One of the central topics in semantic theory over the last few decades concerns the nature of loc... more One of the central topics in semantic theory over the last few decades concerns the nature of local contexts. Recently, theorists have tried to develop general, non-stipulative accounts of local contexts (Schlenker, 2009; Ingason, 2016; Mandelkern & Romoli, 2017a). In this paper, we contribute to this literature by drawing attention to the local contexts of subclausal expressions. More specifically, we focus on the local contexts of quantificational determiners, e.g. `all', `both', etc. Our central tool for probing the local contexts of subclausal elements is the principle Maximize Presupposition! (Percus, 2006; Singh, 2011). The empirical basis of our investigation concerns some data discussed by Anvari (2018b), e.g. the fact that sentences such as `All of the two presidential candidates are crooked' are unacceptable. In order to explain this, we suggest that the local context of determiners needs to contain the information carried by their restrictor. However, no existing non-stipulative account predicts this. Consequently, we think that the local contexts of subclausal expressions will likely have to be stipulated. This result has important consequences for debates in semantics and pragmatics, e.g. those around the so-called "explanatory problem" for dynamic semantics (Soames, 1982; Heim, 1990; Schlenker, 2009).
In some sentences, demonstratives can be substituted with definite descriptions without any chang... more In some sentences, demonstratives can be substituted with definite descriptions without any change in meaning. In light of this, many have maintained that demonstratives are just a type of definite description. However, several theorists have drawn attention to a range of cases where definite descriptions are acceptable, but their demonstrative counterparts are not. Some have tried to account for this data by appealing to presupposition. I argue that such presuppositional approaches are problematic, and present a pragmatic account of the target contrasts. On this approach, demonstratives take two arguments and generally require that the first, covert argument is non-redundant with respect to the second, overt argument. I derive this condition through an economy principle discussed by Schlenker (2005).
This paper presents a puzzle involving embedded attitude reports. We resolve the puzzle by arguin... more This paper presents a puzzle involving embedded attitude reports. We resolve the puzzle by arguing that attitude verbs take restricted readings: in some environments the denotation of attitude verbs can be restricted by a given proposition. For example, when these verbs are embedded in the consequent of a conditional, they can be restricted by the proposition expressed by the conditional's antecedent. We formulate and motivate two conditions on the availability of verb restrictions: (i) a constraint that ties the content of restrictions to the " dynamic effects " of sentential connectives and (ii) a constraint that limits the availability of restriction effects to present tense verbs with first-person subjects. However, we also present some cases that make trouble for these conditions, and outline some possible ways of modifying the view to account for the recalcitrant data. We conclude with a brief discussion of some of the connections between our semantics for attitude verbs and issues concerning epistemic modals and theories of knowledge.
This paper is about conjunctions and disjunctions in the scope of non-doxastic attitude verbs. Th... more This paper is about conjunctions and disjunctions in the scope of non-doxastic attitude verbs. These constructions generate a certain type of ignorance implicature. I argue that the best way to account for these implicatures is by appealing to a notion of contextual redundancy (Schlenker, 2008; Fox, 2008; Mayr and Romoli, 2016). This pragmatic approach to ignorance implicatures is contrasted with a semantic account of disjunctions under 'wonder' that appeals to exhaustification (Roelofsen and Uegaki, 2016). I argue that exhaustification-based theories cannot handle embedded conjunctions, so a pragmatic account of ignorance implicatures is superior.
Although much has been written about the truth-conditions of de re attitude reports, little atten... more Although much has been written about the truth-conditions of de re attitude reports, little attention has been paid to certain 'ultra-liberal' uses of those reports. We believe that if these uses are legitimate, then a number of interesting consequences for various theses in philosophical semantics follow. The majority of the paper involves describing these consequences. In short, we argue that, if true, ultra-liberal reports: (i) bring counterexamples to a popular approach to de re attitude ascriptions, which we will call 'descriptivism'; and (ii) combine with independently plausible principles about the logic of belief to imply that subjects can achieve omniscience about what exists from the armchair. Although we are not committed to the view that ultra-liberal reports are false, in the final part of the paper we discuss the prospects of pursuing a line according to which the acceptability of such reports ought not be taken at face value. We conclude by arguing that those who are sympathetic with this move might have reason to doubt the truth of an even broader class of acceptable de re attitude reports, namely those that have been taken to undermine orthodox accounts of de re attitude ascriptions.
