LAW OF EVIDENCE

CORROBORATION SLIDES
 Lesson plan
• General rule
• Defining corroboration Nsofu v the people
• Rationale
• Corroboration required by statute
• Corroboration required by common law
• Emmanuelle Phiri v The people, Mufudza v the people
and Machobane v the People
• If no warning does it fall under proviso
• Categories of suspect evidence
1. Children
2. Victims of sexual offences
3. Persons with an interest to serve Msupi v the people
 THE GENERAL RULE
• The general rule in both criminal and civil
law is that the court may act on the
testimony of one witness although there
are occasions where the need for
corroboration must be considered by the
court.
 DEFINING CORROBORATION
• Corroboration is independent evidence supporting the evidence of the witness in a material
particular.
• Nsofu v the people illustrates what amounts to corroboration 1973 p287
• The case dealt with an accused charged with defilement of three young girls being below 16. They
gave evidence that the accused was their assailant. A question arose as to whether the judge had
misdirected itself of admitting the evidence without properly applying his mind to the validity of the
evidence submitted as being corroborated.
• It is apparent in cases such as defilement that the evidence given by the witness must be
corroborated to confirm the veracity and reliability of the evidence given. In this case the magistrate
held that the evidence being the testimonies of the victim witnesses was corroborated by the medical
evidence which established that they had been defiled.
• The high court on appeal held otherwise and stated:
1. Corroborative evidence need not only establish that an offence had been committed but also that it
was the accused who committed the offence. In this case the medical evidence only corroborated
the fact that the girls where defiled but not that it was the accused that defiled them. The question
was then that would the magistrate still have convicted had he not made this misdirection?
• The judge construed that contrary to what was argued by the defence corroboration did not
require evidence that is conclusive of the fact that it was indeed the accused that committed
the offence. It is sufficient if such evidence establishes or rather confirms the evidence of the
witness to the effect that their evidence is reliable. In this case although not conclusive, evidence
confirming that the accused was seen at the house of the crime around the time which the medical
evidence confirmed that the defilement should have taken place was sufficient evidence
corroborating the oral testimonies of the witnesses. The conviction was thus upheld.

• R v Baskerville 1916 2 KB 658 Lord Reading 678 : evidence connecting or tending to connect
the accused to the crime. Illustrating not only that a crime has been committed but also that
the accused has committed it.
 Examples
• Mr X an accomplice gives evidence stating that Mr
Y stabbed Mr Z.
• Mr C an independent bystander (Mr Z’s neighbour)
also gives evidence stating that whilst looking
through his window he saw Mr Y in Mr Z’s house
around the same time.
• Mr X evidence establishes that Mr Y murdered Mr
Z
• Mr C’s evidence supports Mr X evidence in that it
shows or tends to show that Mr Y murdered Mr Z.
It thus corroborates Mr Y’s testimony and renders
it more reliable.
Why is corroboration necessary?

