

Igarapé Institute

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Chapeau

We reaffirm our commitment to reinvigorate multilateralism and strengthen global governance for the sake of present and future generations. To achieve this, we embrace ten core principles for transforming the multilateral system: prioritize people and the planet, ensure inclusivity and representation, foster transparency, promote equity, strengthen networks and collaboration, allocate adequate resources, embrace flexibility, stay accountable, and be mission-focused and future-oriented.¹

Chapter I. Sustainable development and financing for development

We reiterate that environmental and climate commitments should be based on an integrated assessment of the three Rio Conventions (climate change, biodiversity, and desertification)² and further instruments, including the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution,³ the High Seas Treaty,⁴ and the Treaty to End Plastic Pollution.⁵ To avoid silos that hinder systemic thinking and action, we emphasize:

- The **need for a holistic approach** to address climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution, and desertification in a cohesive manner, reflecting their interconnections while respecting each convention's mandate and priorities;

¹ High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism (HLAB), [A Breakthrough for People and Planet: Effective and Inclusive Global Governance for Today and the Future](#) (New York: United Nations University, 2023).

² United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, [Presidents of three COPs call for a united approach to climate change](#), desertification and biodiversity loss (2023).

³ [Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution](#). Geneva, 13 November, 1979.

⁴ [Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction](#). New York, 19 June 2023.

⁵ Resolution 5/14. [End plastic pollution: towards an international legally binding instrument](#). Nairobi, 2 March 2022.

- **More cooperation between the three COPs** to foster systemic action and empower countries and stakeholders to underline the urgency of the situation and the inextricable links between climate change, desertification, and biodiversity;
- In line with the principle of **common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR)**, the holistic approach should recognize and mainstream the role of developed countries not only to deliver the financial requirements to fulfill the convention's commitments and avoid double-counting but also to share technological advances and lead the phasing out of fossil fuels;
- **An annual reporting requirement to the United Nations Environment Assembly** for all conventions, highlighting actions aimed at a more integrated approach between them, to hold signatories publicly accountable, support their efforts to reach the core goals of net-zero carbon emissions, biodiversity protection and restoration, and a pollution-free planet through capacity-building resources for developing countries and information-sharing around best practices.

We reiterate that multilateral arrangements must ensure **just ecological transitions** for developing nations, moving beyond the outdated divisions of labor. This includes:⁶

- A commitment to **net-zero carbon emissions**, through a **net-zero carbon pledge by 2050**, based on the IPCC Assessments and building on the COP28 agreement,⁷ with annual progress reports starting today and including interim targets, concrete plans, and clear, credible, and accountable standards to reach net zero by 2050;
- **Open access to the necessary technologies** to prioritize a rapid transition to clean energy and provide electricity on a global scale, considering that the technology for a green transition is a global public good. This should guide the reform of the global trade and intellectual property systems to disallow private monopoly of the crucial knowledge and technology that could accelerate an equitable shift to clean energy globally, regulate technology patents more effectively, increase limitations on patentability criteria to avoid privatization, enable distribution to those in need, and create incentives and disincentives to generate greater transparency and knowledge-sharing;
- **Mobilize the required financial resources to increase investment in clean energy to support low- and middle-income countries in phasing out their reliance on fossil fuels.**

⁶ Project Syndicate, [A Pact for People and Planet](#) (2023); HLAB, [A Breakthrough for People and Planet](#) (2023); Our Common Agenda, Policy Brief 6: [Reforms to the International Financial Architecture](#) (2023).

⁷ Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, Fifth session, [First global stocktake](#). Fifth session. United Arab Emirates, 30 November to 12 December 2023.

We recognize that these countries have their right to development and are pivotal to increasing green ambitions and negotiating multilateral agreements and financing mechanisms to deliver a just climate transition alongside the Sustainable Development Goals.

We recall **the urgency to reform International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in line with the pressing demands for sustainable finance** to provide economic and financial incentives for a clean energy shift. This includes:⁸

- The urgent need to **transform the governance of IFIs** to make them more representative, equitable, and inclusive;
- The need to **reevaluate and revisit the rules, quotas, share of special drawing rights (SDRs), decision-making process, taxonomies, and capital allocation in IFIs to update its governance, structure, and mandate** to create an international financial system that supports global green and just transformations;
- The requisite of ensuring fairer and more equitable tax systems to ensure that all countries can benefit in the global tax system from a level playing field, including the implementation of a “**green taxonomy**” with incentives in place for economic activities transitioning to net-zero, while also clearly defining the rules for such classification;
- The need to **reorient Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) towards sustainable finance** through:
 - **Expanding MDB lending for climate and SDGs** by at least \$1trn, as proposed by the Bridgetown Initiative;
 - **Adding natural disaster clauses** in all lending instruments to suspend debt service when disasters occur to release necessary liquidity for immediate;
 - Considering sovereign **debt swap for climate action as an alternative to expanding MDBs financing to low and middle-income countries vulnerable to climate disasters** to fund climate resilience and adaptation projects where a revenue stream is lacking;
 - **Updating MDBs missions, policy, practice, metrics and internal incentives** to focus on SDGs impact and climate action, aligned with international human rights, labor, and environmental norms and standards.

