Research interest: contemporary and modern political theory, political philosophy, Palestine affairs, Islamism and Islamists, development and democracy. Phone: 00970599841110
Investigating the Palestinian political system is no easy task. It necessitates a careful clarifi... more Investigating the Palestinian political system is no easy task. It necessitates a careful clarification of the term “political” by outlining its scope and limitations because the connotations of this term in the Palestinian context differ significantly from its meaning in other countries. In Palestine, politics occur and must be understood within the constrained conditions imposed by the Israeli occupation, which heavily impact the structure and function of the Palestinian political system. Palestinian political actors include secularists, religious dogmatists, nationalists, and leftists. There are those who subscribe to democratic ideals and others who align themselves with authoritarian values. There are also proponents of the Palestinian Authority (PA) who consider it an achievement that should be defended and nurtured, and opponents who believe that the signing of the accords was a grave mistake and that the PA is a burden on the struggle. Political discourse takes place between those who subscribe to peaceful methods and others who defend their right to engage in violent means of resistance; it includes those who believe in cooperation with the Israeli occupier and others who oppose such involvement. Furthermore, political strife takes place between those who seek to end the internal split and strengthen national unity and those who are profiting from it. Overall, “political” in Palestine is a domain that is simultaneously free and constrained: free from the coercive power of a state that does not yet exist and restricted and constrained by the fragility of the existing political order. The limited achievements made by Palestinians and the steady concessions they were forced to make to Israel over the years have led to ever-diminishing options for new conceptions and alternative strategies. Initially, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) aimed to liberate all of Palestine, striving to establish an entity in which Arabs and Jews share a secular state on the basis of equality. Starting in 1974, this goal was reduced to accepting a Palestinian state on the territories occupied in 1967, a mere 22 percent of the land of historic Palestine, while the PLO expressed readiness to reach an agreement through negotiations. When Palestinian rights continued to be violated, the First Intifada erupted in 1987, involving broad-based popular resistance and protest as well as a boycott of Israeli goods, drawing international attention to the Palestinian cause. In 1993, the signing of the Oslo Accords (OA) initiated the establishment of the PA, tasking it with overseeing a self-ruled entity whose powers were severely limited while rendering it heavily dependent on international aid. Ostensibly, this was intended to lead to full independence after a five-year transition period, but in 1999, Israel refused to grant statehood to this entity. Neither did it become the Singapore of the Middle East that some had hoped for. Moreover, instead of responding to the aspirations of the Palestinian people, the PA has become a convenient provider of colonial services and has operated as a subcontractor for the Israeli occupation authorities. Nonetheless, it is now the center of the entirety of Palestinian politics, including the political system that has emerged since 1994. What is striking is the opacity of the PA’s purpose and strategies: should it serve as a weak, elitist political order capable of implementing limited self-rule with a strong emphasis on so-called security, or should it support Palestinians and enable them to achieve independence? Ambiguity has also dominated decisions regarding the strategy that guides Palestinian resistance against the occupier. Should it apply a soft strategy that entails negotiation, diplomacy, and political and legal work in international forums, or a violent strategy of armed resistance? Because these strategies are not complementary, the overall result of the national struggle has been very modest. This chapter examines the structural factors that reduce the Palestinian political system’s ability not only to confront the policies imposed by the Israeli occupation but also to produce cohesive, effective, and responsive internal politics. Discussing the impact of the Israeli occupation and international aid, it illuminates the internal political dynamics and touches on the overlap between the PA and the PLO and ambiguous legitimacies; the split between Fatah and Hamas; and the operations of the executive authority, as security forces remain unrestrained and political parties ineffective.
‘To persuade without convincing’: Rousseau’s doctrine of soft power?, 2024
this article compares rousseau's understanding of gentle means to obtain consent with the modern ... more this article compares rousseau's understanding of gentle means to obtain consent with the modern concept of soft power. examining the phrase 'to persuade without convincing' , it explores the nature and purpose of the power rousseau attaches to his Great legislator whose enigmatic qualities have been correlated with both democratic and authoritarian tendencies. it explores the power of character, religion, and womento which rousseau refers in various contexts in his writings-suggests resemblance with the authority rousseau assigns to the legislator, and deems its application as rousseau's brand of soft power. Yet while there are surface-level parallels, rousseau's thought departs significantly from the prevailing connotations of this concept, particularly in terms of its undisclosed goals. Joseph nye, who adopted the term soft power and identified the conception, recommends soft power as an outward-directed means that utilises culture, values, and ideology to secure dominance under the notion of influence. For rousseau, it is a defensive, inward-directed instrument that aims to enable the legislator to carry out his task of fostering and enhancing a people's authenticity and autonomy without resorting to force.
Countering the Rapid Growth of Israeli Settlements By Basem Ezbidi At this stage, attempts to ass... more Countering the Rapid Growth of Israeli Settlements By Basem Ezbidi At this stage, attempts to assess the full impact of the ongoing Israeli genocidal war on Gaza and its ambitious objectives that are a pretext for the colonial government's broader and long-term aim to annex all occupied territories are challenging and premature. The complex historical context and the regional and global dimension of this brutal war are extensive, while the internal dynamics that govern the different Palestinian factions, particularly Hamas and Ramallah's PA/PLO, are influenced in both the short and long terms as well.