• This is so because experience has shown that in certain

types of cases or with particular categories of witnesses
it is dangerous to convict in the absence of corroboration
Shamwana v the people 1985 p41
• The judge in this case considered the importance of
corroboration evidence which is mainly needed where
there is a fear of unreliability of the evidence given so
that the court may not solely rely on that evidence to
convict and it will then be needed that some other
evidence be adduced to compliment that evidence or
rather to make the evidence in the first instance reliable.
This is so where the evidence is provided by a co-
accused or an accomplice who would in most cases
have their own interests to protect.
 RATIONALE
• Corroboration or as sometimes termed supporting evidence is a
requirement that seeks to guard against the danger of deliberate false
implication by singly or jointly fabricating a story against the accused
i.e. to see whether the evidence of a particular witness can be believed.
• See Lord Morris in DPP v Hester: ‘the accumulated experience of courts of
law, reflecting accepted general knowledge of the ways of the world has
shown that there are many circumstances and situations in which it is
unwise to found settled conclusions on the testimony of one person alone.
The reason for this are diverse…they may in some cases be motives of
self interest, or of self exculpation or of vindictiveness, in some
situations the straight line of truth is diverted by the influences of
emotion or of hysteria or of alarm or of remorse. Sometimes it may be
that owing to immaturity or perhaps to lively imaginative gifts there is
no true appreciation of the gulf that separates truth from falsehood. It
must therefore be sound policy to have rules of law or of practice which are
designed to avert the peril that findings of guilt may be insecurely based.
 Lord Morris in DPP v Hester
• The judge went on to consider that as a result
statutory law has been enacted which requires that
for certain types of offences there may be no
conviction without corroborated evidence whilst in
other instances the courts have adopted guidelines
which have become rules over time requiring that
although there may be conviction on the
uncorroborated evidence of a particular witness
such the judge must first warn the jury (or itself) of
the dangers of convicting solely on such evidence
examples being the evidence of children (sworn),
sexual offences, accomplices etc.
 CORROBORATION UNDER
STATUTE OR COMMON LAW
• In some instances corroboration is mandatory such
as where it is required by statute and in others there
is merely a requirement that the judge applies his
mind i.e. warn himself on record of the danger of
convicting solely on suspect evidence failure. In the
case of the latter the judge may convict on
uncorroborated evidence where a warning is shown
to have been applied or if the judge fails to warn
himself the case is only reversed if it is shown that
there is no other evidence (which supports need not
be strictly corroborated evidence) on which the judge
would have convicted the accused.
 Corroboration required by statute
• What is corroboration demanded by statute
• This is where statute requires that there may not be a conviction without corroboration of
evidence
• Examples of corroboration demanded by statute
• Perjury
• S107 of the penal code requires for the offence of perjury and subornation of perjury the
evidence of one witness as to the falsity of any statement of the accused to be corroborated
• Procuration
• Under s140 of the Penal code relating to the offence of procuration states that a person may
not be convicted of such an offence based on the evidence of a single witness unless such
witness be corroborated in a material particular.
• Roads and Road Traffic Act
• Under s192(3) and (4) of cap 464 a person commits an offence if they drive over the speed
limit specified for that class of vehicle and on that road, however the court may not convict
solely on the basis of one witness’s evidence to the effect that in their opinion the accused was
driving above the speed limit.
• Affiliation
• Under s6(2) the court may not make an affiliation order based on the evidence of a single
mother unless such evidence is corroborated in some material particular
• Legitimacy Act s15 and Bastardy Laws Amedment Act 1875 (England) section 4
• Requires for the corroboration of such evidence
• CHILDREN: AMENDMENT TO JUVENILE ACT s122: Children below 14 can only give sworn
evidence (requirement for unsown evidence has been abolished), the sworn evidence of
children below 14 must be corroborated
Question: Would old law under common law, apply to the new amendment
 CHILDREN’ UNSWORN EVIDENCE:
•
OLD LAW
In the case of DPP v Hester the court dealt with an appeal questioning whether the unsworn
evidence given by a child witness can corroborate the sworn evidence given by another child
witness. The accused was charged with indecently assaulting a 12 year old girl, Valerie who
testified against him on oath. Her 9 year old sister also gave unsworn evidence to the same
effect.
• Held:
• The judge after analysing the law relating to the sworn and unsworn evidence of children
summarised the law as being that:
• a) The unsworn evidence of a child must be corroborated by sworn evidence, there may
be no conviction solely on the unsworn evidence of a child
• b) it makes no difference whether the child’s evidence relates to an assault on himself or
herself or to any other charge, for example where an unsworn child says that he saw the
accused person steal an article
• c) The sworn evidence of a child need not as a matter of law be corroborated but a jury
should be warned not that they must find corroboration but that there is a risk in acting on the
uncorroborated evidence of young boys or girls though they may do so if convinced that the
witness is telling the truth
• d) such a warning should also be given where a young boy or girl is called to corroborate
the evidence either of another child whether sworn or unsworn or of an adult.
• e) as the statute which permits a child of tender years to give unsworn evidence
expressly provides for such evidence being given in any proceeding against any person
for any offence, the unsworn evidence of a child can be given to corroborate the
evidence of another person given on oath but in such case a particularly careful warning
should be given.
 DPP V HESTER: MUTUAL
CORROBORATION
• Under what he termed mutual corroboration it was held in this
case that the evidence of the two children (one being given on oath
and the other not on oath) corroborated each other and could be
admitted on a careful warning as to the dangers of convicting on the
basis of such evidence.
• Lord Diplock simply emphasised that the jury may not convict solely
on the unsworn evidence of a child which is uncorroborated
and that the unsworn evidence of one child may not
corroborate the unsworn evidence of another child. Although
the sworn evidence of one child may corroborate the unsworn
evidence of another child and vice versa. In essence he states that
the suspect evidence of one witness may corroborate the suspect
evidence of another witness unless they are accomplices in the
strict sense of being participles crimis with the accused in the crime
with which he is charged.
 Fred Mwewa v the people
• It is to be further noted as the court pointed out
in the case of Fred Mwewa v the people that
the evidence of two children being of tender
ages and given not on oath cannot
corroborate each other, as in essence both
will be required to have evidence supporting
it as they are both not on oath they may not
corroborate each other, although evidence of
two children one given sworn and the other
unsworn may corroborate each other.
 CASES WHERE A WARNING IS
NEEDED
• What are these cases?
• In some instances as explained above it is not
mandatory to have the evidence corroborated in that the
judge may convict solely based on the uncorroborated
evidence of an accused however it is necessary that a
warning on the dangers of convicting solely based on
such evidence is given before a conviction as a rule of
law.
• Cases requiring such include:
1.Evidence of an accomplice,
2.Evidence of a witness with an interest to serve,
3.Sworn evidence of children (old law) and
4.Sexual offences.
 ACCOMPLICE
• The general rule is that as a matter of practice which is now mandatory a
judge must warn himself of the dangers of convicting based on evidence of
an accomplice to the crime although he may do so after warning himself of
such dangers, this warn or direction must be shown on record i.e. his
reasons for convicting, in essence a conviction may only be made where
there is special and compelling circumstances being evidence excluding
the possibility of falsity of an accused person’s statement. In the absence of
this the conviction must be quashed unless it is shown that there is
corroborative evidence which would inevitably lead to a similar conclusion.
• Rationale: It was stated in Baskerville that an accomplice has inside
knowledge and it would be hard to judge their credibility based on cross
examination as to the order of events as the only lie he would be telling is as
to the identity of the principal offender in any case even where he is no
longer a co-accused i.e. with no interest of his own to serve he may wish to
protect another or simply for whatever reasons which to implicate an
innocent party.
 ACCOMPLICE: CASES
• The Rule: due to the dangers of convicting solely based on accomplice
evidence, the judge must not convict on such evidence save where he gives
himself a warning, that must take the form that a conviction must not be
reached unless there is special and compelling reason to do so. Failure to
give a warning will entitle the accused to a retrial if shown that the verdict
is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.
ENGLISH AUTHORITY
• R v Baskerville
• The court in this case confirmed that there is a general rule of practice which
is now synonymous to a general rule of law that in dealing with the evidence
of an accomplice that a judge must warn the jury of the dangers of
convicting solely based on that evidence to the point that where there is a