⁸ Our Common Agenda, Policy Brief 6: [Reforms to the International Financial Architecture](#) (2023).

Recognizing the role of tropical forests in a healthy planet, as they cover approximately 40 percent of the Earth’s land surface,⁹ are home to at least two-thirds of the world’s biodiversity,¹⁰ are a net carbon sink,¹¹ absorbing an estimated seven billion metric tons of carbon dioxide per year, and have a global cooling effect,¹² we stress the need for:

- Evaluating and adopting **cutting-edge financial instruments as compensation for tropical forest conservation**,¹³ including innovative sources of financing that provide direct monetary compensation per hectare per year for protecting the Earth’s intact forests, with a goal of preserving more than 1.8 billion hectares of existing tropical forest, and accelerate the regeneration of an additional 1 billion hectares, through funding from a variety of sources of blended finance mechanisms;
- Generating **income for Indigenous peoples and local communities** through sustainable production activities and payments for environmental services to enhance their fair inclusion to a low-carbon economy.

Chapter II. International peace and security

Stressing the importance of **reforming the Security Council to reflect the changing global landscape**,¹⁴ we recognize the urgency to:¹⁵

- **Reform the Security Council membership** to correct regional and developing countries’ underrepresentation;
- **Update the mandate of the Open-ended Working Group** to consider all aspects related to increasing the Council’s membership as well as other matters related to the Council¹⁶

⁹ Bello, Carolina, et al. “Defaunation Affects Carbon Storage in Tropical Forests.” *Science Advances*, vol. 1, no. 11, December 2015.

¹⁰ Giam, Xingli. “Global Biodiversity Loss from Tropical Deforestation.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, vol. 114, no. 23, June 2017.

¹¹ Artaxo, Paulo, et al. “Tropical Forests Are Crucial in Regulating the Climate on Earth.” *PLOS Climate*, vol. 1, no. 8, August 2022.

¹² Lawrence, Deborah, et al. “The Unseen Effects of Deforestation: Biophysical Effects on Climate.” *Frontiers in Forests and Global Change*, vol. 5, March 2022.

¹³ Igarapé Institute, [Global incentive mechanism to protect standing forests](#) (2023); Project Syndicate, [Our Climate Future Hinges on Forest Preservation](#) (2023); HLAB, [A Breakthrough for People and Planet](#) (2023).

¹⁴ Our Common Agenda, Policy Brief 9: [A New Agenda for Peace](#) (2023).

¹⁵ HLAB, [A Breakthrough for People and Planet](#) (2023).

¹⁶ Resolution 48/26. [Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council](#). 3 December, 1993.

to provide it with the necessary tools to organize hearings and collect feedback on reform proposals;

- **Revise the Security Council Provisional Rules of Procedure** to enhance the transparency of its working methods;
- **Stimulate the nomination of non-permanent members as penholders and chairs** of UNSC-related initiatives;
- **Strengthening the role of the General Assembly, the Peacebuilding Commission, and the Secretary-General** for consultations, especially when the Security Council faces stalemates;
- **Include gender balance and gender mainstreaming instruments** in all Security Council's mandates in line with S/RES/1325(2000),¹⁷ considering that women's active involvement in conflict resolution can contribute to effective violence prevention and promote a broader understanding of insecurity.¹⁸

Recognizing the Peacebuilding Commission's unique cross-pillar coordination mandate within the UN system, we recognize the imperative of granting it a more prominent role, particularly within the peace and security architecture.¹⁹ Pursuant of our commitment to address gaps in the peace continuum and improving the effectiveness of the Commission in promoting and sustaining peace, we express our support for efforts to enhance the Peacebuilding Commission's capabilities in the following areas:

- **Facilitating discussions on cross-cutting issues**, including but not limited to, the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) and Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS) agendas, as well as the intersection of climate change and peacebuilding;
- **Strengthening its advisory role to the Security Council**, particularly concerning the incorporation of peacebuilding elements within mission mandates and during reconfigurations, drawdowns, and transitions;
- **Bolstering its advisory role of the Economic and Social Council** to promote greater coherence among development and peacebuilding actors in the field;
- Exploring the **potential of upgrading it into a Council**.²⁰

We express our grave concern at the negative effects on development, peace and security, and human rights posed by climate change, biodiversity loss, and desertification, exacerbating

¹⁷ [Security Council Resolution 1325 \(2000\)](#), 31 October 2000.

¹⁸ Department of Peace Operations, [Gender Equality and Women, Peace and Security](#), Resource Package (2020).