As Palestinians will face a multitude of obstacles on the “Day After” the genocidal war on Gaza, they must carefully contemplate their future objectives and strategies, including questions related to their national struggle and its current condition. Are Palestinians primarily pursuing the establishment of their own independent state or emphasizing their aspiration for liberation from Israel’s colonial rule? Answering this question is vital in order to choose the proper strategy. Moreover, Palestinians should be creatively courageous and discuss the effectiveness of the armed resistance adopted by “Hamas” in light of Israel’s resorting to irrational and brutal force against the Palestinians, which even includes the potential use of nuclear weapons. Likewise, Palestinians must deliberate whether it is prudent to support or oppose the PLO’s international-organizations and negotiation strategy, despite these organizations’ inconsistency in fulfilling their obligations toward the Palestinians, as they alternate between assisting them and manifestly falling short.
ELGAR HANDBOOKS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE Handbook of Middle East Politics Edited by Shahram Akbarzade, 2023
Investigating the Palestinian political system is no easy task. It necessitates a careful clarifi... more Investigating the Palestinian political system is no easy task. It necessitates a careful clarification of the term “political” by outlining its scope and limitations because the connotations of this term in the Palestinian context differ significantly from its meaning in other countries. In Palestine, politics occur and must be understood within the constrained conditions imposed by the Israeli occupation, which heavily impact the structure and function of the Palestinian political system. Palestinian political actors include secularists, religious dogmatists, nationalists, and leftists. There are those who subscribe to democratic ideals and others who align themselves with authoritarian values. There are also proponents of the Palestinian Authority (PA) who consider it an achievement that should be defended and nurtured, and opponents who believe that the signing of the accords was a grave mistake and that the PA is a burden on the struggle. Political discourse takes place between those who subscribe to peaceful methods and others who defend their right to engage in violent means of resistance; it includes those who believe in cooperation with the Israeli occupier and others who oppose such involvement. Furthermore, political strife takes place between those who seek to end the internal split and strengthen national unity and those who are profiting from it. Overall, “political” in Palestine is a domain that is simultaneously free and constrained: free from the coercive power of a state that does not yet exist and restricted and constrained by the fragility of the existing political order. The limited achievements made by Palestinians and the steady concessions they were forced to make to Israel over the years have led to ever-diminishing options for new conceptions and alternative strategies. Initially, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) aimed to liberate all of Palestine, striving to establish an entity in which Arabs and Jews share a secular state on the basis of equality.
Starting in 1974, this goal was reduced to accepting a Palestinian state on the territories occupied in 1967, a mere 22 percent of the land of historic Palestine, while the PLO expressed readiness to reach an agreement through negotiations. When Palestinian rights continued to be violated, the First Intifada erupted in 1987, involving broad-based popular resistance and protest as well as a boycott of Israeli goods, drawing international attention to the Palestinian cause.
In 1993, the signing of the Oslo Accords (OA) initiated the establishment of the PA, tasking it with overseeing a self-ruled entity whose powers were severely limited while rendering it heavily dependent on international aid. Ostensibly, this was intended to lead to full independence after a five-year transition period, but in 1999, Israel refused to grant statehood to this entity. Neither did it become the Singapore of the Middle East that some had hoped for. Moreover, instead of responding to the aspirations of the Palestinian people, the PA has become a convenient provider of colonial services and has operated as a subcontractor for the Israeli occupation authorities. Nonetheless, it is now the center of the entirety of Palestinian politics, including the political system that has emerged since 1994.
What is striking is the opacity of the PA’s purpose and strategies: should it serve as a weak, elitist political order capable of implementing limited self-rule with a strong emphasis on so-called security, or should it support Palestinians and enable them to achieve independence? Ambiguity has also dominated decisions regarding the strategy that guides Palestinian resistance against the occupier. Should it apply a soft strategy that entails negotiation, diplomacy, and political and legal work in international forums, or a violent strategy of armed resistance? Because these strategies are not complementary, the overall result of the national struggle has been very modest. This chapter examines the structural factors that reduce the Palestinian political system’s ability not only to confront the policies imposed by the Israeli occupation but also to produce cohesive, effective, and responsive internal politics. Discussing the impact of the Israeli occupation and international aid, it illuminates the internal political dynamics and touches on the overlap between the PA and the PLO and ambiguous legitimacies; the split between Fatah and Hamas; and the operations of the executive authority, as security forces remain unrestrained and political parties ineffective.
ABSTRACT: In 2017, US President Donald Trump launched the ‘Deal of the Century’ (DoC) to end the ... more ABSTRACT: In 2017, US President Donald Trump launched the ‘Deal of the Century’ (DoC) to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although Trump is no longer in office, the impact of the DoC lingers and will continue to affect future approaches to the conflict and its resolution. This article argues that the Trump DoC profoundly impacted the colonial order in Palestine. destroying further the illusion that a just settlement addressing the plight of the Palestinians could be reached. The DoC’s impact has affected three significant areas: the vision of a resolution, the approach to conflict resolution, and the venue where the conflict occurs. It helped shift the vision from a two-state solution to none, significantly undermining the approach that was based on negotiation and third-party mediation and assisting in creating a new regional versus international venue for the conflict.
