The Saber and Scroll Journal • Volume 10, Number 1 • Summer 2021

“That Dreadful Day”: The Battle of Manzikert

Chris Schloemer
American Military University

Abstract
The Battle of Manzikert in 1071 resulted in a period of decline
for the Byzantine Empire (although it would last in some shape
or form for almost 400 years). This “dreadful day,” as the Byzan-
tines called it, was one of the most influential battles in history.1
The result changed the entire region, sending shockwaves through
both the Christian and Islamic worlds and opening the floodgates
to Turkish incursion into the most strategically important region
of the empire.2 It could have been mitigated, but the battle and its
aftermath was a disaster for the Byzantines and had great ramifica-
tions for not only the Byzantine Empire, but for the course of his-
tory in this region of the world. It, and the decade of civil war that
followed, resulted in the Byzantine request for aid from the Pope,
precipitating the First Crusade.
Keywords: Byzantine, Seljuk Turks, Turcoman, Anatolia, Roma-
nus, Alp Arslan, Shi’ite, Sunni

“Ese día terrible”: La batalla de Manzikert

Resumen
La batalla de Manzikert en 1071 resultó en un período de declive
para el Imperio Bizantino (aunque duraría de alguna forma du-
rante casi 400 años). Este “día terrible”, como lo llamaron los bi-
zantinos, fue una de las batallas más influyentes de la historia. El
resultado cambió toda la región, provocando ondas de choque en
los mundos cristiano e islámico y abriendo las compuertas a la in-
cursión turca en la región más estratégicamente importante del im-
perio. Podría haberse mitigado, pero la batalla y sus consecuencias
fueron un desastre para los bizantinos y tuvieron grandes ramifi-
caciones no solo para el Imperio bizantino, sino para el curso de la
historia en esta región del mundo. Esto, y la década de guerra civil
que siguió, resultó en la solicitud bizantina de ayuda del Papa, lo
que precipitó la Primera Cruzada.

91 doi: 10.18278/sshj.10.1.7
 The Saber and Scroll

Palabras clave: Bizantinos, turcos selyúcidas, turcomanos, Anato-

lia, romanos, Alp Arslan, chiítas, sunitas

“可怕的那天”—曼齐刻尔特战役
摘要
1071年曼齐刻尔特战役导致拜占庭帝国一段时间的衰落（尽
管该帝国会在某种形式上持续近四百年之久）。这一被拜占
庭人称为“可怕的一天”，是史上最具影响力的战役之一。
战役结果改变了整个地区，对基督教和伊斯兰教带来了冲
击，同时为土耳其人的入侵打开大门，进入该帝国最具战略
重要性的区域。此战本可以得以缓解，然而战役及其后果对
拜占庭人而言是一场灾难，并对拜占庭帝国以及该地区的历
史进程造成了巨大影响。该战役以及随之而来的十年内战导
致拜占庭帝国向教皇寻求援助，加速了第一次十字军东征。
关键词：拜占庭人，塞尔柱土耳其人，土库曼人，安纳托利
亚，罗曼努斯四世，阿尔普·阿尔斯兰，什叶派，逊尼派

T
he Emperor Romanus Diogenes, shockwaves through both the Chris-
surrounded by his Varangian tian and Islamic worlds and opened the
Guard, stood his ground and floodgates to Turkish incursion into
fought. However, the Seljuks had his the most strategically important region
group surrounded and his reserves left of the empire.5 The results could have
the field without fighting. He fought been mitigated, but the battle and its
well until his horse was killed from aftermath were a disaster for the Byz-
underneath him, and his sword hand antines and had great ramifications for
was wounded.3 Finally, he surrendered. not only the Byzantine Empire, but for
Thus the Battle of Manzikert of 1071
the course of history in this region of
ended, and a period of decline for the
the world.
Byzantine Empire began (although it
would last in some shape or form for The Seljuk Turks were a nomad-
almost 400 years). This “dreadful day,” ic steppe-warrior group that had great
as the Byzantines called it, was one of success in establishing themselves to
the most influential in history.4 The de- the east of the Byzantine Empire. They
feat changed the entire region. It sent had seceded from the Oghuz tribe, and

