Naval War College Review

Volume 63
Article 1
Number 2 Spring

2010

Full Spring 2010 Issue

The U.S. Naval War College

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 Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

NAVA L WA R COLLEGE REVIEW

N AVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Spring 2010
Volume 63, Number 2

Spring 2010

S NA
TE V
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UNITED S

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 Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

Cover
A model from the Naval War College
Museum collection of a Korean “turtle
ship,” such as those that helped repulse
the sixteenth-century Japanese invasion
of Korea—a campaign vital to the spirit
of the modern Republic of Korea Navy, as
noted by Yoji Koda (Vice Admiral, Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Force, Retired) in
this issue’s lead article.
The model, just over twenty-six inches
long and almost nineteen tall, was do-
nated to the Naval War College in 1993
by Rear Admiral Ha Jong-keun, president
of the Korean Naval War College. The
original ship was 113 feet long, thirty-
four feet in beam; it displaced 150 tons,
mounted fourteen guns, and carried a
complement of 130. The spikes on the
“turtleback” deterred boarding; the iron
plates, which were bolted to wood sheath-
ing up to a foot thick, made the turtle ship
the world’s first ironclad. The Mandarin
Chinese character on the model’s flag
signifies “Turtle.”
Naval War College Museum. Photographs
and design by the Naval War College
Visual Communications Division.

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Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

NAVAL W AR COLLEGE REVIEW

Spring 2010
Volume 63, Number 2

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS

686 Cushing Road
Newport, RI 02841-1207

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Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

NA V A L WA R C O L L E G E PR E S S A DV I S O R Y B O A R D P R E S I D E NT, NA V A L WA R C O L L E G E

Adam Bellow Rear Adm. James P. Wisecup, USN

Capt. Wayne P. Hughes, USN (Ret.) PR O V O S T
Gale A. Mattox Amb. Mary Ann Peters
Robert A. Silano
D E A N O F N A V A L WA R F A R E S T U D I E S
Marin Strmecki
Dov S. Zakheim Robert C. Rubel

NA V A L WA R C O L L E G E P R E S S
N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V IE W E DI TO R I A L B O A R D
Carnes Lord, Editor
Donald Chisholm Pelham G. Boyer, Managing Editor
Audrey Kurth Cronin Phyllis P. Winkler, Book Review Editor
Peter Dombrowski Lori A. Almeida, Secretary and Circulation Manager
Stephen Downes-Martin Frank Uhlig, Jr., Editor Emeritus
Col. Theodore L. Gatchel, USMC (Ret.)
Capt. Dennis Mandsager, JAGC, USN (Ret.) Naval War College Review
William C. Martel Code 32, Naval War College
Col. Mackubin Owens, USMC (Ret.) 686 Cushing Rd., Newport, RI 02841-1207
Lt. Cdr. Derek S. Reveron, USN Fax: 401.841.1071
Capt. Peter M. Swartz, USN (Ret.) DSN exchange, all lines: 948
Scott C. Truver Website: www.usnwc.edu/press
Karl F. Walling http://twitter.com/NavalWarCollege
James J. Wirtz Editor, Circulation, or Business
401.841.2236
press@usnwc.edu
Managing Editor
401.841.4552
managingeditor@usnwc.edu
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associateeditor@usnwc.edu
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Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

The Naval War College Review was established in 1948 as a forum for discussion of
public policy matters of interest to the maritime services. The thoughts and opinions
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Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

CONTENTS

From the Editors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

President’s Forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

The Emerging Republic of Korea Navy

A Japanese Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (Retired)
The Republic of Korea Navy has made itself one of the most notable navies in the region.
Challenges and issues still exist, but there are important areas in which it and the capable Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Force can cooperate in the future.

Arctic Security Considerations and the U.S. Navy’s

Roadmap for the Arctic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Rear Admiral David W. Titley, U.S. Navy, and Courtney C. St. John
The scope and magnitude of changes to the Arctic region as a result of a changing climate are
great—shifts in species populations and distribution, more navigable transportation passages,
increased shipping activity and resource extraction, and modified global circulation patterns. The
Navy’s Task Force Climate Change is addressing these considerations, which will shape safety and
security in the Arctic.

The U.S. Navy’s Transition to Jets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Robert C. Rubel
In this centennial year of naval aviation, it is interesting to observe that it has been jet powered for
over half of its history. The transition was long and brutally expensive in terms of life and aircraft.
However, it was, by any measure, a success.

Pieces of Eight
An Appraisal of U.S. Counterpiracy Options in the Horn of Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Lesley Anne Warner
The key to success against piracy off the coast of Somalia lies in linking current sea-based
counterpiracy methods with approaches designed to remedy the underlying instability ashore that
produced piracy in the first place.

China’s Oil Security Pipe Dream

The Reality, and Strategic Consequences, of Seaborne Imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins
It is widely believed in China that overland pipelines would greatly enhance the security of its oil
supply. Market and geopolitical analysis, however, shows that they would not. Chinese decision
makers must face the fact that, barring discovery of an economically viable large-scale substitute
for crude oil, their nation’s dependence on seaborne oil imports will only increase.

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2 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

Formal Mentoring in the U.S. Military

Research Evidence, Lingering Questions, and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
W. Brad Johnson and Gene R. Andersen
Organizations that mentor produce members who are more rapidly promoted, more confident,
and more likely to achieve leadership positions. Informal mentoring has flourished in the military
for centuries, but should the military institutionalize the process?

Research & Debate

Reflecting on Fuchida, or “A Tale of Three Whoppers” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Jonathan Parshall

Review Essay
Israel: A Revolutionary Miracle in Palestine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
The Rise of Israel: A History of a Revolutionary State, by Jonathan Adelman
Israel and Its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion, by Stuart A. Cohen
reviewed by Mackubin Thomas Owens

Book Reviews
Network-centric Warfare: How Navies Learned to
Fight Smarter through Three Wars, by Norman Friedman
reviewed by Peter Dombrowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Think Again: Why Good Leaders Make Bad Decisions and
How to Keep It from Happening to You, by Sydney Finkelstein, Jo Whitehead, and
Andrew Campbell
reviewed by Henry Kniskern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Rising China and Its Postmodern Fate: Memories of Empire in a
New Global Context, by Charles Horner
reviewed by Andrew Erickson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
The Vital Triangle: China, the United States and the Middle East,
by Jon B. Alterman and John W. Garver
reviewed by Robert A. Harris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan, by Seth G. Jones
reviewed by Douglas J. Wadsworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Tanker War: America’s First Conflict with Iran, 1987–1988, by Lee Allen Zatarain
reviewed by Ron Ratcliff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of
Donald Rumsfeld, by Bradley Graham
reviewed by William Calhoun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs,
1945–1955, by Jeffrey G. Barlow
reviewed by Richard Norton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Of Special Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Reflections on Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

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Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

FROM THE EDITORS

As we noted in the Winter 2010 Review, the Navy’s new maritime strategy places
a premium on maritime security cooperation, which in turn suggests that the
Navy has a heightened requirement to understand the maritime capabilities and
outlooks of its various security partners. That issue addressed the important
cases of the United Kingdom and Australia. In the present issue, the Republic of
Korea Navy is the subject of an informed and searching analysis by Vice Admiral
(Retired) Yoji Koda of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Admiral Koda
may seem an improbable choice as author of a piece on this subject, but in fact he
played an important role personally in initiating navy-to-navy staff talks be-
tween his country and the ROK in the late 1990s and has remained a close ob-
server of Korean maritime affairs since that time. Admiral Koda provides an
overview of the modern evolution of the ROK Navy from a modest coastal force
in the 1950s to the increasingly blue water–capable fleet of today. His discussion
of Japanese-ROK interaction at sea provides valuable insights into what might
be called “third party” maritime security cooperation—something the United
States needs to be keenly aware of as it seeks to strengthen its own bilateral rela-
tionships with foreign navies.
The U.S. Navy has been highly attentive to the possible implications of global
climate change. The Arctic region has been a special focus of this attention,
given the magnitude of recent changes in the climate there and the opportuni-
ties they afford for increased access to the waters and resources of the north. In
their article “Arctic Security Considerations and the U.S. Navy’s Roadmap for
the Arctic,” Rear Admiral David W. Titley, USN, and Courtney C. St. John ex-
plore these issues, their potential impacts on the Navy, and steps the Navy needs
to consider in dealing with them. Rear Admiral Titley is Oceanographer of the
Navy and Director, Task Force Climate Change.
Robert C. Rubel, in “The U.S. Navy’s Transition to Jets,” tells the important
and neglected story of the Navy’s struggle to adapt to jet aircraft beginning in the
late 1940s. He argues that this transition was in fact not finally complete until
the late 1980s, when accident rates in the Navy finally declined to a level approxi-
mating those in the Air Force, and explores in detail the reasons this was so.