Page 152. 4 PNA political institutions and the future of state formation Inge Amundsen and Basem ... more Page 152. 4 PNA political institutions and the future of state formation Inge Amundsen and Basem Ezbidi The state formation process in Palestine that started in 1993 with the Oslo Agreements came to an almost complete halt with the collapse of the Camp David talks. ...
When Security Imperatives meet Sectarian Temptations: the Tehran-Riyadh conflict, 2023
This paper discusses how security considerations and sectarianism have served Iran and Saudi Arab... more This paper discusses how security considerations and sectarianism have served Iran and Saudi Arabia as mutually reinforcing tools in their strife to secure their positions in the struggle for regional influence and standing. It premises that no single factor can explain this conflict and that its proper understanding requires a more comprehensive approach that links factors and analyses their joint impact. The main hypothesis is that an analysis of the impacts of security and sectarianism, both individually and as mutually reinforcing dynamics, allows for a more credible understanding of the Iran-Saudi Arabia conflict. The discussion studies the approaches that both sides have adopted as they dealt with regional developments and made efforts to preserve their legitimacy and internal stability. It contextualizes these approaches with the rivalry during the era of the Shah, the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, the end of the Cold War, the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, and the Arab uprisings of 2011, particularly the conflict in Syria. This study proposes that understanding how sectarianism and security considerations have impacted both countries' decision-making since 1979 can help explain how security has become an essential element in the Tehran-Riyadh conflict.
ABSTRACT In the wake of the protests that spread throughout the Middle East and North Africa in l... more ABSTRACT In the wake of the protests that spread throughout the Middle East and North Africa in late 2010 and early 2011, Islamist movements of varying political persuasions have risen to prominence. This is especially the case in post-Mubarak Egypt and post-Ben Ali Tunisia. Popular Protest in the New Middle East examines Islamist approaches to political participation and integration and asks whether regional trends can be discerned with respect to either the strategy of disparate movements or the challenges they face. It offers analysis of the ideologies and actions of these movements, ranging from countries where Islamism is in control of the state as an Islamic theocracy (Iran), the ruling party (for example, Turkey), part of the ruling coalition (Lebanon), or a parliamentary minority (such as in Jordan or Yemen). Are Knudsen and Basem Ezbidi's analysis of the various experiences of protest, participation and integration make this book vital for researchers of the impact of religion on politics (and, indeed vice versa).
COVID-19 and Risk Society across the MENA Region Assessing Governance, Democracy, and Inequality Larbi Sadiki (Volume Editor), Layla Saleh (Volume Editor), 2022
1st Edition State Formation in Palestine Viability and Governance during a Social Transformation Edited By Inge Amundsen, George Giacaman, Mushtaq Husain Khan Copyright Year 2004, 2004
Foreword: Arab Revolts in Post-Islamist Times. Asef Bayat Chapter 1: Introduction. Are Knudsen Ch... more Foreword: Arab Revolts in Post-Islamist Times. Asef Bayat Chapter 1: Introduction. Are Knudsen Chapter 2: Islamism in Tunisia before and after the Arab Spring. Rikke Hostrup Haugbolle and Francesco Cavatorta Chapter 3: The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Ready for Revolution? Issandr El Amrani Chapter 4: Yemen's Islamists: Between Government and Opposition in the Post-Saleh Order. Vincent Durac Chapter 5: The Secular Uprising and the Possible Resurgence of Post-Islamism. Lina Khatib and Rob Stewart Chapter 6: Democracy as a Minor Necessity in Hamas's Narrative. Karim Knio Chapter 7: The Melding of Islam and Secularism: the Headscarf Ban in Turkey. Yildiz Atasoy Postscript. Basem Ezbidi
Investigating the Palestinian political system is no easy task. It necessitates a careful clarifi... more Investigating the Palestinian political system is no easy task. It necessitates a careful clarification of the term “political” by outlining its scope and limitations because the connotations of this term in the Palestinian context differ significantly from its meaning in other countries. In Palestine, politics occur and must be understood within the constrained conditions imposed by the Israeli occupation, which heavily impact the structure and function of the Palestinian political system. Palestinian political actors include secularists, religious dogmatists, nationalists, and leftists. There are those who subscribe to democratic ideals and others who align themselves with authoritarian values. There are also proponents of the Palestinian Authority (PA) who consider it an achievement that should be defended and nurtured, and opponents who believe that the signing of the accords was a grave mistake and that the PA is a burden on the struggle. Political discourse takes place between those who subscribe to peaceful methods and others who defend their right to engage in violent means of resistance; it includes those who believe in cooperation with the Israeli occupier and others who oppose such involvement. Furthermore, political strife takes place between those who seek to end the internal split and strengthen national unity and those who are profiting from it. Overall, “political” in Palestine is a domain that is simultaneously free and constrained: free from the coercive power of a state that does not yet exist and restricted and constrained by the fragility of the existing political order. The limited achievements made by Palestinians and the steady concessions they were forced to make to Israel over the years have led to ever-diminishing options for new conceptions and alternative strategies. Initially, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) aimed to liberate all of Palestine, striving to establish an entity in which Arabs and Jews share a secular state on the basis of equality. Starting in 1974, this goal was reduced to accepting a Palestinian state on the territories occupied in 1967, a mere 22 percent of the land of historic Palestine, while the PLO expressed readiness to reach an agreement through negotiations. When Palestinian rights continued to be violated, the First Intifada erupted in 1987, involving broad-based popular resistance and protest as well as a boycott of Israeli goods, drawing international attention to the Palestinian cause. In 1993, the signing of the Oslo Accords (OA) initiated the establishment of the PA, tasking it with overseeing a self-ruled entity whose powers were severely limited while rendering it heavily dependent on international aid. Ostensibly, this was intended to lead to full independence after a five-year transition period, but in 1999, Israel refused to grant statehood to