failure to warn the conviction may be quashed. However where a warning is
given the jury is entitled to convict on such evidence although being
uncorroborated and where such is done or in any case where the evidence
is corroborated the judge will have the discretion to quash such a conviction
if it is shown that in all the circumstances of the case the verdict is
unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.
 ACCOMPLICE: ZAMBIAN
AUTHORITY
• Machobane v the People 1972 ZR 101: in this case the appellant was
convicted of stock theft. Two beasts were found in the possession of his
brother who told the court that it was the accused that stole them. The
brother’s son also gave evidence to that effect. The court held that
although the two had an interest to serve the evidence was corroborated
by their demeanour. On appeal the decision was overturned it was held
that as a rule of practice now recognised as a rule of law the court must
not convict on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice unless it is
shown that there is special and compelling reason on which to convict.
Further the court held that the demeanour of the accomplice is not
special and compelling reason. In absence of other evidence on which it
can be shown that the judge would have convicted despite the
irregularities the court quashed the conviction.
• The court in this case confirmed the English case of R v Baskerville and held
that as a rule of practice a judge must give a warning of the dangers of
convicting solely on the basis of uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice or
of a witness with their own interest to serve, this has been stated to now be a
rule of law. It was stated that the jury would rarely convict based on such
evidence solely and thus the test is much higher stating that there should not
be a conviction based on the sole uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice
unless there is special and compelling reason. So that failure of such a
warning would lead to the quashing of a conviction unless there is special and
compelling grounds for such a conviction and even where there is a warning
there must be special and compelling reason to convict on such evidence. In
this case where there was a conviction based on the evidence of the father
and son both who were found to be witnesses with a possible motive to
exculpate themselves by putting the blame on the accused the court held that
honesty of the witness did not amount to special and compelling grounds and
thereby overturned the decision.
 Defining: special and compelling
reason
• Defining Special and compelling grounds
• Emanuel Phiri v the people 1978 ZR p79: this is defined as evidence
which satisfies the court that the dangers of falsely convicting an accused
has been excluded although not strictly amounting to corroborative
evidence. This goes beyond the demeanour of the witness however what
constituted this evidence depended on the nature of the case. Normally it
was stated such evidence would be corroboration in that it must support or
confirm. Thus it may be evidence falling short of being corroboration only
in a technical sense or evidence which removes the intention to fabricate
or motive to so do.
• The judge outlined that as established by law, there may be no conviction
of an accused based solely on the uncorroborated evidence of an
accomplice unless there is special and compelling circumstances defined
as something more although not corroboration in the strict definition being
something which satisfies the court that the dangers of convicting without
corroboration had been excluded.
• In this case a the court held that the conviction should be quashed
unless the proviso applied as the judge convicted on uncorroborated
accomplice evidence, stating that the demeanour or his belief in the
witness’s statement did not constitute special and compelling reason
 Emanuel Phiri v the people 1978
ZR p79: Steps to be taken
• The judge summarised the rules to be:
1. A judge sitting alone or with assessors must direct himself and the assessors if any as to the
dangers of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of accomplices and
2. He must show that he applied his mind to this, there is no particular form of words to use for
the direction however what is necessary is that he shows that he applied his mind to the
particular dangers raised and the facts of the particular case before him.
3. The judge should examine the evidence and consider whether in the circumstances of the
case those dangers have been precluded.
4. The judge should set out the reasons for his conclusions; his mind upon the matter should
be clearly revealed.
5. As a matter of law those reasons must consist of something more than a belief in the truth
of the evidence of the accomplices based simply on their demeanour and the plausibility of
other evidence considerations which apply to any witness. If there is nothing more the court
must acquit.
6. The something more must be circumstances which though not constituting corroboration as a
matter of strict law, yet satisfy the court that the danger that the accused is being falsely