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4 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

Rubel, a retired naval aviator, is dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at
the Naval War College.
We return again in this issue to the seemingly intractable problem of Somali
piracy. Lesley Anne Warner, of the Center for Naval Analyses, argues in “Pieces
of Eight: An Appraisal of U.S. Counterpiracy Options in the Horn of Africa” that
the key to success in countering piracy off the coast of Somalia lies in conceptu-
ally linking the positive elements of current sea-based counterpiracy methods
with approaches designed to remedy the underlying instability ashore that pro-
duced piracy in the first place. This very comprehensive analysis strikes us as a
useful contribution to an ongoing debate.
“China’s Oil Security Pipe Dream,” by Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B.
Collins, gets to the heart of an issue that, perhaps more than any other, seems to
be driving China’s ambitious naval-modernization efforts. The authors argue
that overland pipelines will never prove to be a serious alternative to seaborne
transport of oil and gas for China, in spite of the strong support for them in
some quarters, and that the Chinese would be better advised to explore coopera-
tive steps to safeguard free energy markets and the seaborne flow of energy im-
ports. Erickson is currently, and Collins was formerly, an associate of the Naval
War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. Readers may want to consult in
this connection an article by Collins and William S. Murray, “No Oil for the
Lamps of China?” in the Spring 2008 Review.
Finally, W. Brad Johnson, of the U.S. Naval Academy, and Gene R. Andersen,
of the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership (COSL) at the Naval War
College, offer an extended analysis of a key issue in naval and military leader-
ship, “Formal Mentoring in the U.S. Military: Research Evidence, Lingering
Questions, and Recommendations.” Our next issue will feature an (overdue)
discussion of the important and innovative work being carried out by the re-
cently created COSL organization in Newport.

FORTHCOMING FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS

The next (and thirty-fifth) in our Newport Papers monograph series, Piracy and
Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies, edited by Bruce A.
Elleman, Andrew Forbes, and David Rosenberg, is in press and has been posted
on our website. Dr. Elleman, of the Naval War College Maritime History Depart-
ment, and his coeditors have collected twelve case studies that allow conclusions
to be drawn on uses and limitations of naval antipiracy operations in the context
of new technology and modern national policy goals.
Also soon to be available for sale online by the U.S. Government Printing Office
is Nineteen-Gun Salute: Case Studies of Operational, Strategic, and Diplomatic Naval
Leadership during the 20th and Early 21st Centuries, edited by John B. Hattendorf

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FROM THE EDITORS 5

Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

and Bruce A. Elleman. This collection of brief biographies of nineteen U.S. Navy ad-
mirals, from W. S. Sims to Joseph W. Preuher, with conclusions by the editors focus-
ing particularly on leadership skills in the operational and strategic arenas, is
sponsored by the Naval War College’s College of Operational and Strategic Leader-
ship and has been jointly produced by the Naval War College Press and the Govern-
ment Printing Office.

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Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

Rear Admiral James “Phil” Wisecup became the

fifty-second President of the U.S. Naval War College on
6 November 2008. He most recently served as Com-
mander, Carrier Strike Group 7 (Ronald Reagan Strike
Group), returning from deployment in October 2008.
A 1977 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Rear
Admiral Wisecup earned his master’s degree in interna-
tional relations from the University of Southern Califor-
nia, graduated from the Naval War College in 1998,
and also earned a degree from the University of Strasbourg,
France, as an Olmsted Scholar, in 1982.
At sea, he served as executive officer of USS Valley Forge
(CG 50) during Operation DESERT STORM. As Com-
manding Officer, USS Callaghan (DDG 994), he was
awarded the Vice Admiral James Stockdale Award for
Inspirational Leadership. He served as Commander,
Destroyer Squadron 21 during Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM after 9/11.
Ashore, he was assigned to NATO Headquarters in
Brussels, Belgium; served as Force Planner and Ship
Scheduler for Commander, U.S. Naval Surface Forces,
Pacific; and served as action officer for Navy Headquar-
ters Plans/Policy Staff. He served as a fellow on the Chief
of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group; as Direc-
tor, White House Situation Room; and as Commander,
U.S. Naval Forces Korea.
Rear Admiral Wisecup’s awards include the Defense
Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star,
and various unit, service, and campaign awards.

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Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

PRESIDENT’S FORUM

Greetings from Newport

HARD AS IT IS TO BELIEVE, we’re halfway through our 125th anniver-

sary year here at the Naval War College (NWC). This coming June,
the six hundred or so graduates of the class of 2010 will be taking their places in
the long line of Newport graduates who have gone on to serve their nations and
their services with distinction. As the weather blows a gale here in Rhode Island,
I’d like to take a moment to reflect about the College’s mission of helping the
Chief of Naval Operations define the future Navy. The College has been doing
this for all 125 years of its history. To do this effectively, we have to think about
the strategic environment that is over the horizon, and this is something that has
been getting considerable attention here in Newport. In mid-December we
hosted a small group of eminent scientists and historians to talk about emerging
trends and phenomena, along with the lessons of history, as we proceed into a
complex and uncertain future. The discussion was fascinating and helpful as we
discussed subjects from the health of the oceans to climate change, causes of so-
cietal collapse in ancient history and their relevance for today and the future,
and finally what might be asked of the Navy in the future. I tell you this so you
will know the U.S. Navy is paying attention to the future, as you will see with
Rear Admiral David Titley’s article in this issue. Over a period of the past few
months, the Navy commissioned a science-based “Task Force Climate Change,”
which Admiral Titley, Oceanographer of the Navy, heads up. He spoke at the re-
1
cent United Nations summit in Copenhagen.
Another example is “Task Force Energy,” which is headed up by Rear Admiral
Phil Cullom. During the “Naval Energy Forum” in October 2009, the Secretary
of the Navy, the Honorable Ray Mabus, expressed five ambitious energy goals,
which he reaffirmed as recently as 21 January, when he signed an agreement with

