Seven years after the 2011 uprisings, the Egyptian military shows no evident signs of internal cr... more Seven years after the 2011 uprisings, the Egyptian military shows no evident signs of internal cracks. This article argues that the Egyptian army's unrivalled dominance, both in politics and within the security apparatus, could be explained as the result of three combined factors: substantial economic interests, a long-time legitimacy buttressed by the army's active involvement in welfare and development initiatives, and the reliance on universal conscription as the main avenue for the successful accommodation of class and social cleavages-key elements underpinning the army's status of supreme political arbitrator in Egyptian politics.
MENA uprisings broke, at least temporarily, the thrones of several long-time autocracies, under t... more MENA uprisings broke, at least temporarily, the thrones of several long-time autocracies, under the pressure of massive popular protests. Yet, trajectories of Islamists were not uniform across post- uprising political terrains. Unlike the case in Egypt and Tunisia, where they were initially included with significant electoral gains after 2011, Islamists were faced with immense challenges diminishing their popular base and limiting their political opportunities in Algeria and Sudan after 2019. This article argues that their pre- uprising political records, along with post-uprising regime continuity, define much of these trajectories across cases. Through the comparative focus on Islamists in post-2019 Algeria and Sudan, three key factors which are believed to contribute to their current political decline will be discussed: rebels’ persistent effort to exclude them, Islamists’ own political engagement and survival of the pre-2019 regimes.
Purpose-Years after the 2011 uprising Egypt, it seems that the country's non-Islamist parties are... more Purpose-Years after the 2011 uprising Egypt, it seems that the country's non-Islamist parties are still included in the political game. After significant alterations in their political sphere by mid-2013 at the advent of the Muslim Brother exclusion and the subsequent discrediting of Salafi al-Nour party, non-Islamist parties took clear part in the mobilization for presidential elections (2014, 2018) and competed for legislative seats in 2015. Nonetheless, it is difficult to expect them to turn into long-term key political players with clear-cut ideological postures, unique platforms and strong grass root mobilization. With the exception of the electoral gains scored by numbered parties like Free Egyptians' party and Nation's Future in 2015 legislative elections, these parties seem to be lagging behind esp. in terms of their popular base; who became winners at the advent of the radical exclusion of the MB from July 2013 onwards. Design/methodology/approach-This paper is based on archival research and guided by basic assumptions of rational choice institutionalism, mainly game-theoretic versions of the approach. It is divided into four sections, three of them are chronological and the last one is thematic.
Algeria seemed to avoid largescale uprisings against autocratic regimes when its neighbors were f... more Algeria seemed to avoid largescale uprisings against autocratic regimes when its neighbors were facing unrest. Yet massive protests broke out in February 2019 at Abdelaziz Bouteflika's announcement of his candidacy for a fifth term as president. This article argues that, although many factors associated with Algerian politics reduced the chances for mass protests in 2011, other factors increased in significance between 2011 and 2019, such as Bouteflika's stroke in 2013 and constitutional amendments in 2016, adding to the anti-regime pressure that prompted the 2019 rebellion.
Extreme poverty and undemocratic governance fuel radicalization
Extreme poverty evidently increa... more Extreme poverty and undemocratic governance fuel radicalization
Extreme poverty evidently increased in MENA between 2011-2015, more than doubling from 2.1% to 5% (Bittar, 2020). The overall MENA ranking in terms of poverty is relatively high, when compared globally. For instance, in 2015, the global multidimensional poverty index showed Arab countries came third, among world regions, in terms of incidence of poverty, but came second in terms of intensity of poverty (Alkire et al., 2015, 4). Strikingly, in 2017, 40.6% of Arab countries populations lived in poor households, with about 13% of them living in extreme poverty (Arab Multidimensional Poverty Report, 2017), let alone that vulnerability to poverty is high in the Arab region and increasing the poverty line from 1.9$/day to above 4.0$/day would actually show average poverty in Arab states is higher than the global average (Abu-Ismail & al-Kiswani, 2018).
COVID-19 has exacerbated the dangers of radicalization, due to the economic crisis.
Most generally, the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the pitfalls of MENA economies; MENA GDP losses, since the beginning of the pandemic crisis are estimated at about 227 billion dollars by the end of 2021 and government borrowing to deal with the crisis increased its debt from 46% in 2019 to 54% in 2021; both the global and regional repercussions of the pandemic threaten 192 million people (up from 176) going into extreme poverty (Middle East and North Africa, updated 2021).
