Papers by Eleni Staraki
The particle na is analyzed as a marker of the subjunctive mood, either in root or embedded claus... more The particle na is analyzed as a marker of the subjunctive mood, either in root or embedded clauses. That is, it occurs before a finite verb, usually the perfective non-past (PNP), and introduces the subjunctive complement to
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When we issue an order or express a request or a suggestion with an imperative we are also able t... more When we issue an order or express a request or a suggestion with an imperative we are also able to rephrase the proposition by using a deontic modal expression. The same is true for deontic modal expressions which can be rephrased with an imperative proposition. Think of the following examples: (1) a. Akugh-e tus ghonis su order (∀)
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genericity.ens.fr
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The aim of this paper is to present a new account for imperatives and their interaction with free... more The aim of this paper is to present a new account for imperatives and their interaction with free choice item any and disjunctive or. Specifically, I argue that free choice inferences are a conversational implicature rather than an entailment. To that, I show that indefinite any and
disjunctive or are overt exhaustifiers of the set of alternatives introduced by imperatives and that the derivation of free choice inferences for any and or depend on different types of
exhaustification: recursion and iteration, respectively.
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In this paper, I argue that imperatives do not incorporate a covert modal component (contra Han 1... more In this paper, I argue that imperatives do not incorporate a covert modal component (contra Han 1998, 1999, 2001; Schwager 2005a, 2005b, 2006a; as Kaufmann 2012) and deontic modals do not incorporate an imperative-like performative component (contra Portner 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2012; Ninan 2005) showing that we do not need extra layers in the logical form adding unnecessary and complicating steps in the interpretation. In addition, I show that imperatives do not have predetermined modal force (universal or existential), and that their range of quantification is not fixed. Finally, I present data illustrating that deontic expressions do not commit the addressee to the realization of the modal proposition, and prove that mood and modal expressions do not always equate with each other.
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In this paper I argue that despite the interpretational relation between imperatives and deontic ... more In this paper I argue that despite the interpretational relation between imperatives and deontic modality, imperatives constitute a distinct case of an underquantified modal operator.
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There has been a long debate whether the category “future tense” indicates pure future reference ... more There has been a long debate whether the category “future tense” indicates pure future reference (tense) or whether it should be classified as a type of modality (Jespersen 1924; Prior 1967; Bertinetto 1979; Haegeman 1983; Thomason 1984; Comrie 1985; Palmer 1987; 1986; Enç 1996; Copley 2002; Condoravdi 2002; Kaufmann 2005; Mari 2009; Giannakidou & Mari 2013a/b, 2014, contra to a modal analysis of future Kissine 2008, among many others).
In this paper, I show that future morpheme will conveys a wider range of modal uses ranging from epistemic to deontic necessity and, that temporal reference (the so called predictive reading) is an epiphenomenon of future reference’s underlying logical structure which is of
abductive nature. I also argue that the various readings of future expressions are due to the varying size of
the domain of the universal quantification, and that the degree of certainty (how close to the truth) of a proposition FUT p depends on a measurable intersection BEST. To this, I propose a novel formal analysis which combines modal (Kratzer 1977, 1981, 1991) with scale semantics
(Kennedy 2007) as future morphemes such as will (FUT henceforth) are universal quantifiers the universal quantification of which exhibits gradience. This gradience on the universal quantificational domain I model in a scale of certainty which represents the various degrees of an
individual’s commitment to the truth inference.
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In this paper, I challenge this view by examining cross-linguistic variation in the distribution ... more In this paper, I challenge this view by examining cross-linguistic variation in the distribution and interpretation of embedded tense in Greek and English. Contrary to the main arguments of anaphoric tense theories, I argue that
embedded tense is underspecified in its temporal relation with the time of PAVs in the matrix sentence. Tenses, I argue, are descriptive terms which can be interpreted referentially or attributively to an interval, and they are not genuine cases of anaphoricity.
