The commentary discusses whether AI devices can have an experience of time as passing. The papers... more The commentary discusses whether AI devices can have an experience of time as passing. The papers commented on suggest the answer is “Yes”. However, I claim that the metaphysical view of time this answer presupposes, namely, eternalism, or the block universe, is untenable, and that a sound understanding of time must acknowledge time’s normative significance. This raises new and substantial questions regarding the possibility of representing time, and of equipping devices with “gadgets” that would facilitate as-of flow experiences for them. More generally, the commentary critically evaluates the role science may have in the context of philosophical debates.
How does time pass? Does time itself move, or is time's passage merely an illusion? Analytic ... more How does time pass? Does time itself move, or is time's passage merely an illusion? Analytic philosophers belong, for the most part, to one of two camps on this question: the tensed camp, which defends the reality of time's passage, conceiving the present as "ontologically privileged" over the past and future; and the tenseless camp, which denies time's passage and holds that all events, whatever their temporal location, are ontologically equal. In Time and Realism, Yuval Dolev goes beyond the tensed-tenseless debate to argue that neither position is conclusive but that the debate over them should be seen as only the first stage in the philosophical investigation of time. The next stage, he claims, belongs to phenomenology, and, he argues further, the phenomenological analysis of time grows naturally out of the analytic enterprise. Dolev shows that the two rival theories share a metaphysical presupposition: that tense concerns the ontological status of things. He argues that this ontological assumption is natural but untenable, and that leaving it behind creates a new viewpoint from which to study central topics in the metaphysics of time. Dolev shows that such a study depends on the kind of meticulous attention to our firsthand experiences that drives phenomenological investigations. Thus, he argues, phenomenology is the venue for advancing the investigation of time. Time and Realism not only analyzes the tensed-tenseless debate, resolving some of its central difficulties along the way, it transcends it. It serves as a bridge between the analytic and the continental traditions in the philosophy of mind, both of which are shown to be vital to the philosophical examination of time. Yuval Dolev is Professor of Philosophy at Bar Ilan University, Israel.
Publisher Summary It is often alleged that relativity theory has revolutionized ontology. There i... more Publisher Summary It is often alleged that relativity theory has revolutionized ontology. There is now solid empirical evidence; it is claimed in favor of the age-old tenseless theory of time that denies the reality of this distinction. The appeal to relativity is made with the intention of making a physical theory into a metaphysical one, but it already relies on weighty and unacceptable metaphysical assumptions. This chapter discusses these hidden assumptions and highlights their role in the argument from relativity theory to the tenseless view and explains how transcending them paves the way for squaring the understanding of tense with relativity theory.
This paper claims that, to the extent that temporal direction figures in physics at all, it is fo... more This paper claims that, to the extent that temporal direction figures in physics at all, it is found there as part of the extra-scientific language science employs. The asymmetry between “before” and “after” is not captured by the mathematics of any theory, nor can it be derived from the laws of any theory. This, I argue, is true even of theories whose laws are not time reversal invariant. Recognizing that physics does not yield temporal direction but receives it from the background in which physics develops and operates does not, however, expose any hitherto unknown limitations or deficiencies of physics. The claim is not about physics, but about metaphysical stances regarding physics, specifically, physicalism, which requires from physics to deliver more than it does, or should. Once the place of temporal direction in physics is understood, infamous difficulties can be addressed in a novel way. Issues emerging from the 2nd law of thermodynamics, such as the minimum problem, and the worry that the law generates outlandish predictions, are removed. A side benefit is the recognition that the past hypothesis is superfluous. A final conclusion of the paper is that the relationship between physics and everyday language, far from being a source of difficulties, is healthy and beneficial to both.
