Philosophy

This article investigates the relationship between Hume’s causal philosophy and Newton’s philosophy of nature. I claim that Newton’s experimentalist methodology in gravity research is an important background for understanding Hume’s conception of causality: Hume sees the relation of cause and effect as not being founded on a priori reasoning, similar to the way that Newton criticized non-empirical hypotheses about the properties of gravity. However, according to Hume’s criteria of causal inference, the law of universal gravitation is not a complete causal law, since it does not include a reference either to contiguity or to temporal priority. It is still argued that because of the empirical success of Newton’s theory—the law is a statement of an exceptionless repetition—Hume gives his support to it in interpreting gravity force instrumentally as if it bore a causal relation to motion.

Given the sharp distinction that follows from Hume’s Fork, the proper epistemic status of propositions of mixed mathematics seems to be a mystery. On the one hand, mathematical propositions concern the relation of ideas. They are intuitive and demonstratively certain. On the other hand, propositions of mixed mathematics, such as in Hume’s own example, the law of conservation of momentum, are also matter of fact propositions. They concern causal relations between species of objects, and, in this sense, they are not intuitive or demonstratively certain, but probable or provable.
In this article, I argue that the epistemic status of propositions of mixed mathematics is that of matters of fact. I wish to show that their epistemic status is not a mystery. The reason for this is that the propositions of mixed mathematics are dependent on the Uniformity Principle, unlike the propositions of pure mathematics.

Einstein acknowledged that his reading of Hume influenced the development of his special theory of relativity. In this article, I juxtapose Hume’s philosophy with Einstein’s philosophical analysis related to his special relativity. I argue that there are two common points to be found in their writings, namely an empiricist theory of ideas and concepts, and a relationist ontology regarding space and time. The main thesis of this article is that these two points are intertwined in Hume and Einstein.

Tarkastelen tässä kirjoituksessa sensualismiksi kutsuttua suuntausta mielenfilosofiassa. Tämän suuntauksen puolustajina voidaan pitää David Humea (1711–1776) sekä hänen aikalaistaan, filosofian historiassa vähemmän tunnettua Étienne Bonnot de Condillacia (1715–1780). Sensualismin keskeinen väite on, että tieto mielestä tai minuudesta perustuu aistivaikutelmiin ja havaintoihin.

Esitän tässä kirjoitelmassa, että Humen ja Condillacin sensualistisia mielenfilosofioita yhdistää ainakin yksi erityinen piirre: heidän mukaansa tiedolla mielestä ja minuudesta ei ole tiedollisesti ensisijaista asemaa. Tästä johtuen heidän mielenfilosofiset johtopäätöksensä asettuvat René Descartes’n (1596–1650) kannattamaa rationalistista tiedonkäsitystä vastaan, jonka mukaan tieto mielestä ja minuudesta on tiedollisesti ensisijainen. Väitän kirjoitelmassani, että tästä tieto-opillisten lähtökohtien eroavaisuuksista johtuen Hume ja Condillac päätyvät ajattelemaan, ettei tieto mielestä tai minuudesta eroa merkittävästi muista havainnon kohteista saatavasta tiedosta.

Tässä lehdessä on käyty kiivasta ja provokatiivistakin keskustelua suhteellisuusteoriasta. Edellisessä numerossa Juha Himanka (Tieteessä tapahtuu 3/2014) väittää, että Albert Einsteinin suhteellisuusteoria, erotuksena luonnontieteestä, on yksinomaan filosofiaa. Se ylittää hänen mukaansa luonnontieteen rajat pyrkiessään yleispätevään esitykseen todellisuudesta, ajasta ja avaruudesta. Hän myös pitää sitä fenomenologiseen tieteenkritiikkiinsä vedoten ongelmallisena. Toisaalta Kari Enqvist ja Syksy Räsänen (Tieteessä tapahtuu 3/2014) ovat korostaneet suhteellisuusteorian kiistatonta empiiristä tukea sekä siihen pohjaavan teknologian toimivuutta osoituksena teorian paikkansapitävyydestä.

Esitän tässä kirjoitelmassani, että Einsteinin suppean suhteellisuusteorian ajan ja avaruuden käsitteet ovat sekä filosofiaa että fysiikkaa. Tässä mielessä edustan välittävää kantaa filosofian ja fysiikan välillä.