92
 “That Dreadful Day”: The Battle of Manzikert

led by their namesake leader Seljuk, paigns, the Seljuks kept them from cre-
moved into Transoxiana and eastern ating chaos and diverting Alp Arslan
Persia about 1000 B.C.6 By this time, the from his planned campaigns against
Persian Umayyads had been divided the Fatimids.
into sub-states and local dynasties. Lat- Although the Byzantines and
er, the Islamic Abbasids of Persia had Seljuks made a treaty in 1055, this did
taken power, but fought ruinous civil not stop the Turcomans, and eventu-
wars with one another and were not as
ally Alp Arslan, from raiding into Asia
powerful as they had been.7 They hired
Minor.17 He led a huge expedition into
the Seljuk Turks as mercenaries and the
Armenia and captured its capital, Ani,
Seljuks soon took over. They consid-
in 1064.18 He burned all of its church-
ered themselves the protectors of Sunni
es to the ground and massacred or car-
Islam.8 By 1055, the Seljuk Turks were
ried off much of its population to be
at the outskirts of Baghdad.9 Seljuk’s
sold into slavery.19 Alp Arslan wanted
grandson, Tughril Bey, took over with-
to secure the Armenian meadow lands
out opposition.10 The Sunni Abbasid
for the Turcomans and then turn his
caliphs remained spiritual leaders, but
the Seljuk Turks ruled the empire.11 attention to the Fatimids.20 He drove
Tughril Bey died in 1063 and Alp Ar- into Anatolia unopposed and sacked
slan, his nephew, succeeded him.12 He Cappadocian Caesarea, which was far
was a strong warrior, and devoted to the from the eastern frontier; they pillaged
Sunni religion. Caesarea and desecrated its cathedral of
St. Basil.21 Turcoman raiders plundered
Alp Arslan came to power in his far into Anatolia, pillaging Cappadocia
early thirties and continued the expan- and Cilicia, where no attacks had hap-
sion of the Turkish domain to the west pened for over a century.22 This was
and south.13 There were two reasons
one of the reasons Romanus eventually
for this. First, as a Sunni, he despised
campaigned eastwards.
the Shiite Fatimids of Egypt who ruled
Syria and Palestine as subject states.14 At about the time Romanus was
Second, although the Seljuk Turks had moving towards him in 1071, Alp Ar-
become a little less nomadic for the slan was trying to solidify his border
most part, their kinsmen, the Turco- so he could focus on the heretic Shi’ite
mans, had not.15 These nomads were Fatimids, the number one priority for
not interested in the glory of the Sun- the devout Sunni.23 He passed through
ni religion, but wanted land for their western Armenia, taking Manzikert and
herds of ponies and sheep. The Seljuks Khelat, and captured or received trib-
liked to push the Turcomans to the pe- ute from the border towns of Edessa,
riphery of their empire to soften up en- Aleppo, and Antioch.24 Alp Arslan was
emies, and also because they were un- shoring up his defenses on the western
disciplined and hard to control.16 The border of his territory (the eastern edge
vast plateau of Anatolia was perfect for of Byzantium) so he could drive south.
them. By keeping them busy on cam- At this point, the Seljuk Turks were at

93
 The Saber and Scroll

their strongest and Alp Arslan’s army The Byzantines, of course, had a
was mobile and effective. long history as the Eastern Roman Em-
The Seljuk army was a typical pire, but the Byzantine government and
light cavalry army of the steppe who army had come upon difficult times in
were masters of the hit-and-run tac- controlling the empire by the time of
the battle. Emperor Basil II had expand-
tic.25 They wore little, if any, body ar-
ed the empire, and the army was stron-
mor and carried a saber and possibly
ger than any neighboring force.33 He
a javelin, but relied mainly on a short
had taken over Armenia and Antioch,
composite bow.26 This short recurve
threatening the local Muslim leaders
bow was very powerful and allowed
of Damascus and Aleppo so much that
the Turk to shoot quickly in any direc-
they had agreed to pay tribute in order
tion from horseback, firing up to 12 to be left alone.34 However, after Basil II
arrows per minute.27 Their short stir- died in 1025, the Byzantine army had
rup, or “forward seat,” positioned the declined, mostly due to neglect and a
warrior over the shoulder of the horse reliance on mercenaries. His brother,
instead of square on the horse’s back, who succeeded him, was incompetent
which greatly facilitated archery from and the throne passed on to aristocratic
horseback.28 Their horses, or “steppe families like the Monomachus and the
ponies,” were strong and highly trained Ducas.35 These rulers were more inter-
for warfare.29 The Seljuk Turks liked to ested in their own interests than in pro-
use their mobility to hover just within tecting the frontiers. In addition, they
bowshot of their enemy—striking from were afraid of revolt by popular mili-
a distance with their powerful bows and tary leaders. They neglected the army
then fleeing when the enemy offered a and changed Basil’s practice of protect-
pitched battle, twisting their torsos and ing the peasantry against the power-
firing backwards at their pursuers, a ful landowners who wanted to expand
maneuver called the “Parthian shot.”30 their estates. They became extremely
They also excelled in the “feigned re- wealthy, but the thematic armies, based
treat,” sometimes retreating for days to on citizen-soldiers that came from the
draw their enemies into a trap of a larg- landholding peasants, dried up.36
er body of warriors or just tiring them The reign of Constantine IX
out and waiting until the enemy forma- Monomachus between 1042 and 1055
tion became scattered, and then wheel- caused extreme discontent and decay in
ing and striking when the opportunity the army.37 His massive luxury building
presented itself.31 If a pursuer seemed projects were expensive and ended up
vulnerable in any way, the Turks would debasing the currency. For a long time,
counterattack and swarm over their en- the Byzantine gold coin was considered
emy, killing both men and horses.32 The “the Dollar of the Middle Ages.”38 How-
Seljuk Turks were very strong in 1071, ever, he decreased its gold content. Part
but the Byzantine Empire was in a com- of this was intentional, to pay for war
pletely different situation. against the Pechenegs in the east after