this entity. Neither did it become the Singapore of the Middle East that some had hoped for. Moreover, instead of responding to the aspirations of the Palestinian people, the PA has become a convenient provider of colonial services and has operated as a subcontractor for the Israeli occupation authorities. Nonetheless, it is now the center of the entirety of Palestinian politics, including the political system that has emerged since 1994. What is striking is the opacity of the PA’s purpose and strategies: should it serve as a weak, elitist political order capable of implementing limited self-rule with a strong emphasis on so-called security, or should it support Palestinians and enable them to achieve independence? Ambiguity has also dominated decisions regarding the strategy that guides Palestinian resistance against the occupier. Should it apply a soft strategy that entails negotiation, diplomacy, and political and legal work in international forums, or a violent strategy of armed resistance? Because these strategies are not complementary, the overall result of the national struggle has been very modest. This chapter examines the structural factors that reduce the Palestinian political system’s ability not only to confront the policies imposed by the Israeli occupation but also to produce cohesive, effective, and responsive internal politics. Discussing the impact of the Israeli occupation and international aid, it illuminates the internal political dynamics and touches on the overlap between the PA and the PLO and ambiguous legitimacies; the split between Fatah and Hamas; and the operations of the executive authority, as security forces remain unrestrained and political parties ineffective.
‘To persuade without convincing’: Rousseau’s doctrine of soft power?, 2024
this article compares rousseau's understanding of gentle means to obtain consent with the modern ... more this article compares rousseau's understanding of gentle means to obtain consent with the modern concept of soft power. examining the phrase 'to persuade without convincing' , it explores the nature and purpose of the power rousseau attaches to his Great legislator whose enigmatic qualities have been correlated with both democratic and authoritarian tendencies. it explores the power of character, religion, and womento which rousseau refers in various contexts in his writings-suggests resemblance with the authority rousseau assigns to the legislator, and deems its application as rousseau's brand of soft power. Yet while there are surface-level parallels, rousseau's thought departs significantly from the prevailing connotations of this concept, particularly in terms of its undisclosed goals. Joseph nye, who adopted the term soft power and identified the conception, recommends soft power as an outward-directed means that utilises culture, values, and ideology to secure dominance under the notion of influence. For rousseau, it is a defensive, inward-directed instrument that aims to enable the legislator to carry out his task of fostering and enhancing a people's authenticity and autonomy without resorting to force.
Countering the Rapid Growth of Israeli Settlements By Basem Ezbidi At this stage, attempts to ass... more Countering the Rapid Growth of Israeli Settlements By Basem Ezbidi At this stage, attempts to assess the full impact of the ongoing Israeli genocidal war on Gaza and its ambitious objectives that are a pretext for the colonial government's broader and long-term aim to annex all occupied territories are challenging and premature. The complex historical context and the regional and global dimension of this brutal war are extensive, while the internal dynamics that govern the different Palestinian factions, particularly Hamas and Ramallah's PA/PLO, are influenced in both the short and long terms as well.
As Palestinians will face a multitude of obstacles on the “Day After” the genocidal war on Gaza, they must carefully contemplate their future objectives and strategies, including questions related to their national struggle and its current condition. Are Palestinians primarily pursuing the establishment of their own independent state or emphasizing their aspiration for liberation from Israel’s colonial rule? Answering this question is vital in order to choose the proper strategy. Moreover, Palestinians should be creatively courageous and discuss the effectiveness of the armed resistance adopted by “Hamas” in light of Israel’s resorting to irrational and brutal force against the Palestinians, which even includes the potential use of nuclear weapons. Likewise, Palestinians must deliberate whether it is prudent to support or oppose the PLO’s international-organizations and negotiation strategy, despite these organizations’ inconsistency in fulfilling their obligations toward the Palestinians, as they alternate between assisting them and manifestly falling short.
ELGAR HANDBOOKS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE Handbook of Middle East Politics Edited by Shahram Akbarzade, 2023
Investigating the Palestinian political system is no easy task. It necessitates a careful clarifi... more Investigating the Palestinian political system is no easy task. It necessitates a careful clarification of the term “political” by outlining its scope and limitations because the connotations of this term in the Palestinian context differ significantly from its meaning in other countries. In Palestine, politics occur and must be understood within the constrained conditions imposed by the Israeli occupation, which heavily impact the structure and function of the Palestinian political system. Palestinian political actors include secularists, religious dogmatists, nationalists, and leftists. There are those who subscribe to democratic ideals and others who align themselves with authoritarian values. There are also proponents of the Palestinian Authority (PA) who consider it an achievement that should be defended and nurtured, and opponents who believe that the signing of the accords was a grave mistake and that the PA is a burden on the struggle. Political discourse takes place between those who subscribe to peaceful methods and others who defend their right to engage in violent means of resistance; it includes those who believe in cooperation with the Israeli occupier and others who oppose such involvement. Furthermore, political strife takes place between those who seek to end the internal split and strengthen national unity and those who are profiting from it. Overall, “political” in Palestine is a domain that is simultaneously free and constrained: free from the coercive power of a state that does not yet exist and restricted and constrained by the fragility of the existing political order. The limited achievements made by Palestinians and the steady concessions they were forced to make to Israel over the years have led to ever-diminishing options for new conceptions and alternative strategies. Initially, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) aimed to liberate all of Palestine, striving to establish an entity in which Arabs and Jews share a secular state on the basis of equality.
