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An Evolutionary Study on Cooperation in N-person Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

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Simulated Evolution and Learning (SEAL 1998)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 1585))

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Abstract

The iterated prisoner’s dilemma game has been used to study on the evolution of cooperation in social, economic and biological systems. There have been much work on the relationship of number of players and cooperation, evolutionary strategy learning as a kind of machine learning, and the effect of payoff function to cooperation. This paper attempts to reveal that cooperative coalition size depends on payoff function and localization affects the evolution of cooperation in the N-player Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (NIPD). Localization makes individuals to interact or learn with adjacent individuals. Experimental result reports that cooperative coalition size increases as the gradient of the payoff function for cooperation becomes steeper than that of defector’s payoff function or as minimum coalition size gets smaller. It is also shown that localization of interaction is an important factor to affect cooperative coalition.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Yonsei University, 134 Shinchon-dong, Sudaemoon-ku, Seoul, 120-749, Korea

    Yeon-Gyu Seo & Sung-Bae Cho

Authors
  1. Yeon-Gyu Seo
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  2. Sung-Bae Cho
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computer Science, University College, UNSW Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, ACT, Australia, 2600

    Bob McKay , Xin Yao  & Charles S. Newton ,  & 

  2. Department of Electrical Engineering Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 373-1, Kusung-dong, Yusung-gu, Taejon-shi, 305-701, Korea

    Jong-Hwan Kim

  3. Department of Information Electronics, Nagoya University, Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku, Nagoya, 464-8603, Japan

    Takeshi Furuhashi

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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Seo, YG., Cho, SB. (1999). An Evolutionary Study on Cooperation in N-person Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. In: McKay, B., Yao, X., Newton, C.S., Kim, JH., Furuhashi, T. (eds) Simulated Evolution and Learning. SEAL 1998. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 1585. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48873-1_39

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48873-1_39

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-65907-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-48873-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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