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8 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

the Department of Agriculture. In case you missed some of this, here are his
broad goals:
• When awarding contracts, appropriately consider energy efficiency and the
energy footprint as additional factors in acquisition decisions.
• By 2012, demonstrate a Green Strike Group, composed of nuclear vessels
and ships powered by biofuel. By 2016, sail the Strike Group as a Great
Green Fleet, composed of nuclear ships, surface combatants equipped with
hybrid electric alternative-power systems running on biofuel, and aircraft
running on biofuel.
• By 2015, cut petroleum use in the Navy’s fifty thousand–vehicle nontactical
commercial fleet in half, by phasing in hybrid, flex fuel, and electric
vehicles.
• By 2020, produce at least half of shore-based installations’ energy require-
ments from alternative sources. Also 50 percent of all shore installations
will be net zero-energy consumers.
• By 2020, half of the Department of the Navy’s total energy consumption for
ships, aircraft, tanks, vehicles, and shore installations will come from alter-
2
native sources.
What else could come into play as we look ahead? Food distribution/security?
The health of the oceans/rising ocean levels? Pandemic? Global economic melt-
down? Some combination of these things? As I travel around, I feel there is a
sense of anxiety in the country, and you can’t help but feel it if you watch some of
the recent disaster movies. My message is this: the Navy, with the help of the
NWC, is watching and looking ahead at a wide range of possible futures, with a
view to anticipating future requirements.
I’ve recently talked with Mr. Tomas Ries, director of the Swedish Institute of
International Affairs, who provides a very interesting, overarching framework
that situates not only the developed world but the rest of the world as well, pro-
viding a framework for viewing potential sources of conflict. From where I sit,
the most interesting thing he highlights is that almost two-thirds of the world’s
population lives in what he calls “the zone of misery”—and today’s drama play-
ing out in Haiti is only the latest example. Though the United States is engaged
in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the response to the agony and humanitarian di-
saster in Haiti shows how rapidly and effectively things can move into action
when this nation decides to do so. The military support of our government de-
partments and agencies as I write this (a week after the quake) has been impres-
sive. For most of the Navy readers, however, we know these operations happen
routinely, though normally on a much smaller scale. For example, during my
time in Ronald Reagan Strike Group, we provided emergency aid to typhoon
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM 9
Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

victims in the Philippines, and we executed plans we had all discussed and
planned well before deploying—all part of normal preparations, though we
know each operation, each tragic disaster, will bring its own terrible, unique
challenges and complexities. This is all set out in the “Cooperative Strategy
for 21st Century Seapower”—it’s simply part of the deal today, at least the
backdrop.
Getting a useful grip on where the Navy should be headed is hard and contin-
uous work. It requires a robust institution if it is to occur. The Naval War College
is such an institution—advancing knowledge in “all matters relating to war,
statesmanship connected to war, and the prevention of war,” as its founder, Rear
Admiral Stephen B. Luce, said. A quick scan of current NWC activities reveals
the scope and intensity of the effort. The China Maritime Studies Institute has
expanded and improved its library, our faculty is in demand, and we are working
3
on a wide variety of gaming activities as a matter of priority. The student/fac-
ulty research going on (Halsey, Stockdale, Mahan groups) is cutting-edge, very
interesting, and helpful. Another development, which has come about over the
past few years, is the solid connection developing with our fleet commanders as
the Navy improves its focus on the operational level of war—this is the goal of
our College of Operational and Strategic Leadership. To paraphrase Churchill,
we want to develop captains of war, not just captains of ships. The result is that
we are having a good bit of “saltwater pumped into Newport” directly from fleet
operations worldwide, and there is a nice balance in place.
The natural focus of the incoming students is today’s fight (one in three or
four is returning directly from Iraq or Afghanistan). This is where the wonderful
adaptability of our faculty comes into play—relating today’s fight to classroom
discussions and to our curriculum; however, we know here in Newport that our
task is also to provide frameworks to our students based on enduring principles
studied over long years. This has always been one of the primary, practical tasks
here at the Naval War College. I refer you to Admiral William Sims’s pamphlet
that he circulated in 1912 at his own expense to all the officers of the Navy; it can
be found online at www.usnwc.edu/presidentsjournal. We also chartered a “cen-
ter for irregular warfare and armed groups” in November 2008, designed to cap-
ture the lessons of this fight for the future, with particular emphasis on the
maritime domain.
James Fallows quotes the president of Princeton, Shirley Tilghman: “U.S.
higher education has essentially been our innovation engine . . . even with all its
4
challenges at the moment.” That certainly includes the Naval War College, even
knowing that not every student officer will become a flag or general officer or
Chief of Naval Operations, and that not every paper, conference, or operational

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10 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

game will produce “game changing” ideas. As one of my faculty members put it,
investing in the Naval War College is almost like venture capital.
The lesson of the history of the College, at least as best I can decipher it from
my own reading, is that the value is in the persistence of study and insights
gained over time, the capability to sustain them being a function of a robust in-
stitution. The other lesson made clear to me during my first year here is that
frustration in problem solving leads to innovation—naval officers are nothing if
not problem solvers, and this would seem logically to lead to adaptation. A re-
cent report from Britain’s Defence Academy indicates frustration with British
institutions, going as far as to call them “incapable of fighting modern wars . . .
and suggest[ing that] the Western education system was designed for a previous
5
age and [can]not adapt to future challenges.” Worth a look for sure. The re-
search and gaming effort at Newport is only half of the equation. The College
works to help the Navy adapt to the future by providing a first-class, graduate-
level education to future military and civilian leaders, an investment in our abil-
ity to outthink our adversaries in future wars, and to adapt to changing
circumstances. When I was a student here in 1998, my professors helped me un-
derstand the lessons of insurgencies, including El Salvador and the American
Revolution. NWC graduates like Generals Odierno and McChrystal are applying
those lessons in today’s conflicts. Clausewitz said that war is “more than a cha-
6
meleon”; no two wars are the same. However, by providing students with a
framework and the intellectual tools we can equip them to think creatively about
how to deal with the unanticipated curveballs that are hurled their way. Along
with original research, these are the cornerstones of what we’re doing today,
what we’ve done here at the Naval War College for 125 years.

JAMES P. WISECUP
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

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PRESIDENT’S FORUM 11
Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

NOTES

1. Bob Freeman, “Oceanographer of the Navy 4. James Fallows, “How America Can Rise
Speaks at U.N. Climate Change Summit,” Again,” Atlantic Monthly 305, no. 1
NNS091217-09, 17 January 2010, Office of (January/February 2010), p. 46, available at
the Oceanographer of the Navy, www.navy www.theatlantic.com/doc/201001/american
.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=50245. -decline.
2. Navy Office of Information, “USDA, 5. Andre Mackay and Steve Tatham, Behav-
Navy Sign Agreement to Encourage the De- ioural Conflict, from General to Strategic
velopment, Use of Renewable Energy,” Corporal: Complexity, Adaptation and Influ-
NNS100121-05, 21 January 2010, www.navy ence, Shrivenham Paper 9 (Shrivenham,
.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=50710. U.K.: Defence Academy of the United King-
3. Tyler Will, “China Maritime Studies Institute dom, December 2009), available at www.da
Opens Unique Research Library,” 14 January .mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/
2010, Naval War College Public Affairs Of- monographs/091216%20FINAL.pdf/view
fice, www.usnwc.edu/About/News-And ?searchterm=Steve%20Tatham.
-Events/January-2010/China-Maritime 6. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael
-Studies-Institute-Opens-Unique-Rese.aspx. Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), p. 89.

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Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

Vice Admiral Yoji Koda is a graduate of Japan’s Na-

tional Defense Academy, the JMSDF Officer Candidate
School and Naval Staff College, and, in 1992, the U.S.
Naval War College. As a vice admiral he commanded
the Fleet Escort Force (2003–2004), later serving as Di-
rector General of the Joint Staff Office, commandant of
the Sasebo JMSDF District, and as Commander in
Chief, Self-Defense Fleet, from 2007 until his retirement
in 2008. He has written widely on history and security
in both Japanese and English; his most recent English-
language article appeared in the Naval War College
Review (Spring 2005). His “From Alliance to Coali-
tion, Then Where?” will appear in 2010 in Maritime
Strategy and National Security in Japan and Britain:
From the First Alliance to Post 9/11, edited by Alessio
Patalano, to be published in the United Kingdom by
Global Oriental.