implicated has been excluded and that it is safe to rely on the evidence of the accomplice
implicating the accused. This is what is meant by special and compelling grounds.
7. These circumstances do not lend themselves to close description; the nature and sufficiency
of the evidence in question will depend on the nature and the facts of the particular case.
As a principle however the evidence will be in the nature of corroboration in that it must of
necessity support or confirm. For instance it may fall short of being corroboration as a matter of
strict law only because of some technicality in the existing law of corroboration; or the evidence
may be of circumstances which negative any motive for false implication.
 APPLYING JURY WARNING TO
ZAMBIAN SYSTEM
• Emanuel Phiri v The people 1982 ZR p77 (see above)
• In the case of Phiri v the people the court also outlined
what would amount to a sufficient warning in countries
with no Jury system,
• ‘but unless the court’s mind is essential that the
judgement state, just as a judge would state to a jury, the
particular dangers inherent in the circumstances of the
particular case; and the judgement should explain what
are the circumstances which satisfy the court that the
particular dangers have been excluded and why just as
the judges direction to a jury would explain what
circumstances are capable of so satisfying them. Unlike
a jury a judge sitting alone must give reasons for being
so satisfied.
 The proviso
• The test for the proviso was stated to be:
• ‘Does there exist corroboration of such manifest cogency that the conclusion is not
to be resisted that the jury properly directed, would certainly have arrived at the
same conclusion?’
Elaboration of the above test:
1. In other words the judge cannot convict solely on the evidence of an accomplice.
2. The judge may only convict if he applies his mind to the dangers of such a
conviction,
3. This must be shown on record, the judge must show that such dangers have been
excluded as
4. There is something more being special and compelling circumstances showing
that the falsity of the statement is excluded.
5. This something more is normally in the form of corroborative evidence but may fall
short of being corroboration in the technical sense.
6. If the judge fails to so warn himself and convicts (i.e. in the absence of something
more) the conviction must be quashed unless
7. The proviso applies which requires that there is corroborative evidence surrounding
the case which shows that even in the absence of such uncorroborating evidence
the need not be corroboration but should be evidence which in some sense support
such a conviction i.e. in any event the judge would have arrived at the same
conclusion.
 Options for a judge
• In other words he must either:
1. Acquit
2. Convict and illustrate that there is something
more which eradicates the dangers of falsity or
3. Convict on the strength of other corroborative
evidence, being independent of the
uncorroborative evidence and sufficient to lead
to a conviction.
Persons with an interest to serve
In the case of George Musupi v The people 1978 p 271
• This category has been interpreted to include people that may
fall short of being an accomplice but have a motive to fabricate.
In the case below the witnesses giving evidence were at the crime
scene but failed to call the police and report. This it was stated gave
them a motive to fabricate. The court stated that as there was no
warning given the conviction is to be quashed save where it falls
within the proviso. The court held that it did not fall under the proviso
(states conviction is upheld if there exists other evidence
corroborating, where it is shown that a jury sitting on the safe facts
having been directed properly would come to the same conclusion)
as the other evidence available constituted mere circumstantial
evidence in which case many inferences could be drawn.
• Further the court held that the category of suspect witness is not
closed and that ‘suspect witness’ is not specific to dishonesty it may
also include categories where there is a danger of honest mistake
such as identification evidence.
 RELEVANCE OF MSUPI V THE
PEOPLE
• The case is also relevant in that it indicates
that the rules relating to corroboration are
relaxed, the court states that a technical
approach should not be favoured, in which case
the classes of ‘suspect evidence’ is not
closed. Evidence of relatives or employees that
may be biased could amount to suspect
evidence. Further the term suspect is not limited
to a motive to fabricate but rather could also
indicate possibility for error such as identification
evidence for instance
 Children: OLD V NEW LAW
• Under the old law as sworn evidence of
children did not have to be corroborated, it
merely fell under suspect evidence,
requiring a warning i.e. conviction where
there is special and compelling ground to
do so. Now there is a requirement that
children must give sworn evidence and
this is to be corroborated under statute.
 SWORN EVIDENCE OF
CHILDREN OLD LAW
• Bernard Chisha v the People 1980 ZR p36As the child’s evidence
although on oath was not corroborated the conviction was quashed.

