Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume, 1980
While there is agreement that it is the central task of semantics to give the semantic interpreta... more While there is agreement that it is the central task of semantics to give the semantic interpretation (the meaning) of every sentence in the language, nowhere in the linguistic literature will one find, so far as I know, a straightforward account of how a theory performs this task, or how to tell when it has been accomplished. The contrast with syntax is striking. The main Job of a modest syntax is to characterizemeaningfulness(or sentencehood). We may have as much confidence in the correctness of such a characterization as we have in the representativeness of our sample and our ability to say when particular expressions are meaningful (sentences). What clear and analogous task and test exist for semantics?
Causation is defined as a relation between facts: C causes E if and only if C and E are nomologic... more Causation is defined as a relation between facts: C causes E if and only if C and E are nomologically independent facts and C is a necessary part of a nomologically sufficient condition for E. The analysis is applied to problems of overdetermination, preemption, trumping, intransitivity, switching, and double prevention. Preventing and allowing are defined and distinguished from causing. The analysis explains the direction of causation in terms of the logical form of dynamic laws. Even in a universe that is deterministic in both temporal directions, not every fact must have a cause and present facts may have no future causes
Presented at “Free Will Physics and Metaphysics” conference. Rutgers University,, 2022
Presented ... more Presented at “Free Will Physics and Metaphysics” conference. Rutgers University,, 2022 Presented at “Free Will Physics and Metaphysics” conference. Rutgers University, May 12th,2022
Abstract Causation requires (at least the possibility of) contingent counterfactual dependence between events at different times. Contingent counterfactual dependence requires logically irreversible laws connecting those events. But logically irreversible laws only give you contingent counterfactual dependence in one direction. Thus, contingent counterfactual dependence between events is temporally asymmetric. Our actual laws are logically irreversible. Thus, causation is temporally asymmetric.
The direction of causation is the direction of contingent counterfactual dependence. The temp... more The direction of causation is the direction of contingent counterfactual dependence. The temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence gives causation its temporal direction. That asymmetry is explained by the fact that the dynamical laws of nature are logically irreversible functions from partial states of the world onto other partial states. Though these irreversible laws are locally indeterministic, they sum to global determinism. This combination of global determinism and local indeterminism gives rise to counterfactual asymmetry and gives causation and time a direction. That direction is independent of the direction of entropy. The direction of contingent counterfactual dependence-- and hence causation-- is time's arrow. [nb. Originally posted as Irreversible Laws and the Direction of Time on 11/10/2018]
Causation is defined as a relation between facts: C causes E if and only if C and E are nomologic... more Causation is defined as a relation between facts: C causes E if and only if C and E are nomologically independent facts and C is a necessary part of a nomologically sufficient condition for E. The analysis is applied to problems of overdetermination, preemption, trumping, intransitivity, switching, and double prevention. Preventing and allowing are defined and distinguished from causing. The analysis explains the direction of causation in terms of the logical form of dynamic laws. Even in a universe that is deterministic in both temporal directions, not every fact must have a cause and present facts may have no future causes.
The Computational Theory of the laws of nature is a rival to David Lewis' Best System Analysis. ... more The Computational Theory of the laws of nature is a rival to David Lewis' Best System Analysis. This "Best Program" analysis defines Laws in terms of Algorithmic Information Theory. This paper argues for the objectivity of Algorithmic Simplicity and explores some upshots of this understanding of laws for the logic of nomological necessity and metaphyisical disputes about Humean supervenience.
A short primer on counterfactuals and the difference between Jonathan Bennett's "Simple Theory" a... more A short primer on counterfactuals and the difference between Jonathan Bennett's "Simple Theory" and David Lewis's "miracles" account.