Naval War College Review, Spring 2010, Vol. 63, No. 2

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Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

THE EMERGING REPUBLIC OF KOREA NAVY

A Japanese Perspective

Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (Retired)

O n 21 May 1997 the author, then director of the Policy, Plans, and Programs
Division, in the Maritime Staff Office of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense
Force, attended a preparatory meeting for proposed navy-to-navy staff talks for
the exchange of opinions on various maritime and naval subjects with the Re-
public of Korea Navy. My counterpart at this meeting, which was held at a navy
facility in Taejung, in the central region of the Republic of Korea, was the Naval
Policy Director of ROKN* Headquarters.
Navy-to-navy talks symbolize military exchanges between countries. The
JMSDF has had such talks with the U.S. Navy, an allied partner, for a long time
and also with the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy, regarded as a “father” of mod-
ern navies. During the mid-1990s the JMSDF began to have such talks with the
Royal Australian Navy, which has close relations with the navies of many South-
east Asian nations. The JMSDF hopes that the Australian navy can help it bridge
historical gaps in relations—arising from the wariness in these countries caused
by the bitter experience of World War II—between the JMSDF and Southeast
Asian navies. Military-to-military exchanges developed rapidly in those years, as
a part of the new international exchanges that arose in the post–Cold War era, so
the establishment of a close relationship with the ROKN had become a serious
and urgent issue for the JMSDF. For all these reasons, I, as an official responsible
for JMSDF policy in MSO, proposed to meet with my counterpart in the ROKN
as a preliminary measure.
Because our meeting was held before the start of official exchanges, and be-
cause we did not know each other, the atmosphere was awkward at first. However,

* All abbreviations used in this article are expanded in the sidebar on page 16.

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14 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

as time passed, we gradually became friendly, finding that we had much in com-
mon as sailors. A number of exchanges followed fairly quickly, and in the years
since then the relationship between the two navies has deepened. Still, the history
of this official relationship between the JMSDF and the ROKN is very short—only
about ten years—when one considers the geographical proximity between the two
nations; true mutual understanding has yet to mature. Much can still be done to
bring the JMSDF and ROKN closer together.
It is for that reason, and from that perspective, that I, as a former leader of the
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, would like here to examine comprehen-
sively the Republic of Korea Navy. I will discuss the whole service, except for
(though they are officially part of the ROKN) the ground forces of the Republic
of Korea Marine Corps.

WATERBORNE FORCES IN ANCIENT KOREA

The history of maritime armed forces in the Korean Peninsula originates with
those that fought during the unification of the peninsula. The chronicles of the
Three Kingdoms of Korea—Baekje, Goguryeo, and Silla—record the activity of
these waterborne forces. For a typical example, in the latter half of the fourth
century, King Kwanggaeto of Goguryeo attacked and conquered Baekje by effec-
tive use of naval forces.1 His conquest is remembered today in the name of the
first ship of the KDX-I destroyer class—Kwanggaeto Daewang (Kwanggaeto the
2
Great).
When the Mongolian Yuan dynasty, which had conquered China and cen-
tral Eurasia, invaded the Korean Peninsula in the mid-thirteenth century, the
Goguryeo dynasty evacuated its capital to Ganghwado Island, two kilometers
off the coast. The sea forces of Goguryeo protected their island capital from
fierce Yuan attacks for about thirty years. The Yuans, whose Mongolian cavalry
was overwhelming on land, were poor at combat on the water; nonetheless,
this success was a noteworthy event in the history of the waterborne forces of
3
the peninsula.
The next prominent event in Korean naval history was the successful protec-
tion of its coasts from Japanese pirates, known as the “Wa-ko,” whose lawless ac-
tivities became significant in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.
Korean forces protected the population and coastal villages from Wa-ko assault
and later neutralized the pirate base in the islands of the Tsushima Strait, be-
tween Kyushu and the peninsula.4
In the late sixteenth century a Korean hero, Yi Sun-Shin, became an unforgetta-
ble figure in the history of the Korean Peninsula. Hideyoshi Toyotomi, who had
emerged supreme after a century-long reunification war in Japan, twice sent huge
expeditionary forces to the Korean Peninsula, as part of his strategic goal of

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conquering the Ming dynasty of China; however, the Japanese forces were, in gen-
eral, unsuccessful. Yi Sun-Shin interrupted the Japanese supply lines at sea several
times, sometimes causing serious problems. In 1598 Hideyoshi suddenly died,
and the Japanese forces started to withdraw. Taking full advantage of this change
of tide, Yi Sun-Shin, together with Ming naval forces, attacked a retreating Japa-
nese convoy off the coast of the peninsula. He made good use of intelligence, local
topography (marked by islands and narrow straits), tactics (especially surprise at-
tack and separation of the enemy), and equipment (such as “turtle ships,” which
were heavily protected by iron armor casements of a turtleback shape) and finally
defeated the sea forces of Japan. The Korean-Chinese combined force reportedly
sank two hundred out of five hundred Japanese ships, putting an end to a
seven-year-long war on the Korean homeland.5 The tragic loss of Yi Sun-Shin in
the final action made him a true hero—a man who saved the Korean nation at
the cost of his life. Even today, the Koreans respect him as a savior of their coun-
try. To commemorate his achievement, the lead ship of KDX-II destroyer class
was named Yi Sun-Shin.

THE FOUNDING OF THE ROKN: THE IMPACT OF THE

KOREAN WAR
On 11 November 1945, soon after the end of World War II in the Pacific, a mer-
chant mariner, Son Won-Il, established the Maritime Affairs Association, which
later developed into the Korean Coast Guard. With the establishment of the
ROK government on 15 August 1948, the coast guard was renamed the Republic
of Korea Navy, with Son as its first Chief of Naval Operations. Of the four ser-
vices of the ROK Armed Forces, the navy has, accordingly, the longest history.
(In 2007 the first of the ROKN’s cutting-edge Type 214 submarines was named
Son Won-Il, after this father of the South Korean navy.)
The Korean War erupted with a surprise attack and invasion by North Korean
forces in June 1950. The ROKN participated in the fighting that followed, to-
gether with the navies of the United Nations coalition. Maritime operations in
this war were exclusively in favor of the UN forces; the North Korean navy had
only a coastal capability, whereas the UN naval forces, with elements of the U.S.
Navy at their center, had overwhelming power.
At that time, the ROKN was not yet able to wage modern maritime warfare
beyond coastal seas; it was still too immature, the outbreak of the war having
come immediately after its establishment. The personnel strength of the ROKN
was about seven thousand, to the North Korean navy’s estimated fourteen
thousand.
Continued on page 17

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16 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

ABBREVIATIONS
AMS auxiliary minesweeper
AO auxiliary oiler
AOR auxiliary replenishment oiler
APD auxiliary personnel transport destroyer
ARL auxiliary repair light
ARS auxiliary rescue/salvage ship
ASR auxiliary submarine rescue ship
ASROC antisubmarine rocket
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASV antisurface vessel; antisurface vehicle [e.g., Lynx helicopter]
ASW antisubmarine warfare
CVSG aircraft carrier strike group
DD destroyer
DDG guided-missile destroyer
DE destroyer escort
FAC fast attack craft (gun)
FFG guided-missile frigate
FFS fast frigate, small
FRAM Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization
FS frigate, small
FSG guided-missile frigate, small
JML Japanese minelayer
JMSDF Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
KDX-I first generation of destroyers designed and built in South Korea
KDX-II second generation of destroyers designed and built in South Korea
KDX-III Aegis DDG, third generation of destroyers designed and built in
South Korea
KSS Korean midget submarine
LPD landing platform, dock
LSM landing ship, medium
LSMR landing ship medium, rocket
LSSL landing ship support, large
LST landing ship, tank
MCM mine countermeasures
MHC minehunter, coastal
ML minelayer
MSC minesweeper, coastal
MSO Maritime Staff Office [JMDSF]
PC patrol craft (submarine chaser)
PCE patrol craft, escort
PCF patrol craft, fast
PCS patrol craft, sweeper
PF patrol frigate [World War II construction]
PG guided-missile patrol boat
PKM patrol killer boat, medium
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PT patrol torpedo boat
ROK Republic of Korea
ROKN Republic of Korea Navy
SLOC sea line of communication
SMG Strategic Mobile Group
SS conventionally powered [diesel-electric] attack submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine

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Continued from page 15

With regard to large combatant ships, the ROKN had in 1951 only two out-
dated, World War II–vintage patrol frigates capable of operations on “blue wa-
ter”—that is, on the high seas, away from home waters. Beyond these two ships,
there were only about ten coastal minesweepers of U.S. and Japanese build, as
well as ten small patrol craft (see table 1).

