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Religion in Lebanon

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Saint George Maronite Cathedral and the Mohammad Al-Amin Mosque, Beirut.
A Christian Church and a Druze Khalwa in the Shuf Mountains: Historically, the Druzes and the Christians in the Shuf Mountains lived in complete harmony.[1]
Listing the largest community in the Lebanese electorate, per qada and/or "minor district".
  Sunni
  Shia
  Druze
  Maronite
  Greek Orthodox
  Armenian Orthodox

Lebanon is an eastern Mediterranean country that has the most religiously diverse society within the Middle East, recognizing 18 religious sects.[2][3] The recognized religions are Islam (Sunni, Shia, Alawites, Isma'ili and Druze), Christianity (the Maronite Church, the Greek Orthodox Church, the Melkite Greek Catholic Church, evangelical Protestantism, the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Armenian Catholic Church, the Latin Church, the Syriac Catholic Church, the Syriac Orthodox Church, the Assyrian Church of the East, the Chaldean Catholic Church, the Coptic Orthodox Church) and Judaism.

Religion in Lebanon (2024)[4]

  Islam (53.31%)
  Christianity (41.4%)
  Druze (5.21%)

Lebanon differs from other Middle East countries where Muslims have become the majority after the civil war, and somewhat resembles Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania, both are in Southeast Europe, and have a diverse mix of Muslims and Christians that each make up a large proportion of the country's population. Christians were once a majority inside Lebanon and are still an overwhelming majority in the diaspora, which consists of nearly 14 million people.[5][6]

Besides Lebanese citizens in Lebanon, a large proportion of people in the country are refugees, accounting for approximately 2 million people out of a bit over 6 million in 2017, which affects statistics.[2] The refugees, who mostly are of Syrian or Palestinian origin, are predominantly Sunni Muslim, but include Christians and Shia Muslims.[2]

Under the National Pact, the president of Lebanon must be a Maronite Christian,[7] the prime minister a Sunni Muslim,[8] and the speaker of parliament a Shia Muslim.[9]

Population by religious affiliation

[edit]

No official census has been taken since 1932, reflecting the political sensitivity in Lebanon over confessional (i.e., religious) balance.[10] As a result, the religious affiliation of the Lebanese population is very difficult to establish with certainty and various sources are used to get the possible estimate of the population by religious affiliation. The following are different sources that do not pretend to be fully representative of the religious affiliation of the people of Lebanon.[citation needed]

A 2012 study conducted by Statistics Lebanon, a Beirut-based research firm, estimated Lebanon's population to be 54% Muslim (27% Shia; 27% Sunni), 46% Christian (31.5% Maronite, 8% Greek Orthodox, 6.5% other Christian groups) [11]

The CIA World Factbook estimates (2020) the following, though this data does not include Lebanon's sizable Syrian and Palestinian refugee populations: Muslim 67.8% (Sunni, Shia and smaller percentages of Alawites and Ismailis), Christian 32.4% (mainly Maronite Catholics are the largest Christian group), Druze 4.5%, and very small numbers of Jews, Baha'is, Buddhists, and Hindus.[12]

According to a 2022 analysis by the Pew Research Center, the demographic landscape of Lebanon reveals a Christian population estimated at 43.4%, with Muslims constituting the majority at 57.6%. This data underscores the religious diversity within Lebanon, reflecting a dynamic interplay of different faith communities within the country.[13]

Lebanon has a community of around 13,000 Hindus.[14] There is a very small and ancient community of Zoroastrians, numbering between 100–500 individuals.[15][16] Lebanon also has a Jewish population estimated at less than 100.[2]