This paper claims that, to the extent that temporal direction figures in physics at all, it is fo... more This paper claims that, to the extent that temporal direction figures in physics at all, it is found there as part of the extra-scientific language science employs. The asymmetry between “before” and “after” is not captured by the mathematics of any theory, nor can it be derived from the laws of any theory. This, I argue, is true even of theories whose laws are not time reversal invariant. Recognizing that physics does not yield temporal direction but receives it from the background in which physics develops and operates does not, however, expose any hitherto unknown limitations or deficiencies of physics. The claim is not about physics, but about metaphysical stances regarding physics, specifically, physicalism, which requires from physics to deliver more than it does, or should. Once the place of temporal direction in physics is understood, infamous difficulties can be addressed in a novel way. Issues emerging from the 2nd law of thermodynamics, such as the minimum problem, and the worry that the law generates outlandish predictions, are removed. A side benefit is the recognition that the past hypothesis is superfluous. A final conclusion of the paper is that the relationship between physics and everyday language, far from being a source of difficulties, is healthy and beneficial to both.
In this paper I argue that physics is, always was, and probably always will be voiceless with res... more In this paper I argue that physics is, always was, and probably always will be voiceless with respect to tense and passage, and that, therefore, if, as I believe, tense and passage are the essence of time, physics’ contribution to our understanding of time can only be limited. The argument, in a nutshell, is that if "physics has no possibility of expression for the Now", to quote Einstein, then it cannot add anything to the study of tense and passage, and specifically, cannot add anything to the debate between deniers and affirmers of the existence or reality of tense and passage. Since relativity theory did not equip physics with a new language with which to speak of tense and passage, I draw the further conclusion that relativity theory has not generated the revolution to our conception of time that is attributed to it. In the last section I discuss the motivations behind the continued but misguided attempts to integrate tense into a relativistic setting, and assess the manners in which relativity theory has nevertheless enhanced, albeit indirectly, our understanding of tense and passage.
Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, 2016
An overview of the efforts of the last century to interpret relativity theory reveals that, for t... more An overview of the efforts of the last century to interpret relativity theory reveals that, for the most part, they concentrated on the formal and geometrical features of the theory while ignoring almost entirely its experiential side. One consequence of neglecting to examine the nature of experience is the widespread acceptance of the static block-universe picture. While many supporters of this view admit to the existence of a gap between this interpretation of relativity theory and experience, according to a suggestion made by Dieks in this volume, a closer examination shows the block-universe picture to be in perfect harmony with experience. In this paper I claim that: (a) any interpretative enterprise regarding relativity that does not include a phenomenological study is inadequate; hence Dieks’ attempt to harmonize the theory with experience is commendable; (b) nevertheless, Dieks’ proposal is untenable; (c) global tense and passage are irremovable from our experience-based conception of reality and must therefore figure in any interpretation of relativity theory; (d) a proper phenomenological analysis of tense and passage (based on an abandonment of the A and the B theories of time) facilitates squaring relativity with experience.
The commentary discusses whether AI devices can have an experience of time as passing. The papers... more The commentary discusses whether AI devices can have an experience of time as passing. The papers commented on suggest the answer is “Yes”. However, I claim that the metaphysical view of time this answer presupposes, namely, eternalism, or the block universe, is untenable, and that a sound understanding of time must acknowledge time’s normative significance. This raises new and substantial questions regarding the possibility of representing time, and of equipping devices with “gadgets” that would facilitate as-of flow experiences for them. More generally, the commentary critically evaluates the role science may have in the context of philosophical debates.