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Genericity, 2013
In this paper, we show that Greek distinguishes empirically ability as a precondition for action,... more In this paper, we show that Greek distinguishes empirically ability as a precondition for action, and
ability as initiating and sustaining force for action. In this latter case, the ability verb behaves like an
action verb, and the sentence has the logical form of a causative structure φ CAUSE [BECOME ψ]
(Dowty 1979). The distinction between ability as potential for action and ability as action itself has a
venerable tradition that goes back to Aristotle, and is recently implied in a number of analyses (Mari
and Martin 2007, 2009, Thomason 2005). We show first that the phenomenon is not just aspectual
(pace Bhatt 1999, Hacquard 2006, 2009, Pinon 2003): actualized ability emerges with the ability
verb also with imperfective aspect and present tense. They key, we argue is causation, which
triggers a shift from pure ability, to ability as force (in the sense of Copley and Harley 2010, i.e. as
action initiating energy). In Greek, the action reading of the ability modal comes about in an
apparent co-ordinate causative structure, where the two clauses are connected with conjunction ke
‘and’— a pattern that we find also in other languages, including English, at least with some action
verbs such as try, allow. Our analysis implies a meaning of ability richer than mere possibility (pace
Hacquard); and, by capitalizing on the causative meaning and the presence of force in causative
structures, our analysis enables a principled explanation of the shift to action-ability without positing
ambiguity for the ability verb (pace Bhatt 1999).
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Conference Presentations by Eleni Staraki
In this paper, I argue that the various readings of tha-structures are due to the varying size of... more In this paper, I argue that the various readings of tha-structures are due to the varying size of the domain of the universal quantification (Staraki 2013, 2014, 2017), and that the degree of certainty (how close to the truth) of a proposition of the form THA [p] depends on a measurable intersection BEST.
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Drafts by Eleni Staraki
The modal variation and morpho-syntactic mismatches of imperatives have challenged model-theoreti... more The modal variation and morpho-syntactic mismatches of imperatives have challenged model-theoretic linguists, making it hard to unify them as a notional category. Depending on specific theories, imperatives inherently contain an illocutionary operator with directive force (e.g., Han 1998, 1999a/b/c, 2001), a performative necessity modal similar to MUST/SHOULD (e.; among others). Despite the fact that imperatives cannot be simply identified with a single label of modality (i.e., necessity, possibility, deontic, bouletic, teleological etcetera), I propose that there is indeed an underlying property shared by all imperatives unifying and distinguishing them from declaratives: they contribute a nonveridical modal space. In this paper, I study imperatives in terms of nonveridicality and polar partition and argue that their semantic contribution is the presupposition of epistemic uncertainty as to the actualization of a proposition p and the creation of nonveridical modal spaces. Imperatives introduce a preference ordering between p and non-p worlds, and are analyzed as nonveridical operators conveying partial certainty and no inherent directive force. Under this perspective, it is not unexpected that imperative manifests not only as a verbal morphology, but also in the form of particles, i.e., the subjunctive imperatives with na particle in Greek, or that imperatives function modally since nonveridicality characterizes all modalities. Therefore, the dilemma whether imperatives are modals or not becomes redundant; it only matters that imperatives induce nonveridical modal spaces.
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In this paper, I argue that the interpretation of the necessity modal prepi in Greek and the indi... more In this paper, I argue that the interpretation of the necessity modal prepi in Greek and the individuation of the modalities (epistemic vs. deontic reading) depends on causation rather than the argument structure (raising vs. control) of the modal verb. The necessity verb behaves like volitional and directive verbs, and triggers the force individuation criterion as defined in Copley et al. (2015), distinguishing between CAUSE and ENABLE causal frames. The individuation between epistemic necessity and deontic necessity depends on the conceptualization of agency and the different configurations of force. I show, first, that the phenomenon is not just syntactical among many others): the variation in the interpretation (epistemic vs. deontic) is the result of differences in the argument structure (raising vs. control) of the modal auxiliary verbs. The key, I argue is causation, which triggers a shift from pure necessity, to intention as force (in the sense of Copley et al. (2015), i.e., as a field generating force. In Greek, the epistemic and deontic reading of the necessity modal comes about in a conceptual causal frame, where the two clauses are connected with the subjunctive particle na 'to/that'— a pattern that we find also in other languages, including English, at least with some performative verbs such as agree, insist where the different modal reading are visible through complement choice. The current analysis implies a meaning of modality richer than mere argument structure (raising vs. control); and, by capitalizing on the causal frame and the presence of force in modal structures, the analysis enables a principled explanation of the shift to intention-necessity without positing ambiguity for the necessity verb prepi.
