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## Chapeau

### Values and principles

To be legitimate and effective, institutions and structures playing a global coordination role need to be:

- **Inclusive:** Decision-making at the global level, as well as discussions around the future shape of global governance structures, must be inclusive of the public, civil society, and all other stakeholders.
- **Open:** Building faith in global governance institutions and accountability for their activities requires the highest levels of transparency.
- **Fair:** Global governance structures must be fair and reflect a common understanding of the universality of human rights and the equality of and dignity inherent to each person, and promote fundamental principles of democracy.

Inclusive, open and fair global governance is essential to ensure the future of humanity. **We call on all leaders to place these principles at the heart of global governance and to build trust by working together, first to overcome the global risks we face and second to build a more just, sustainable, and peaceful world order.**

We, therefore, resolve to create a more a more peaceful, prosperous, sustainable, equitable, and just world and to undertake concrete measures to fulfill the outcome of earlier UN summits, so as to provide multilateral solutions to problems in the five following areas:

## Chapter I. Sustainable development and financing for development

**A Biennial UN-G20+ Summit for the Global Economy**, for better fostering socioeconomic recovery from the pandemic, mitigating and managing cross-border shocks, and addressing rising global inequality. Such a regular global economic apex convening would incentivize the leaders of the G20 and heads of

the international financial institutions and WTO to join all 193 UN Member States and the Secretary-General for the General Assembly's High-Level Week (where influential country participation, at the highest level, has waned lately).

Moreover, establishing a small, "networked secretariat" led by the Deputy Secretary-General and engaging senior technical staff from the IFIs, WTO, and rotating G20 presidency could ensure accountability of decisions reached and serve as a knowledge center to collect, validate, and push out collective analysis across the international system between the summits. This should include disseminating recommended policy priorities from the Secretary-General's proposed annual meeting with all heads of regional organizations.

In taking into account the concerns of all countries, whether large, small, advanced industrialized, or developing, with inputs from regional convenings, the proposed Biennial UN-G20+ Summit should focus on priority-setting of critical issues for the world economy. Specifically, its three core functions should entail:

- 1) Facilitating multistakeholder, cross-disciplinary dialogue and policy solutions, by adopting integrated approaches across economic, social, and environmental areas, in consultation with non-state actors.
- 2) Promoting inclusive economic reform, by offering political support and other incentives to countries and regions that pursue difficult reforms to achieve growth and job creation.
- 3) Enabling global economic crisis response, by identifying threats and urgent crisis response needs and taking concrete actions to promote global economic stability and growth.

The Biennial UN-G20+ Summit would also provide an opportunity to review the relationship between intergovernmental bodies and the private sector, to clarify and, where appropriate, strengthen the interplay between international agencies, donor governments, private investors, and other stakeholders for a given global policy issue. This new platform could also focus on global economic stocktaking and measuring success against clearly identified baselines.

## Chapter II. International peace and security

**Upgrade the UN Peacebuilding Commission into an [Empowered Peacebuilding Council](#)**, for both preventing and building just and durable peace after a protracted violent conflict. Crucially, this involves an expanded mandate to lead on peacebuilding policy development, coordination, resource mobilization, and conflict prevention efforts in countries and regions not directly addressed by the UN Security Council. As a new principal organ of the United Nations in place of the Trusteeship Council (though the upgraded PBC could be established without Charter reform too), it would focus on countries and regions in non-peacekeeping environments

Especially in light of the difficulties in achieving a more representative Security Council, a more authoritative and inclusive 32-member Peacebuilding Council would allow for more capable UN Member States to contribute directly to the UN's primary purpose of maintaining international peace and security. The upgraded body should be further entrusted with a new "Peacebuilding Audit" tool, modeled on the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review (UPR), for tracking early warning

indicators, so as to facilitate early action by the Peacebuilding Council toward preventing the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict.

As with the UPR, all countries would participate periodically in such audits of early warning indicators, supported in some cases by the rigorous work of UN special rapporteurs. This would be consistent with current efforts to track the ten targets and associated indicators of all countries' progress toward meeting their commitments to Sustainable Development Goal 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions).

Besides the Secretary-General's *Our Common Agenda* and *New Agenda for Peace* both calling for Peacebuilding Commission strengthening, the High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism concurred this past April in this proposed upgrade of the Commission into an empowered Council. And only an initial endorsement of this idea would be needed in the Pact for the Future, with further details fleshed out in the planned 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review.

**A [New Civilian Response Capability](#):** The initiative could include a rapidly deployable cadre of 500 international staff possessing technical expertise, along with fifty senior mediators and Special Envoys/Representatives of the Secretary-General, with emphasis on recruitment of women and youth leaders in support of prevention, peacemaking, [peacekeeping](#), and post-conflict peacebuilding (the "4P's") objectives. Ideally, these teams would be complemented by a standby component of highly skilled and periodically trained international civil servants, up to two thousand strong, drawn voluntarily from across the UN system.

**[Early Warning and Action](#):** Improving conflict analysis, early warning, and early action capabilities means first designating responsibility within and equipping the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Department of Peace Operations with the tools, resources, and mandate to work out—with the Security Council, General Assembly, and the Peacebuilding Commission—the signs and factors associated with mass atrocity events. An upgraded early warning system could, in turn, support a new Peacebuilding Audit, modeled on the Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review.