Autocratic politics is still a challenge across the region, further exacerbating the problem.
MENA is the region with the lowest score on democracy index (2010-2020) across world regions (Szmigiera, 2021). The 2018 Global Democracy Index (GDI) showed only Tunisia as a flawed democracy and very few hybrid regimes (including Iraq, Morocco and Lebanon) all other MENA countries were different grades of authoritarian regimes (Appendix E: Democracy Index Scores, 2018).
Seven years after the 2011 uprisings, the Egyptian military shows no evident signs of internal cr... more Seven years after the 2011 uprisings, the Egyptian military shows no evident signs of internal cracks. This article argues that the Egyptian army's unrivalled dominance, both in politics and within the security apparatus, could be explained as the result of three combined factors: substantial economic interests, a long-time legitimacy buttressed by the army's active involvement in welfare and development initiatives, and the reliance on universal conscription as the main avenue for the successful accommodation of class and social cleavages-key elements underpinning the army's status of supreme political arbitrator in Egyptian politics.
MENA uprisings broke, at least temporarily, the thrones of several long-time autocracies, under t... more MENA uprisings broke, at least temporarily, the thrones of several long-time autocracies, under the pressure of massive popular protests. Yet, trajectories of Islamists were not uniform across post- uprising political terrains. Unlike the case in Egypt and Tunisia, where they were initially included with significant electoral gains after 2011, Islamists were faced with immense challenges diminishing their popular base and limiting their political opportunities in Algeria and Sudan after 2019. This article argues that their pre- uprising political records, along with post-uprising regime continuity, define much of these trajectories across cases. Through the comparative focus on Islamists in post-2019 Algeria and Sudan, three key factors which are believed to contribute to their current political decline will be discussed: rebels’ persistent effort to exclude them, Islamists’ own political engagement and survival of the pre-2019 regimes.
Purpose-Years after the 2011 uprising Egypt, it seems that the country's non-Islamist parties are... more Purpose-Years after the 2011 uprising Egypt, it seems that the country's non-Islamist parties are still included in the political game. After significant alterations in their political sphere by mid-2013 at the advent of the Muslim Brother exclusion and the subsequent discrediting of Salafi al-Nour party, non-Islamist parties took clear part in the mobilization for presidential elections (2014, 2018) and competed for legislative seats in 2015. Nonetheless, it is difficult to expect them to turn into long-term key political players with clear-cut ideological postures, unique platforms and strong grass root mobilization. With the exception of the electoral gains scored by numbered parties like Free Egyptians' party and Nation's Future in 2015 legislative elections, these parties seem to be lagging behind esp. in terms of their popular base; who became winners at the advent of the radical exclusion of the MB from July 2013 onwards. Design/methodology/approach-This paper is based on archival research and guided by basic assumptions of rational choice institutionalism, mainly game-theoretic versions of the approach. It is divided into four sections, three of them are chronological and the last one is thematic.
Algeria seemed to avoid largescale uprisings against autocratic regimes when its neighbors were f... more Algeria seemed to avoid largescale uprisings against autocratic regimes when its neighbors were facing unrest. Yet massive protests broke out in February 2019 at Abdelaziz Bouteflika's announcement of his candidacy for a fifth term as president. This article argues that, although many factors associated with Algerian politics reduced the chances for mass protests in 2011, other factors increased in significance between 2011 and 2019, such as Bouteflika's stroke in 2013 and constitutional amendments in 2016, adding to the anti-regime pressure that prompted the 2019 rebellion.
Extreme poverty and undemocratic governance fuel radicalization
Extreme poverty evidently increa... more Extreme poverty and undemocratic governance fuel radicalization
Extreme poverty evidently increased in MENA between 2011-2015, more than doubling from 2.1% to 5% (Bittar, 2020). The overall MENA ranking in terms of poverty is relatively high, when compared globally. For instance, in 2015, the global multidimensional poverty index showed Arab countries came third, among world regions, in terms of incidence of poverty, but came second in terms of intensity of poverty (Alkire et al., 2015, 4). Strikingly, in 2017, 40.6% of Arab countries populations lived in poor households, with about 13% of them living in extreme poverty (Arab Multidimensional Poverty Report, 2017), let alone that vulnerability to poverty is high in the Arab region and increasing the poverty line from 1.9$/day to above 4.0$/day would actually show average poverty in Arab states is higher than the global average (Abu-Ismail & al-Kiswani, 2018).
