research-article

Attack Incentive and Security of Exchanging Tokens on Proof-of-Work Blockchain

Authors:

Keita Nakamura,

Kentaro Teramoto,

Misato TakahashiAuthors Info & Claims

AINTEC '18: Proceedings of the 14th Asian Internet Engineering Conference

Pages 32 - 37

https://doi.org/10.1145/3289166.3289171

Published: 12 November 2018 Publication History

Abstract

In a consensus algorithm based on Proof-of-Work, miners are motivated by crypto rewards. Furthermore, security is guaranteed because a cost of a 50% attack chance is higher than the potential rewards. However, because of the sudden price jump of cryptocurrencies and cheap prices of mining machines like ASICs, the cost and profit were on equilibrium for Bitcoin in 2017. In this situation, attackers are motivated by the balance between hash power and profits. In this paper, we describe that there is relevance between mining power on the network and price of tokens that can be taken securely on a blockchain. Users who exchange tokens on the PoW blockchain should monitor mining power and exchange tokens cheaper than the attack cost so that profit and cost of the attacker are not in equilibrium.

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Cited By

Wang JZhu JZhang MAlam IBiswas S(2022)Function Virtualization Can Play a Great Role in Blockchain ConsensusIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2022.317634910(59862-59877)Online publication date: 2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3176349
Zhuang PZamir TLiang H(2021)Blockchain for Cybersecurity in Smart Grid: A Comprehensive SurveyIEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics10.1109/TII.2020.299847917:1(3-19)Online publication date: Jan-2021
https://doi.org/10.1109/TII.2020.2998479
Fu YChen HQian JDong Y(2020)A PoL Protocol for Spatiotemporal BlockchainSecurity and Privacy in Digital Economy10.1007/978-981-15-9129-7_41(591-605)Online publication date: 22-Oct-2020
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9129-7_41

Index Terms

Attack Incentive and Security of Exchanging Tokens on Proof-of-Work Blockchain
1. Computing methodologies
  1. Modeling and simulation
2. Security and privacy
  1. Systems security
    1. Distributed systems security

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cover image ACM Other conferences

AINTEC '18: Proceedings of the 14th Asian Internet Engineering Conference

November 2018

69 pages

ISBN:9781450361316

DOI:10.1145/3289166

Copyright © 2018 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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SIGCOMM: ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication
AIOT: Asian Institute of Technology

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 12 November 2018

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AINTEC '18

AINTEC '18: ASIAN INTERNET ENGINEERING CONFERENCE

November 12 - 14, 2018

Bangkok, Thailand

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AINTEC '18 Paper Acceptance Rate 8 of 21 submissions, 38%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 15 of 38 submissions, 39%

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Cited By

Wang JZhu JZhang MAlam IBiswas S(2022)Function Virtualization Can Play a Great Role in Blockchain ConsensusIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2022.317634910(59862-59877)Online publication date: 2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3176349
Zhuang PZamir TLiang H(2021)Blockchain for Cybersecurity in Smart Grid: A Comprehensive SurveyIEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics10.1109/TII.2020.299847917:1(3-19)Online publication date: Jan-2021
https://doi.org/10.1109/TII.2020.2998479
Fu YChen HQian JDong Y(2020)A PoL Protocol for Spatiotemporal BlockchainSecurity and Privacy in Digital Economy10.1007/978-981-15-9129-7_41(591-605)Online publication date: 22-Oct-2020
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9129-7_41

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