Confessional breakdown of registered voters in Lebanon

[edit]
Year Christians Muslims Druze
Total Maronites Orthodox Catholics Armenian Apostolics Other Christians Armenians Catholics Protestants Total Shias Sunnis Alawites
2011[17]
39.1%
21.71%
7.34%
4.8%
2.64%
1.46%
0.62%
0.53%
55.88%
27.35%
27.65%
0.88%
5.74%
2018[18][19]
40%
21.11%
8.1%
5.2%
2.88%
1.51%
0.65%
0.55%
54.58%
28.2%
25.49%
0.89%
5.42%
2024[18][19]
41.4%
22.47%
8.3%
4.97%
2.92%
1.64%
0.67%
0.53%
53.31%
26.2%
26.55%
0.64%
5.21%
Growth
2.3%
1.36%
0.96%
0.17%
0.28%
0.18%
0.05%
0%
−2.57%
−1.15%
−1.1%
−0.24%
−0.53%
Year Christians Muslims Druze
Total Maronites Orthodox Catholics Armenians Apostolics Other Christians Armenian Catholics Protestants Total Shias Sunnis Alawites
2011[20] 1 280 221 702 291 244 627 158 723 88 005 48 428 20 514 17 633 1 863 534 912 095 922 125 29 314 191 321
2018[18][19] 1 474 241 778 032 298 534 191 651 106 145 55 652 23 956 20 271 2 011 604 1 039 341 939 461 32 802 199 760
2024[18][19] 1 642 548 891 498 329 303 197 185 115 851 65 067 26 582 21 027 2 115 078 1 039 487 1 053 373 25 392 206 707
Growth +362 327 +189 207 +84 676 +38 462 +27 846 +16 639 +6 068 +3 394 +251 541 +127 392 +131 248 -3 922 +15 386
% growth Increase17.16% Increase21.22% Increase25.71% Increase19.5% Increase24.03% Increase25.57% Increase22.82% Increase16.14% Increase11.89% Increase12.25% Increase12.45% Decrease-15.44 Increase7.44


The confessional breakdown of registered voters in Lebanon between 2011, 2018, and 2024 offers a detailed look at the demographic trends among the country’s various religious sects, including Christians, Muslims (Shias, Sunnis, and Alawites), and Druze. Lebanon’s complex socio-political environment and history of conflict have heavily influenced these trends, with shifts in population numbers reflecting broader regional upheavals, such as the Syrian civil war, the Lebanese-Israeli conflicts, and internal economic and political struggles. This review will explore the changes within each major sect and the possible factors driving these shifts.

Christians Lebanon’s Christian population, historically a dominant political force, remains a significant part of the electorate. The Christian category is diverse, including Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Catholics, Armenians (Apostolics and Catholics), Protestants, and other smaller groups. A general upward trend can be seen in the voter registration figures for Christians, contrasting with the relative stagnation or decline in Muslim sects.

Maronites:

2011: Maronites made up 21.71% of the total voter base, representing over 700,000 individuals. 2018: Their percentage dipped slightly to 21.11%, but their absolute numbers grew to 778,032. 2024: By this year, Maronites saw a growth in both their percentage (22.47%) and absolute numbers (891,498). This upward trend, particularly from 2018 onwards, could be linked to the return of displaced individuals and demographic recovery following the initial effects of the 2011 Syrian crisis. During the Syrian conflict, many Maronites living in areas near the Syrian border or in vulnerable economic situations were likely displaced, resulting in a temporary stagnation. However, by 2024, their voter base had expanded, reflecting improved social and political conditions for this community. Their growth can also be attributed to higher birth rates or returns from the diaspora.

Orthodox:

2011: Represented 7.34% of voters, with around 244,627 people. 2018: This number increased to 8.1%, or 298,534 voters. 2024: The percentage reached 8.3%, with 329,303 voters. Orthodox Christians have experienced steady growth, reflecting similar factors that benefited the Maronites. Orthodox communities, largely based in stable urban centers or regions less affected by direct conflict, may have benefited from higher birth rates and lower emigration compared to other groups. Their growth could also reflect increasing stability in their traditional areas of residence.

Catholics:

2011: Catholics made up 4.8% of the electorate, totaling 158,723 voters. 2018: Their percentage slightly increased to 5.2%, with 191,651 voters. 2024: Catholics remained at around 4.97%, with 197,185 voters. Although the Catholic community’s percentage growth has been modest, their total numbers have increased significantly. This suggests that while their overall demographic proportion is stable, the absolute growth in voters reflects a broader trend of population growth in Christian communities.

