Samuel White

This article examines the use of generative metaphors in the context of interference operations, particularly focusing on trolling and disinformation. It begins by emphasising the crucial role of metaphors in shaping perceptions of cybersecurity issues and subsequent government policies. To demonstrate this, the study delves into two case studiesthe Philippines and Australiaanalysing how their historical and political contexts have shaped the metaphors they employ to address trolling and disinformation. The article evaluates the effectiveness of these metaphors in both cases, considering their impact on policy formulation. It employs Allan McConnell's methodology to assess process and program success, ultimately concluding that, while the virus metaphor conveys urgency, it falls short in addressing the root causes of trolling. Conversely, the industry metaphor, as exemplified in the Philippines, promotes accountability and regulation.

Despite the recent upsurge of interest in the Australian Frontier Wars, the military tactics adopted by First Nations groups have consistently failed to attract the attention of scholars. What work that does exist often struggles to move beyond a characterisation of First Nations dispossession as a profound defeat, one that continues to resonate in contemporary Australia. Yet by utilising a centre of gravity analysis, a standard military appreciation tool, it is possible to identify compelling evidence that the economic warfare, as practiced along multiple frontiers in Australia by First Nations groups, was both sophisticated and remarkably effective. By utilising modern military analytical frameworks to assess Frontier Warfare, it is possible to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of First Nations tactics and identify lessons for modern military operations.

This article explores the evolving landscape of foreign interference in domestic affairs, particularly in the context of 'information operations' facilitated by the internet. The primary focus of the article is on the lawful authority to respond to external information operations, and how this authority may be shaped by international law. Specifically, the article explores the royal prerogative in two manifestations-the war prerogative, and external affairs prerogative-as a potential source of authority. In doing so, the article employs an analytical framework by George Winterton, distinguishing between the 'breadth' and 'depth' of constitutional executive power. The article acknowledges the limited case law and debates surrounding these prerogatives' scope and triggers, and slight nuances between British and Australian jurisprudence. It discusses the relationship between the war prerogative and the existence of armed conflict and touches on how international law can support the exercise of the war prerogative through the 'public policy test'. Drawing from international legal perspectives, the article references United Nations resolutions from 1976 and 1981 that emphasise the importance of domestic legal remedies against information operations. It stresses the duty of states to combat the dissemination of false or distorted news that interferes with other states' internal affairs. In sum, the article concludes that, while countering IOs is a matter requiring domestic legal authority, international law can likely extend the ambit of the royal prerogative and should also, as a matter of public policy, apply to such campaigns.

This article seeks to define what an Internet Referral Unit ('IRU') is by examining different IRUs in various jurisdictions and discerning their functions. It also makes a policy argument with respect to the implementation of an IRU in an Australian domestic setting. It does so by analysing Anglo-Saxon norms with respect to censorship and determining the best means of implementing an IRU that would give effect to rational public policy. It does so to highlight, through a legal history perspective and policy success perspective, that cybersecurity often brings with it new challenges to age-old questions. The paper posits that the establishment of an IRU would be consistent with Anglo-Saxon practice, leading to the issue of what legal frameworks would need to be established.

Foreign interference operations are shaping Australian domestic policy, but the target audiences have never been identified by intelligence organisations. This paper seeks to highlight one of the major risks to Australian society-the gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. Although an internal issue, vulnerabilities and gaps in social groups have been exploited in other jurisdictions. It merits then to look critically at Australia, a continent and country that has limited modern experience in domestic insurrections and conflict. It does, however, have a long history of colonial conflict, which has shaped health and social outcomes for its Indigenous population. Through a legal-medical perspective, this paper addresses first the national security risks that have shaped Australian legal thinking with respect to First Nations, and then how modern information war practices can target so-called 'useful idiots' and 'fellow travellers' in the Closing the Gap police.

How can Indigenous Australian thinking can stabilise a global rules-based order? This paper addresses the public nature of violence within Indigenous Australian society prior to colonisation, in order to inform best practice within cyberspace.

