The voting system itself was very indirect
and of Byzantine complexity, allowing rpf placement to exercise full con-
trol over the process” (Reytiens, 2004, pp. 182-183). The main goal of the
provincial elections was to develop the rpf presence in the countryside
198 Africa in the 21st Century

and building the party’s political base for the presidential and parliamen-
tary elections in 2003 (International Crisis Group, 2001, p. 7).

Gacaca and the politics of “define and rule”

The Gacaca Courts were implemented in Rwanda in 2002. They were

presented as the response to several issues concerning justice in Rwan-
da. Gacaca were put in place to solve the incapacity of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Local Rwandan Courts to address
genocide accusations. After the genocide, one hundred and twenty thou-
sand people, mainly Hutu, were incarcerated while Rwandan prisons
could hardly accommodate forty thousand inmates2.
The Gacaca courts were at the heart of the government efforts to fulfill
national unity and reconciliation. This rpf strategy looked forward to forging
a unified Rwandan identity and fostering reconciliation between survivors of
the genocide and its perpetrators. “The official narrative of unity and recon-
ciliation argues that the combination of a docile and obedient population, a
legacy of authoritarian government, and colonial policies of ethnic division-
ism caused the 1994 genocide” (Thompson, 2011, p. 376). For the Rwandan
government, reconciliation would only occur until the national unity was
restored. Therefore, reconciliation allowed the government to present an
idea of a peaceful past that needed to be retaken3.For those Rwandans who
did not step into the reconciliation and national unity building processes,

2 In 1994, both Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed by Hutu extremists in Rwanda. The geno-
cide took place 4 years after the Rwandan Patriotic Front (rpf) invaded the country from
Uganda. Led by the then Rwandan president, Paul Kagame, the rpf ended up defeating the
radical Hutu militias. Although the rpf obtained the power in Rwanda, the prosecution of
the genocide perpetrators generated a deeply harsh situation. Prisons were spilling over with
about 120,000 people accused of participating in the genocide. The pace of processing all the
genocide offenders was very slow, only 7,000 people accused of taking place in the genocide
had been prosecuted by the first year of the 21st century (Buckley, Zistel, 2005, pp. 114-115).
3 In an interview made by Susan Thompson in Rwanda in 2006, the interviewee considered
reconciliation as the only way to achieve the “national unity” that had existed before the col-
onizers arrived (Thompson, 2011, pp. 377).
 The Ubuntu Philosophy and the Political Uses of the Past and History: 199
the Gacaca Courts and Post-apartheid South Africa

the reactions coming from the government were very clear: “imprisonment
without charge, disappearance, intimidation, even death” (Thompson, 2011,
p. 377). On the other hand, reconciliation was built upon the binary base of
victims and killers or génocidaires on the basis of where they were during the
genocide or based on what they were doing during the genocide.

“For example, the policy of national unity officially substitutes génocid-

aire for Hutu, and is thus able to exclude from public life those Hutu who
were victims or bystanders, or who will not confess to their real or imag-
ined crimes. While the policy appears to be inclusive and conciliatory,
Hutu can in fact participate only as génocidaires, not as victims of the
genocide, of civil war, or of revenge attacks” (Thompson, 2011, p. 377).

Rony Brauman considers “the logic of ethnicity” is alive in the official

messages relentlessly repeated by the Rwandan government. Every Hutu
becomes suspect since their ethnic community is held responsible for the
genocide; by the very same logic, only Tutsis qualify as victims.
Besides the above, we have to remember that the crimes commit-
ted by the rpf were not limited to Rwanda; tens of thousands of Hutu
civilians were killed in Eastern Congolese land between October and
November 1996. However, trying to raise these points in Rwanda had
become a dangerous activity since anyone could be punished for chal-
lenging the Rwandan constitution on issues related to the trivialization
and banalization of the genocide. To René Lemarchand, behind this
repressive legislation looms the Paul Kagame determination to ban all
references to ethnic identities. According to this rationale, there are no
Hutu, Tutsi or Batwa in Rwanda but victims and victimizers. It seemed
that the Kagame regime considered the genocide to be the result of ethnic
divisions and, accordingly, avoiding such divisions was the best guaran-
tee for peace even though these ethnic divisions were constantly present
in legal texts or the constitution.
One thing is clear: under the present circumstances, any attempt to
re-evaluate the roots of the genocide becomes extremely problematic.
“Not only does it run counter to the taboo of «revisionism», denial and
200 Africa in the 21st Century