Armenians Apostolics (Apostolics and Catholics):

Armenian Apostolics: 2011: Represented 2.64% of voters (88,005 people). 2018: This percentage increased to 2.88% (106,145 people). 2024: By this time, Armenian Apostolics made up 2.92% (115,851 people). Armenian Catholics: 2011: Made up 0.62% of voters (20,514 people). 2018: This number increased to 0.65% (23,956 people). 2024: Reached 0.67%, with 26,582 voters. The Armenian communities, both Apostolic and Catholic, have seen steady growth. The Armenian diaspora in Lebanon has long maintained close ties to its homeland and international diaspora, which might explain the resilience and growth of these communities. Given Lebanon's relatively stable environment for religious minorities, Armenians have seen a consistent rise in voter registration, suggesting healthy birth rates and potential return migration.

Protestants and Other Christians:

Protestants: 2011: 0.53% of voters, with 17,633 individuals. 2024: Grew to 21,027 voters, marking a significant increase of 16.14%. Other Christians: 2011: Represented 1.46% (48,428 voters). 2024: Increased to 65,067 voters, a growth of 25.57%. Smaller Christian sects, such as Protestants and various independent Christian groups, have also seen healthy growth. This could be due to greater political and social organization, increased migration from other regions, or higher fertility rates.

Muslims The Muslim population in Lebanon is primarily divided between Shia, Sunni, and Alawite communities. While they constitute a significant portion of the voter base, the overall Muslim population has seen a slight decline as a percentage of the electorate, particularly in areas heavily affected by conflict.

Shias:

2011: Shias made up 27.35% of the voter base, with 912,095 registered voters. 2018: This number rose to 28.2%, totaling 1,039,341 voters. 2024: However, the percentage decreased to 26.2%, with 1,039,487 voters. Shia Muslims experienced an increase between 2011 and 2018, but this trend reversed by 2024. The Lebanese-Israeli conflicts, which have disproportionately affected southern Lebanon (where many Shias reside), likely led to this decrease. Many Shia residents of southern Lebanon have faced displacement, economic hardship, and lower birth rates due to instability and conflict. Additionally, some may have migrated to Syria or other countries in search of better living conditions, further contributing to their reduced voter base.

Sunnis:

2011: Sunnis constituted 27.65% of voters, with 922,125 individuals. 2018: This percentage fell to 25.49%, with 939,461 registered voters. 2024: Their proportion stabilized slightly, reaching 26.55%, with 1,053,373 voters. Like the Shia, the Sunni population has experienced fluctuations. While their absolute numbers have grown, their overall percentage of the population has seen a slight decline. Many Sunni communities reside in regions of Lebanon that have been economically challenged, such as Tripoli and parts of the Bekaa Valley. These areas have been affected by both internal Lebanese political struggles and the Syrian crisis, which may have led to migration or reduced birth rates.

Alawites:

2011: Alawites made up 0.88% of voters, with 29,314 individuals. 2018: Their number slightly increased to 0.89%, with 32,802 voters. 2024: The Alawite percentage decreased to 0.64%, with 25,392 voters, marking a decline of -15.44%. The Alawite community, which is closely tied to the Assad regime in Syria, has seen a significant decline in Lebanon. The Lebanese-Israeli conflicts and their connection to the Assad regime likely contributed to their displacement or migration back to Syria, as many Alawites fled Lebanon due to political instability and threats to their safety.

Druze The Druze community, a significant but small religious group in Lebanon, has seen a relatively stable voter base:

2011: The Druze represented 5.74% of voters, with 191,321 individuals. 2018: This percentage decreased to 5.42%, with 199,760 voters. 2024: The Druze voter base grew to 206,707 individuals, constituting 5.21% of voters. The Druze have maintained a relatively stable population in Lebanon, with minor fluctuations in their overall percentage. Their traditional strongholds in the Chouf mountains have largely remained insulated from the worst effects of conflict, allowing their population to grow modestly over time.