We think that what happens in the future depends upon what happens now in a way the past does not... more We think that what happens in the future depends upon what happens now in a way the past does not. Lewis attempted to explain this as in terms of the temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. On Lewis theory, counterfactuals describe worlds with pasts like ours save a miracle-- a violation of our laws-- has made the antecedent true. At our world, he says, the future overdetermined the past. This makes for an "asymmetry of miracles" which explains the counterfactual asymmetry. But Lewis's account fails. His account of counterfactuals is circular and his explanation of asymmetry self-contradictory. Jonathan Bennett's Simple Theory of counterfactuals does not involve miracles: it supposes counterfactuals describe worlds where the antecedent comes about as a result of differences in the past. Because it roots counterfactuals in laws, Bennett's theory allows us to explain temporal asymmetries as the result of the logical irreversibility of natural laws.
The standard account of counterfactuals that most philosophers endorse— Lewis's 'Analysis 1' — is... more The standard account of counterfactuals that most philosophers endorse— Lewis's 'Analysis 1' — is wrong. The correct theory is one invented by Jonathan Bennett in 1984 which he called 'The Simple Theory'. Bennett later argued himself out of that theory and went on to champion the standard account. But those arguments fail. The Simple Theory has been right all along.
My topic is the state of mind of people who utter sentences containing indexicals; sentences like... more My topic is the state of mind of people who utter sentences containing indexicals; sentences like "I am here now". It is a subject much discussed but invariably it has been addressed as an issue in philosophical semantics: as a problem about what indexical words mean. I want here to pursue a different and, I hope, more productive approach.
Abstract
The scientific ideal is a system of deterministic laws which would, in principle, allow ... more Abstract The scientific ideal is a system of deterministic laws which would, in principle, allow us to infer the entire history of the universe given a description of its initial conditions. But what is special about the "initial" conditions? It cannot just be that they are temporally initial. Determinism means we should be able to deduce the state of the world at every time from its condition at any time. David Lewis's "Best System Account" of Laws offers no explanation. Lewis said that laws are the generalizations that occur as axioms in the best deductive description of the particular facts about the world; the initial conditions are the axioms that are not generalizations. But contemporary advocates of BSA have commonly rejected the requirement that laws be generalizations, raising the question of how else to distinguish the laws from the initial conditions in the Best System. Then too, many advocates of BSA talk as if the axioms of the Best System are all laws, which mean that the Best System could not be an axiomatic description of any particular facts about the actual world The Computational Theory of Laws resolves these puzzles. A description of the world must have an optimal encoding comprising an optimal program and an optimal data set. The laws of nature are those facts that obtain in every world described by the optimal program. The optimal data describe the inputs for which the optimal program describes the actual world. Initial conditions are special in that they yield the most algorithmically simple description of the world. We illustrate the point using cellular automata as simulated universes. In real world physics, the temporal invariance of the laws illustrates that the temporally initial conditions of the world are also those that provide its optimal encoding. [Chapter 3 of “The System of the World”, forthcoming]
Textbook definitions of 'determinism' that avoid appeal to the notion of nomological possibility ... more Textbook definitions of 'determinism' that avoid appeal to the notion of nomological possibility are mistaken. To explain Determinism, we must invoke a distinction between states of the world that are and those that are not nomologically possible. It is plausible to suppose that nomological determinism, properly understood, entails counterfactual determinism. That is, to suppose that If the world is deterministic then, if it were different at any time, then it would have to be different at every other time. David Lewis' theory of counterfactuals forces him to deny this. This is more evidence that his theory is wrong and that a rival theory is correct.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume, 1980
While there is agreement that it is the central task of semantics to give the semantic interpreta... more While there is agreement that it is the central task of semantics to give the semantic interpretation (the meaning) of every sentence in the language, nowhere in the linguistic literature will one find, so far as I know, a straightforward account of how a theory performs this task, or how to tell when it has been accomplished. The contrast with syntax is striking. The main Job of a modest syntax is to characterizemeaningfulness(or sentencehood). We may have as much confidence in the correctness of such a characterization as we have in the representativeness of our sample and our ability to say when particular expressions are meaningful (sentences). What clear and analogous task and test exist for semantics?