trivialization”; doing so offers an opportunity for being subject to an in-

dictment on the grounds of divisionism, discrimination or sectarianism,
or all the above (Lemarchand, 2006, p. 27).
The politics of national unity and the political use of the past that
Paul Kagame’s regime had deployed to raise an idyllic past between
Hutu, Tutsi, and Batwa had not only helped to define Hutu as a geno-
cidal identity but to obscure any criticism towards the deepening of
the 1980s crisis caused by the Structural Adjustment Programs as well.
“Rwanda under Kagame is in some respects a star pupil of the Washing-
ton Consensus. The rpf-led government has been strongly committed
to the private sector as the engine of development” (Booth and Goloo-
ba-Mutebi, 2011, p. 386).
Tzvetan Todorov (2000) points out that concerning too much on the
past will take us to the disengagement of the present time. In this sense,
throughout the preservation of the memory of the genocide victims, the
rpf-Kagame government has been able to grasp at political power but
has also defeated some other pasts and memories. The cult of memory
in Rwanda had assured its practitioners and genocide victims some priv-
ileges inside the society. It would seem that there is hardly something
pleasant in the fact of being a victim given that nobody wants to be a
victim but everybody would like to have the status of a historical victim.
Eventually, the victim position is more desirable than the one of a killer
or culprit. It is even more advantageous to preserve the recognition as a
victim ad infinitum given that it allows to have an “inexhaustible credit
line” (Todorov, 2000, p. 54).

The defeated memories: the hutu-ricide and the risks of over-

emphasizing the past

For Tzvetan Todorov (2000, p. 17) re-establishing or knowing the past ex-
actly the way it happened is something beyond any real possibility. On the
contrary, memory is always a given selection of past events, some things
are to be remembered and some others forgotten. Some elements of the
 The Ubuntu Philosophy and the Political Uses of the Past and History: 201
the Gacaca Courts and Post-apartheid South Africa

historical event will be kept while some others will be marginalized and
finally forgotten. If the past is impossible to know in the way it exactly
happened, memory can be utilized with political objectives in the present.
Therefore, if there is an exigency to recover the past, of historicizing the
past, that obligation does not give us any clue about how memory will be
used and/or what kind of political purposes it will end up serving.
Despite its outstanding economic indicators, Rwanda’s post-geno-
cide history can be used as an evidence that the memory cult not
always delivers more justice and it is not necessarily favorable to
memory itself. Maurice Halbwachs (2004) assures that there is always
a number of collective memories existing simultaneously. There is
nothing more historically inaccurate than viewing ethnic memories
through a binary prism.

“Among Hutu there are those who killed out of hatred and those who
killed in order not to be killed, and there are those who risked their
lives to save their Tutsi neighbors, and those who, though innocent,
were driven into exile and managed to escape the avenging arm of the
FPR” (Lemarchand, 2006, p. 29).

Consequently, somebody should alert the custodians of this or

that memory for taking history and memory as a political hostage.
Contrary to the arguments that considered there were three million
genocide perpetrators (one half of the Rwandan population), recent
studies have shown that actually no more than 8 per cent of the Hutu
population certainly participated in the killings (Strauss, 2004, p. 94).
Notwithstanding these figures, the official history has assigned the
status of perpetrators and killers to the Hutu majority. At the same
time, the Tutsi become the undisputed victim of the genocide. For Le-
marchand (2006, p. 27), Paul Kagame has involved itself into a work of
memory characterized by erasing ethnic identities, while defining and
leaving no doubt on the identity and roles of perpetrators and victims,
assigned respectively to Hutu and Tutsi. Hutus become the killer and
Tutsi the ultimate victim.
202 Africa in the 21st Century

This manipulative handling of memory in Rwanda denies the status

of victims to those Hutus who, even though they did not kill, were mas-
sacred so as to create a climate of terror (Vidal, 2004, p. 10). The power
structures in Rwanda have organized a whole process of forced mem-
orization (mémorisation forcée), within which there exists an extreme
symbolic violence.