For the last 40 years, Hume’s Newtonianism has been a debated topic in Hume scholarship. The crux of the matter can be formulated by the following question: Is Hume a Newtonian philosopher? Answering to this permanent issue has produced two lines of interpretation. I shall call them “traditional” and “critical” interpretations. The traditional interpretation asserts that there are many Newtonian elements in Hume, whereas the critical interpretation seriously questions this.

In this article, I consider the main points made by both lines of interpretations, and offer further arguments that contribute to this debate. I shall first argue, in favor of the traditional interpretation, that Hume is sympathetic to many prominently Newtonian themes in natural philosophy, such as experimentalism, critique of hypotheses, inductive proof, and critique of Leibnizian principles of sufficient reason and intelligibility. Second, I shall argue, in accordance with the critical interpretation, that in many cases Hume is not a Newtonian philosopher: his conceptions regarding space and time, vacuum, reality of forces, specifics about causation, and the status of mechanism differ markedly from Newton’s related conceptions. The outcome of the article is that there are both Newtonian and non/anti-Newtonian elements in Hume.

Hume's work has an observable role in the historical development of science after his time. To show this, I shall focus on the relation between Hume and two major figures in the history of natural science: Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and Albert Einstein (1879-1955). Both of these scientist read Hume. Their evaluation of him was also most positive. Inquiring into the relations between Hume and the two scientists evidences that Hume’s philosophical positions did have a partial constructive role in the formation of modern biology and physics.

The subject of this essay-based dissertation is Hume’s natural philosophy. The dissertation consists of four separate essays and an introduction. These essays do not only treat Hume’s views on the topic of natural philosophy, but his views are placed into a broader context of history of philosophy and science, physics in particular. The introductory section outlines the historical context, shows how the individual essays are connected, expounds what kind of research methodology has been used, and encapsulates the research contributions of the essays. The first essay treats Newton’s experimentalist methodology in gravity research and its relation to Hume’s causal philosophy. It is argued that Hume does not see the relation of cause and effect as being founded on a priori reasoning, similar to the way in which Newton criticized non-empirical hypotheses about the causal properties of gravity. Contrary to Hume’s rules of causation, the universal law does not include a reference either to contiguity or succession, but Hume accepts it in interpreting the force and the law of gravity instrumentally. The second article considers Newtonian and non-Newtonian elements in Hume more broadly. He is sympathetic to many prominently Newtonian themes in natural philosophy, such as experimentalism, critique of hypotheses, inductive proof, and the critique of Leibnizian principles of sufficient reason and intelligibility. However, Hume is not a Newtonian philosopher in many respects: his conceptions regarding space and time, the vacuum, the specifics of causation, the status of mechanism, and the reality of forces differ markedly from Newton’s related conceptions. The third article focuses on Hume’s Fork and the proper epistemic status of propositions of mixed mathematics. It is shown that the epistemic status of propositions of mixed mathematics, such as those concerning laws of nature, is that of matters of fact. The reason for this is that the propositions of mixed mathematics are dependent on the Uniformity Principle. The fourth article analyzes Einstein’s acknowledgement of Hume regarding special relativity. The views of the scientist and the philosopher are juxtaposed, and it is argued that there are two common points to be found in their writings, namely an empiricist theory of ideas and concepts and a relationist ontology regarding space and time.

David Humen Keskusteluja luonnollisesta uskonnosta (Dialogues concerning Natural Religion) lukeutuu uskonnonfilosofian merkittävimpien teoksien joukkoon. Humen veljenpoika julkaisi sen nimettömänä tämän kuoleman jälkeen vuonna 1779. Vaikka teos on ajalleen tyypillisesti kirjoitettu dialogi-muotoon, monet sen keskeisistä väitteistä olivat aikanaan hyvin rohkeita ja kiistanalaisia. Kärjekkäästi ja hauskasti kirjoitettu teos on mielenkiintoista luettavaa vaikkapa lukion tai yliopistojen filosofian, historian tai uskonnon kursseille.

Oliko Newton tieteilijä vai filosofi? Tulisiko hänen suurteoksensa Principia ‒ Luonnonfilosofian matemaattiset perusteet (ensimmäinen painos vuonna 1687) ymmärtää erityistieteellisenä fysiikan työnä, vain onko se perimmältään luontoa koskevaa yleisluontoista filosofointia?