Renato De Castro
Renato Cruz De Castro is a full professor in the International Studies Department, De La Salle University, Manila, and holds the Charles Lui Chi Keung Professorial Chair in China Studies. He was the U.S.-ASEAN Fulbright Initiative Researcher from the Philippines and was based in the East-West Center in Washington D.C. from September to December 2016. He is a alumnus of the Daniel Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii, U.S.A. In 2009, Dr. De Castro became the U.S. State Department ASEAN Research Fellow from the Philippines and was based in the Political Science Department of Arizona State University. He earned his Ph.D. from the Government and International Studies Department of the University of South Carolina as a Fulbright Scholar in 2001, and obtained his B.A. and two master’s degrees from the University of the Philippines. Professor De Castro has conducted several courses on International Relations and Security Studies in the National Defense College and Foreign Service Institute. He is also a member of the Board of Trustees of the Albert Del Rosario Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ADR Institute). A consultant in the National Security Council of the Philippines during the Aquino Administration, Professor De Castro’s research interests include Philippine-U.S. security relations, Philippine defense and foreign policies, U.S. defense and foreign policies in East Asia, and the international politics of East Asia. He has written over 80 articles on international relations and security that have been published in a number of scholarly journals and edited works in the Philippines, South Korea, Canada, Malaysia, France, Singapore, Taiwan, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States.
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Papers by Renato De Castro
leave the public coffers empty and dry because of China’s reneging on its commitment to fund the Philippines’ massive infrastructure-building program, labeled “Build, Build, and Build.”
geo-strategic competition between the U.S. and China. At the start of his sixyear
term, President Benigno Aquino III became concerned that China’s maritime
expansion threatened the Philippines’ territorial rights over its Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea. He then pursued a balancing policy towards
China’s maritime expansion into this area. Aquino pursued this policy as a reaction
to China’s naval expansion but also considered the Obama Administration’s
strategic rebalancing to Asia. President Rodrigo Duterte, however, is unraveling
his predecessor’s geopolitical agenda in the South China Sea. Duterte has pursued
an appeasement policy on China to take advantage of Beijing’s One Belt, One
Road (OBOR) initiative. Strategically, President Duterte has shown a sensitivity to
Chinese security interests. In conclusion, both Filipino presidents, in crafting their
respective foreign policies, have taken into account the geopolitical developments
in the Indo-Pacific region in terms of the prospect of losing either territorial rights
or economic gains.
Keywords
Philippine
expansive claim in the South China Sea. He challenged Chinese maritime expansion by
shifting the AFP’s focus away from domestic security to territorial defense, bolstering
closer Philippine-U.S. security relations; acquiring American military equipment;
seeking from Washington an explicit security guarantee under the 1951 Mutual Defense
Treaty (MDT); and promoting a strategic partnership with Japan. In late April 2014,
the Philippines signed the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
with its strategic ally—the U.S. Designed to constrain Chinese maritime expansion in
the South China Sea, the agreement allowed American forces a strategic footprint in
Southeast Asia through rotational presence in Philippine territory. By strengthening the
country’s security relations with the U.S. and Japan, the Philippines got involved again in
a traditional geo-political game among the great powers in East Asia.
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte, however, is determined on undoing former
President Aquino’s geo-political agenda in the South China Sea. Less than three months
in office and after the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) land-mark award to the
Philippines in its territorial row with China in the South China Sea, President Duterte
launched a charm offensive to earn Chinese goodwill. He downplayed the South China
Sea dispute in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit meeting in
Laos. President Duterte also declared that he wanted to distance the Philippines from the
United States, a move that will not only alter the region’s strategic balance but mark a
dramatic departure from his country’s long-standing policy of maintaining close security
ties with its only strategic ally. After this trip to Laos, he announced that the Philippine
Navy (PN) would stop joining the U.S. Navy in patrolling the South China Sea to avoid
upsetting Beijing. He also said that he wanted American Special Forces (SOF) supporting
the AFP in counter-terrorism operations in Mindanao to withdraw from the island.