¹⁹ Together First, [A stronger Peacebuilding Commission](#) (2019); HLAB, [A Breakthrough for People and Planet](#) (2023).

²⁰ Together First, [Create a strong UN Peacebuilding Council to replace the current Peacebuilding Commission](#) (2019).

drivers of conflict, such as poverty and food insecurity. In a context in which six of the nine planetary boundaries have been crossed,²¹ we emphasize:

- **The necessity of integrating these discussions** into a broader array of deliberations within the General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Economic and Social Council, and the Peacebuilding Commission;
- **The explicit inclusion of these multifaceted risks in the Peacebuilding Commission work,** leveraging its collaboration with the United Nations Environment Programme, IFIs, and other relevant entities to consolidate diverse data sources and evidence to swiftly translate research findings into comprehensive strategies with a focus on the Global South.

Chapter III. Science, technology and innovation and digital cooperation²²

Inclusive Global AI Governance and Regulation. We propose to convene a diverse, permanent multi-stakeholder board of experts in AI governance. This board will be tasked with developing recommendations and advising countries on policy frameworks for public interest AI. Our aim is to ensure that these frameworks are inclusive of the majority world, thereby expanding the voice and representation of low- and middle-income countries and underrepresented groups in global AI decision-making.

Funding from developed countries to foster responsible AI in the majority world to close the digital divide. We encourage the creation of specialized funding mechanisms, involving multilateral organizations and international foundations, to de-risk investments in digital connectivity and responsible technology. This approach is intended to solve local problems by providing financing for localized testing, sandboxes, and context-specific experimentation of AI applications prior to their deployment.

Transparency and AI Literacy for all. We reinforce the necessity to promote open software and comprehensive AI education for every citizen impacted by AI systems to empower individuals to audit, question, and have a say in their digital rights. This initiative is particularly crucial for countries with lower levels of digital literacy or limited understanding of the potential risks and benefits of AI.

²¹ Katherine Richardson et al. "[Earth beyond six of nine planetary boundaries](#)" *Sci. Adv.* 9, (2023).

²² Igarapé Institute, [Global Task Force](#) (2023); Project Syndicate, [AI and the Global South](#) (2023); Foreign Policy, [Artificial Intelligence Will Entrench Global Inequality](#) (2023).

Chapter IV. Youth and future generations

We commit to incorporating the principle of future-proof policies in international decision-making.²³ We reaffirm the paramount importance of prioritizing the rights of children and generations not yet born in all decision-making, as well as shaping institutions, policies, and practices that account for them. This includes the development of future-fit organizations and processes that meaningfully integrate long-term analysis, goal-setting, and impact assessments, ensuring our multilateral system is adaptable and sensitive to their needs. We recommend the appointment of a Special Envoy for Future Generations, with a comprehensive mandate.²⁴ This position would provide crucial oversight and accountability to ensure our commitments to succeeding generations are met.

Chapter V. Transforming global governance

Recognizing the importance of civil society participation in global governance, commencing with enhanced participation within the United Nations.²⁵ We welcome the positive contributions of civil society garnered through the UN75 global consultations, Our Common Agenda, and the Summit of the Future. In this regard:

- We call upon the Secretary-General to develop a **comprehensive system-wide strategy for engaging civil society and to create an office dedicated to civil society affairs, led by a senior official.** This office should facilitate the coordination of the network of civil society focal points across the major institutions of the UN system as well as the engagement of a more diverse and representative cross-section of civil society.

²³ Folha de S. Paulo, [Políticas Públicas à Prova de Futuro](#) (2023); HLAB, [A Breakthrough for People and Planet](#) (2023).

²⁴ United Nations, [Our Common Agenda](#), Report of the Secretary-General (2021).

²⁵ United Nations, Note by the Secretary-General, [Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations](#) (2004); Together First, [The case for UN civil society champion](#) (2020); Action for Sustainable Development, [Recommendations to ensure meaningful civil society participation at the United Nations: From ambition to action](#) (2021); United Nations, [Our Common Agenda](#), Report of the Secretary-General (2021); HLAB, [A Breakthrough for People and Planet](#) (2023).

Emphasizing the imperative of strengthening the Economic and Social Council to provide leadership and coordination in critical economic, financial, and social policy matters, we reaffirm the role enshrined in the Charter and entrusted to the Economic and Social Council by the General Assembly. To this end, we resolve:²⁶

- **To establish a representative apex body** to enable the Council to undertake a norm-setting and coordination role in the context of economic and financial globalization, with the aim of fostering conditions conducive to growth, employment, and effective responses to inequality and financial instability;
- **To welcome the Secretary-General's proposal for a Biennial Summit**, which would bring together key stakeholders and serve as a platform to address discrepancies in the regulations governing trade, aid, debt, taxation, finance, environmental sustainability, climate action, and other developmental concerns.

²⁶ Our Common Agenda, Policy Brief 6: [Reforms to the International Financial Architecture](#) (2023).