Vitaly Kozyrev

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 consolidated the West which seeks to secure the Putin regime’s strategic defeat in Ukraine. While refraining from a direct support of the Kremlin, China has demonstrated throughout this conflict a “pro-Russian neutrality” declaring a “no limits partnership” with Moscow which might result in a new bipolar confrontation between the West and the non-Western power centre with China and Russia on top of it. Being unable to directly confront the consolidated West, Beijing and Moscow have embarked on the path of a hybrid warfare strategy to modify America’s hegemonic behaviour by shifting global normative narratives, delegitimising the US leadership in the eyes of the broader international community and gaining support among the countries of the Global South.

This article examines the recent evolution of China’s policies toward the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept in the context of a changing international environment. As an example of an emerging ‘non-Western’ alternative to the existing normative consensus, the Chinese perception of the norm reflects the nature of the ongoing new East–West divide and is derived from Beijing’s new vision of a future world order and China’s role in it. In 2001–2011, China supported R2P as a new mechanism to revise Western practices of humanitarian interventionism and to contribute to a changing multilateral global international legal order exemplifying China’s new status as a responsible ‘global citizen’. When the R2P norm was politicized by the West as part of its global democratic interventionist policies of 2005–2014, China’s predominantly globalist vision of the international rule of law was replaced by its predominantly security-driven approach. This perspective, while recognizing the ongoing...

The paper examines the impact of the global economic crisis on the development of Russia’s security policy in Asia. In the final years of Vladimir Putin's presidency (2007-08), the Russian leadership made a dramatic reassessment of major global trends, sources of power, security threats, and the roles of key actors in the changing international environment. On the doctrinal level, the contours of the Kremlin’s new eastern policy has been consistent during the tenure of Dmitri Medvedev, Putin’s successor in the Kremlin. Three major developments predetermined the strengthening of the “Asian component” of Russian foreign and security strategy. Firstly, Russia’s “new globalist” approach to world politics which links national interest to the restoration of Russia’s global competitiveness and a great power status. Secondly, the imperative of modernization which requires Russia’s imminent integration into the global economic space filled with multiple geoeconomic risks and security threats. Thirdly, domestic political issues in the spheres of political control, administrative efficiency and development, critical for the interpretation of national security priorities by ruling political and business elites, especially prior to the new electoral cycle in 2011-12. The paper overviews these three groups of factors, demonstrating their impact on the Kremlin leadership and its policies aimed at Russia’s adjustment to the dynamic Asian security environment. The paper maintains that the recent global economic downturn has sharpened Moscow’s strife toward a decisive role in global affairs, aggravated its concerns of slow modernization and domestic socio-political situation. As a result, the Russian leadership is trying to reshape its foreign and security policy in Asia originally guided by the “East-West” dilemma toward a more comprehensive, proactive strategy oriented to maximizing gains from a deeper integration into the world system, and getting an access to financial and material resources including those of Asia, to eventually restore Russia’s relative influence, regionally and globally. The Asian vector of Russian foreign and security policy activism is considered to be even more important for effective management of complex domestic problems in times of economic turbulence. Moscow’s China policy remains the key component of the new Russian strategy. Driven by financial needs and the imperative of modernization, Moscow has made unprecedented steps toward a closer cooperation with Beijing which may potentially result in Russia’s irreversible gravitation to the China’s orbit and thus weaken Russia’s chances to craft the multipolar order in Eurasia. The paper concludes that, under the current circumstances, Moscow will hardly reconcile its accommodation to the emerging Sino-centered international order in the Greater East Asia with its own integrative efforts to create its exclusive zone of influence in the region. Russia will have to subsume its great power ambitious and security interests to Beijing’s grand strategy of creating a new, China-centered regional order in Asia.

The recent deterioration of US–China and US–Russia relations has stumbled the formation of a better world order in the 21st century. Washington’s concerns of the “great power realignment”, as well as its Manichean battle against China’s and Russia’s “illiberal regimes” have resulted in the activated alliance-building efforts between Beijing and Moscow, prompting the Biden administration to consider some wedging strategies. Despite their coordinated preparation to deter the US power, the Chinese and Russian leaderships seek to avert a conflict with Washington by diplomatic means, and the characteristic of their partnership is still leaving a “window of opportunity” for the United States to lever against the establishment of a formal Sino–Russian alliance.

A close reading of the recent high profile summits of the Asia‐Pacific – the 22nd APEC leaders’ mee ng in Beijing and the 9th East Asia Summit (EAS) in Naypyitaw, Myanmar – provides the opportunity to assess the depth and velocity of change in the regional poli cal arena. One of the most intriguing developments comes from a new strategic conjunc on between China and Russia, the la er estranged and sanc oned by the West over Ukraine. The progress in the major areas of Sino‐Russian coopera on since the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis not only demonstrates the level of trust between the two powers, but raises the ques on about concerted Sino‐Russian “pushback” against the U.S. in Asia. Although the recent US‐China arrangements in security, investments and environmental policies have eased tensions between the two, the problem of trust and conflic ng interests in the region remains unresolved. Earlier this year Chinese President Xi Jiping acclaimed China’s leadership roles in the forma...

This article examines the recent evolution of China's policies toward the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept in the context of a changing international environment. As an example of an emerging 'non-Western' alternative to the existing normative consensus, the Chinese perception of the norm reflects the nature of the ongoing new East–West divide and is derived from Beijing's new vision of a future world order and China's role in it.