Abstract
Informally, a public-key steganography protocol allows two parties, who have never met or exchanged a secret, to send hidden messages over a public channel so that an adversary cannot even detect that these hidden messages are being sent. Unlike previous settings in which provable security has been applied to steganography, public-key steganography is information-theoretically impossible. In this work we introduce computational security conditions for public-key steganography similar to those introduced by Hopper, Langford and von Ahn [7] for the private-key setting. We also give the first protocols for public-key steganography and steganographic key exchange that are provably secure under standard cryptographic assumptions. Additionally, in the random oracle model, we present a protocol that is secure against adversaries that have access to a decoding oracle (a steganographic analogue of Rackoff and Simon’s attacker-specific adaptive chosen-ciphertext adversaries from CRYPTO 91 [10]).
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von Ahn, L., Hopper, N.J. (2004). Public-Key Steganography. In: Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.L. (eds) Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2004. EUROCRYPT 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3027. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24676-3_20
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