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A Weak Key Class of XTEA for a Related-Key Rectangle Attack

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Progress in Cryptology - VIETCRYPT 2006 (VIETCRYPT 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4341))

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Abstract

XTEA is a block cipher with a very simple structure but there has not been found attack even for half of full round version i.e 32-round version. In this paper we introduce a class of weak keys which makes a 34-round reduced version of XTEA vulnerable to the related-key rectangle attack. The number of such weak keys is about 2108.21. Our attack on a 34-round reduced version of XTEA under weak key assumption requires 262 chosen plaintexts and 231.94 34-round XTEA encryptions.

This research was supported by the MIC(Ministry of Information and Communication), Korea, under the ITRC(Information Technology Research Center) support program supervised by the IITA(Institute of Information Technology Advancement)(IITA-2006-(C1090-0603-0025)).

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Lee, E., Hong, D., Chang, D., Hong, S., Lim, J. (2006). A Weak Key Class of XTEA for a Related-Key Rectangle Attack. In: Nguyen, P.Q. (eds) Progress in Cryptology - VIETCRYPT 2006. VIETCRYPT 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4341. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11958239_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11958239_19

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-68799-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-68800-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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