Geographical distribution of sects in Lebanon

[edit]

Lebanese Christians

[edit]

Lebanese Christians form a large proportion of the total population, and they are divided into many branches, including Maronite, Eastern Orthodox, Melkite, and other communities.

Lebanese Maronites are concentrated in the northern parts of Greater Beirut, the northern part of Mount Lebanon Governorate, the southern part of North Governorate, parts of Beqaa Governorate and South Governorate.[21]

Lebanese Greek Orthodox are concentrated in north Beirut, as well as Lebanese North areas including Zgharta, Bsharri, Koura, and Batroun.

Lebanese Greek Catholics are found across the country but in particular in districts on the eastern slopes of the Lebanese mountain range and in Zahlé where they are a majority.

Lebanese Protestants are concentrated mainly within the area of Beirut and Greater Beirut.

The other Lebanese Christians and non-native Christian communities are concentrated in similar areas like in east Beirut (northern parts of Greater Beirut), Mount Lebanon, Zahlé, and Jezzine.

Lebanese Muslims

[edit]

Lebanese Muslims form a large number of the total population, and they are divided into many sects, which include Sunnis, Shias, Alawites, and Ismailis.[citation needed]

Lebanese Sunnis are mainly residents of the major cities: west Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon. Sunnis are also present in rural areas, which include Akkar, Ikleem al Kharoub, and the western Beqaa Valley.[citation needed]

Lebanese Shias are concentrated in Southern Lebanon, Baalbek District, Hermel District and the south Beirut (southern parts of Greater Beirut).

Lebanese Druze

[edit]
Religious map of Lebanon by municipality according to municipal elections data

The Druze are located in the areas known as the Matn, Gharb, Chouf, Wadi-al Taym, Beirut and its suburbs, and the Druze make up the majority in cities like Aley, Choueifat, Rashaya, Ras el-Matn and Baakleen.

Lebanese Jews

[edit]
Estimated distribution of main religious groups, 1985, by the CIA[citation needed]
Lebanon religious groups distribution[citation needed]
Maps of religion distribution in Lebanon

As of 2021, there are only 69 Jews remaining in Lebanon.[22] The majority of the remaining Jewish population is concentrated in Beirut. The Jewish community was traditionally located in Wadi Abu Jamil and Ras Beirut, with other communities in Chouf, Deir al-Qamar, Aley, Bhamdoun, and Hasbaya.[23]

Religion and society

[edit]

Religion and politics

[edit]

The Maronite Catholics and the Druze founded modern Lebanon in the early eighteenth century, through a governing and social system known as the "Maronite-Druze dualism" in the Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate.[24]

Religion plays a major role in politics. Some researchers describe the political system in Lebanon as "coming out of the womb of religion and politics".[25] After the independence from France in 1943, the leaders of Lebanon agreed on the distribution of the political positions in the country according to religious affiliation, known as the National Pact. Since then, the President is always a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister is at all times a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the Parliament must be a Shia Muslim.

Most political parties are based on sectarian belongingness and represent their religion's interests. It is not rare to find the clergy involved in political activities, either as members or as leaders.[26]

Current political and religious issues

[edit]

Under the terms of an agreement known as the National Pact between the various political and religious leaders of Lebanon, the president of the country must be a Maronite, the prime minister must be a Sunni, and the speaker of Parliament must be a Shia.[27][28] This has further sustained a power balance which has been founded on religious-sectarian values.

Since Lebanon is a country that is ruled by a sectarian system, family matters such as marriage, divorce and inheritance are handled by the religious authorities representing a person's faith. The modern Lebanese state regulates the intersection between rights, sex, and kinship through the simultaneous application of civil and personal status law and through civil institutions that provide oversight over the legal system as a whole.[29] Calls for civil marriage are unanimously rejected by the religious authorities but civil marriages conducted in another country are recognized by Lebanese civil authorities. In the case of Lebanon, many Lebanese couples therefore conducted their civil marriage in Cyprus, which became a well-known destination for such instances.[30]