94
 “That Dreadful Day”: The Battle of Manzikert

they crossed the Danube.39 However, it invading the Balkans, and the Seljuk
effectively lowered army pay by about Turks were threatening the east. When
one-fifth.40 He then reduced the size of Constantine X Ducas died, the Ducas
the army, feeling it to be too large and aristocratic family lined up to be the
costly and a threat to rebel. next emperor. However, his wife, the
Constantine IX did not seem to Empress Eudocia, tricked them all and
be able to tell which of the troops were married a young military aristocrat,
necessary and which were not. He al- Romanus IV Diogenes, in 1068. Al-
46

lowed even the best of the thematic though he had capability, his rule was
troops to become ineffective, decom- short-lived.
missioning 50,000 troops from the Ar- An experienced and brave mili-
menian theme on the northeast frontier. tary leader, Romanus IV Diogenes had
This was exactly where the Seljuk Turks distinguished himself in war against
began raiding a few years later.41 These the Patzinaks and had a high reputa-
same troops had defeated the Seljuks in tion among the military.47 He also had
battle as late as 1048.42 His successor, a good reputation as an administrator,
Michael VI Stratioticus, indulged the but when he became emperor in 1068,
civilian aristocracy and victimized the he faced many obstacles, which ulti-
military aristocracy.43 mately he could not overcome. The civil
The military revolted in 1057, aristocracy resented him, especially the
and under the general Isaac Comnenus, Ducas family, who thought they had
defeated Michael VI. Emperor Isaac I been robbed of their rightful throne. He
Comnenus immediately worked to re- had a demoralized army made up most-
build the empire, but he contracted a ly of mercenaries, which was frequent-
fever and died after only two years on ly on the brink of mutiny.48 Inadequate
the throne.44 His successor, Constan- pay and lack of supplies had crippled
tine X Ducas, was even worse than his the army. The soldiers were often sim-
most recent namesake—the themes ply unwilling to fight.49
were further disbanded, the treasury When Romanus came to power,
was squandered, and the military made the empire’s eastern frontier was collaps-
even poorer. He also began a bloody ing. However, he recognized the threat
persecution of the Monophysite Arme- of the Turks and tried to get the army
nians.45 This helped widen a severe rift into fighting shape. There had been no
between the Byzantines and the resent- large imperial army campaigning in the
ful Armenians, which manifested at eastern regions for 20 years. He knew
Manzikert. he had to reassert imperial presence
By this time, the civil aristocra- there and if possible, thoroughly defeat
cy had little to fear from the military the enemy.50 Armenia was in danger of
any longer, but neither did their many collapsing and the Turks were still raid-
outside military threats. The Normans ing into Cappadocia and threatening
were taking Byzantine Italy, tribes were Anatolia.51 During the first two years

95
 The Saber and Scroll

of his rule, he ranged throughout Ana- (although by the time of Manzikert,

tolia with his mostly mercenary army, many of the mercenaries did not have
trying to find and fight bands of Seljuk this skill), fusing the strengths of heavy
Turks.52 He had a few successes against and light cavalry into one.58 They also
small bands of Seljuks. The expedition relied on light infantry, which wore lit-
of 1068 was very successful, plugging tle armor and carried a composite bow
the hole in defense of Syria and show- or javelin, a shield, and an axe for close
ing the Turks there were consequences combat.59 The third part of a typical
for raiding.53 However, his position was Byzantine army consisted of heavy in-
still dire. fantry, which wore mail armor, helmets,
and carried a large shield, a long spear,
Comnenus was still under a lot
and a sword, and fought in a phalanx.60
of pressure and trying to consolidate his
The heavy infantry normally formed up
position. His critics in Constantinople
behind the heavy cavalry to take advan-
lamented the losses in Byzantine Italy.
tage of the confusion caused by the cav-
In the meantime, paying this army was
alry charge. They used the light infantry
expensive and he strong-armed the ar-
to protect the heavy troops from light
istocracy to get the money to pay for it, cavalry, as they could fire their arrows
which increased unrest.54 Every time he further from a more stable platform
left Constantinople, he feared intrigues (the ground).61 Theoretically, this army
behind his back. He needed a great could stand up to any other army, and
victory to consolidate his position and the situation at hand was ripe for these
prestige. He wanted to secure his throne leaders and armies to collide—they did
and intimidate the Turks through mil- so at Manzikert.
itary defeat, and so he put together a
large army consisting of some natives Romanus had bad luck and made
bad decisions from the start. He had
and a horde of mercenary troops, in-
started out with the largest Byzantine
cluding Normans, and Eurasian steppe
army of the entire 11th century.62 During
warriors, Bulgars, Pechenegs, and Uze.55
the course of the campaign, Romanus
He took along a prominent member of
split his army. He sent a large part, led by
the Ducas family, Andronicus, nephew
general Joseph Trachaneiotes, to Khe-
of the former emperor, in part as lever-
lat, north of Lake Van, while he went
age against intrigues back at the capital
towards Manzikert.63 Trachaneiotes
while he was gone.56 Finally, with an
never joined the battle at Manzikert.
army of around 48,000 men, he crossed
We do not know why. Trachaneiotes
the Bosporus and marched towards Alp was a respected general who had about
Arslan.57 This army was very different 25,000 men, probably as many as the
from the Seljuk Turk army. entire Seljuk army, including many of
The Byzantine army was also de- the most experienced, best soldiers in
pendent on cavalry, but they preferred the army.64 Byzantine historian Michael
a heavily armored soldier who was Attaleiates (who was present during the
both a mounted lancer and an archer campaign) hints that Trachaneiotes was

