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Making Sense of Specifications: The Formalization of SET

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Security Protocols (Security Protocols 2000)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2133))

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Abstract

The last ten years, since the seminal work on the BAN logic [6], have seen the rapid development of formal methods for the analysis of security protocols. But security protocols have also developed rapidly, becoming more and more complex. Protocols for electronic commerce are the béte noir: six pages were enough to describe the Needham-Schroeder protocol in 1978 [15], six hundred pages were not enough to describe the SET protocol of VISA and Mastercard [11, 12, 13] twenty years later.

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© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Bella, G., Massacci, F., Paulson, L.C., Tramontano, P. (2001). Making Sense of Specifications: The Formalization of SET. In: Christianson, B., Malcolm, J.A., Crispo, B., Roe, M. (eds) Security Protocols. Security Protocols 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2133. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44810-1_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44810-1_11

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-42566-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-44810-5

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