Starting in 1974, this goal was reduced to accepting a Palestinian state on the territories occupied in 1967, a mere 22 percent of the land of historic Palestine, while the PLO expressed readiness to reach an agreement through negotiations. When Palestinian rights continued to be violated, the First Intifada erupted in 1987, involving broad-based popular resistance and protest as well as a boycott of Israeli goods, drawing international attention to the Palestinian cause.
In 1993, the signing of the Oslo Accords (OA) initiated the establishment of the PA, tasking it with overseeing a self-ruled entity whose powers were severely limited while rendering it heavily dependent on international aid. Ostensibly, this was intended to lead to full independence after a five-year transition period, but in 1999, Israel refused to grant statehood to this entity. Neither did it become the Singapore of the Middle East that some had hoped for. Moreover, instead of responding to the aspirations of the Palestinian people, the PA has become a convenient provider of colonial services and has operated as a subcontractor for the Israeli occupation authorities. Nonetheless, it is now the center of the entirety of Palestinian politics, including the political system that has emerged since 1994.
What is striking is the opacity of the PA’s purpose and strategies: should it serve as a weak, elitist political order capable of implementing limited self-rule with a strong emphasis on so-called security, or should it support Palestinians and enable them to achieve independence? Ambiguity has also dominated decisions regarding the strategy that guides Palestinian resistance against the occupier. Should it apply a soft strategy that entails negotiation, diplomacy, and political and legal work in international forums, or a violent strategy of armed resistance? Because these strategies are not complementary, the overall result of the national struggle has been very modest. This chapter examines the structural factors that reduce the Palestinian political system’s ability not only to confront the policies imposed by the Israeli occupation but also to produce cohesive, effective, and responsive internal politics. Discussing the impact of the Israeli occupation and international aid, it illuminates the internal political dynamics and touches on the overlap between the PA and the PLO and ambiguous legitimacies; the split between Fatah and Hamas; and the operations of the executive authority, as security forces remain unrestrained and political parties ineffective.
ABSTRACT: In 2017, US President Donald Trump launched the ‘Deal of the Century’ (DoC) to end the ... more ABSTRACT: In 2017, US President Donald Trump launched the ‘Deal of the Century’ (DoC) to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although Trump is no longer in office, the impact of the DoC lingers and will continue to affect future approaches to the conflict and its resolution. This article argues that the Trump DoC profoundly impacted the colonial order in Palestine. destroying further the illusion that a just settlement addressing the plight of the Palestinians could be reached. The DoC’s impact has affected three significant areas: the vision of a resolution, the approach to conflict resolution, and the venue where the conflict occurs. It helped shift the vision from a two-state solution to none, significantly undermining the approach that was based on negotiation and third-party mediation and assisting in creating a new regional versus international venue for the conflict.
Page 152. 4 PNA political institutions and the future of state formation Inge Amundsen and Basem ... more Page 152. 4 PNA political institutions and the future of state formation Inge Amundsen and Basem Ezbidi The state formation process in Palestine that started in 1993 with the Oslo Agreements came to an almost complete halt with the collapse of the Camp David talks. ...
When Security Imperatives meet Sectarian Temptations: the Tehran-Riyadh conflict, 2023
This paper discusses how security considerations and sectarianism have served Iran and Saudi Arab... more This paper discusses how security considerations and sectarianism have served Iran and Saudi Arabia as mutually reinforcing tools in their strife to secure their positions in the struggle for regional influence and standing. It premises that no single factor can explain this conflict and that its proper understanding requires a more comprehensive approach that links factors and analyses their joint impact. The main hypothesis is that an analysis of the impacts of security and sectarianism, both individually and as mutually reinforcing dynamics, allows for a more credible understanding of the Iran-Saudi Arabia conflict. The discussion studies the approaches that both sides have adopted as they dealt with regional developments and made efforts to preserve their legitimacy and internal stability. It contextualizes these approaches with the rivalry during the era of the Shah, the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, the end of the Cold War, the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, and the Arab uprisings of 2011, particularly the conflict in Syria. This study proposes that understanding how sectarianism and security considerations have impacted both countries' decision-making since 1979 can help explain how security has become an essential element in the Tehran-Riyadh conflict.
ABSTRACT In the wake of the protests that spread throughout the Middle East and North Africa in l... more ABSTRACT In the wake of the protests that spread throughout the Middle East and North Africa in late 2010 and early 2011, Islamist movements of varying political persuasions have risen to prominence. This is especially the case in post-Mubarak Egypt and post-Ben Ali Tunisia. Popular Protest in the New Middle East examines Islamist approaches to political participation and integration and asks whether regional trends can be discerned with respect to either the strategy of disparate movements or the challenges they face. It offers analysis of the ideologies and actions of these movements, ranging from countries where Islamism is in control of the state as an Islamic theocracy (Iran), the ruling party (for example, Turkey), part of the ruling coalition (Lebanon), or a parliamentary minority (such as in Jordan or Yemen). Are Knudsen and Basem Ezbidi's analysis of the various experiences of protest, participation and integration make this book vital for researchers of the impact of religion on politics (and, indeed vice versa).