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This paper discusses nonveridicality as a way of analyzing quantifier variability of imperatives ... more This paper discusses nonveridicality as a way of analyzing quantifier variability of imperatives in Greek and English. I argue that the quantifier variability in imperatives is due to an non-homogenous
modal base (quantificational domain), and that the logical form of imperatives features a quantifier placeholder (underquantified) that obtains its interpretation as a universal or an existential quantifier
via a Selection function. The Selection, a partition-function, represents an individual’s ranked preferences and goals and determines the type of quantifier in imperatives. The formal model I propose does not introduce ambiguity or inherent properties into the logical form of imperatives;
rather, it implies a meaning of imperatives beyond merely ORDER and, by capitalizing on nonveridicality and ranked preferences of an individual, enables a principled analysis of the quantifier variability of imperatives.
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In this paper, I show that the future morpheme tha 'will' in Greek conveys a wide range of modal ... more In this paper, I show that the future morpheme tha 'will' in Greek conveys a wide range of modal uses ranging from epistemic to deontic necessity, and that the temporal reference (the so called predictive reading) is an epiphenomenon of future reference's underlying logical structure which is of abductive nature. I argue that the various readings of future expressions are due to the varying size of the domain of the universal quantification (Staraki 2013, 2014, 2017), and that the degree of certainty (how close to the truth) of a proposition of the form THA [p] depends on a measurable intersection BEST. Tha " will " is a universal quantifier the universal quantification of which exhibits gradience. This gradience on the universal quantificational domain conveys the various degrees of an individual's commitment to a logical inference. The formal analysis I offer combines modal (Kratzer 1977, 1981, 1991) with scale semantics (Kennedy 2007).
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Papers by Eleni Staraki
disjunctive or are overt exhaustifiers of the set of alternatives introduced by imperatives and that the derivation of free choice inferences for any and or depend on different types of
exhaustification: recursion and iteration, respectively.
In this paper, I show that future morpheme will conveys a wider range of modal uses ranging from epistemic to deontic necessity and, that temporal reference (the so called predictive reading) is an epiphenomenon of future reference’s underlying logical structure which is of
abductive nature. I also argue that the various readings of future expressions are due to the varying size of
the domain of the universal quantification, and that the degree of certainty (how close to the truth) of a proposition FUT p depends on a measurable intersection BEST. To this, I propose a novel formal analysis which combines modal (Kratzer 1977, 1981, 1991) with scale semantics
(Kennedy 2007) as future morphemes such as will (FUT henceforth) are universal quantifiers the universal quantification of which exhibits gradience. This gradience on the universal quantificational domain I model in a scale of certainty which represents the various degrees of an
individual’s commitment to the truth inference.
embedded tense is underspecified in its temporal relation with the time of PAVs in the matrix sentence. Tenses, I argue, are descriptive terms which can be interpreted referentially or attributively to an interval, and they are not genuine cases of anaphoricity.
ability as initiating and sustaining force for action. In this latter case, the ability verb behaves like an
action verb, and the sentence has the logical form of a causative structure φ CAUSE [BECOME ψ]
(Dowty 1979). The distinction between ability as potential for action and ability as action itself has a
venerable tradition that goes back to Aristotle, and is recently implied in a number of analyses (Mari
and Martin 2007, 2009, Thomason 2005). We show first that the phenomenon is not just aspectual
(pace Bhatt 1999, Hacquard 2006, 2009, Pinon 2003): actualized ability emerges with the ability
verb also with imperfective aspect and present tense. They key, we argue is causation, which
triggers a shift from pure ability, to ability as force (in the sense of Copley and Harley 2010, i.e. as
action initiating energy). In Greek, the action reading of the ability modal comes about in an
apparent co-ordinate causative structure, where the two clauses are connected with conjunction ke
‘and’— a pattern that we find also in other languages, including English, at least with some action
verbs such as try, allow. Our analysis implies a meaning of ability richer than mere possibility (pace
Hacquard); and, by capitalizing on the causative meaning and the presence of force in causative
structures, our analysis enables a principled explanation of the shift to action-ability without positing
ambiguity for the ability verb (pace Bhatt 1999).