How does time pass? Does time itself move, or is time's passage merely an illusion? Analytic ... more How does time pass? Does time itself move, or is time's passage merely an illusion? Analytic philosophers belong, for the most part, to one of two camps on this question: the tensed camp, which defends the reality of time's passage, conceiving the present as "ontologically privileged" over the past and future; and the tenseless camp, which denies time's passage and holds that all events, whatever their temporal location, are ontologically equal. In Time and Realism, Yuval Dolev goes beyond the tensed-tenseless debate to argue that neither position is conclusive but that the debate over them should be seen as only the first stage in the philosophical investigation of time. The next stage, he claims, belongs to phenomenology, and, he argues further, the phenomenological analysis of time grows naturally out of the analytic enterprise. Dolev shows that the two rival theories share a metaphysical presupposition: that tense concerns the ontological status of things. He argues that this ontological assumption is natural but untenable, and that leaving it behind creates a new viewpoint from which to study central topics in the metaphysics of time. Dolev shows that such a study depends on the kind of meticulous attention to our firsthand experiences that drives phenomenological investigations. Thus, he argues, phenomenology is the venue for advancing the investigation of time. Time and Realism not only analyzes the tensed-tenseless debate, resolving some of its central difficulties along the way, it transcends it. It serves as a bridge between the analytic and the continental traditions in the philosophy of mind, both of which are shown to be vital to the philosophical examination of time. Yuval Dolev is Professor of Philosophy at Bar Ilan University, Israel.
Publisher Summary It is often alleged that relativity theory has revolutionized ontology. There i... more Publisher Summary It is often alleged that relativity theory has revolutionized ontology. There is now solid empirical evidence; it is claimed in favor of the age-old tenseless theory of time that denies the reality of this distinction. The appeal to relativity is made with the intention of making a physical theory into a metaphysical one, but it already relies on weighty and unacceptable metaphysical assumptions. This chapter discusses these hidden assumptions and highlights their role in the argument from relativity theory to the tenseless view and explains how transcending them paves the way for squaring the understanding of tense with relativity theory.
This paper claims that, to the extent that temporal direction figures in physics at all, it is fo... more This paper claims that, to the extent that temporal direction figures in physics at all, it is found there as part of the extra-scientific language science employs. The asymmetry between “before” and “after” is not captured by the mathematics of any theory, nor can it be derived from the laws of any theory. This, I argue, is true even of theories whose laws are not time reversal invariant. Recognizing that physics does not yield temporal direction but receives it from the background in which physics develops and operates does not, however, expose any hitherto unknown limitations or deficiencies of physics. The claim is not about physics, but about metaphysical stances regarding physics, specifically, physicalism, which requires from physics to deliver more than it does, or should. Once the place of temporal direction in physics is understood, infamous difficulties can be addressed in a novel way. Issues emerging from the 2nd law of thermodynamics, such as the minimum problem, and the worry that the law generates outlandish predictions, are removed. A side benefit is the recognition that the past hypothesis is superfluous. A final conclusion of the paper is that the relationship between physics and everyday language, far from being a source of difficulties, is healthy and beneficial to both.
This paper claims that, to the extent that temporal direction figures in physics at all, it is fo... more This paper claims that, to the extent that temporal direction figures in physics at all, it is found there as part of the extra-scientific language science employs. The asymmetry between “before” and “after” is not captured by the mathematics of any theory, nor can it be derived from the laws of any theory. This, I argue, is true even of theories whose laws are not time reversal invariant. Recognizing that physics does not yield temporal direction but receives it from the background in which physics develops and operates does not, however, expose any hitherto unknown limitations or deficiencies of physics. The claim is not about physics, but about metaphysical stances regarding physics, specifically, physicalism, which requires from physics to deliver more than it does, or should. Once the place of temporal direction in physics is understood, infamous difficulties can be addressed in a novel way. Issues emerging from the 2nd law of thermodynamics, such as the minimum problem, and the worry that the law generates outlandish predictions, are removed. A side benefit is the recognition that the past hypothesis is superfluous. A final conclusion of the paper is that the relationship between physics and everyday language, far from being a source of difficulties, is healthy and beneficial to both.
In this paper I argue that physics is, always was, and probably always will be voiceless with res... more In this paper I argue that physics is, always was, and probably always will be voiceless with respect to tense and passage, and that, therefore, if, as I believe, tense and passage are the essence of time, physics’ contribution to our understanding of time can only be limited. The argument, in a nutshell, is that if "physics has no possibility of expression for the Now", to quote Einstein, then it cannot add anything to the study of tense and passage, and specifically, cannot add anything to the debate between deniers and affirmers of the existence or reality of tense and passage. Since relativity theory did not equip physics with a new language with which to speak of tense and passage, I draw the further conclusion that relativity theory has not generated the revolution to our conception of time that is attributed to it. In the last section I discuss the motivations behind the continued but misguided attempts to integrate tense into a relativistic setting, and assess the manners in which relativity theory has nevertheless enhanced, albeit indirectly, our understanding of tense and passage.
Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, 2016
An overview of the efforts of the last century to interpret relativity theory reveals that, for t... more An overview of the efforts of the last century to interpret relativity theory reveals that, for the most part, they concentrated on the formal and geometrical features of the theory while ignoring almost entirely its experiential side. One consequence of neglecting to examine the nature of experience is the widespread acceptance of the static block-universe picture. While many supporters of this view admit to the existence of a gap between this interpretation of relativity theory and experience, according to a suggestion made by Dieks in this volume, a closer examination shows the block-universe picture to be in perfect harmony with experience. In this paper I claim that: (a) any interpretative enterprise regarding relativity that does not include a phenomenological study is inadequate; hence Dieks’ attempt to harmonize the theory with experience is commendable; (b) nevertheless, Dieks’ proposal is untenable; (c) global tense and passage are irremovable from our experience-based conception of reality and must therefore figure in any interpretation of relativity theory; (d) a proper phenomenological analysis of tense and passage (based on an abandonment of the A and the B theories of time) facilitates squaring relativity with experience.
How does time pass? Does time itself move, or is time's passage merely an illusion? Analytic phil... more How does time pass? Does time itself move, or is time's passage merely an illusion? Analytic philosophers belong, for the most part, to one of two camps on this question: the tensed camp, which defends the reality of time's passage, conceiving the present as "ontologically privileged" over the past and future; and the tenseless camp, which denies time's passage and holds that all events, whatever their temporal location, are ontologically equal. In Time and Realism, Yuval Dolev goes beyond the tensed-tenseless debate to argue that neither position is conclusive but that the debate over them should be seen as only the first stage in the philosophical investigation of time. The next stage, he claims, belongs to phenomenology, and, he argues further, the phenomenological analysis of time grows naturally out of the analytic enterprise. Dolev shows that the two rival theories share a metaphysical presupposition: that tense concerns the ontological status of things. He argues that this ontological assumption is natural but untenable, and that leaving it behind creates a new viewpoint from which to study central topics in the metaphysics of time. Dolev shows that such a study depends on the kind of meticulous attention to our firsthand experiences that drives phenomenological investigations. Thus, he argues, phenomenology is the venue for advancing the investigation of time. Time and Realism not only analyzes the tensed-tenseless debate, resolving some of its central difficulties along the way, it transcends it. It serves as a bridge between the analytic and the continental traditions in the philosophy of mind, both of which are shown to be vital to the philosophical examination of time.
In: New Papers on the Present, Roberto Ciuni, Kristie Miller, Giuliano Torrengo, Editors (Philos... more In: New Papers on the Present, Roberto Ciuni, Kristie Miller, Giuliano Torrengo, Editors (Philosophia Verlag, 2013).
Book Review of Maria Baghramian's Reading Putnam (Routledge), Analysis Reviews, Analysis (2014) 7... more Book Review of Maria Baghramian's Reading Putnam (Routledge), Analysis Reviews, Analysis (2014) 74 (2): 351-353.
Book Review of Michlee Friend’s Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics, (Stocksfield UK: Acume... more Book Review of Michlee Friend’s Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics, (Stocksfield UK: Acumen), Philosophical Books (April 2008), Vol. 49 Num. 2.
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Papers by Yuval Dolev
phenomenological investigations. Thus, he argues, phenomenology is the venue for advancing the investigation of time. Time and Realism not only analyzes the tensed-tenseless debate, resolving some of its central difficulties along the way, it transcends it. It serves as a bridge between the analytic and the
continental traditions in the philosophy of mind, both of which are shown to be vital to the philosophical examination of time.