TABLE 1
ROKN STRENGTH IN 1951 (MAJOR COMBATANTS)

PF 2 U.S.-built, 1,500 tons

PC 4 U.S.-built, 1,300 tons

AMS 13 U.S.-built, 300 tons, wooden coastal minesweeper

JML 10 Details unknown, minelayers of the Imperial Japanese Navy

LSSL 2 U.S.-built, 230 tons

Japanese-left gunboats (22), former Japanese coastal patrol crafts (8), self-propelled oil barges, tug-
Others
boats, and various service craft

Source: All numerical data in the charts in this article are from the Jane’s Fighting Ships of each year. The type designations (DD, SS, PGM, etc.), which vary in suc-
cessive editions of Jane’s, are the author’s own. See the sidebar for a legend.

In spite of these handicaps, the ROKN took great pride, and found a strong
spiritual foundation, in the fact that though the smallest service in the South Ko-
rean Armed Forces, it had engaged in combat with great courage and effectiveness
6
in the war’s most difficult period, the first years after the state’s establishment.
The highest operational command billet—Commander in Chief, ROK Fleet
—was established in September 1953, soon after the armistice agreement was
7
signed in July.

1960 TO THE EARLY 1980S: LAYING THE “BEDROCK”

Over the next two decades, the ROKN continued to build its fleet as a main pillar
of deterrence against invasion by North Korea, in full compliance with its na-
tional defense commitments under the ROK-U.S. alliance. At that time, because
of the nature of the South–North confrontation, the nation had no other option
than to emphasize building up the army. The core of the ROK fleet comprised
surface ships given by or rented from the U.S. Navy (see table 2).
Around 1960, the ROKN beefed up the numbers of both DEs and PFs and in-
creased its force of patrol boats, such as PCs. Additionally, the navy rapidly rein-
forced its amphibious-warfare ships, including LSTs. The ROKN was trying to
improve its capabilities in coastal defense against small craft from the North,
and in amphibious warfare, which would provide South Korean ground forces
operational flexibility in case of invasion.

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Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

TABLE 2
ROKN STRENGTH 1960–80 (MAJOR COMBATANTS)

1960 1970 1980

Total Personnel 16,600 16,600 20,000

DD 5 U.S.-built, 2,500 tons

DD 2 U.S.-built, 2,200 tons

DD 3 U.S.-built, 2,000 tons 3

DE 2 U.S.-built, 1,500 tons 2

DE 1 U.S.-built, 1,500 tons 1

PF 4 U.S.-built, 1,500 tons 4

PCE 3 U.S.-built, 900 tons 3

PC 4 U.S.-built, 650 tons 8

PC 5 U.S.-built, 300 tons 4

PCS 2 U.S.-built, 250 tons

APD 1 U.S.-built, 1,400 tons 6 (ex-high-speed transport)

PT 3 U.S.-built, 30 tons

8 U.S.-built, 250 tons

PG
4 Korean-built

PG 1 U.S.-built, 250 tons

PKM 6 Korean-built, 80 tons

MSC 3 U.S.-built, 320 tons 6 8

AMS 10 U.S.-built, 300 tons 5

LST 8 U.S.-built, 1,600 tons 8 8

LSMR 1 U.S.-built, 1,000 tons 1 (ex-LSM with rockets)

LSM 12 U.S.-built, 800 tons 11 11

LSSL 5 U.S.-built, 230 tons

ARL 1 U.S.-built, 2,400 tons 1 (ex-LST repair ship)

1 Norwegian-built,
AO 1 1
1,400 tons

Others Patrol crafts, self-propelled oil barges, tugboats, and various service crafts

Source: The official personnel strength of ROKN is not available in open sources like Jane’s. The total number of personnel in the ROKN used in the charts was
calculated by subtracting ROK Marine Corps strength from the sum of the “active duty service members” and “draftees” given in Jane’s.

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In about 1970, the ROKN introduced U.S. Navy Fletcher-class destroyers,

which, though already obsolete, were superior in surface combat capability, with
their five-inch guns, to what the navy had possessed in the past. In addition, the
ROKN steadily introduced new patrol craft. As a result, deterrence was strength-
ened against the North Korean navy, which was estimated to be good at
small-craft operations. In regard to amphibious ships, the ROKN by 1970 still
had the same strength as in 1960; apparently it had achieved its goal at this point
as far as the number of landing ships was concerned.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the ROKN received from the U.S. Navy a
number of Gearing- and Allen M. Sumner–class destroyers that had gone
through the American Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization (FRAM) pro-
8
gram. As a result, the operational capability of the ROK fleet jumped. However,
the ASROC (antisubmarine rocket) system, which was one of the centerpieces of
the FRAM modernization of these still-capable World War II–era destroyers
that were retained in U.S. service, was not installed on the units transferred to
the ROKN.
Perhaps at this time the ROKN preferred to improve its capability in surface
combat rather than that in ASW. If so, a reason might have been that Western na-
vies at that time estimated the threats posed by North Korea to be
• Sea denial against U.S.-led naval forces, by submarine force and mines
• Confusion, spread by special operations forces
• Surprise assault landings, by large numbers of small landing craft and
boats.
However, the most likely reason for a strong emphasis on surface combat instead
of ASW is that the South Korean navy put more focus on the second and third of
these threats than on the first. The ROKN might have based such an assessment
on an internal evaluation based on shared national origin—that is, on unique
insight, unavailable to analysts of other navies—of the operational capability of
the North Korean navy.
In this period the ROKN decommissioned old U.S.-built ships that it had
used since its founding. At the same time, it replaced obsolete patrol boats with
new guided-missile patrol craft and small patrol boats, built by the Tacoma
Shipyard in the United States. In addition, some PGs were built in-country. In
this way the ROKN improved its capability in the area of coastal operations by
small patrol craft.
In contrast, however, the buildup of the mine-warfare and MCM forces, in-
cluding coastal minesweepers, was slow. Apparently, the ROKN was uninter-
ested in building up its MCM force. The South Korean navy was similarly

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uninterested in underway logistics; it purchased only one large oiler, from Nor-
way. The main mission of the navy in this period was still coastal defense, not
blue-water operations.
In these years the Republic of Korea participated in the Vietnam War, with the
ROKN deploying transport ships to the South China Sea. In home waters, on 19
January 1967 a U.S.-built PCE was sunk in the Sea of Japan north of the Military
9
Demarcation Line by North Korean shore batteries. In June 1970, an ROKN
vessel that had been broadcasting propaganda to the North was captured by a
10
North Korean patrol craft.
During the 1970s, the administration of President Pak Chung-Hee devel-
oped and announced an “eight-year national defense plan” intended to build a
11
self-reliant national defense capability. On the basis of this plan, the ROK
started to construct a fleet using its domestic technology and industrial re-
sources. Noteworthy products of this plan were the Ulsan-class frigates, with
displacements of two thousand tons, and the Pohang-class corvettes, of one
thousand tons. The ROKN eventually constructed, respectively, nine and
twenty-four of these types, which have been regarded as the workhorses of the
fleet in coastal operations. Since then, the ROKN has constructed almost all of
its own major combatants, at several shipyards.

