Abstract
Super solutions provide a framework for finding robust solutions to Constraint Satisfaction Problems [5,3]. We present a novel application of super solutions to combinatorial auctions in which a bid may be disqualified or withdrawn after the winners are announced. We examine the effectiveness of super solutions in different auction scenarios that simulate economically motivated bidding patterns. We also analyze the drawbacks of this approach and motivate an extension to the framework that permits a more flexible and realistic approach for determining robust solutions.
This work has received funding from Science Foundation Ireland (Grant Number 00/Pl.1/C075) and from Enterprise Ireland, Research Innovation Fund (Grant Number RIF-2001-317).
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Holland, A., O’Sullivan, B. (2005). Super Solutions for Combinatorial Auctions. In: Faltings, B.V., Petcu, A., Fages, F., Rossi, F. (eds) Recent Advances in Constraints. CSCLP 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3419. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11402763_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11402763_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-25176-7
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