96
 “That Dreadful Day”: The Battle of Manzikert

scared off when the entire Seljuk Army still Turkish.72 This showed the loyalty
showed up, saying: problem with some mercenaries, and
when their commander learned caused distrust in the army. Alp Arslan,
of the attack of the sultan against knowing he was still outnumbered and
the emperor himself he took all wanting to conserve his forces for the
the men around him and fled ig- attack on the Fatimids, offered a peace
nobly through Mesopotamia to treaty to Romanus. The Seljuks did not
the land of the Romans, giving prefer pitched battles and the only quar-
no thought to his lord nor to rel they really had with the Byzantines
what is seemly, the coward.65 was over Armenia, which they could
possibly divide.73 However, Romanus
Muslim historians say Trachaneiotes refused. Romanus wanted a decisive
was taken by surprise by Alp Arslan and military victory to not only remove the
defeated, although there is no mention Seljuk threat, but also to consolidate his
of any engagement by Byzantine sourc- political power. He knew that it would
es.66 Perhaps he was a traitor controlled be difficult to keep this army together if
by the Ducas family. Interestingly, after he marched back without fighting. He
Romanus’ death in 1072, Trachaneiotes also knew that the campaign had been
was awarded the coveted governorship very expensive, and he probably would
of Antioch by the Ducas. Was this a re- not be able to afford to raise another
ward for betraying Romanus?67 In any large army in the future.74 Finally, in
case, no word was sent to Romanus, light of his lack of political support in
thirty miles away.68 Also, Romanus had Constantinople, he probably wondered
sent much of his light infantry away if he could even save his throne if he did
with Trachaneiotes.69 This left the heavy not fight.75 The next day, in August 1071
cavalry and infantry without light infan- (the exact date is disputed), Romanus
try protection. Romanus had to fight the advanced with his main army.
battle of Manzikert with less than half of During the decisive battle, Ro-
his army, and without the piece which manus ignored normal strategy used
was most effective against steppe war- against steppe warriors and, eager for
riors. However, he still had more troops a decisive victory, pressed an attack.
than the Seljuks, and Alp Arslan did not He commanded the center, the general
even want to fight the Byzantine army. Alyattes took the right and the general
Romanus captured the large- Bryennius was on the left.76 For some
ly undefended town of Manzikert but reason, Romanus gave Andronicus
did not have long to savor the victory, Ducas charge of the reserves, which
as his army was soon harassed by Sel- would attack when needed to protect
juk bowmen.70 A contingent of Turkish breaks in the line. As was their norm,
Uze mercenaries crossed over to the the Seljuks withdrew in the face of this
Seljuk side.71 Even though Michael had force in a wide crescent.77 They set traps
administrated oaths to the Uze merce- and ambushes to isolate and destroy
naries to ensure their loyalty, they were portions on the Byzantines who lost

97
 The Saber and Scroll

discipline.78 Some of his cavalry detach- streamed down the hills onto the Byz-
ments took the bait and chased groups antine flanks.85 Seljuks who had been
of Turks into the hills, to be ambushed hiding farther north came out and the
and slaughtered, but most marched main Byzantine force was effectively
on.79 The Seljuk mounted light infan- surrounded.86 Many of Romanus’ mer-
try rode up and down the flanks of the cenary troops fled, including a large
army, showering them with arrows, but contingent of Armenians, who had
the frustrated Byzantine army contin- been conscripted and hated the Byzan-
ued on with no opposition in front of tines anyway.87
them.80 However, Romanus, so desper- This was the point in the battle
ate for a victory, kept the army moving. when the rearguard should have fallen
Finally, Romanus, knowing that on the Seljuks and crushed them be-
the sun would set soon, gave the signal tween themselves and Romanus’ force.
to turn around and go back. He feared Surrounded, the right wing tried to
the Seljuks would attack his camp face both ways and fight, but it was de-
which was lightly defended. The ma- stroyed. The left wing, cut off from the
jority of his force was untouched. The center, fought to reach the emperor, but
signal was to face the imperial banner it was also routed.88 Romanus and his
in the other direction, but it could eas- Varangian Guard (Swedo-Slavic war-
ily have been a misinterpretation as a riors from the Ukraine who had served
signal to retreat because the emperor the Eastern Roman emperor since the
had fallen.81 Indeed, Attaleiates said reign of Basil II89) fought on until they
that the soldiers far from the front line were overpowered and Romanus was
thought that the emperor had suffered a captured.90 Romanus did not give up un-
defeat.82 Attaleiates points out that the til his horse was killed out from under
commander of the rear guard, Andron- him and his sword hand was wounded,
icus, spread the rumor that Romanus preventing him using his sword.91 The
was dead and his force defeated, and the Seljuk Turks had won a great victory
rear guard retreated, leaving Romanus against a larger force.
behind.83 Confused units nearby saw The Byzantines heavily outnum-
the rearguard retreat and followed. Ad- bered the Turks, so why did the Turks
ditionally, it would have taken time for win? The answer is in the difference in
all four wings of the army to recognize the states of the armies, the difference
the order to retreat, causing inevitable in the applicability of the tactics used,
gaps between sections of the army for and treachery. Although Romanus had
the Seljuk cavalry to take advantage of.84 made progress in whipping the once
At that point, Alp Arslan, who proud Byzantine army into shape, there
viewed the whole affair, sprung his at- had not been enough time to undo the
tack. The main force of the Seljuk army harm done to the military by previous
in the center of the crescent charged emperors. The army was ill-equipped,
into Byzantine army as it turned to go ill-paid, and morale was low. Byzan-
back, and thousands of Seljuk warriors tine intelligence was poor. Romanus