President Duterte is seeking Chinese assistance for the construction of
drug-rehabilitation centers for Filipino drug dependents, soft loans for the construction
of railways in Mindanao, and even the acquisition of Chinese-made weapons for the
38 Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-Pacific
Philippine military and police. His goal is to foster closer economic and diplomatic
relations with China while distancing the Philippines from the U.S. President Duterte’s
policy of effecting a dramatic departure from the Philippines’ long-standing policy of
maintaining close security ties with its traditional and only strategic ally—the U.S.—has
also altered the regional balance of power in favor of China. It has also transformed the
Philippines’ approach in the South China dispute from challenging China’s expansion
in the South China Sea to an outright appeasement of this expansionist regional
power. Consequently, his pronouncements and actions eroded the Philippines’
influence in the ASEAN on the South China Sea issue and generated a major crisis in
the Philippine-U.S. alliance.
This article addresses a central question: how is the Duterte Administration
unraveling its predecessor’s geo-political agenda in the South China Sea dispute? It
also raises the following questions: 1) what are the foreign policy goals of the Dueterte
Administration? 2) How does the Duterte Administration pursue these goals? 3) In what
ways does the pursuit of these goals affect the Philippine-U.S. alliance? 4) And finally,
how does this affect the Philippines’ approach in the South China Sea dispute?
the Duterte Administration, and how these changes impact 21st
century Philippine–US alliance. Unlike the Aquino Administration that
challenged China’s expansionism in the South China Sea, the Duterte
Administration keeps silent on this maritime dispute in exchange for
Chinese trade concessions, aid, and investments. President Duterte
fosters closer economic and diplomatic relations with China and
distances the Philippines from the US Specifically, he seeks China’s
assistance for the building of drug-rehabilitation centers for Filipino
drug dependents, soft loans for the construction of railways in
Mindanao, and even the acquisition of Chinese-made weapons for the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). In consideration of this largess,
President Duterte has degraded the country’s strategic security ties
with the US by terminating the joint Philippine–US naval patrols
in the South China Sea, and limiting the scope and number of US
military interactions with the AFP. These moves, which are a dramatic
departure from the Philippines’ long-standing policy of maintaining
close security ties with the US, have strained the Philippine–US
alliance. This article addresses this central question: How do the foreign
policy changes under the Duterte Administration adversely impact
the Philippine–US alliance? It also raises the following questions: (1)
What are the foreign policy goals of the Duterte Administration? (2)
How does the Duterte Administration pursue these goals? (3) In what
ways does the pursuit of these goals affect Philippine–US alliance? (4)
What is the future of Philippine–US alliance in the light of the Duterte
Administration’s shifting foreign policy goals?
I would have alliances on trade and commerce with China. Russia has
external defense posture of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the face of
China’s territorial expansion in the South China Sea. This move entailed the
upgrading of the Philippine Navy’s and the Philippine Air Force’s capabilities for
maritime domain awareness and naval interdiction. The Aquino administration also
anchored its strategic agenda on the 60-year-old Philippines-U.S. alliance by signing
the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). The election of President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte as the 16th president of the Philippines, however, generated
uncertainties on whether or not he will continue building the AFP’s territorial defense
capabilities. Eventually, Duterte decided to continue the Aquino administration’s
build-up as a hedge, in case he should find it imperative in the future to pursue his
predecessor’s policy of challenging China’s expansive claim in the South China Sea.
The article concludes that like Aquino’s security policy, the Duterte administration is
also committed to building up the Philippine military’s credible defense posture—in
light of the growing uncertainties in the region marked by China’s emergence and the
perceived retreat of the United States as a Pacific power.