Conference Presentations by Eleni Staraki
Drafts by Eleni Staraki
modal base (quantificational domain), and that the logical form of imperatives features a quantifier placeholder (underquantified) that obtains its interpretation as a universal or an existential quantifier
via a Selection function. The Selection, a partition-function, represents an individual’s ranked preferences and goals and determines the type of quantifier in imperatives. The formal model I propose does not introduce ambiguity or inherent properties into the logical form of imperatives;
rather, it implies a meaning of imperatives beyond merely ORDER and, by capitalizing on nonveridicality and ranked preferences of an individual, enables a principled analysis of the quantifier variability of imperatives.
disjunctive or are overt exhaustifiers of the set of alternatives introduced by imperatives and that the derivation of free choice inferences for any and or depend on different types of
exhaustification: recursion and iteration, respectively.
In this paper, I show that future morpheme will conveys a wider range of modal uses ranging from epistemic to deontic necessity and, that temporal reference (the so called predictive reading) is an epiphenomenon of future reference’s underlying logical structure which is of
abductive nature. I also argue that the various readings of future expressions are due to the varying size of
the domain of the universal quantification, and that the degree of certainty (how close to the truth) of a proposition FUT p depends on a measurable intersection BEST. To this, I propose a novel formal analysis which combines modal (Kratzer 1977, 1981, 1991) with scale semantics
(Kennedy 2007) as future morphemes such as will (FUT henceforth) are universal quantifiers the universal quantification of which exhibits gradience. This gradience on the universal quantificational domain I model in a scale of certainty which represents the various degrees of an
individual’s commitment to the truth inference.
embedded tense is underspecified in its temporal relation with the time of PAVs in the matrix sentence. Tenses, I argue, are descriptive terms which can be interpreted referentially or attributively to an interval, and they are not genuine cases of anaphoricity.
ability as initiating and sustaining force for action. In this latter case, the ability verb behaves like an
action verb, and the sentence has the logical form of a causative structure φ CAUSE [BECOME ψ]
(Dowty 1979). The distinction between ability as potential for action and ability as action itself has a
venerable tradition that goes back to Aristotle, and is recently implied in a number of analyses (Mari
and Martin 2007, 2009, Thomason 2005). We show first that the phenomenon is not just aspectual
(pace Bhatt 1999, Hacquard 2006, 2009, Pinon 2003): actualized ability emerges with the ability
verb also with imperfective aspect and present tense. They key, we argue is causation, which
triggers a shift from pure ability, to ability as force (in the sense of Copley and Harley 2010, i.e. as
action initiating energy). In Greek, the action reading of the ability modal comes about in an
apparent co-ordinate causative structure, where the two clauses are connected with conjunction ke
‘and’— a pattern that we find also in other languages, including English, at least with some action
verbs such as try, allow. Our analysis implies a meaning of ability richer than mere possibility (pace
Hacquard); and, by capitalizing on the causative meaning and the presence of force in causative
structures, our analysis enables a principled explanation of the shift to action-ability without positing
ambiguity for the ability verb (pace Bhatt 1999).
modal base (quantificational domain), and that the logical form of imperatives features a quantifier placeholder (underquantified) that obtains its interpretation as a universal or an existential quantifier
via a Selection function. The Selection, a partition-function, represents an individual’s ranked preferences and goals and determines the type of quantifier in imperatives. The formal model I propose does not introduce ambiguity or inherent properties into the logical form of imperatives;
rather, it implies a meaning of imperatives beyond merely ORDER and, by capitalizing on nonveridicality and ranked preferences of an individual, enables a principled analysis of the quantifier variability of imperatives.