Causation is defined as a relation between facts: C causes E if and only if C and E are nomologic... more Causation is defined as a relation between facts: C causes E if and only if C and E are nomologically independent facts and C is a necessary part of a nomologically sufficient condition for E. The analysis is applied to problems of overdetermination, preemption, trumping, intransitivity, switching, and double prevention. Preventing and allowing are defined and distinguished from causing. The analysis explains the direction of causation in terms of the logical form of dynamic laws. Even in a universe that is deterministic in both temporal directions, not every fact must have a cause and present facts may have no future causes
Presented at “Free Will Physics and Metaphysics” conference. Rutgers University,, 2022
Presented ... more Presented at “Free Will Physics and Metaphysics” conference. Rutgers University,, 2022 Presented at “Free Will Physics and Metaphysics” conference. Rutgers University, May 12th,2022
Abstract Causation requires (at least the possibility of) contingent counterfactual dependence between events at different times. Contingent counterfactual dependence requires logically irreversible laws connecting those events. But logically irreversible laws only give you contingent counterfactual dependence in one direction. Thus, contingent counterfactual dependence between events is temporally asymmetric. Our actual laws are logically irreversible. Thus, causation is temporally asymmetric.
The direction of causation is the direction of contingent counterfactual dependence. The temp... more The direction of causation is the direction of contingent counterfactual dependence. The temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence gives causation its temporal direction. That asymmetry is explained by the fact that the dynamical laws of nature are logically irreversible functions from partial states of the world onto other partial states. Though these irreversible laws are locally indeterministic, they sum to global determinism. This combination of global determinism and local indeterminism gives rise to counterfactual asymmetry and gives causation and time a direction. That direction is independent of the direction of entropy. The direction of contingent counterfactual dependence-- and hence causation-- is time's arrow. [nb. Originally posted as Irreversible Laws and the Direction of Time on 11/10/2018]
Causation is defined as a relation between facts: C causes E if and only if C and E are nomologic... more Causation is defined as a relation between facts: C causes E if and only if C and E are nomologically independent facts and C is a necessary part of a nomologically sufficient condition for E. The analysis is applied to problems of overdetermination, preemption, trumping, intransitivity, switching, and double prevention. Preventing and allowing are defined and distinguished from causing. The analysis explains the direction of causation in terms of the logical form of dynamic laws. Even in a universe that is deterministic in both temporal directions, not every fact must have a cause and present facts may have no future causes.
The Computational Theory of the laws of nature is a rival to David Lewis' Best System Analysis. ... more The Computational Theory of the laws of nature is a rival to David Lewis' Best System Analysis. This "Best Program" analysis defines Laws in terms of Algorithmic Information Theory. This paper argues for the objectivity of Algorithmic Simplicity and explores some upshots of this understanding of laws for the logic of nomological necessity and metaphyisical disputes about Humean supervenience.
A short primer on counterfactuals and the difference between Jonathan Bennett's "Simple Theory" a... more A short primer on counterfactuals and the difference between Jonathan Bennett's "Simple Theory" and David Lewis's "miracles" account.
We think that what happens in the future depends upon what happens now in a way the past does not... more We think that what happens in the future depends upon what happens now in a way the past does not. Lewis attempted to explain this as in terms of the temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. On Lewis theory, counterfactuals describe worlds with pasts like ours save a miracle-- a violation of our laws-- has made the antecedent true. At our world, he says, the future overdetermined the past. This makes for an "asymmetry of miracles" which explains the counterfactual asymmetry. But Lewis's account fails. His account of counterfactuals is circular and his explanation of asymmetry self-contradictory. Jonathan Bennett's Simple Theory of counterfactuals does not involve miracles: it supposes counterfactuals describe worlds where the antecedent comes about as a result of differences in the past. Because it roots counterfactuals in laws, Bennett's theory allows us to explain temporal asymmetries as the result of the logical irreversibility of natural laws.