Overall, societal norms and family dynamics create significant obstacles for mixed-sect couples in Lebanon, impacting their relationships and the acceptance of their unions within their communities and families.[31]

Non-religion is not recognized by the state. However, following intense pressure and lobbying by the Civil Center for National Initiative, the Minister of the Interior Ziyad Baroud made it possible to have a citizen's religious sect removed from his identity card in 2009.[32][33]

In April 2010, Laïque Pride, a secular group co-founded by feminist Yalda Younes, called for "an end to the country's deep-rooted sectarian system" and for a "secular Lebanon". Laïque Pride supports the enacting of a unified Civil Code for the Personal Status Law.[34]

On April 26, 2010, in response to Hizb ut-Tahrir's growing appeal in Beirut and demands to re-establish an Islamic caliphate, a Laïque Pride march was held in Beirut. Three days later, 70,000 gathered in Martyrs' Square, Beirut for a march organized by Laïque Pride.

In 2011, hundreds of protesters rallied in Beirut on 27 February in a Laïque Pride march, calling for reform of the country's confessional political system. At the same time, a peaceful sit-in took place in Sidon.[35]

At a march in May 2012 in which 600 participated, Laïque Pride issued six demands, four concerning women's rights and two concerning media freedom. Secular student clubs from Saint Joseph University (USJ), the Lebanese Academy of Fine Arts (ALBA), as the American University of Beirut (AUB) also participated in the march.

In October 2019, and until August 2020, a series of civil protests ensued in Lebanon, now known as the 17 October Revolution condemning sectarian rule amongst a myriad of other issues plaguing their country.[36] Lina Khatib, a journalist for Al Jazeera, has labelled these protests as "cross-sectarian". She notes: "They are taking place across Lebanon, rather than only in Beirut. And they are demanding the fall of the government from the outset, while criticizing political leaders from every sect."[37]

Freedom of religion

[edit]

In 2023 and 2024, Freedom House gave Lebanon a score of 3 out of 4 for freedom of religious expression.[38][39]