[Global Governance Innovation Report 2023](#) also introduces other ideas on long-overdue collective security structural reforms, including: i) expanding the number of non-permanent seats by six on the **Security Council**, and allowing the immediate re-election of non-permanent members, who are currently not allowed to serve consecutive terms, through a basic amendment of UN Charter Article 23; ii) more frequent use of the ***Uniting for Peace* resolution of the General Assembly** when the Security Council fails to act.

### Chapter III. Science, technology and innovation and digital cooperation

**An [International Artificial Intelligence Agency](#)—or IA2—**to advance the core principles of "safety, sustainability, and inclusion" through effective global governance, to better harness the potential of artificial intelligence and other cyber-technologies for humanity. Specifically, the new agency would serve to: i) improve visibility, advocacy, and resource mobilization for global AI regulatory efforts; ii) provide thought leadership on General Assembly and Security Council AI and cyber-technology-related initiatives and agreements; iii) monitor, evaluate, and report on AI industry safeguards in compliance with an emerging international regulatory framework; and iv) enhance coordination and knowledge-

sharing across Member States and regional bodies, such as the African Union and ASEAN, to leverage AI's positive development applications.

The IA2 should be supported by an expert-led Intergovernmental Cyber and AI Panel, modeled on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and building on the Secretary-General's recently initiated High-Level Advisory Body on Artificial Intelligence.

## Chapter IV. Youth and future generations

An [Earth Stewardship Council](#)—or **ESC**—for the global commons, as well as a new Special Envoy for Future Generations, to facilitate implementation of the Declaration on Future Generations currently under negotiation. Building on Singapore's successful leadership decades ago in negotiating the Law of the Sea treaty and more recent calls by the Mary Robinson, Maria Fernanda Espinosa, and Johan Rockström-led [Climate Governance Commission](#), this new body could deliberate upon the governance of the global commons, whose protection and preservation are imperative to ensuring the well-being of future generations.

Globally, the connection between human well-being, our natural environment, and human rights was made ever clearer in the recent, [historic UN General Assembly resolution](#) that declared access to a clean and healthy environment to be a universal human right. The Declaration on Future Generations is expected to build on this normative breakthrough.

To ensure Member States' accountability with their declaration commitments, the multistakeholder ESC could carry out a Future Generations Review, modeled on the Human Rights Council's UPR, designed to acknowledge the collective responsibility of present generations toward the rights of future generations, including in preserving the global commons.

A new office of a Special Envoy for Future Generations, as proposed in the Secretary-General's *Our Common Agenda*, could further give a voice to future generations within the highest echelon of the UN Secretariat, representing their rights and championing the perspectives of those speaking up for intergenerational equity.

## Chapter V. Transforming global governance

[Global Economic & Financial Architecture Reforms](#) for greater stability and sustainable progress, including through [Greater Global-Regional Organizations Collaboration](#). Among the most urgent changes needed are: *first*, repurposing multilateral development banks by expanding their lending capacity by more than USD \$100 billion through the increased use of guarantees, reforming voting rights and decision-making rules, updating the IMF quota formulas, instituting new measures to de-risk investments to further unleash private capital, and issuing the IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) more regularly and at greater scale as a means to finance critical global public goods.

On the latter point, to improve global liquidity management, especially in times of crisis, the IMF should be allowed to mobilize additional resources by: i) tapping capital markets and issuing bonds dominated

in SDRs; ii) making better targeted emergency SDR allocations under more streamlined procedures; and iii) and allocating SDRs regularly to supplement the demand for “own reserves.”

*Second*, strengthening the global debt architecture through, for example, debt-for-nature-swaps (DNSs), which help to address the closely interlinked, debt, climate, and biodiversity crises. Already faced with debt distress, the debt burden of low- and middle-income countries has further intensified since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. DNSs have helped to reduce the debt burden by allowing for the cancellation or reduction of the level of debt servicing by a developing country in exchange for using the saved debt payments for investments in conservation or climate change mitigation projects.

At the same time, and building on the G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative during the pandemic, a full restructuring of the stock of debt has become a practical imperative for many developing countries. This has engendered the need to review, in full, the global debt architecture, including by synchronizing the debt management practices of China and other new donors with more traditional donor countries (e.g., through a new global coordination platform, as propose by the High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism) and establishing a representative sovereign debt authority.

Global economic & financial architecture reforms wield immense potential for fostering collaboration with regional organizations too by, for instance, synchronizing global and regional macroeconomic coordination and development strategies—especially in support of Sustainable Development Goals implementation—and creating multiplier effects by jointly leveraging the economic assets of global and regional development banks, as well as seeking to attract private capital to shared global-regional development priorities.

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Just as the UN60 Summit in 2005 was followed by several General Assembly resolutions to “operationalize” many of that gathering’s commitments, Member States would be wise to heed the call of the High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, which recommended a “Charter Review conference focused on Security Council reform” to follow this September’s Summit. At the same time, it is possible, if not likely, that the full realization of several of the anticipated Pact for the Future commitments may require subsequent Charter amendments too.