In this paper, I raise a problem for standard precisifications of The Relational Analysis. The pr... more In this paper, I raise a problem for standard precisifications of The Relational Analysis. The problem I raise involves so–called 'counterfactual’ attitude verbs, such as ‘wish’. In short, the trouble is this: there are true attitude reports ‘S wishes that P’ but there is no suitable referent for the term ‘that P’. The problematic reports illustrate that the content of a subject’s wish is intimately related to the content of their beliefs. I capture this fact by moving to a framework in which ‘wish’ relates subjects to sets of pairs of worlds, or paired propositions, rather than — as is standardly assumed — sets of worlds. Although other types of counterfactual attitude reports, e.g. those involving ‘imagine’, may be similarly problematic, at this stage it is unclear whether they can be handled the same way.
In this paper, I outline a novel approach to the semantics of natural language pronouns. On this ... more In this paper, I outline a novel approach to the semantics of natural language pronouns. On this account, which I call demonstrativism, pronouns are semantically equivalent to demonstratives. I begin by presenting some contrasts that provide support for demonstrativism. Then I try to explain these contrasts by developing a particular demonstrativist proposal. I build on the "hidden argument" theory of demon
In 1978, Eric Kraemer observed that 'Brown intentionally threw a six' and 'Brown intentionally wo... more In 1978, Eric Kraemer observed that 'Brown intentionally threw a six' and 'Brown intentionally won the game' can differ in truth-value, even when it is known that Brown won the game just in case he threw a six. More generally, there are cases where S intentionally V 1 and S intentionally V 2 differ in truth-value even though V 1 and V 2 are known to be co-extensive. We call this Kraemer's puzzle in the theory of intentional action. We bring out some of the puzzle's central features, and gesture towards a solution.
Inheritance is the principle that deontic 'ought' is closed under entailment. This paper is about... more Inheritance is the principle that deontic 'ought' is closed under entailment. This paper is about a tension that arises in connection with Inheritance. More specifically, it is about two observations that pull in opposite directions. One of them raises questions about the validity of Inheritance, while the other appears to provide strong support for it. We argue that existing approaches to deontic modals fail to provide us with an adequate resolution of this tension. In response, we develop a positive analysis, and show that this proposal provides a satisfying account of our intuitions.
A slightly later version is forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy
The analysis of desire ascriptions has been a central topic of research for philosophers of langu... more The analysis of desire ascriptions has been a central topic of research for philosophers of language and mind. This work has mostly focused on providing a theory of want reports, i.e. sentences of the form S wants p. In this paper, we turn attention from want reports to a closely related, but relatively understudied construction, namely hope reports, i.e. sentences of the form S hopes p. We present two contrasts involving hope reports, and show that existing approaches to desire fail to explain these contrasts. We then develop a novel account that combines some of the central insights in the literature. We argue that our theory provides us with an elegant account of our contrasts, and yields a promising analysis of hoping.
This paper presents a puzzle involving embedded attitude reports. We resolve the puzzle by arguin... more This paper presents a puzzle involving embedded attitude reports. We resolve the puzzle by arguing that attitude verbs take restricted readings: in some environments the denotation of attitude verbs can be restricted by a given proposition. For example, when attitude verbs are embedded in the consequent of a conditional, they can be restricted by the proposition expressed by the conditional's antecedent. We formulate and motivate two conditions on the availability of verb restrictions: (i) a constraint that ties the content of restrictions to the local context of the relevant attitude report and (ii) a constraint that limits the availability of restriction effects to present tense verbs with first-person subjects. However, we also present some cases that make trouble for these conditions, and outline some possible ways of modifying the view to account for the recalcitrant data. We conclude with a brief discussion of some of the connections between our semantics for attitude verbs and issues concerning epistemic modals and theories of knowledge.