COVID-19 has exacerbated the dangers of radicalization, due to the economic crisis.
Most generally, the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the pitfalls of MENA economies; MENA GDP losses, since the beginning of the pandemic crisis are estimated at about 227 billion dollars by the end of 2021 and government borrowing to deal with the crisis increased its debt from 46% in 2019 to 54% in 2021; both the global and regional repercussions of the pandemic threaten 192 million people (up from 176) going into extreme poverty (Middle East and North Africa, updated 2021).
Autocratic politics is still a challenge across the region, further exacerbating the problem.
MENA is the region with the lowest score on democracy index (2010-2020) across world regions (Szmigiera, 2021). The 2018 Global Democracy Index (GDI) showed only Tunisia as a flawed democracy and very few hybrid regimes (including Iraq, Morocco and Lebanon) all other MENA countries were different grades of authoritarian regimes (Appendix E: Democracy Index Scores, 2018).
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Extreme poverty evidently increased in MENA between 2011-2015, more than doubling from 2.1% to 5% (Bittar, 2020). The overall MENA ranking in terms of poverty is relatively high, when compared globally. For instance, in 2015, the global multidimensional poverty index showed Arab countries came third, among world regions, in terms of incidence of poverty, but came second in terms of intensity of poverty (Alkire et al., 2015, 4). Strikingly, in 2017, 40.6% of Arab countries populations lived in poor households, with about 13% of them living in extreme poverty (Arab Multidimensional Poverty Report, 2017), let alone that vulnerability to poverty is high in the Arab region and increasing the poverty line from 1.9$/day to above 4.0$/day would actually show average poverty in Arab states is higher than the global average (Abu-Ismail & al-Kiswani, 2018).
COVID-19 has exacerbated the dangers of radicalization, due to the economic crisis.
Most generally, the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the pitfalls of MENA economies; MENA GDP losses, since the beginning of the pandemic crisis are estimated at about 227 billion dollars by the end of 2021 and government borrowing to deal with the crisis increased its debt from 46% in 2019 to 54% in 2021; both the global and regional repercussions of the pandemic threaten 192 million people (up from 176) going into extreme poverty (Middle East and North Africa, updated 2021).
Autocratic politics is still a challenge across the region, further exacerbating the problem.
MENA is the region with the lowest score on democracy index (2010-2020) across world regions (Szmigiera, 2021). The 2018 Global Democracy Index (GDI) showed only Tunisia as a flawed democracy and very few hybrid regimes (including Iraq, Morocco and Lebanon) all other MENA countries were different grades of authoritarian regimes (Appendix E: Democracy Index Scores, 2018).
Extreme poverty evidently increased in MENA between 2011-2015, more than doubling from 2.1% to 5% (Bittar, 2020). The overall MENA ranking in terms of poverty is relatively high, when compared globally. For instance, in 2015, the global multidimensional poverty index showed Arab countries came third, among world regions, in terms of incidence of poverty, but came second in terms of intensity of poverty (Alkire et al., 2015, 4). Strikingly, in 2017, 40.6% of Arab countries populations lived in poor households, with about 13% of them living in extreme poverty (Arab Multidimensional Poverty Report, 2017), let alone that vulnerability to poverty is high in the Arab region and increasing the poverty line from 1.9$/day to above 4.0$/day would actually show average poverty in Arab states is higher than the global average (Abu-Ismail & al-Kiswani, 2018).
COVID-19 has exacerbated the dangers of radicalization, due to the economic crisis.
Most generally, the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the pitfalls of MENA economies; MENA GDP losses, since the beginning of the pandemic crisis are estimated at about 227 billion dollars by the end of 2021 and government borrowing to deal with the crisis increased its debt from 46% in 2019 to 54% in 2021; both the global and regional repercussions of the pandemic threaten 192 million people (up from 176) going into extreme poverty (Middle East and North Africa, updated 2021).
Autocratic politics is still a challenge across the region, further exacerbating the problem.
MENA is the region with the lowest score on democracy index (2010-2020) across world regions (Szmigiera, 2021). The 2018 Global Democracy Index (GDI) showed only Tunisia as a flawed democracy and very few hybrid regimes (including Iraq, Morocco and Lebanon) all other MENA countries were different grades of authoritarian regimes (Appendix E: Democracy Index Scores, 2018).