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Formal Verification of Forward Secrecy and Post-Compromise Security for TreeKEM

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Formal Methods: Foundations and Applications (SBMF 2024)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 15403))

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Abstract

The TreeKEM protocol is the preeminent implementation candidate for the Message Layer Security standard. Prior work analyzed TreeKEM by defining the Continuous Group Key Agreement security game, which facilitated proof of some security guarantees and also identified protocol deficiencies which were subsequently remedied. This work extends such applications by formalizing the Continuous Group Key Agreement security game through multiple soundness preserving abstractions. The model is parameterized by N, representing an unbounded protocol duration among N distinct participants. Once formalized, the game is encoded within Promela and essential security guarantees are verified for \(N \le 16\) via the model checker Spin. This represents a notable achievement, both in practical security terms for the TreeKEM protocol, as well as demonstrating scalability techniques for non-trivial parameter bounds when modeling a complex, concurrent protocol.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Performed on the American Museum of Natural History scientific computing cluster.

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Correspondence to Alex J. Washburn .

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Washburn, A.J., Shankar, S. (2025). Formal Verification of Forward Secrecy and Post-Compromise Security for TreeKEM. In: C. Nogueira, S., Teodorov, C. (eds) Formal Methods: Foundations and Applications. SBMF 2024. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 15403. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-78116-2_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-78116-2_10

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-78116-2

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