98
 “That Dreadful Day”: The Battle of Manzikert

had no idea Arslan was coming to still attacked, violating this doctrine,
Manzikert to fight.92 There were divi- and proving the point that heavy cav-
sive elements in the Byzantine Empire alry could not defeat light cavalry with-
and also in the army.93 The lack of an out light infantry support.96 Romanus
indigenous professional army had dire was so intent on defeating the Seljuks in
consequences—the army was entirely a pitched battle, he continued to pursue
too dependent on mercenaries. These the Turks further and further, for hours
mercenaries were often of limited loy- and hours, causing his numerically su-
alty (except for the Varangian Guard), perior army to become spread out, dis-
as shown by the defection of the Uze. organized, and tired. This played right
Additionally, even those who did not into the normal steppe warrior tactics,
defect did not stand and fight—they which Alp Arslan used to perfection.
ran to save themselves once the rear- He knew the strengths and weaknesses
guard retreated. Some spoke different of his forces and used them optimal-
languages and were loyal only to their ly, exploiting Byzantine weakness and
own captains. In the end, between de- keeping his forces out of danger. Then,
fections and the abandonment by the at the perfect moment, he unleashed
rearguard, a large part of Romanus’s them to great effect. However, the Byz-
army did not even participate in the antine army could still have been saved
battle. In contrast, although the Seljuk if not for treachery.
Turk army was smaller, it was highly Romanus had made a great error
trained, heavily armed, and totally de- by allowing a member of the rival Ducas
voted to Alp Arslan.94 To be defeated, family to command the reserves and
his army would have had to be crushed this sealed the Byzantine army’s fate. It
to the last man—they were not a mer- is a mystery as to why he did this. After
cenary force. However, the Byzantines all, he had exiled Andronicus’ father.97
still should have had enough of a force Perhaps he was trying to mend bridges
there to beat the Turks, or at least to not with the Ducas family and thought the
be defeated, but there was a big differ- rear guard was where he could do the
ence in how they were used tactically. least harm. In any case, this decision
The Byzantines were well aware cost him dearly. If the rear guard had
of the importance of using cooperative advanced, it could have smashed the
combined arms tactics for fighting light Turks surrounding Romanus’ contin-
cavalry, especially steppe cavalry. They gent. If it had not inflicted a large defeat
had fought the Huns, Khazars, Bulgars, upon them, it could at least have saved
Magyars, and Pechenegs. However, al- Romanus and his contingent. Androni-
though he was an experienced and re- cus Ducas’ betrayal handed Alp Arslan
spected general who had defeated the and the Seljuk Turks victory, and al-
Turks previously, Romanus ignored 500 though it furthered the circumstances
years of Byzantine doctrine, going back of the Ducas family in the short term,
to Leo VI’s Taktika.95 He had committed it had disastrous consequences for the
most of his light infantry elsewhere, but empire.

99
 The Saber and Scroll

Map showing the incursion of the Seljuk Turks into the Byzantine Empire. The empire
extended to the dark line east of the Battle of Manzikert. By 1194, the Seljuks controlled
much of Anatolia in what is now Turkey. https://about-history.com/the-battle-of-man
zikert-1071-and-the-beginning-of-seljuk-dominance/?fbclid=IwAR3gaa59yWxhvJ9KQ_
eTN6zJvMZX1Rv3sQ5GcePChRU6XxfZYS3P89U8ZNk

The results of this battle were the next decade.100 “It dispersed the im-
a shock to the Christian and Islam- perial armies in full view of the Seljuks,
ic worlds. The psychological impact opened the eastern frontier, and sent a
of this battle to the Islamic world was signal of Roman weakness.”101 However,
dramatic. For a long time, the Byzan- even as all of this played out, in spite of
tine Empire had been considered “a the great defeat, strong leadership af-
permanent, stable and unshakeable, ter the battle could have mitigated this
element of the political universe of the disaster; unfortunately, the Byzantine
era.”98 The Islamic world now began to Empire did not have any at this time.
see the Byzantine Empire in a totally
different light. Byzantium was on the Manzikert did not have to be a
decline. Instead of a power, they were disaster—the Seljuks offered merciful
a weakening empire, vulnerable and and generous terms as Alp Arslan still
unable to defend itself in many areas, wanted to focus on war with the Shiite
and with wealth and lands available to Fatimids.102 The Turks were not inter-
be taken.99 This battle, and especially ested in conquering the Byzantine Em-
the civil war that followed, led to per- pire. Alp Arslan did not follow up his
manent invasion and conquest during victory—he immediately went east to