LATE 1980S–2000: STABILIZATION, THEN RAPID ADVANCE

In the latter half of the 1980s modernization became conspicuous, with the in-
troduction of new equipment, state-of-the-art technology, and new ships of do-
mestic construction (see table 3).

TABLE 3
ROKN STRENGTH 1980–2000 (MAJOR COMBATANTS)

1980 1990 2000

Total Personnel 20,000 35,000 40,000

1 German-built 8 Korean-built after fourth

SS (209)
2 Korean-assembled boat

6 Korean-built,
KSS 11
midget submarines

KDX-1 (11) 3

DD 5 U.S.-built, 2,500 tons 7 5

DD 2 U.S.-built, 2,200 tons 2

DD 3 U.S.-built, 2,000 tons

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TABLE 3 CONTINUED
ROKN STRENGTH 1980–2000 (MAJOR COMBATANTS)

1980 1990 2000

DE 1 U.S.-built, 1,500 tons

FFG 7 Korean-built, Ulsan 9

FS/FSG 18 Korean-built, Pohang 24

FS 4 Korean-built, Dong-Hae 4

PCE 3 U.S.-built, 900 tons

8 U.S.-built, 250 tons

PG 8 5
4 Korean-built

PG 1 U.S.-built, 250 tons 1

PKM 6 Korean-built, 80 tons 36 Sea Fox

PCF 32 Sea Dolphin 54

PCF 2 Wildcat 47

ML 1 Wonsan

MSC/MHC 1 Yangyang

3 licensed production,
MHC
Swallow

MSC 8 U.S.-built, 320 tons 8 8

LST 8 U.S.-built, 1,600 tons 8 6

LST 4 Alligator

LSMR 1 (ex-LSM with rockets)

LSM 11 U.S.-built, 800 tons 7 3

ARL 1 (ex-LST repair ship)

1 Norwegian-built, 1,400
AO
tons

AOR 3 Chunjee

ASR 1 Chunghaejin

ARS 2 U.S.-built, 1,500 tons 2 U.S.-built, 3,000 tons

Others An oceanographic research ship, a variety of auxiliary ships, and various service craft

The ROKN selected the German-developed Type 209 submarine for its
first-generation submarine (known as the Chang Bogo class). The navy imported
the first boat; the South Korean shipbuilding industry assembled the second and

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22 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

third boats; and the fourth was built in-country, from keel laying to final fitting-
out. By this means, the ROKN, which had started its submarine force from noth-
ing, paved the way to a real undersea-warfare capability—establishing training
procedures for the crews, developing operational concepts, and learning the tech-
nology needed for building diesel-electric submarines.
Additionally, while introducing the new SSs, the ROKN planned to establish a
submarine-rescue posture, indispensable for a submarine-operating navy. To
this end the navy introduced two submarine-rescue ships from the U.S. Navy
and ordered a Korean-built unit, Chunghaejin, along with the other measures
necessary to realize an appropriate and viable submarine-rescue capability.
As for destroyers, the ROKN seems to have set itself a goal of about ten DDs
that were superior in surface combat power to those of the North. In this period
it replaced six of eleven old, U.S.-built destroyers with three KDX-I units (the
Kwanggaeto Daewang class), trading a reduction in the total number of units for
improved capability.
Furthermore, the ROKN replaced its diverse collection of U.S.-built patrol
boats and craft with a force made up of two types, the Ulsan frigates and Pohang
corvettes. This improved not only practical operational capability but also ratio-
nalized education, training, and logistic support. In other words, the Navy made
a successful transition from a posture of many types with a few ships each to the
one with a few types with many ships each.
In general, and though the number of destroyers dropped, the operational ca-
pability of the ROK fleet, focused as it was on coastal defense against the North
Korean navy, apparently reached the level that the ROKN had envisioned. With
respect to ASW, however, it was inadequate, even after the introduction of the
three KDX-I destroyers and the Lynx helicopter. The ASW posture of the ROKN
still remains questionable today, in relation to the perceived threat of North Ko-
rean submarines and the geopolitical nature of the country. Where the ROKN
had once depended heavily on U.S.-built small patrol craft, in the 1980s and
1990s it made rapid progress in producing its own vessels, building a large num-
ber of domestically developed Sea Dolphin–class and Wildcat-class PCFs. A
buildup of the defenses of South Korean territorial waters was continually re-
quired, even “demanded,” of the ROKN by clandestine intrusions of North
Korean boats and small craft, which had continued ever since the war.
We can see in these facts a consistent ROKN policy toward the stark realities
of South–North confrontation and East–West rivalry that faced it—that is, fric-
tion and tension on the peninsula against the background, in the first part of the
period, of the Cold War and then of the unstable post–Cold War international
order that followed. Judging from statistics, the ROKN needed about a hundred
PCFs, including small PKMs (the Sea Fox class), to take proper measures against

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clandestine intrusion attempts from the sea and suspicious boat movements off
both coasts of the peninsula. In June 1999, for instance, a conflict occurred be-
tween small craft of the South and North near the Northern Limit Line off the
west coast of the peninsula. In June 2002 another engagement, including an ex-
change of fire, occurred in the same waters; the ROKN lost a patrol craft,
PKM-357.
A heavy burden was thus imposed on the ROKN by the nation. In contrast,
the JMSDF is relatively free of this burden, partly because larger distances reduce
the small-boat threat, and partly thanks to Japan’s coast guard. This difference
underlies clear contrasts that can be seen in the force-planning assumptions of
12
these two neighboring navies.
In the area of amphibious warfare, the South Korean navy decommissioned in
these years a large number of U.S.-built LSTs and LSMs. It filled the gap with four
domestically built, higher-performance LSTs of the Alligator class. As for MCM
ships, the navy introduced a minelayer, Wonsan, and several Yangyang-class
MSCs/MHCs, together with Swallow-class MHCs. Finally, the ROKN saw some im-
provement in its MCM operational capabilities; however, progress was still slow. At
the end of this period, three Korean-built, Chunjee-class AORs, which could steam
with surface forces at high speed, were introduced to the fleet. This improved sub-
stantially the fleet’s capability to support operations on the high seas.
In the last two decades of the century, specifically in the late 1990s, modern-
ization in the ROK fleet, both in quality and quantity, was conspicuous. This
trend was supported by a noteworthy change-of-command speech of the twen-
tieth Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ahn Byung-Tae, who made it clear that
13
the ROKN would aim to become a blue-water navy.