The standard account of counterfactuals that most philosophers endorse— Lewis's 'Analysis 1' — is... more The standard account of counterfactuals that most philosophers endorse— Lewis's 'Analysis 1' — is wrong. The correct theory is one invented by Jonathan Bennett in 1984 which he called 'The Simple Theory'. Bennett later argued himself out of that theory and went on to champion the standard account. But those arguments fail. The Simple Theory has been right all along.
My topic is the state of mind of people who utter sentences containing indexicals; sentences like... more My topic is the state of mind of people who utter sentences containing indexicals; sentences like "I am here now". It is a subject much discussed but invariably it has been addressed as an issue in philosophical semantics: as a problem about what indexical words mean. I want here to pursue a different and, I hope, more productive approach.
Abstract
The scientific ideal is a system of deterministic laws which would, in principle, allow ... more Abstract The scientific ideal is a system of deterministic laws which would, in principle, allow us to infer the entire history of the universe given a description of its initial conditions. But what is special about the "initial" conditions? It cannot just be that they are temporally initial. Determinism means we should be able to deduce the state of the world at every time from its condition at any time. David Lewis's "Best System Account" of Laws offers no explanation. Lewis said that laws are the generalizations that occur as axioms in the best deductive description of the particular facts about the world; the initial conditions are the axioms that are not generalizations. But contemporary advocates of BSA have commonly rejected the requirement that laws be generalizations, raising the question of how else to distinguish the laws from the initial conditions in the Best System. Then too, many advocates of BSA talk as if the axioms of the Best System are all laws, which mean that the Best System could not be an axiomatic description of any particular facts about the actual world The Computational Theory of Laws resolves these puzzles. A description of the world must have an optimal encoding comprising an optimal program and an optimal data set. The laws of nature are those facts that obtain in every world described by the optimal program. The optimal data describe the inputs for which the optimal program describes the actual world. Initial conditions are special in that they yield the most algorithmically simple description of the world. We illustrate the point using cellular automata as simulated universes. In real world physics, the temporal invariance of the laws illustrates that the temporally initial conditions of the world are also those that provide its optimal encoding. [Chapter 3 of “The System of the World”, forthcoming]
Textbook definitions of 'determinism' that avoid appeal to the notion of nomological possibility ... more Textbook definitions of 'determinism' that avoid appeal to the notion of nomological possibility are mistaken. To explain Determinism, we must invoke a distinction between states of the world that are and those that are not nomologically possible. It is plausible to suppose that nomological determinism, properly understood, entails counterfactual determinism. That is, to suppose that If the world is deterministic then, if it were different at any time, then it would have to be different at every other time. David Lewis' theory of counterfactuals forces him to deny this. This is more evidence that his theory is wrong and that a rival theory is correct.
We think that what happens in the future depends upon what happens now in a way the past does not... more We think that what happens in the future depends upon what happens now in a way the past does not. Lewis attempted to explain this as in terms of the temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. On Lewis theory, counterfactuals describe worlds with pasts like ours save a miracle-- a violation of our laws-- has made the antecedent true. At our world, he says, the future overdetermined the past. This makes for an "asymmetry of miracles" which explains the counterfactual asymmetry. But Lewis's account fails. His account of counterfactuals is circular and his explanation of asymmetry self-contradictory. Jonathan Bennett's Simple Theory of counterfactuals does not involve miracles: it supposes counterfactuals describe worlds where the antecedent comes about as a result of differences in the past. Because it roots counterfactuals in laws, Bennett's theory allows us to explain temporal asymmetries as the result of the logical irreversibility of natural laws.
A short primer on counterfactuals and the difference between Jonathan Bennett's "Simple Theory" a... more A short primer on counterfactuals and the difference between Jonathan Bennett's "Simple Theory" and David Lewis's "miracles" account.