COVID-19 and Risk Society across the MENA Region Assessing Governance, Democracy, and Inequality Larbi Sadiki (Volume Editor), Layla Saleh (Volume Editor), 2022
1st Edition State Formation in Palestine Viability and Governance during a Social Transformation Edited By Inge Amundsen, George Giacaman, Mushtaq Husain Khan Copyright Year 2004, 2004
Foreword: Arab Revolts in Post-Islamist Times. Asef Bayat Chapter 1: Introduction. Are Knudsen Ch... more Foreword: Arab Revolts in Post-Islamist Times. Asef Bayat Chapter 1: Introduction. Are Knudsen Chapter 2: Islamism in Tunisia before and after the Arab Spring. Rikke Hostrup Haugbolle and Francesco Cavatorta Chapter 3: The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Ready for Revolution? Issandr El Amrani Chapter 4: Yemen's Islamists: Between Government and Opposition in the Post-Saleh Order. Vincent Durac Chapter 5: The Secular Uprising and the Possible Resurgence of Post-Islamism. Lina Khatib and Rob Stewart Chapter 6: Democracy as a Minor Necessity in Hamas's Narrative. Karim Knio Chapter 7: The Melding of Islam and Secularism: the Headscarf Ban in Turkey. Yildiz Atasoy Postscript. Basem Ezbidi
Book Title: Rebel Governance in the Middle East. Editors: Ibrahim Fraihat, Abdalhadi Alijla, 2023
In 1988, it seemed unimaginable that within 20 years Hamas would
become a decisive force in the ... more In 1988, it seemed unimaginable that within 20 years Hamas would become a decisive force in the Palestinian political scene, whether through its actions or via self-restraint. Since its foundation, Hamas has made prodigious strides, overcome many challenges, and left a lasting effect on the Palestinian movement itself, the Palestinian political system, and the dynamics of Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation. Simultaneously, numerous questions have arisen, including whether Hamas will be able to reconcile politics with ideology and regarding the movement’s views on important issues, such as democracy, the Oslo peace process, the status of Palestinian women, and national reconstruction. Thirty-one years after the movement’s inception, these and other questions still remain to be answered. The ambiguity of Hamas’s position has allowed for varying interpretations of the movement’s intentions and impacts, which makes an assessment difficult and has influenced the engagement of foreign actors with the group—to the detriment of Hamas’s international recognition and standing, even though the movement has become an unbeatable force in Palestinian politics. The difficulty of providing clear answers to many of these questions lies in the multiplicity of internal and external factors that influence Hamas’s political and ideological outlook and the ambiguity of these questions and their underlying assumptions. Initially, we must ask whether Hamas is indeed a rebel group and determine how we should characterise its experience in governance and how governance has impacted the movement’s thinking, structures, and overall conduct. These questions are important, yet difficult to answer, especially when tackled through the lens of “rebel governance” that investigates what factors determine the conduct of rebel groups upon seizing power in civil wars.2 This line of analysis is premised on the assumption that, while the reasons that rebel groups fight and bring down governments and regimes are known, the nature of rebels’ rule and how they “govern” after seizing power remains subject to varying interpretations, with assessments weighing the levels of rebel movements’ self-enrichment versus developmental considerations and practical versus ideological motivators. Taking Hamas as an illustrative example to answer these questions, the guiding hypothesis in this chapter is that Hamas pursues governance and resistance (whether through political means or as armed struggle) assimultaneous goals, with governance serving to enhance resistance, just as resistance is used to strengthen governance. In other words, governance and resistance are both means and ends at the same time. Had Hamas not been in control of the Gaza Strip since 2007, it would not have been able to consolidate its military capabilities through the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Equally, if Hamas had not possessed military capabilities, it would not have been able to safeguard its rule in Gaza and strengthen its political standing among Palestinians. As resistance and governance are both tools that aim to strengthen Hamas’s power, they must be appraised in connection with one another rather than independently. Furthermore, the assumption here is that, in the context of the ongoing occupation by a foreign entity, the term “resistant” better suits Hamas than the term “rebel” that is generally applied to groups involved in civil wars. Moreover, this chapter claims that Hamas’s engagement in governance is not surely a sign of flexibility and moderation, exactly as the expansion of its military capabilities is not necessarily a sign of extremism. Hamas’s calculus in this matter differs from that of other groups, and its conduct and decisions in this regard are not arbitrarily determined but based on rational calculations. Characteristics of Hamas that other parties, such as Israel and Western countries or even Fatah, perceive as extremism (or moderation), the movement itself considers as a necessity dictated by a changing reality, rather than as legitimate or illegitimate action. “Extreme” (or “moderate”) behaviour is given meaning by the extent to which it serves Hamas’s consolidation of power and allows the movement to obtain recognition and be acknowledged as a relevant political player who should be incorporated into Palestinian political life. This chapter’s main body consists of three sections. The first sketches out the broad contours of the debate over both “governance” and “rebel governance” and shows its limited benefit for understanding Hamas’s conduct. The second section shows how Hamas has reconciled governance and resistance through discussing how it battles Fatah, encounters Salafi groups, suppresses dissent, restructures the judiciary, encounters the “moral decay” of society, runs the distressed public service system, and is perceived by the public. The third section shows that debating Hamas’s radicalism or moderation is of limited value in efforts to understand its perspective on governance.