100
 “That Dreadful Day”: The Battle of Manzikert

Central Asia to deal with a revolt and pire, as he would have honored the trea-
was killed two years later without ever ty with Alp Arslan, bringing peace and
returning to Anatolia. His son, who a period in which to recover the em-
succeeded him, also never campaigned pire’s strength. The army had been left
in Anatolia.103 For centuries the Per- leaderless as the high-ranking officers
sians, Byzantines, and Turks had raided rushed back to Constantinople to play
and campaigned along this fluctuating politics. The Ducas family acted before
border. It was business as usual. Addi- he returned and Michael VII Ducas was
tionally, returning a defeated and grate- proclaimed emperor by the Patriarch.104
ful Romanus to the throne would be Romanus tried to collected remnants
much more useful than having to deal of his armies and march on Constan-
with another emperor bent on revenge. tinople, but he was defeated in battle
twice and agreed to give up the throne
The defeat at Manzikert brought on a and retire to a monastery. However,
105

civil war in the decade between the bat- he was betrayed, brutally blinded, and
tle and the accession of Alexios I Com- died from his wounds.
nenus in 1081, which in turn shaped The aristocratic families were
decades of political and military events. more interested in their own power and
Romanus’s return to the throne prob- wealth than protecting the eastern bor-
ably would have been best for the em- ders—they refused Alp Arslan’s deal.

A painting depicting the aftermath of the Battle of Manzikert (Mantzikert) in August,

1071 C.E. The battle, in Armenia, was one of the greatest defeats suffered by the Byzantine
Empire. The victorious Seljuk army captured the Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV Dio-
genes. (Diorama at the Istanbul Military Museum, Public Domain) https://about-history.
com/the-battle-of-manzikert-1071-and-the-beginning-of-seljuk-ominance/?fbclid=I
wAR3gaa59yWxhvJ9KQ_eTN6zJvMZX1Rv3sQ5GcePChRU6XxfZYS3P89U8ZNk

101
 The Saber and Scroll

Chaos reigned. After Romanus’ down- and eastern borders of Byzantium were
fall, his general Philaretus Brachamius effectively defenseless and the Byzan-
rebelled and briefly held a fiefdom tines often fled west. Turkish warriors
from Cilicia and Armenia.106 General filled the gap in the central and eastern
Bryennius revolted at Adrianople, and regions and settled there. The neglect of
Roussel of Bailleul, once Michael VII’s the frontiers opened up the entire Ana-
Norman mercenary general, tried to tolia region to Turkish raids and settle-
set up an independent Norman state ment and during all of this internal tur-
in Anatolia.107 Michael VII was contin- moil, independent bands of Turks were
uously faced with revolts and was de- able to invade Asia Minor and occupy
posed in 1078 by Nicephoras III Bota- land unopposed.114 However, it wasn’t
neiates, who himself was deposed three until two years after the battle that the
years later by Alexius Comnenus.108 Seljuk Turks began to systematically oc-
Byzantine leaders such as Nicephoras cupy Anatolia and migrated into Ana-
III, lacking their own strong armies, tolia in force.115 Instead of acting against
often asked Seljuk emirs and troops them, the Byzantines let their internal
to help in advancing emperors to the struggles actually strengthen the Turk-
throne—increasing their influence.109 ish position. Soon the Turks had won
While the Byzantine leaders were oc- control of almost all of Anatolia—by
cupied with all of this in-fighting, the 1080 much of Anatolia was incorporat-
Byzantine Empire’s strategic position ed into the Sultanate of Rum.116
changed. As a result of the Battle of Man-
The defeat at Manzikert and the zikert and the ensuing rebellion, the
political strife immediately following Byzantine Empire had lost its major
combined with the failure to focus on recruiting region, which provided over
the external threats were a devastat- half of its military manpower, its larg-
ing combination that undermined the est grain producing region, and its vi-
power of the Byzantine Empire forev- tal trade route between Constantinople
er. It was a “death blow to Byzantine and the east.117 The Byzantine Empire
domination in Asia Minor.”110 The cam- had lost the greatest part of its inter-
paign had almost bankrupted the state. nal resources and the real source of its
Romanus himself said “I have used up strength, which had previously enabled
the monies of the Romans . . . in the re- it to recover from setbacks. Anatolia
organization of the armies and in wars, was “defensible, rich, and populous,”
and I have impoverished the nation.”111 but fell because nobody would defend
Thus began the slow steady decline of it.118 By the time of the Crusades, Byzan-
Byzantine influence and Christianity tium only held the Anatolian coasts. A
in Anatolia.112 The Turks used the re- movement was instigated that changed
fusal of the treaty made by Alp Arslan people and ideas decisively—Christian-
with Romanus as an excuse for their ity in the region began to be replaced
incursions into Anatolia.113 Turcomans by Islam, and the people of Anatolia
poured over the border. The southern changed identities.119 Even the Comne-