THE PRESENT: REALIZING THE GOAL OF A BLUE-WATER NAVY

The ambitious force buildups of the 1990s seem to have given the Republic of
Korea Navy sufficient operational defenses in coastal and regional waters against
the periodic, unpredictable attempts of the North Korean navy. Meanwhile, the
South Korean state and people have developed strong national interests beyond
the northwest Pacific region, especially in extensive trade with foreign nations
and in the sea lines of communications over which that trade is carried. The
South Korean navy has, accordingly, established a basis for a distant-operations
capability of which it had long dreamed; it is safe to say that quest continues to-
day. The progress of the ROKN toward a blue-water fleet merits the attention of
other navies in the region, even the rest of the world (see table 4).
As for submarines, the ROKN has started to construct the Son Won-Il class,
the new German-developed Type 214, with air-independent propulsion. The
U.S.-built DDs have now disappeared from the fleet, and the ROKN has started

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24 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

TABLE 4
ROKN STRENGTH 2000–2008 (MAJOR COMBATANTS)

2000 2008

Total personnel 40,000 41,000

SS (209) 8 (Korean-built after fourth boat) 9

SS (214) 1

KSS 11 Korean-built, midget submarines 11

KDX-I 3 3

KDX-II 4

KDX-III 1

DD 5 U.S.-built, 2,500 tons

FFG 9 Korean-built, Ulsan 9

FS/FSG 24 Korean-built, Pohang 24

FS 4 Korean-built, Dong-Hae 4

PG 5 U.S.-built, 250 tons + 4 Korean-built

FAC 54 Korean-built, Sea Dolphin 83 (total number of FACs)

FAC 47 Korean-built, Wildcat

ML 1 Korean-built, Wonsan 1

MSC/MHC 1 Korean-built, Yangyang 3

MHC 6 licensed production, Swallow 6

MSC 8 U.S.-built, 320 tons

LPD 1 Korean-built, Dokdo

LST 6 U.S.-built, 1,600 tons 2

LST 4 Korean-built, Alligator 4

LSM 3 U.S.-built, 800 tons

AOR 3 Korean-built, Chunjee 3

ASR 1 Korean-built, Chunghaejin 1

ARS 2 U.S.-built, 3,000 tons 2

Others Patrol boats, oceanographic research ship, and various service craft

six KDX-IIs (the Chungmugong Yi Sun-Shin class) and three KDX-IIIs (Sejong
Daewang class), almost in parallel. The KDX-III is equipped with the latest Aegis
combat system. By the time this program is completed, the ROK fleet’s destroyer

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force will reach the level of the leading navies of the world. With respect to small,
fast patrol boats, the ROKN has kept its strength at around eighty units, a num-
ber achieved by 2000. These boats have remained in frontline service, with the
main mission of the coastal defense, together with the larger Ulsan and Pohang
ships. However, it is about time for the ROKN to start planning for their replace-
ments; these large and small patrol units will soon be reaching the ends of their
service lives.
For amphibious warfare, the South Korean navy has one LPD, Dokdo, and
four Alligator-class LSTs. Only two of the old U.S.-built LSTs remain today. The
ROKN has also introduced high-speed air-cushion landing craft, which are ex-
pected to improve the capability of the amphibious force in terms of quality;
meanwhile, the service seems to be reviewing the strategic concept of its am-
phibious force and accordingly the number of landing ships it requires.
Underlying all this activity may be an ROKN strategic estimate that South
Korea has substantially surpassed North Korea—thanks to the country’s over-
whelming economic growth in recent years—and that the capability and possi-
bility of all-out, full-scale invasion into the South by the North are extremely
low. The navy apparently also thinks that the ROK military, together with U.S.
forces, could surely interdict and repel such an invasion, except in a nuclear sce-
nario. The buildup of the amphibious force in quality at the expense of quantity
may reflect such an estimate.
Also, one aspect of the amphibious program can be seen as a fresh approach
to the international situation. The ROKN is now fully aware of the new mis-
sions of international contribution and cooperation, such as peacekeeping
and humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief operations. The South Korean
navy learned a vital lesson from bitter experience when it found itself unable to
participate sufficiently in the multinational relief operations on northern Su-
matra, in Indonesia, after the earthquake and tsunami in December 2004.
Memories of this episode may well be reflected in multirole amphibious ships
projected for the future.
In the area of mine warfare, the ROKN has decommissioned all eight of its
outdated U.S.-built MSCs. Its new mine-countermeasures force is composed
of three Yangyang-class MSCs/MHCs and six Swallow-class MHCs, all of do-
mestic construction but carrying new, foreign-developed MCM equipment.
The South Korean navy has apparently improved the quality of its MCM force,
but its quantity seems not yet sufficient for the current security and military
situation around the peninsula. In the realm of underway replenishment,
which is indispensable if the ROKN is to become a real blue-water navy, the
ROK fleet has its three domestically built Chunjee-class AORs. These three re-
plenishment oilers seem to meet the operational requirement today.

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26 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

With respect to the naval aviation, the ROKN has replaced its old S-2 mari-
time surveillance and patrol aircraft with new P-3Cs. Thanks to these new air-
craft, the ocean-surveillance capability of the ROK fleet has substantially
improved; however, only eight P-3Cs are now in the inventory. Otherwise, the
navy is introducing new multimission Lynx helicopters, useful for antisurface
and antisubmarine warfare. The strength of the Lynx helicopter force, which
numbers twenty-five today, seems enough for shipboard operations on board
the new KDXs and for land operations (see table 5).

TABLE 5
NAVAL AVIATION 1990–2008

1990 2000 2008

P-3C maritime surveillance and patrol 8 8

S-2A/F maritime surveillance and patrol 8 8

Lynx helicopter (ASV) 12 17 12

Lynx helicopter (ASW) 13 13

F-406 (fixed-wing small-size at-sea surveil-

5
lance aircraft)

With regard to the growing trend toward a navy capable of operations in dis-
tant waters, two important new initiatives were taken by the present Lee
Myung-Bak administration in 2009. In March, the government authorized
ROKN participation in international antipiracy operations in Gulf of Aden; in
May, South Korea became the ninety-fifth nation to join the Proliferation Secu-
rity Initiative. These decisions clearly show the government’s intention to make
the Republic of Korea a nation of greater international responsibility and influ-
ence. They also show its determination to use its capable navy as a tool to realize
national objectives. The ROKN today seems to have sufficient capability to sup-
port and respond fully to the growing expectations and requirements of its
nation’s government and people.

TO THE FUTURE
The Republic of Korea Navy’s recent emphasis on the construction of a blue-
water navy is understandable if its perception of the threat has in fact changed
from that of previous years. As implied above, the military capability of North
Korea to fight a conventional, full-scale war against the South seems to be de-
clining. However, the North is still capable of small but determined intimidat-
ing or trap-setting operations along the coast of the peninsula.

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Missions/Resource Allocation: Coastal Defense and Blue-Water Operations

The South–North confrontation still continues, against the background of an
unchanging geopolitical and strategic environment defined by the close prox-
imity of such powerful nations as China, Russia, and Japan. Accordingly, the
ROKN has made coastal defense its main mission since its foundation, and it
may have to do so for the foreseeable future.
The question, then, becomes: How can the South Korean navy improve its
blue-water capability—which is its strongly held goal, perceived as the mark of a
mature navy—and at the same time protect the nation’s coasts? The tempo of
distant operations will surely continue to grow in the future, but an appropriate
balance will have to be maintained—not an easy job for the strategic thinkers
and force planners of the ROKN. Beyond that, every country has only finite re-
sources, especially in terms of budget. The course the Republic of Korea Navy
chooses to take through these obstacles and challenges will be of much interest
to regional navies.
Antisubmarine Warfare
Three factors (strategic, tactical, and geopolitical) bearing upon South Korean
ASW must be taken into consideration, and they lead clearly to an overall con-
clusion, or implication.
First, the ROKN’s present ASW assets—twelve destroyers, of three types; two
dozen Lynx helicopters, and eight P-3Cs—are not sufficient. Second, the re-
gion’s unique geography and oceanography make for a highly complex and diffi-
cult ASW environment, one requiring special consideration and measures. The
Korean Peninsula is, by definition, surrounded with water on three sides. The
mountainous east coast faces the deep and steeply shelving Sea of Japan. To the
south a complicated coastline, with scattered small islands and two large ones
farther out to sea (Tsushima and Cheju), faces the east and west channels of the
Tsushima Strait, which in turn connects the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea.
The west coast is also complicated, but its topography is relatively flat; it abuts
the northern part of the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea, which is shallow for
long stretches and where a great tide differential exists. Third, the navies of all
the neighboring nations—Russia, China, Taiwan, and Japan—as well as that of
the United States, an allied partner of South Korea, operate submarines in these
waters.
The conclusion is that the ASW capability of the ROKN plainly requires im-
provement in both quality and quantity.
Quite aside from the threat posed by North Korean submarines (most of
which are obsolete), the need to collect subsurface information on surrounding
waters and on deployed submarines of other navies makes ASW capability for

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28 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

the ROK fleet a precondition of status as a navy capable of distant operations.