The Australian government has determined that the Australian Defence Force (‘ADF’) will prepare to counter non-geographic threats in a range of operational environments, including cyberspace. This article explores the viability of constitutional executive power to authorise the use of the ADF in counter cyber interference operations. Speci cally, it looks to address the breadth and depth of the nationhood power as a lawful authority for operations outside of s 119 of the Constitution. This is an important area to explore, noting that interference operations will often fall below the ‘domestic violence’ threshold conventionally required to call out the troops.
This article addresses the manner in which executive power can enable and support ADF operations from a jurisprudential and operational perspective. With reference to earlier ADF operations such as the Bowral call out in 1978 and the 2002 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting deployment, this article argues that executive power could provide a capability and legal authority for a suite of operations that may be seen as otherwise breaching Australian law.

Historically, personnel who join the armed forces agree to take what has been known as the King’s Hard Bargain – a unilateral contract to give all, and expect nothing. Little has been written however on the nature of this power, an arguably outdated concept inconsistent with modern concepts of employment law. This article looks to explore the notion of accepting the King’s Hard Bargain, and whether or not the Governor-General has, and retains in the face of Regulations, the power to dismiss members of the Australian Defence Force. In doing so, it challenges the notion that the Commander-in-Chief is merely titular, a line of thinking that has been twisted from its original meaning to a near-rule of constitutional interpretation, and concludes with questioning whether or not the King’s Hard Bargain should remain so, or whether or not the legislation should be amended to reflect the Public Service’s conditions.

Foreign State and non-State actors attempting to interfere in the domestic affairs of others is not a new phenomenon; nor, too, is the use of information as a resource, environment and weapon in warfare. However, historically there have been some buffer zones.

This has all changed. Now, rather than simply writing a message on stone at popular watering holes, foreign interference operations (IOs) can leverage the ubiquity of the Internet in order to deliver personally tailored, micro-targeted messages to individuals in their homes.  The changing nature of warfare has led, formally and informally, to practitioners of the Profession of Arms to claim that grey zone operations unfairly exploit the gaps between peace and war, exploiting the vulnerabilities of Western democracy – free speech – in an unacceptable manner.

This paper looks to explore this notion, and opines that rhetoric claiming conflicts fought in ‘the grey zone’ are somehow unacceptable fails to grapple with the basic concept of armed conflict and competition – to win. In order to demonstrate this point, it is first necessary to canvass what is meant by the concept of ‘grey zone’. To do so requires, axiomatically, covering ‘traditional’ legal frameworks of peace and war and exploring how this binary distinction has shaped legal thinking since Rome. It will then look to unpack the underlying logic in identifying something as being ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ exploitations in war, demonstrating that even through the Eurocentric lens of chivalry – a high water mark in the idea of unacceptable exploitation – the exploitation of traditional legal thresholds was more than acceptable. Finding that it is unsafe to maintain a moralistic stance to security threats, and that the current strategic framework is inappropriate, it then addresses what domestic remedies are available for the Australian Government to take, under the Australian Constitution.

Automated decision-making systems are becoming more prevalent in government processes around the world, in areas as diverse as the administration of social security, taxation, criminal sentencing and migration.3 These systems are most likely to be deployed in branches of government that must cope with a high caseload, as well as repetitive assessments against prescriptive criteria. However, as will be shown below, automated systems can vary in nature, which is likely to have implications for the manner in
which they are authorised or delegated, as well as for the risks that might be posed by indiscriminate use of those systems. Accordingly, this paper  rst canvasses the lexicon and meaning of terms such as arti cial intelligence and machine learning, before discussing technical aspects of the processes and tools these capacities can produce. Next, it applies the solution to three problems: assisting individuals when sentencing ADF members within the military discipline system; assisting ADF decision-makers to make consistent decisions when imposing administrative sanctions; and assisting central bodies such as the Career Management Agency with posting plots and career plans. This paper will not deal with some of the more nuanced legal issues surrounding automated decision-making.

The need for delegated authority and delegated decision making has been recognised as a necessity for modern administrative practice. Yet, with the rise of machine learning tools, it is necessary to start to grapple with the appropriateness of delegating decisions, about humans, to machines. This paper seeks to address from technical, legal and legal policy perspectives the viability of delegated decision making, and the process by which accountability and transparency can be retained.