Key words: credible defense, Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, Rodrigo Duterte, South
China Sea, U.S. alliance
自2011年起, 阿基诺政府就已加强了菲律宾武装部队(Armed Forces of the Philippines
face of China’s maritime expansion in the South and East China Seas. The two
countries pursue this security partnership through regular bilateral consultations
among Philippine and Japanese heads of states, political leaders, defense ministry
officials, and high-ranking military officers; joint naval exercises; and exploratory
discussions for arms transfers and negotiations for a Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) between Japan and the Philippines. Initially, Article 9 of Japan’s 1947
Constitution hindered this security partnership. However, a recent reinterpretation
of the pacifist constitution now allows Japan a collective self-defense “particularly
to export arms to its allies and security partners and to deploy the JSDF overseas
when necessary. Now, the challenge for Japan and the Philippines is to ensure the
viability of their security partnership in the light of Philippine President Rodrigo
Duterte’s efforts to improve his country’s relations with China.
leave the public coffers empty and dry because of China’s reneging on its commitment to fund the Philippines’ massive infrastructure-building program, labeled “Build, Build, and Build.”
geo-strategic competition between the U.S. and China. At the start of his sixyear
term, President Benigno Aquino III became concerned that China’s maritime
expansion threatened the Philippines’ territorial rights over its Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea. He then pursued a balancing policy towards
China’s maritime expansion into this area. Aquino pursued this policy as a reaction
to China’s naval expansion but also considered the Obama Administration’s
strategic rebalancing to Asia. President Rodrigo Duterte, however, is unraveling
his predecessor’s geopolitical agenda in the South China Sea. Duterte has pursued
an appeasement policy on China to take advantage of Beijing’s One Belt, One
Road (OBOR) initiative. Strategically, President Duterte has shown a sensitivity to
Chinese security interests. In conclusion, both Filipino presidents, in crafting their
respective foreign policies, have taken into account the geopolitical developments
in the Indo-Pacific region in terms of the prospect of losing either territorial rights
or economic gains.
Keywords
Philippine
expansive claim in the South China Sea. He challenged Chinese maritime expansion by
shifting the AFP’s focus away from domestic security to territorial defense, bolstering
closer Philippine-U.S. security relations; acquiring American military equipment;
seeking from Washington an explicit security guarantee under the 1951 Mutual Defense
Treaty (MDT); and promoting a strategic partnership with Japan. In late April 2014,
the Philippines signed the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
with its strategic ally—the U.S. Designed to constrain Chinese maritime expansion in
the South China Sea, the agreement allowed American forces a strategic footprint in
Southeast Asia through rotational presence in Philippine territory. By strengthening the
country’s security relations with the U.S. and Japan, the Philippines got involved again in
a traditional geo-political game among the great powers in East Asia.
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte, however, is determined on undoing former
President Aquino’s geo-political agenda in the South China Sea. Less than three months
in office and after the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) land-mark award to the
Philippines in its territorial row with China in the South China Sea, President Duterte
launched a charm offensive to earn Chinese goodwill. He downplayed the South China
Sea dispute in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit meeting in
Laos. President Duterte also declared that he wanted to distance the Philippines from the
United States, a move that will not only alter the region’s strategic balance but mark a
dramatic departure from his country’s long-standing policy of maintaining close security
ties with its only strategic ally. After this trip to Laos, he announced that the Philippine
Navy (PN) would stop joining the U.S. Navy in patrolling the South China Sea to avoid
upsetting Beijing. He also said that he wanted American Special Forces (SOF) supporting
the AFP in counter-terrorism operations in Mindanao to withdraw from the island.
President Duterte is seeking Chinese assistance for the construction of
drug-rehabilitation centers for Filipino drug dependents, soft loans for the construction
of railways in Mindanao, and even the acquisition of Chinese-made weapons for the
38 Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-Pacific
Philippine military and police. His goal is to foster closer economic and diplomatic
relations with China while distancing the Philippines from the U.S. President Duterte’s
policy of effecting a dramatic departure from the Philippines’ long-standing policy of
maintaining close security ties with its traditional and only strategic ally—the U.S.—has
also altered the regional balance of power in favor of China. It has also transformed the
Philippines’ approach in the South China dispute from challenging China’s expansion
in the South China Sea to an outright appeasement of this expansionist regional
power. Consequently, his pronouncements and actions eroded the Philippines’
influence in the ASEAN on the South China Sea issue and generated a major crisis in
the Philippine-U.S. alliance.