• Court confirmed that the evidence of a child be it sworn or unsworn falls

under ‘suspect’ evidence and there is thus a requirement for a warning
before conviction of such evidence being uncorroborated. There may only
be a conviction where there is something more illustrating that the dangers
of convicting on such evidence have been excluded. As a reason why
such is excluded it was stated that a child’s mind is yet too immature
and further citing Atkin J a child’s mind is ‘possibly more under
influence of third persons sometimes their parents than are adults and
they are apt to allow their imaginations to run away with them and to
invent untrue stories.’
• The judge concluded ‘it is the immaturity of mind that directly accounts for a
child’s susceptibility to the influence of third persons, fantasy, and lack of
appreciation of the gulf that separates truth from falsehood. It is thus good
law that the sworn evidence of a child does not qualify to be ranked together
with the sworn evidence of any other witness concerning which it is
unnecessary for a trial court to warn itself or to look for corroboration.’
 BENARD CHISHA V THE
PEOPLE: CONSIDER BELOW
• Further the court held that as to defining
‘child’ this means as defined under the
juvenile’s act s122(1) a person who has not
attained the age of sixteen years.
• Consider now that sworn evidence of a child
under s122 must be corroborated. The age
being below 14. under the old law they stated
child means under 16 as defined by the Juv
act. Would this mean that for those 14-15
there is a common law requirement for
corroboration
 Sexual offences:

• It is a well established rule of law that in cases involving sexual

offences the court is required to warn itself of the dangers of
convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant,
this is because by nature of the offences complainants are
sometimes motivated by spite, sexual frustration or
unpredictable emotional responses also because defending an
allegation concerning a sexual offence is hardly as easy as
making the allegation. Offences such as indecent assault often
leave no traceable evidences.
• In rape cases the alleged act of sexual intercourse by the
accused and the question of consent by the complainant
sometimes depend entirely upon the word of the victim as
against that of the accused. If the court fails to warn itself the
conviction is liable to be quashed.
 RAPE: ACKSON ZIMBA V THE
•
PEOPLE 1980 p259
The appellant was convicted of rape, the particulars of the charge being that on the 14th June,
1979, he did unlawfully have carnal know ledge of Monica Ndhlovu without her consent. The
learned State Advocate does not support this conviction.

• The evidence against the appellant was that he was alleged to have seized a woman in the
bush and to have raped her, and the woman was thereafter seen to be crying by an
independent witness.

• The complainant stated that during the course of her alleged rape she sustained scratches on
her legs, and she said that the third party whom she met had asked her how she had obtained
those scratches. That witness did not corroborate the evidence as to the scratches, nor did the
medical report refer to any external injuries to the complainant at all. In the circumstances, there
was a complete lack of corroboration In this case.

• We have considered whether the fact that the complainant was crying, when she was seen by
the independent witness, could amount to corroboration. Although the distress of the
complainant could have been regarded as corroboration, on the authority of Knight v R
(1) it is necessary for the trial court to warn itself that evidence of distress at the time of
the making of the complaint may not be enough to amount to corroboration as it may
well be simulated. No such warning was given to himself by the magistrate in this case,
and we agree with the learned State Advocate that this conviction cannot be supported.
The appeal is allowed, the conviction is quashed, and the sentence is set aside.

