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Related-Key Attacks on Reduced Rounds of SHACAL-2

  • Conference paper
Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2004 (INDOCRYPT 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 3348))

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Abstract

SHACAL-2 is a 256-bit block cipher with up to 512 bits of key length based on the hash function SHA-2. It was submitted to the NESSIE project and was recommended as one of the NESSIE selections. In this paper we present two types of related-key attacks called the related-key differential-(non)linear and the related-key rectangle attacks, and we discuss the security of SHACAL-2 against these two types of attacks. Using the related-key differential-nonlinear attack we can break SHACAL-2 with 512-bit keys up to 35 out of its 64 rounds, and using the related-key rectangle attack we can break SHACAL-2 with 512-bit keys up to 37 rounds.

This work was supported by the Ministry of Information & Communications, Korea, under the Information Technology Research Center (ITRC) Support Program.

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Kim, J., Kim, G., Lee, S., Lim, J., Song, J. (2004). Related-Key Attacks on Reduced Rounds of SHACAL-2. In: Canteaut, A., Viswanathan, K. (eds) Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2004. INDOCRYPT 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3348. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30556-9_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30556-9_15

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-24130-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-30556-9

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