102
 “That Dreadful Day”: The Battle of Manzikert

nian recovery later was really limited to or refused to return cities to Byzantine
the coastal regions and could not sus- control, and sometimes were very harsh
tain itself long-term.120 However, this traveling through Byzantine territory.
situation had effects which would not The Battle of Manzikert was defi-
only change the Byzantine Empire, but nitely one of the most influential events
would have a great impact on the entire in history. It marked the beginning
region. of the end for the Byzantines. It sent
The Battle of Manzikert is of- shockwaves through both the Chris-
ten cited as the casus belli for the Cru- tian and Islamic worlds and opened the
sades.121 The beleaguered Byzantines floodgates to Turkish incursion into the
had sent many requests for military as- most strategically important region of
sistance during Pope Urban II’s reign, the empire.125 The two armies and their
and in March 1095 Emperor Alexios leaders were very different. The Seljuk
I Comnenus made another appeal for Turks were nomadic steppe warriors,
help in fighting off the Turkish invaders experts at using light infantry on hit-
to the Pope at the Council of Piacen- and-run attacks. Their leader, Alp Ar-
za.122 This fell right into the Pope’s plans. slan, was a strong Sunni warrior who
There had long been a rift between the really wanted no war with the Byzan-
Eastern and Western churches, and the tines—he wanted to make war on the
papacy hoped to reunite them. After the heretical Shiite Fatimids. They had tak-
defeat of the Byzantines at Manzikert en over the Persian Empire and were in
and the fall of Jerusalem in the same a very strong position. The Byzantines
year, Damascus and Antioch also fell, were in a very different position. De-
and it was easy to fan the fears of Chris- cades of mismanagement had turned
tians.123 Just ten months after Emperor the strong Byzantine military into an
Alexius’s request, the Pope made his fa- underpaid, mostly mercenary force
mous speech at Clermont. Although no with low morale. The Byzantine leader
record of what he said exists, according at Manzikert, Romanus, was insecure
to one account, he chastised his knights in his position as emperor with many
and said, “[I]f you want to take coun- political enemies, leading a large, but
sel for your souls . . . go forward boldly inefficient force. Romanus’ campaign
as knights of Christ, hurrying swiftly to towards the Seljuk Turks was filled with
defend the Eastern church.”124 Although errors. He split his army in half and
Alexius expected mercenary warriors then ignored Byzantine tactics versus
to help, he had opened up the prover- steppe warriors, finally betrayed by his
bial Pandora’s Box. The first Crusade own generals. Although the Byzantines
was the response to these appeals for lost this battle, it might not have been
help to repel those who held the lands a disaster if followed by good leader-
of the Christians, and the Franks soon ship. In the end, however, the battle and
traveled en mass into Byzantium on subsequent civil war were a disaster for
their way to the Holy Land. Often cru- the Byzantines because of poor leader-
saders carved out their own fiefdoms ship, internal struggles, and neglect of

103
 The Saber and Scroll

the borders that resulted in the loss of of the world. The battle so changed the
Anatolia, a strategically important area strategic position of the Byzantines that
they could hardly afford to lose. The re- soon the Turks had overrun Anatolia
sult of the battle had great ramifications and their requests for assistance led to
for not only the Byzantine Empire, but the first Crusade—a seminal event in
for the course of history in this region world history.

Bibliography
Attaleiates, Michael. Historia. In Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press Ltd, 2007.

Billings, Malcolm. The Cross and the Crescent: A History of the Crusades. New York:
Sterling Publishing Company, 1990.

Carey, Brian T. “Debacle at Manzikert, 1071: Prelude to the Crusades.” Medieval

History Magazine, Jan 2004: 16-23.

Carey, Brian T., Allfree, Joshua B., and Cairns, John. Road to Manzikert: Byzantine
and Islamic Warfare 527-1071. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books,
Ltd., 2012.

Harris, Jonathan. Byzantium and the Crusades. London: Hambledon and London,
2003.

Hillenbrand, Carole. Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol: The Battle of Manzikert.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, Ltd., 2007.

Holmes, Nick. The Byzantine World War: The Last Romans and the First Crusaders.
Leicestershire: Matador, 2019.

Jenkins, Romilly. Byzantium: The Imperial Centuries AD 610-1071. Toronto: Uni-

versity of Toronto Press, 1987.

Kadellis, Anthony. Streams of Gold, Rivers of Blood: The Rise and Fall of Byzantium.
955 AD to the First Crusade. New York: Oxford Press, 2017.

Kaplanis, Costas. “The Debasement of the ‘Dollar of the Middle Ages.’” The Jour-
nal of Economic History 63, no. 3 (2003): 768-801. Accessed February 15, 2021.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3132307.

104
 “That Dreadful Day”: The Battle of Manzikert

Norwich, John Julius. A Short History of Byzantium. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc., 1997.

O’Shea, Stephen. Sea of Faith: Islam and Christianity in the Medieval Mediterra-
nean World. New York: Walker Publishing Company, 2006.

Ostrogorsky, George. History of the Byzantine State. New Brunswick: Rutgers Uni-
versity Press, 1969.

Riley-Smith, Jonathan. The Crusades: A Short History. New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1987.

Treadgold, Warren. Byzantium and Its Army 284-1081. Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 1995.

———. A Concise History of Byzantium. Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001.

Vasiliev, A. A. History of the Byzantine Empire 324-1453, Vol. 1. Madison: The Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Press, 1952.

105
 The Saber and Scroll

Notes
1 Nick Holmes, The Byzantine World War: The Last Romans and the First Crusaders.
(Leicestershire: Matador, 2019), 124.

2 Carey, Allfree, and Cairns, 1.

3 Brian T. Carey, Joshua B. Allfree, and John Cairns, Road to Manzikert: Byzantine and
Islamic Warfare 527-1071. (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books, Ltd.,
2012), 150-151.