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As Palestinians will face a multitude of obstacles on the “Day After” the genocidal war on Gaza, they must carefully contemplate their future objectives and strategies, including questions related to their national struggle and its current condition. Are Palestinians primarily pursuing the establishment of their own independent state or emphasizing their aspiration for liberation from Israel’s colonial rule? Answering this question is vital in order to choose the proper strategy. Moreover, Palestinians should be creatively courageous and discuss the effectiveness of
the armed resistance adopted by “Hamas” in light of Israel’s resorting to irrational and brutal force against the Palestinians, which even includes the potential use of nuclear weapons. Likewise, Palestinians must deliberate
whether it is prudent to support or oppose the PLO’s international-organizations and negotiation strategy, despite these organizations’ inconsistency in fulfilling their obligations toward the Palestinians, as they alternate between assisting them and manifestly falling short.
Starting in 1974, this goal was reduced to accepting a Palestinian state on the territories occupied in 1967, a mere 22 percent of the land of historic Palestine, while the PLO expressed readiness to reach an agreement through negotiations. When Palestinian rights continued to be violated, the First Intifada erupted in 1987, involving broad-based popular resistance and protest as well as a boycott of Israeli goods, drawing international attention to the Palestinian cause.
In 1993, the signing of the Oslo Accords (OA) initiated the establishment of the PA, tasking it with overseeing a self-ruled entity whose powers were severely limited while rendering it heavily dependent on international aid. Ostensibly, this was intended to lead to full independence after a five-year transition period, but in 1999, Israel refused to grant statehood to this entity. Neither did it become the Singapore of the Middle East that some had hoped for. Moreover, instead of responding to the aspirations of the Palestinian people, the PA has become a convenient provider of colonial services and has operated as a subcontractor for the Israeli occupation authorities. Nonetheless, it is now the center of the entirety of Palestinian politics, including the political system that has emerged since 1994.
What is striking is the opacity of the PA’s purpose and strategies: should it serve as a weak, elitist political order capable of implementing limited self-rule with a strong emphasis on so-called security, or should it support Palestinians and enable them to achieve independence? Ambiguity has also dominated decisions regarding the strategy that guides Palestinian resistance against the occupier. Should it apply a soft strategy that entails negotiation, diplomacy, and political and legal work in international forums, or a violent strategy of armed resistance? Because these strategies are not complementary, the overall result of the national struggle has been very modest. This chapter examines the structural factors that reduce the Palestinian political system’s ability not only to confront the policies imposed by the Israeli occupation but also to produce cohesive, effective, and responsive internal politics. Discussing the impact of the Israeli occupation and international aid, it illuminates the internal political dynamics and touches on the overlap between the PA and the PLO and ambiguous legitimacies; the split between Fatah and Hamas; and the operations of the executive authority, as security forces remain unrestrained and political parties ineffective.
destroying further the illusion that a just settlement addressing the plight of the Palestinians could be reached. The DoC’s impact has affected three significant areas: the vision of a resolution, the approach to conflict resolution, and the venue where the conflict occurs. It helped shift the vision from a two-state solution to none, significantly undermining the approach that was based on negotiation and third-party mediation and assisting in creating a new regional versus international venue for the conflict.
As Palestinians will face a multitude of obstacles on the “Day After” the genocidal war on Gaza, they must carefully contemplate their future objectives and strategies, including questions related to their national struggle and its current condition. Are Palestinians primarily pursuing the establishment of their own independent state or emphasizing their aspiration for liberation from Israel’s colonial rule? Answering this question is vital in order to choose the proper strategy. Moreover, Palestinians should be creatively courageous and discuss the effectiveness of
the armed resistance adopted by “Hamas” in light of Israel’s resorting to irrational and brutal force against the Palestinians, which even includes the potential use of nuclear weapons. Likewise, Palestinians must deliberate
whether it is prudent to support or oppose the PLO’s international-organizations and negotiation strategy, despite these organizations’ inconsistency in fulfilling their obligations toward the Palestinians, as they alternate between assisting them and manifestly falling short.
Starting in 1974, this goal was reduced to accepting a Palestinian state on the territories occupied in 1967, a mere 22 percent of the land of historic Palestine, while the PLO expressed readiness to reach an agreement through negotiations. When Palestinian rights continued to be violated, the First Intifada erupted in 1987, involving broad-based popular resistance and protest as well as a boycott of Israeli goods, drawing international attention to the Palestinian cause.
In 1993, the signing of the Oslo Accords (OA) initiated the establishment of the PA, tasking it with overseeing a self-ruled entity whose powers were severely limited while rendering it heavily dependent on international aid. Ostensibly, this was intended to lead to full independence after a five-year transition period, but in 1999, Israel refused to grant statehood to this entity. Neither did it become the Singapore of the Middle East that some had hoped for. Moreover, instead of responding to the aspirations of the Palestinian people, the PA has become a convenient provider of colonial services and has operated as a subcontractor for the Israeli occupation authorities. Nonetheless, it is now the center of the entirety of Palestinian politics, including the political system that has emerged since 1994.