“Indeed, in every commemoration, power has instrumentalized the

representation of genocide according to the conflicts of the moment
and has also produced an official history that ideologically contributed
to the balance of power in which the authorities were involved at the
time.” (Vidal, 2004, p. 10).

Pierre Nora underlines the fact that, given the actions of several
groups, today we can testify that there are several groups defending mem-
ory more and more aggressively. “They impose a tyrannical memory,
sometimes terrorist…” (Nora, 2005). However, this aggressive tenden-
cy or wave of defenders of memory fighting against those considered as
memory or past killers, sometimes ends up in what Pierre Nora defines
as a “tyrannical memory”, a tyrannical use of the past in order to legiti-
mate the governments that take or hold power after a traumatic historical
episode. The work of memory (Rosoux, 2011, p. 3) that the rpf-Kagame
government has developed in Rwanda has a literal profile, that is a sort
of political use of memory that inhibits any action in the present time, it
is the memory used to legitimate the status quo, it is the best example of
tyrannical use of the past.
The practitioners of this sort of literal memory are also to a certain ex-
tent the defenders of assigning privileges inside the society. A dichotomic
construction of the victims and killers in the genocide allowed the regime
to avoid any further criticism on the neoliberal transformation that Rwanda
had undergone since the late 1980s. Therefore, the use and abuse of the geno-
cide victims’ memory enabled the regime to continue reproducing the same
economic model that was followed years before the genocide. The memory
of the deep mourning of genocide impedes to pay attention to someone else
 The Ubuntu Philosophy and the Political Uses of the Past and History: 203
the Gacaca Courts and Post-apartheid South Africa

suffering or is even used to justify some rather unfair actions exercised against
others, in other words, the memory of suffering is used to acquire power
and privileges.

Counter-memories of the genocide: economic development to forget

For Tzvetan Todorov (2000), there will have to be a question about the
acts that pretend to be founded on the memory of the past and there will
have to be a steady criticism alerting about the uses and abuses of mem-
ory. For this author, there are two possible readings of past events: literal
and paradigmatic/exemplary (Todorov, 2000, p. 30). The exemplary use
of memory permitted to draw conclusions of a traumatic event and use
them as an example. Therefore, the past becomes a principle of action
for the present. Exemplary memory has a potential of emancipation. On
the contrary, within the literal use or reading of the past, that memory of
those people who are still living in the past inhibits the present action,
the past is consequently used to repress the present moment as memory
legitimizes the status quo, and the post genocide present.
In this case, there is a constant danger in using historical observation
and surveillance for watching the past rather than the present (Todorov,
2000). Gacaca was presented as a mechanism that belonged to and was
inspired by an idyllic African past and therefore as a useful tool for not
questioning some present injustices. Gacaca became a receptacle or de-
posit of fantasies (Mbembe, 2016) dodging any further criticism of the
Rwandan present and future.
While the post-genocide regime outlawed any reference to ethnic iden-
tification within the Rwandan society, the “work of memory” that Paul
Kagame’s government unfolded was based on a binary terminology of vic-
tims and génocidaires. By preserving this dichotomy, it also extended to the
future the permanent privilege of the victims and the culpability of the killers.

“To have been a victim concedes the right to protest and ask for retri-
butions. Unless the status of a victim is shattered, everybody would be
204 Africa in the 21st Century

obliged to satisfy all the petitions. It is more favorable to keep on the

role of being a victim than receiving a specific restoration for the suffer-
ing. It is better to keep a permanent privilege…” (Todorov, 2000, p. 57).