Uploads
Presented at “Free Will Physics and Metaphysics” conference. Rutgers University, May 12th,2022
Abstract
Causation requires (at least the possibility of) contingent counterfactual dependence between events at different times. Contingent counterfactual dependence requires logically irreversible laws connecting those events. But logically irreversible laws only give you contingent counterfactual dependence in one direction. Thus, contingent counterfactual dependence between events is temporally asymmetric. Our actual laws are logically irreversible. Thus, causation is temporally asymmetric.
[nb. Originally posted as Irreversible Laws and the Direction of Time on 11/10/2018]
The scientific ideal is a system of deterministic laws which would, in principle, allow us to infer the entire history of the universe given a description of its initial conditions. But what is special about the "initial" conditions? It cannot just be that they are temporally initial. Determinism means we should be able to deduce the state of the world at every time from its condition at any time. David Lewis's "Best System Account" of Laws offers no explanation. Lewis said that laws are the generalizations that occur as axioms in the best deductive description of the particular facts about the world; the initial conditions are the axioms that are not generalizations. But contemporary advocates of BSA have commonly rejected the requirement that laws be generalizations, raising the question of how else to distinguish the laws from the initial conditions in the Best System. Then too, many advocates of BSA talk as if the axioms of the Best System are all laws, which mean that the Best System could not be an axiomatic description of any particular facts about the actual world
The Computational Theory of Laws resolves these puzzles. A description of the world must have an optimal encoding comprising an optimal program and an optimal data set. The laws of nature are those facts that obtain in every world described by the optimal program. The optimal data describe the inputs for which the optimal program describes the actual world. Initial conditions are special in that they yield the most algorithmically simple description of the world. We illustrate the point using cellular automata as simulated universes. In real world physics, the temporal invariance of the laws illustrates that the temporally initial conditions of the world are also those that provide its optimal encoding.
[Chapter 3 of “The System of the World”, forthcoming]
Presented at “Free Will Physics and Metaphysics” conference. Rutgers University, May 12th,2022
Abstract
Causation requires (at least the possibility of) contingent counterfactual dependence between events at different times. Contingent counterfactual dependence requires logically irreversible laws connecting those events. But logically irreversible laws only give you contingent counterfactual dependence in one direction. Thus, contingent counterfactual dependence between events is temporally asymmetric. Our actual laws are logically irreversible. Thus, causation is temporally asymmetric.
[nb. Originally posted as Irreversible Laws and the Direction of Time on 11/10/2018]
The scientific ideal is a system of deterministic laws which would, in principle, allow us to infer the entire history of the universe given a description of its initial conditions. But what is special about the "initial" conditions? It cannot just be that they are temporally initial. Determinism means we should be able to deduce the state of the world at every time from its condition at any time. David Lewis's "Best System Account" of Laws offers no explanation. Lewis said that laws are the generalizations that occur as axioms in the best deductive description of the particular facts about the world; the initial conditions are the axioms that are not generalizations. But contemporary advocates of BSA have commonly rejected the requirement that laws be generalizations, raising the question of how else to distinguish the laws from the initial conditions in the Best System. Then too, many advocates of BSA talk as if the axioms of the Best System are all laws, which mean that the Best System could not be an axiomatic description of any particular facts about the actual world
The Computational Theory of Laws resolves these puzzles. A description of the world must have an optimal encoding comprising an optimal program and an optimal data set. The laws of nature are those facts that obtain in every world described by the optimal program. The optimal data describe the inputs for which the optimal program describes the actual world. Initial conditions are special in that they yield the most algorithmically simple description of the world. We illustrate the point using cellular automata as simulated universes. In real world physics, the temporal invariance of the laws illustrates that the temporally initial conditions of the world are also those that provide its optimal encoding.
[Chapter 3 of “The System of the World”, forthcoming]