What is striking is the opacity of the PA’s purpose and strategies: should it serve as a weak, elitist political order capable of implementing limited self-rule with a strong emphasis on so-called security, or should it support Palestinians and enable them to achieve independence? Ambiguity has also dominated decisions regarding the strategy that guides Palestinian resistance against the occupier. Should it apply a soft strategy that entails negotiation, diplomacy, and political and legal work in international forums, or a violent strategy of armed resistance? Because these strategies are not complementary, the overall result of the national struggle has been very modest. This chapter examines the structural factors that reduce the Palestinian political system’s ability not only to confront the policies imposed by the Israeli occupation but also to produce cohesive, effective, and responsive internal politics. Discussing the impact of the Israeli occupation and international aid, it illuminates the internal political dynamics and touches on the overlap between the PA and the PLO and ambiguous legitimacies; the split between Fatah and Hamas; and the operations of the executive authority, as security forces remain unrestrained and political parties ineffective.
destroying further the illusion that a just settlement addressing the plight of the Palestinians could be reached. The DoC’s impact has affected three significant areas: the vision of a resolution, the approach to conflict resolution, and the venue where the conflict occurs. It helped shift the vision from a two-state solution to none, significantly undermining the approach that was based on negotiation and third-party mediation and assisting in creating a new regional versus international venue for the conflict.
become a decisive force in the Palestinian political scene, whether
through its actions or via self-restraint. Since its foundation, Hamas
has made prodigious strides, overcome many challenges, and left a
lasting effect on the Palestinian movement itself, the Palestinian political
system, and the dynamics of Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation. Simultaneously, numerous questions have arisen, including whether Hamas will be able to reconcile politics with ideology and regarding the movement’s views on important issues, such as democracy, the Oslo peace process, the status of Palestinian women, and national reconstruction. Thirty-one years after the movement’s inception, these and other questions still remain to be answered. The ambiguity of Hamas’s position has allowed for varying interpretations of the movement’s intentions and impacts, which makes an assessment difficult and has influenced the engagement of foreign actors with the group—to the detriment of Hamas’s international recognition and standing, even though the movement has become an unbeatable force in Palestinian politics.
The difficulty of providing clear answers to many of these questions
lies in the multiplicity of internal and external factors that influence Hamas’s political and ideological outlook and the ambiguity of
these questions and their underlying assumptions. Initially, we must
ask whether Hamas is indeed a rebel group and determine how we
should characterise its experience in governance and how governance
has impacted the movement’s thinking, structures, and overall conduct.
These questions are important, yet difficult to answer, especially when
tackled through the lens of “rebel governance” that investigates what
factors determine the conduct of rebel groups upon seizing power in
civil wars.2 This line of analysis is premised on the assumption that,
while the reasons that rebel groups fight and bring down governments
and regimes are known, the nature of rebels’ rule and how they “govern”
after seizing power remains subject to varying interpretations, with assessments weighing the levels of rebel movements’ self-enrichment versus developmental considerations and practical versus ideological motivators. Taking Hamas as an illustrative example to answer these questions, the guiding hypothesis in this chapter is that Hamas pursues governance and resistance (whether through political means or as armed struggle) assimultaneous goals, with governance serving to enhance resistance, just as resistance is used to strengthen governance. In other words, governance and resistance are both means and ends at the same time. Had Hamas not been in control of the Gaza Strip since 2007, it would not have been able to consolidate its military capabilities through the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Equally, if Hamas had not possessed military capabilities, it would not have been able to safeguard its rule in Gaza and
strengthen its political standing among Palestinians. As resistance and
governance are both tools that aim to strengthen Hamas’s power, they
must be appraised in connection with one another rather than independently. Furthermore, the assumption here is that, in the context of the ongoing occupation by a foreign entity, the term “resistant” better suits
Hamas than the term “rebel” that is generally applied to groups involved
in civil wars. Moreover, this chapter claims that Hamas’s engagement
in governance is not surely a sign of flexibility and moderation, exactly
as the expansion of its military capabilities is not necessarily a sign of
extremism. Hamas’s calculus in this matter differs from that of other
groups, and its conduct and decisions in this regard are not arbitrarily
determined but based on rational calculations. Characteristics of Hamas
that other parties, such as Israel and Western countries or even Fatah,
perceive as extremism (or moderation), the movement itself considers as
a necessity dictated by a changing reality, rather than as legitimate or illegitimate action. “Extreme” (or “moderate”) behaviour is given meaning
by the extent to which it serves Hamas’s consolidation of power and
allows the movement to obtain recognition and be acknowledged as
a relevant political player who should be incorporated into Palestinian
political life.
This chapter’s main body consists of three sections. The first sketches
out the broad contours of the debate over both “governance” and “rebel
governance” and shows its limited benefit for understanding Hamas’s
conduct. The second section shows how Hamas has reconciled governance and resistance through discussing how it battles Fatah, encounters Salafi groups, suppresses dissent, restructures the judiciary, encounters the “moral decay” of society, runs the distressed public service system, and is perceived by the public. The third section shows that debating Hamas’s radicalism or moderation is of limited value in efforts to
understand its perspective on governance.