One of the central topics in semantic theory over the last few decades concerns the nature of loc... more One of the central topics in semantic theory over the last few decades concerns the nature of local contexts. Recently, theorists have tried to develop general, non-stipulative accounts of local contexts (Schlenker, 2009; Ingason, 2016; Mandelkern & Romoli, 2017a). In this paper, we contribute to this literature by drawing attention to the local contexts of subclausal expressions. More specifically, we focus on the local contexts of quantificational determiners, e.g. `all', `both', etc. Our central tool for probing the local contexts of subclausal elements is the principle Maximize Presupposition! (Percus, 2006; Singh, 2011). The empirical basis of our investigation concerns some data discussed by Anvari (2018b), e.g. the fact that sentences such as `All of the two presidential candidates are crooked' are unacceptable. In order to explain this, we suggest that the local context of determiners needs to contain the information carried by their restrictor. However, no existing non-stipulative account predicts this. Consequently, we think that the local contexts of subclausal expressions will likely have to be stipulated. This result has important consequences for debates in semantics and pragmatics, e.g. those around the so-called "explanatory problem" for dynamic semantics (Soames, 1982; Heim, 1990; Schlenker, 2009).
In some sentences, demonstratives can be substituted with definite descriptions without any chang... more In some sentences, demonstratives can be substituted with definite descriptions without any change in meaning. In light of this, many have maintained that demonstratives are just a type of definite description. However, several theorists have drawn attention to a range of cases where definite descriptions are acceptable, but their demonstrative counterparts are not. Some have tried to account for this data by appealing to presupposition. I argue that such presuppositional approaches are problematic, and present a pragmatic account of the target contrasts. On this approach, demonstratives take two arguments and generally require that the first, covert argument is non-redundant with respect to the second, overt argument. I derive this condition through an economy principle discussed by Schlenker (2005).
This paper presents a puzzle involving embedded attitude reports. We resolve the puzzle by arguin... more This paper presents a puzzle involving embedded attitude reports. We resolve the puzzle by arguing that attitude verbs take restricted readings: in some environments the denotation of attitude verbs can be restricted by a given proposition. For example, when these verbs are embedded in the consequent of a conditional, they can be restricted by the proposition expressed by the conditional's antecedent. We formulate and motivate two conditions on the availability of verb restrictions: (i) a constraint that ties the content of restrictions to the " dynamic effects " of sentential connectives and (ii) a constraint that limits the availability of restriction effects to present tense verbs with first-person subjects. However, we also present some cases that make trouble for these conditions, and outline some possible ways of modifying the view to account for the recalcitrant data. We conclude with a brief discussion of some of the connections between our semantics for attitude verbs and issues concerning epistemic modals and theories of knowledge.
This paper is about conjunctions and disjunctions in the scope of non-doxastic attitude verbs. Th... more This paper is about conjunctions and disjunctions in the scope of non-doxastic attitude verbs. These constructions generate a certain type of ignorance implicature. I argue that the best way to account for these implicatures is by appealing to a notion of contextual redundancy (Schlenker, 2008; Fox, 2008; Mayr and Romoli, 2016). This pragmatic approach to ignorance implicatures is contrasted with a semantic account of disjunctions under 'wonder' that appeals to exhaustification (Roelofsen and Uegaki, 2016). I argue that exhaustification-based theories cannot handle embedded conjunctions, so a pragmatic account of ignorance implicatures is superior.
Although much has been written about the truth-conditions of de re attitude reports, little atten... more Although much has been written about the truth-conditions of de re attitude reports, little attention has been paid to certain 'ultra-liberal' uses of those reports. We believe that if these uses are legitimate, then a number of interesting consequences for various theses in philosophical semantics follow. The majority of the paper involves describing these consequences. In short, we argue that, if true, ultra-liberal reports: (i) bring counterexamples to a popular approach to de re attitude ascriptions, which we will call 'descriptivism'; and (ii) combine with independently plausible principles about the logic of belief to imply that subjects can achieve omniscience about what exists from the armchair. Although we are not committed to the view that ultra-liberal reports are false, in the final part of the paper we discuss the prospects of pursuing a line according to which the acceptability of such reports ought not be taken at face value. We conclude by arguing that those who are sympathetic with this move might have reason to doubt the truth of an even broader class of acceptable de re attitude reports, namely those that have been taken to undermine orthodox accounts of de re attitude ascriptions.