This article addresses a central question: how is the Duterte Administration
unraveling its predecessor’s geo-political agenda in the South China Sea dispute? It
also raises the following questions: 1) what are the foreign policy goals of the Dueterte
Administration? 2) How does the Duterte Administration pursue these goals? 3) In what
ways does the pursuit of these goals affect the Philippine-U.S. alliance? 4) And finally,
how does this affect the Philippines’ approach in the South China Sea dispute?
the Duterte Administration, and how these changes impact 21st
century Philippine–US alliance. Unlike the Aquino Administration that
challenged China’s expansionism in the South China Sea, the Duterte
Administration keeps silent on this maritime dispute in exchange for
Chinese trade concessions, aid, and investments. President Duterte
fosters closer economic and diplomatic relations with China and
distances the Philippines from the US Specifically, he seeks China’s
assistance for the building of drug-rehabilitation centers for Filipino
drug dependents, soft loans for the construction of railways in
Mindanao, and even the acquisition of Chinese-made weapons for the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). In consideration of this largess,
President Duterte has degraded the country’s strategic security ties
with the US by terminating the joint Philippine–US naval patrols
in the South China Sea, and limiting the scope and number of US
military interactions with the AFP. These moves, which are a dramatic
departure from the Philippines’ long-standing policy of maintaining
close security ties with the US, have strained the Philippine–US
alliance. This article addresses this central question: How do the foreign
policy changes under the Duterte Administration adversely impact
the Philippine–US alliance? It also raises the following questions: (1)
What are the foreign policy goals of the Duterte Administration? (2)
How does the Duterte Administration pursue these goals? (3) In what
ways does the pursuit of these goals affect Philippine–US alliance? (4)
What is the future of Philippine–US alliance in the light of the Duterte
Administration’s shifting foreign policy goals?
I would have alliances on trade and commerce with China. Russia has
external defense posture of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the face of
China’s territorial expansion in the South China Sea. This move entailed the
upgrading of the Philippine Navy’s and the Philippine Air Force’s capabilities for
maritime domain awareness and naval interdiction. The Aquino administration also
anchored its strategic agenda on the 60-year-old Philippines-U.S. alliance by signing
the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). The election of President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte as the 16th president of the Philippines, however, generated
uncertainties on whether or not he will continue building the AFP’s territorial defense
capabilities. Eventually, Duterte decided to continue the Aquino administration’s
build-up as a hedge, in case he should find it imperative in the future to pursue his
predecessor’s policy of challenging China’s expansive claim in the South China Sea.
The article concludes that like Aquino’s security policy, the Duterte administration is
also committed to building up the Philippine military’s credible defense posture—in
light of the growing uncertainties in the region marked by China’s emergence and the
perceived retreat of the United States as a Pacific power.
Key words: credible defense, Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, Rodrigo Duterte, South
China Sea, U.S. alliance
自2011年起, 阿基诺政府就已加强了菲律宾武装部队(Armed Forces of the Philippines
face of China’s maritime expansion in the South and East China Seas. The two
countries pursue this security partnership through regular bilateral consultations
among Philippine and Japanese heads of states, political leaders, defense ministry
officials, and high-ranking military officers; joint naval exercises; and exploratory
discussions for arms transfers and negotiations for a Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) between Japan and the Philippines. Initially, Article 9 of Japan’s 1947
Constitution hindered this security partnership. However, a recent reinterpretation
of the pacifist constitution now allows Japan a collective self-defense “particularly
to export arms to its allies and security partners and to deploy the JSDF overseas
when necessary. Now, the challenge for Japan and the Philippines is to ensure the
viability of their security partnership in the light of Philippine President Rodrigo
Duterte’s efforts to improve his country’s relations with China.