On the other hand, by using Gacaca, the government raised the idea
of a harmonic past between Hutu and Tutsi that eroded any further pos-
sibility of criticizing other historical factors that also contributed to the
outbreak of the genocide. Meanwhile, the “work of memory” produced a
status of permanent privileges of the victims and a permanent culpability
of the génocidaires. If the present of the past is the memory and the pres-
ent of the future is the expectation (Bedarida, 1998, p. 21), the Rwandan
past was presented as fully harmonic and the present was displayed to
reproduce the privilege of the victims of the genocide.
The “work of memory” and the political use of the Rwandan past
contributed to regenerate, to reset an order, habitus, ethos and telos ad
hoc to the development of the capitalist modernity. The old modernizing
discourse used before the genocide was re-launched by the rpf-Kagame
government. Past, present, memory and future mixed together not only
to discipline individuals but also to set up the conditions leading to a so-
cial atmosphere which is normalized and productive in capitalist terms.
In other words, below the “work of memory” and the political use of the
“harmonic” Rwandan past, the objective of recreating capitalist moderni-
ty could be found (Escobar, 2014, p. 225).
The idea of a harmonic past has also helped to produce normalized
subjects, a “docile body” (Foucault, 1997) produced by a whole regime of
discipline and normalization. A Homo Economicus who is able to produce
under determined physical and cultural conditions. Capital accumula-
tion and the expansion of education, health and wealth that Rwanda has
reached in the first two decades of the 21st century required the establish-
ment of a disciplinary society.
If, according to Valerie Leach (2003, p. 325), modernity is an individ-
ualization process which is deeply related to the State, releasing capitalist
modernity after the genocide required to reaffirm once again the mercantile
individualism within the Rwandan society. Notwithstanding the argument
 The Ubuntu Philosophy and the Political Uses of the Past and History: 205
the Gacaca Courts and Post-apartheid South Africa

of the idyllic past, this individualistic logic of capitalist behavior unfolded

because the “work of memory” carried out after the genocide maintained
the same binary colonial boundaries between Hutu and Tutsi, those lim-
its that recognize somebody as an entity belonging to the “not being zone”
(Fanon, 1987) that seems to subsist to the reconciliation policies in Rwanda.

Post-apartheid South Africa

Rwandan genocide is not an exception of major dynamics recorded at the

end of the second half of the 1990s when the African continent experi-
enced several events with deep historical meanings: the apartheid regime
in South Africa. The epilogue of South Africa’s Interim Constitution of
1993 stated that in order to address the divisions and strife of the past:
“there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for repa-
ration but not for retaliation, a need for Ubuntu but not for victimization”
(Interim Constitution of South Africa, 1993, p. 139).
Desmond Tutu shared the conviction that there could be “no fu-
ture without forgiveness” (Murithi, 2009, p. 224). He also suggested that
Ubuntu looked forward to restoring the dignity of all the people involved
and focused on forgiveness in order to restore the balance between victim
and perpetrator. For Desmond Tutu (1999):

“Ubuntu is very difficult to render into a Western language. It speaks

to the very essence of being human. When you want to give high praise
to someone we say, ‘Yu, u nobuntu’; he or she has Ubuntu. This means
that they are generous, hospitable, friendly, caring, and compassionate.
They share what they have. It also means that my humanity is caught
up, is inextricably bound up, in theirs. We belong in a bundle of life….
A person with Ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of oth-
ers, does not feel threatened that others are able and good; for he or she
has a proper self-assurance that comes with knowing that he or she be-
longs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated
or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if
they were less than who they are”. (Tutu, 1999, pp. 34, 35)
206 Africa in the 21st Century

Mechanisms such as Ubuntu pre-dated colonialism and continue to

function until today. Societies that practice Ubuntu place a high value on
communal life. They also try to maintain positive relations within the society.

“According to the notion of ubuntu, each member of the community

is linked to each of the disputants, be they victims or perpetrators. If
everybody is willing to acknowledge this (that is, to accept the princi-
ples of ubuntu), then people will either feel some sense of having been
wrong, or a sense of responsibility for the wrong that has been commit-
ted” (Mutithi, 2009, p. 228).