In this paper, I raise a problem for standard precisifications of The Relational Analysis. The pr... more In this paper, I raise a problem for standard precisifications of The Relational Analysis. The problem I raise involves so–called 'counterfactual’ attitude verbs, such as ‘wish’. In short, the trouble is this: there are true attitude reports ‘S wishes that P’ but there is no suitable referent for the term ‘that P’. The problematic reports illustrate that the content of a subject’s wish is intimately related to the content of their beliefs. I capture this fact by moving to a framework in which ‘wish’ relates subjects to sets of pairs of worlds, or paired propositions, rather than — as is standardly assumed — sets of worlds. Although other types of counterfactual attitude reports, e.g. those involving ‘imagine’, may be similarly problematic, at this stage it is unclear whether they can be handled the same way.
In this paper, I outline a novel approach to the semantics of natural language pronouns. On this ... more In this paper, I outline a novel approach to the semantics of natural language pronouns. On this account, which I call demonstrativism, pronouns are semantically equivalent to demonstratives. I begin by presenting some contrasts that provide support for demonstrativism. Then I try to explain these contrasts by developing a particular demonstrativist proposal. I build on the "hidden argument" theory of demon
In 1978, Eric Kraemer observed that 'Brown intentionally threw a six' and 'Brown intentionally wo... more In 1978, Eric Kraemer observed that 'Brown intentionally threw a six' and 'Brown intentionally won the game' can differ in truth-value, even when it is known that Brown won the game just in case he threw a six. More generally, there are cases where S intentionally V 1 and S intentionally V 2 differ in truth-value even though V 1 and V 2 are known to be co-extensive. We call this Kraemer's puzzle in the theory of intentional action. We bring out some of the puzzle's central features, and gesture towards a solution.
Inheritance is the principle that deontic 'ought' is closed under entailment. This paper is about... more Inheritance is the principle that deontic 'ought' is closed under entailment. This paper is about a tension that arises in connection with Inheritance. More specifically, it is about two observations that pull in opposite directions. One of them raises questions about the validity of Inheritance, while the other appears to provide strong support for it. We argue that existing approaches to deontic modals fail to provide us with an adequate resolution of this tension. In response, we develop a positive analysis, and show that this proposal provides a satisfying account of our intuitions.
A slightly later version is forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy
The analysis of desire ascriptions has been a central topic of research for philosophers of langu... more The analysis of desire ascriptions has been a central topic of research for philosophers of language and mind. This work has mostly focused on providing a theory of want reports, i.e. sentences of the form S wants p. In this paper, we turn attention from want reports to a closely related, but relatively understudied construction, namely hope reports, i.e. sentences of the form S hopes p. We present two contrasts involving hope reports, and show that existing approaches to desire fail to explain these contrasts. We then develop a novel account that combines some of the central insights in the literature. We argue that our theory provides us with an elegant account of our contrasts, and yields a promising analysis of hoping.
This paper presents a puzzle involving embedded attitude reports. We resolve the puzzle by arguin... more This paper presents a puzzle involving embedded attitude reports. We resolve the puzzle by arguing that attitude verbs take restricted readings: in some environments the denotation of attitude verbs can be restricted by a given proposition. For example, when attitude verbs are embedded in the consequent of a conditional, they can be restricted by the proposition expressed by the conditional's antecedent. We formulate and motivate two conditions on the availability of verb restrictions: (i) a constraint that ties the content of restrictions to the local context of the relevant attitude report and (ii) a constraint that limits the availability of restriction effects to present tense verbs with first-person subjects. However, we also present some cases that make trouble for these conditions, and outline some possible ways of modifying the view to account for the recalcitrant data. We conclude with a brief discussion of some of the connections between our semantics for attitude verbs and issues concerning epistemic modals and theories of knowledge.
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