4 Nick Holmes, The Byzantine World War: The Last Romans and the First Crusaders.
(Leicestershire: Matador, 2019), 124.

5 Carey, Allfree, and Cairns, 1.

6 Stephen O’Shea, Sea of Faith: Islam and Christianity in the Medieval Mediterranean
World. (New York: Walker Publishing Company, 2006), 106.

7 Ibid., 107.

8 Carole Hillenbrand, Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol: The Battle of Manzikert. (Ed-
inburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd. 2007), 5.

9 O’Shea, 106.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., 108.

12 Ibid.

13 John Julius Norwich, A Short History of Byzantium. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
1997), 237.

14 O’Shea, 108.

15 Ibid.

16 Hillenbrand, 7.

17 Jonathan Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades. (London: Hambledon and London,
2003), 33.

18 Ibid.

19 O’Shea, 118

20 Ibid., 109.

21 Harris, 33.

22 Warren Treadgold, Byzantium and Its Army 284-1081. (Stanford: Stanford University

106
 “That Dreadful Day”: The Battle of Manzikert

Press, 1995), 40.

23 Hillenbrand, 6-7

24 O’Shea, 118.

25 Brian T. Carey, “Debacle at Manzikert, 1071: Prelude to the Crusades,” Medieval His-
tory Magazine, Jan 2004, 20.

26 Carey, Allfree, and Cairns, 117.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., 118.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Treadgold, Byzantium and Its Army 284-1081, 40.

34 O’Shea, 118.

35 Ibid., 110.

36 Ibid.

37 Warren Treadgold, A Concise History of Byzantium. (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001),

167.

38 Costas Kaplanis, “The Debasement of the ‘Dollar of the Middle Ages.’” The Journal of
Economic History 63, no. 3 (2003), 768. Accessed February 15, 2021. http://www.jstor.
org/stable/3132307.

39 Ibid., 769.

40 Treadgold, Byzantium and Its Army, 40.

41 Carey, Allfree, and Cairns, 121.

42 Treadgold, Byzantium and Its Army, 216.

43 Norwich, 232.

44 Ibid., 236.

45 Romilly Jenkins, Byzantium: The Imperial Centuries AD 610-1071. (Toronto: Univer-

sity of Toronto Press, 1987), 367.

46 Norwich, 237.

107
 The Saber and Scroll

47 George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State. (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univer-
sity Press, 1969), 344.

48 Ibid.

49 Anthony Kadellis, Streams of Gold, Rivers of Blood: The Rise and Fall of Byzantium.
955 AD to the First Crusade. (New York: Oxford Press, 2017), 238.

50 Ibid., 240.

51 Treadgold, Byzantium and Its Army, 217-218.

52 O’Shea, 116.

53 Kadellis, 242.

54 Carey, Allfree, and Cairns, 117.

55 Kadellis, 119.

56 Ibid., 117.

57 Carey, Allfree, and Cairns, 136.

58 Carey, 17.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid., 18.

61 Ibid.

62 Holmes, 74.

63 Norwich, 238.

64 Carey, Allfree, and Cairns, 139-140.

65 Michael Attaleiates, Historia, in Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol. (Edinburgh: Edin-
burgh University Press, Ltd., 2007), 233.

66 Ibid.

67 Holmes, 82.

68 Ibid.

69 Carey, 22.

70 Norwich, 238.

71 O’Shea, 121.

72 Harris, 58.

108
 “That Dreadful Day”: The Battle of Manzikert

73 Norwich, 239.

74 Carey, Allfree, and Cairn, 143,

75 Carey, 22.

76 Norwich, 239.

77 Ibid.

78 Holmes, 89.

79 O’Shea, 121.

80 Norwich, 239.

81 Kadellis, 247.

82 Attaleiates, in Hillenbrand, 234.

83 Holmes, 89.

84 Hillenbrand, 12.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

87 Romilly, 367.

88 Carey, 23.

89 Carey, Allfree, and Cairns, 2.

90 Ibid.

91 Norwich, 240.

92 Kadellis, 248.

93 Hillenbrand, 15.

94 Romilly, 372.

95 Carey, Allfree, and Cairns, 144.

96 Ibid.

97 Holmes, 87.

98 Carey, Allfree, and Cairns, 153.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid.

109
 The Saber and Scroll

101 Kadellis, 251.

102 Harris, 34.

103 Hillenbrand, 15.

104 Norwich, 241.

105 Ibid.

106 Treadgold, Byzantium and Its Army, 41.

107 Norwich, 243.

108 Ibid.

109 Carey, Allfree, and Cairns, 3.

110 A. A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire 324-1453, Vol. 1. (Madison: The Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Press, 1952), 356.

111 Kadellis, 248.

112 Hillenbrand, 3.

113 Ostrogorsky, 345.

114 Harris, 34.

115 Norwich, 242.

116 Norwich, 242.

117 Treadgold, Byzantium and Its Army, 41.

118 Ibid, 219.

119 O’Shea, 120.

120 Ostrogorsky, 357.

121 Carey, 23.

122 Malcolm Billings, The Cross and the Crescent: A History of the Crusades. (New York:
Sterling Publishing Company, 1990), 19.

123 Carey, 23.

124 Billings, 18-19.

125 Carey, Allfree, and Cairns, 1.

110