• Appeal allowed.
 Katebe v The people 1975 o13
• Although the cautionary rule of practice has long since become virtually a rule of
law (see for instance R v Baskerville [1]), if, as we said in Machobane v The People
[2], there are special and compelling grounds for so doing it is competent to convict
on the uncorroborated testimony of a witness with a possible interest to serve.
Machobane's case [2] was of course a case of stock theft and the witnesses in
question were witnesses whose evidence ought to have been treated with the
same care as that of accomplices; but the general principle of the cautionary rule
applies equally in sexual cases. The reasons for this caution in such cases are
legion and it is unnecessary for us to repeat them at length; obviously there are
circumstances in which a woman will make false allegations - in order to protect a
boy-friend, or in circumstances where she may fear the anger of a husband or a
father. In the present case there is nothing to suggest that any of these factors is
present. We can see no motive for the prosecutrix in this case deliberately and
dishonestly making a false allegation against the appellant. This case is in practice
no different from any other in which the conviction depends on the reliability of the
evidence of a complainant as to the identity of the culprit, and this is a "special and
compelling ground" which would justify a conviction on the uncorroborated
testimony of a prosecutrix. We are satisfied that the learned magistrate was right,
firstly when he said there was no corroboration as to the identity of the culprit, and
secondly when he considered that this was a case when he could convict on the
uncorroborated testimony of the complainant if he believed her.
• Question: In this case the absence of a motive to implicate or falsify as is usual in
such cases i.e. in fear of an angry father, or husband or to protect a boy friend, was
recognised as something more and a conviction based on the evidence of the
complainant was held to be sufficient.
 RELATIVITY OF SOMETHING
MORE
• Something more was defined as being
relative depending on the nature of the case,
aspects such as the absence of motive to
implicate the accused as in Katebe have
been held sufficient as well as exclusion of
the possibility of mistaken identity. Such lack
of motive was not present on the facts of the
case.
Sexual offences: Mupfudza v the State the two
part test
• The Zimbabwean Court in this case applied a two stage procedure
(1) Credibility of the witness (2) has the danger of convicting on the
uncorroborated evidence of a suspect witness been excluded?
1. The court must first decide whether taking into account all the
circumstances of the case including demeanour, the probabilities and all
the other considerations which trier of fact properly take into account in
assessing credibility it believes the witness
2. The court once satisfied as to the credibility the second stage is to
question in what circumstances can the court be satisfied that the danger
of false incrimination has been excluded and it is safe to rely on evidence
of the suspect witness.
3. Ideally there must be independent evidence corroborating however in the
absence of this there must be something more which is beyond the mere
credibility of a witness illustrating the dangers of convicting based solely
on such evidence has been excluded.
 Sufficient Corroboration

• In most instances corroboration will be in the form of various pieces of circumstantial

evidence which taken separately will not be sufficient but however conjunctively will
amount to corroboration.
• Muna Ndulo stated these questions are to be considered:
• what are the real issues in the case
• what the evidence being put forward as corroboration does in fact prove. The proof
may come from several sources and in that sense corroboration may be cumulative;
• whether that evidence; Comes from a source or sources independent of the
accomplice; goes some significant part of the way towards showing that the offence
was committed and that the accused committed it.
• Evidence of accomplices of a class may be mutually corroborative, where they
give independent evidence of separate incidents and where the circumstances are
such as to exclude the danger of a jointly fabricated story.
• A lie told by an accused out of court may amount to corroboration. It depends upon
the nature of the lie and the nature of the rest of the evidence.
 Failure to give a warning
consequences
• What about where evidence of corroboration exists but
the court fails to warn itself of the dangers of
convicting, can the case be upheld. The position as
explained above in the case of Phiri and the people is
that where there is a failure to warn of the dangers of
convicting on the basis of uncorroborated suspect
evidence the conviction will only stand where the case
falls under the proviso which as confirmed in the case
of Shamwana v the people is to the effect that:
• ‘does there exist in this case corroboration of such
manifest cogency that the conclusion is not to be
resisted that the jury properly directed would certainly
have arrived at the same conclusion.’?
 QUESTIONS
• Questions
• John was charged with murder, the victim having been shot dead.
Kenneth, an accomplice gave evidence which implicated John. This
included evidence of conversations with John in which he said that
he intended to use an AK47 rifle for the killing. Forensic evidence
shows that a weapon of this type was used to kill the victim.
Kenneth also gave details of the car which was used to effect the
escape from the scene of the crime. The police found John’s
fingerprints in the car. Kenneth has a long string of previous
offences, mainly for obtaining goods by false pretence. There is no
other evidence to connect John with the murder. The trial judge
stated ‘I warn myself that the evidence of Kenneth requires
corroboration but on the evidence I am satisfied that there is
sufficient evidence to corroborate his testimony’. John is convicted
and appeals. Consider whether he has any grounds for appeal.
• What is corroboration? With the aid of decided cases, describe
instances when corroboration is essential