Despite the use of the Ubuntu philosophy by the post-apartheid gov-

ernment, several waves of violence against the Makwerekwere4 have taken
place since 1994. “The largest and best known broke out in May 2008
in a Johannesburg shantytown of Alexander. The militants were black
citizens who exclusively targeted African foreign nationals…”. (Matsinhe,
2011, p. 295). Two decades after the end of the apartheid, in the words
of Achille Mbembe, many people in South Africa finally have brought
the white supremacy down to its knees, but that does not seem to ap-
ply when it comes to condemning the extra judicial executions of fellow
black Africans on the streets just because they do not have the South
African nationality.

“In South Africa’s public mind, “foreign nationals” are mostly black
people from the rest of Africa and, eventually, from the various Af-
rican diasporas in the world. From a South African perspective, what
characterizes African “foreign nationals” is their blackness and the fact
that, Nigeria notwithstanding, they enjoy no protection from a power-
ful state….Today, many black “foreign nationals” are at the receiving
end of this violence originally designed to discipline and to domesticate
black South Africans…” (Mbembe, 2019).

4 This term refers to “foreigners”, or black immigrants coming from the African continent,
mainly Nigerians.
 The Ubuntu Philosophy and the Political Uses of the Past and History: 207
the Gacaca Courts and Post-apartheid South Africa

For Mbembe (2019), South Africa has reached very high levels of de-
portation. The former policies that were used for black Africans under
apartheid are now being applied to black African foreigners. Further-
more, we can realize that there are probably more variants of racism in
the twenty-first century than we ever imagined. New configurations of
segregation are emerging worldwide. Racism, classism and xenophobia
have also proven resistant to Ubuntu and reconciliation tribunals. Mem-
ory has demonstrated to be capable of both erasing ethnic labels and at
the same time perpetuating the dichotomic terms of victim and killer
delaying any further possibility of deeper justice inside societies.

Some final considerations

Walter Benjamin used to say that there is always a danger that tradition
becomes an instrument of the ruling classes. Whenever that happens not
even the dead will be saved if the enemy wins and this enemy has not
ceased to win the battles so far. Are we moving forward in the fight against
racism and discrimination and therefore in the consolidation of social
justice or are we simply opening spaces for social and political mobility,
and the formation of small black political elites that end up reproducing
the status quo in the name of memory, reconciliation and racial equality?
Ubuntu and Gacaca were not originally designed to operate under the
nation-state structure. Even more, using Gacaca and Ubuntu under these
apparatus inherited from colonization might end up in the subsump-
tion of the Gacaca and Ubuntu spirits to the polarizing and exclusive
logic of capitalism (Amin, 2004). By being inserted into the logic of the
state, Ubuntu, memory, and Gacaca were instrumentalized in the logic of
power of state politics. In both cases —Rwanda and South Africa— Ga-
caca and Ubuntu were instruments to grasp political power. Therefore,
those elements that are not important to reach power are suppressed or
considered as marginal. “This instrumentalization/hierarchy is simulta-
neously an impoverishment of the struggle. When the world is conceived
through the prism of the power conquest, many ways of expression of our
208 Africa in the 21st Century

rejection of capitalism, many ways of fighting for a different society are

simply filtered or remained hidden” (Holloway, 2005, pp. 20-21).
In this sense, changing society through the conquest of power using
ideas such as Ubuntu or Gacaca ends up reaching everything but what it
originally intended. What begins as a struggle against dehumanization of
people becomes an imposition of the logics and discourses of power. It
may be time to consider those defeated pasts, those genes of anti-power
that have been obscured by the fights concerned with taking power, those
exercises of anti-power which are not interested in who will hold the
power but in the existence/removal of power the way we have known it.

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Africa in the 21st Century. Fue editado por el Programa
Universitario de Estudios sobre Asia y África de la
Coordinación de Humanidades. La primera edición
digital en formato PDF se publicó en el mes
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