Digital connections and the ubiquity of cyberspace have undermined Australia’s historic defence system: our distance from other nations. Increasingly, this new vulnerability is being covertly exploited by foreign actors. Accordingly, the Commonwealth government has determined that the Australian Defence Force (‘ADF’) is to prepare to counter these new threats in the grey zone. Yet, little has been written on the legal authorities for, and constraints on, the utilisation of the ADF in this context. This article explores one microcosm example of the multitude of threats that Australia might face in the coming century — foreign interference operations targeting domestic voting infrastructure and the information environment.

This article will canvass the viability of the internal security prerogative, the so-called sister prerogative to the war prerogative, to authorise the use of the ADF in counter-interference operations. This is an important area to explore, noting that interference operations will often fall within the ‘domestic violence’ threshold for the ADF to be permitted to be called out under pt IIIAAA of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth). This article first looks at the nature of the internal security prerogative of ‘keeping the peace of the realm’, and how it is constrained by federalism in the Australian context. This requires a historical exploration of both Anglo-Saxon and Australian domestic military deployments. This article then explores the principle of desuetude as a rule of extinguishment, and whether it is applicable to this little-used prerogative power. It then concludes by arguing for a re-interpretation of the legal foundations for earlier ADF operations — such as the Bowral call-out in 1978 and the 2002 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (‘CHOGM’) deployment — in accordance with the prerogative, rather than under an implied nationhood power.

The defence of superior orders is not new. However, within Australia, its statutory codification is lamentably underexplored. The 2018 Amendments to Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) provides a neat catalyst to expand the defence and look at possible manners in which it can be constructed. Utilising a theoretical case study of Australian Defence Force members killing a possible terrorist, this article addresses the key elements of the defence-what an order is, when can it be constructed as being manifestly unlawful and what does reasonable and necessary force mean for Australian Defence Force members.

This article explores the viability for the executive power to authorise the use of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) domestically, through the lens of military intervention in industrial action. It has become practice, when discussing the executive power, to delineate between breadth and depth-the latter of which is somewhat controversial. The article first looks at possible courses of action that can be taken under the Defence Act 1903 (Cth), before highlighting the apparent gap where the ADF is placed in domestic situations that might require coercion or force, but the situation does not meet the "domestic violence" threshold required under Pt IIIAAA. It then discusses the non-statutory executive power-namely, the internal security prerogative and the implied nationhood power. The article concludes by advocating for statutory empowerment and protection for ADF members.

Deciding to deploy the Australian Defence Force domestically, in aid to the civil authority, is no small decision. This paper looks at the ability to judicially review a decision to call out the ADF under Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act 1903. It focuses upon the threshold requirements, and mandatory considerations. In doing so, it further looks at what would be required to demonstrate bad faith by an authorising Minister.

The ability to deport or cancel the visas of non-citizens, regardless of the length of their residency in Australia, remains a controversial topic. Whilst it re ects long-standing Australian policy, the widening scope of s 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) should provoke re ection and criticism. The legislative provision empowers the Minister for Immi- gration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs with a non-delegable, non-reviewable and non-compellable discretion to expel from Australia those deemed not to be of good character. I explore the history of the character test in Australia, highlighting the relevant inter- national and domestic legal frameworks with a particular focus on visa holders to whom Australia owes non-refoulement obligations, followed by key issues arising from the current regime: the potential inconsistency of domestic legislation with international law; the inherent irrationality of assessing future risk; and the consequences of mandatory detention. I will then explore the current review process and its legal and practical barriers, before concluding with select solutions.

It used to be held that 'The law acknowledges no distinction… between the soldier and the private individual. The soldier is still a citizen, lying under the same obligation and invested with the same authority to preserve the peace of the King as any other subject.' How correct is this, however, today? This paper seeks to address whether or not members of the armed forces, whose primary role is to kill the Queen's enemies, should hold a distinct, and separate, legal status for their conduct whilst called out to aid the civil authority.

Australia has often used national security exemptions to try camouflage the arrival of irregular maritime vessels - thereby Hiding the Boats. This paper critiques the use of operational and tactical security exemptions for Operation Sovereign Borders, and demonstrates that operational transparency and operational security are not necessarily mutually exclusive.