[edit]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ Hobby (1985). Near East/South Asia Report. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. p. 53. the Druzes and the Christians in the Shuf Mountains in the past lived in complete harmony..
  2. ^ a b c d "International Religious Freedom Report for 2017". www.state.gov. United States Department of State. Retrieved 30 March 2019. Cites Statistics Lebanon for most Lebanon statistics
  3. ^ Alfred B. Prados (June 8, 2006). "CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Lebanon". The Library of Congress. Retrieved June 11, 2012.
  4. ^ International Foundation for Electoral Systems (September 2011). "Overview of the current 26 electoral districts" (PDF).
  5. ^ Kechichian, Joseph A. (17 November 2015). "Lebanon contemplates a new citizenship law". gulfnews.com. Retrieved 17 April 2018.
  6. ^ "Bassil promises to ease citizenship for expatriates". The Daily Star. 1 May 2014. Archived from the original on 2 May 2014. Retrieved 17 April 2018.
  7. ^ Gambill, Gary C. (January 2001). "Michel Aoun Former Lebanese Prime Minister". Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. Archived from the original on 4 April 2011. Retrieved 8 September 2024.
  8. ^ William Harris (2012). Lebanon: A History, 600-2011. Oxford University Press. p. 347. ISBN 978-0-19-518111-1.
  9. ^ "Nabih Berri, born 1938". Wars of Lebanon. Retrieved 8 September 2024.
  10. ^ "Population (Lebanon)". Country Studies. Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. Retrieved 30 December 2019.
  11. ^ "International Religious Freedom Report for 2012: Lebanon". United States Department of State. Retrieved 30 March 2019.
  12. ^ "Lebanon — The World Factbook". Central Intelligence Agency, United States. Retrieved 10 January 2021.
  13. ^ "Religious Composition By Country". pewresearch.org. 21 December 2022. Retrieved 2023-03-26.
  14. ^ "Lebanon, Religion And Social Profile". thearda.com. Retrieved 2021-12-13.
  15. ^ "Seif And The "Fire Worshipers" Of Beirut?". Seif and his Beiruti Adventures. 9 October 2010.
  16. ^ Chebaro, Mohamed (18 November 2014). "Lebanon's Zoroastrians want a civil state". NOw (mmedia.me). Archived from the original on 3 May 2016.
  17. ^ International Foundation for Electoral Systems (September 2011). "Overview of the current 26 electoral districts" (PDF). p. 3. Retrieved May 24, 2024.
  18. ^ a b c d الدوائر الانتخابية: بالارقام والنسب عدد الناخبين واسماء المرشحين للانتخابات النيابية اللبنانية 2018. Ministry of Information Cite error: The named reference "mininfo" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  19. ^ a b c d دراسة نقدية في قانون الانتخاب النسبي. Lebanon Files
  20. ^ International Foundation for Electoral Systems (September 2011). "Overview of the current 26 electoral districts" (PDF). p. 3. Retrieved May 24, 2024.
  21. ^ Lebanon Maronites Overview World Directory of Minorities. June 2008. Retrieved 28 December 2013.
  22. ^ Kirsten E. Schulze (2009) Point of Departure: The 1967 War and the Jews of Lebanon, Israel Affairs, 15:4, p: 336-339
  23. ^ "The Jews of Lebanon". Archived from the original on 8 August 2007.
  24. ^ Deeb, Marius (2013). Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah: The Unholy Alliance and Its War on Lebanon. Hoover Press. ISBN 9780817916664. the Maronites and the Druze, who founded Lebanon in the early eighteenth century.
  25. ^ "الإصلاح والسلطة في لبنان بين الديني والسياسي". 2020-10-24. Archived from the original on 2020-10-24. Retrieved 2020-10-31.
  26. ^ Limited, Elaph Publishing (7 February 2008). "رجال الدين في لبنان: يوم للرب وآخر للسياسة". @Elaph (in Arabic). Retrieved 2020-10-31. {{cite web}}: |last= has generic name (help)
  27. ^ "AUB: The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement". 2018-10-15. Archived from the original on 2018-10-15. Retrieved 2020-10-08.
  28. ^ "Politics and the Airlines". International Affairs. 42 (2): 276. April 1966. doi:10.1093/ia/42.2.276a. ISSN 1468-2346.
  29. ^ Maya Mikdashi, Sextarianism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2022). Chapters 1 (pages 24-47)
  30. ^ Abillama, Raja (September 2018). "Contesting Secularism: Civil Marriage and Those Who Do Not Belong to a Religious Community in Lebanon". PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review. 41 (S1): 148–162. doi:10.1111/plar.12259. S2CID 158980395.
  31. ^ Deeb, Lara (2022). "WHEN EXPOSURE ISNOT ENOUGH: Sectarianism as a Response to Mixed Marriage," in Practicing Sectarianism (ed. Lara Deeb, Tsolin Nalbantian, and Nadya Sbaiti ed.). Stanford: Stanford University Press. pp. 157–179. ISBN 9781503631090.
  32. ^ "Religious affiliation to disappear from Lebanese documents". www.asianews.it. 13 February 2009. Retrieved 30 March 2019.
  33. ^ Religious Affiliation Can Be Removed From Lebanese ID Cards. Barcode Nation (2009-02-25). Retrieved on 2013-09-26.
  34. ^ adonis49. "Lebanese Laïque Pride activist group". Adonis Diaries. Retrieved 2020-10-08.
  35. ^ "Lebanese protest against sectarian political system". Reuters. 2011-02-27. Retrieved 2020-10-08.
  36. ^ Network, Readables (2019-10-27). "Lebanon Protesters Found Strength in Unity, Ditched Sectarianism". Report Syndication. Retrieved 2020-10-08.
  37. ^ Khatib, Lina. "Lebanon is experiencing a social revolution". www.aljazeera.com. Retrieved 2020-10-08.
  38. ^ "Lebanon: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report". Freedom House. Retrieved 8 September 2024.
  39. ^ "Lebanon: Freedom in the World 2024 Country Report". Freedom House. Retrieved 8 September 2024.