The ROK-U.S. alliance, with the intelligence exchange it brings, could be of
some help in this context, and certainly the possibility is very small that South
Korea will go to war with any of these nations; nevertheless, the navy must estab-
lish its own comprehensive ASW capability, built around adequate ocean
surveillance capabilities.
Additionally, of course, credible tactical ASW capability—search, detection,
tracking, identification, and attack, as well as postattack analysis—has real sig-
nificance to the ROK fleet today. In fact, a sufficient ASW capability, supported
by underwater surveillance, is a must, a prerequisite for combined operations
under the ROK-U.S. alliance with the American carrier strike groups that would
be deployed in a contingency on the Korean Peninsula or in the northwest Pa-
cific. Also, should a crisis occur involving Japan, a CVSG responding under the
Japanese-U.S. alliance would operate in the same waters as it would in a Korean
crisis per se; the ROKN could not be indifferent to that. In any case, and in any
grave contingency, the protection of an American CVSG operating around the
peninsula or in the northwest Pacific from all kinds of threats, in particular sub-
marines, would become the most important mission of the ROK fleet. In this re-
spect especially, antisubmarine warfare, especially underwater surveillance and
a strong tactical capability, has great significance for the South Korean navy.
Submarines
Today, the ROKN has a robust submarine force composed of nine Type 209 and
several (eventually nine) Type 214 boats. However, the navy’s strategic objec-
tives and operational concepts for its capable submarine force are not clear, at
least from the viewpoint of some foreign experts. In other words, they would
ask: How and against whom would the ROKN use its capable submarines? A tac-
tical question also remains unanswered: “Would the main task of its submarines
be antisubmarine or antisurface warfare?”
If the answer is ASW, the current composition of the ROK fleet seems rather
unbalanced. The strength of the submarine force is disproportionately high in
comparison to that of other antisubmarine assets, such as destroyers, maritime
patrol air, and helicopters. The buildup of the submarine force has been too
quick; too many submarines now exist but too few platforms of other kinds.
But maybe the answer is ASUW, and that would be understandable, given that
the most important historical mission of ROKN has been defense of coastal wa-
ters against covert operations by small surface craft from North Korea. However,
the submarine seems generally unsuitable for this type of ASUW. In light of the
importance of ASW capability, the ROKN may have been building its forces in a
way incompatible with its historical position and security needs. That is, if it

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takes seriously the country’s peninsular geopolitical character and what cooper-
ation as a fully reliable partner in the ROK-U.S. alliance requires, it may now
have to strengthen and improve its ASW capability in general, and in particular,
to achieve the best possible underwater situational awareness.
This view is contradicted by a theory now current in China, where submarine
development is a subject of debate. One school of thought in the PLA Navy takes
the operations of British SSNs during the Falklands War, in 1982, as an model
for sea control in distant waters. In this view, the point is the high speed and long
endurance of the Royal Navy’s SSNs, which made it possible for the United King-
dom, a nonglobal power lacking a large network of overseas naval bases, to gain
sea control in a remote and distant operational area—the waters around the
Falklands.14 The attractiveness of this theory to navies like that of China is un-
derstandable, but the Chinese rationale raises a further point, a strategic
one—the antisurface (that is, tactical) capability of submarines. In the Falklands
War a British nuclear-powered submarine, HMS Conqueror, attacked and sank a
World War II–vintage Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano. The Argentine navy’s
surface operations ceased totally, and eventually Argentine maritime operations
of all kinds against British forces were substantially contained. With this single
submarine operation, the Royal Navy had gained sea control around the
Falklands. In other words, a tactical action by an SSN—a torpedo attack against
a surface ship—gained an unexpected strategic advantage, by establishing
regional, but total, sea control.
Many navies—notably the Imperial Japanese Navy, the U.S. Navy, and the
Royal Navy itself—have made every effort, over the entire course of other wars, to
achieve such a capability, regardless of casualties or damage to themselves, and yet
have failed. Gaining such a strategic advantage is the very raison d’être of an
armed force, the goal of its nation and people in wartime, the pride of its service-
men and women. Nonetheless, many navies have looked for a key to the true sig-
nificance of submarines in the single success of HMS Conqueror in the Falklands.
If the ROKN planners dare instead to seek the strategic significance of conven-
tional submarines in the sea surrounding the Korean Peninsula, taking full ac-
count of the limitations of diesel-electric-driven boats, they will have established a
good basis for future naval operations and strategy. There are indications suggest-
ing that some answers may become clearer in the near future.
Wide-Area Ocean Surveillance
The ROKN has been continuously modernizing its fleet, but its wide-area
ocean-surveillance capability—which is indispensable to both coastal defense
and blue-water operations—does not look sufficient at present. If the navy is to
achieve these two main missions, it will be necessary to collect and plot precise

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30 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

surface and subsurface information and intelligence. It is fundamentally impor-

tant that the ROKN be able to collect information on the three maritime envi-
ronments, with strikingly different characteristics, that surround it. The ROKN
has built robust and capable submarine and destroyer forces, which constitute
between them the core of the practical combat power of the fleet—in figurative
language, its “spear.” However, the navy has yet to improve the wide-area ocean
surveillance that it must develop in order to point and thrust this spear. It has al-
ready been announced that the ROKN plans to double the number of its P-3Cs,
to sixteen, in the near future. However, two questions remain: What is the plan
for a wide-area ocean-surveillance capability that meets the real operational and
strategic requirements of the Korean nation and its navy? And what is the target
date for its completion?
MCM Capability
Some people might consider the mine-warfare resources of the ROKN modest.
But in a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, mine warfare, especially mine
countermeasures, would be pivotal for the coastal defense of both the east and
west coasts of the country. In addition, it would be crucial to secure SLOCs in
the Tsushima Strait, which connect the southern part of the ROK with Kyushu,
the closest of the four main islands of Japan to the Korean Peninsula, where
most logistic supplies for military operations on the peninsula would be col-
lected, stored, and transshipped. So, safe navigation of the Tsushima Strait is
indispensable to the ability of both ROK and American forces to fight and sus-
tain themselves, and to the U.S. alliances with both South Korea and Japan. The
ROK fleet should be prepared to clear all possible mine threats in at least the
strait’s western channel; perhaps the JMSDF would clear the eastern channel.
In reality however, there is no agreement between the governments of Japan
and the ROK to conduct combined military operations in case of any contin-
gency in either of the two nations. It is true that the lack of a combined opera-
tional plan among the Japanese and ROK militaries has been one of most
serious problems for regional security, especially in a contingency on the Ko-
rean Peninsula. Of course, it is not a purely military matter; a political decision
by the two governments is needed to resolve this problem. However, apart
from political issues between two governments, the Tsushima Strait will be-
come a SLOC of strategic importance in case of a real-world contingency on
the peninsula. In that case, under the sound bilateral policies that are expected
to be established shortly, it is natural to presume that the JMSDF would take
responsibility in the strait’s eastern channel—that is, the Japanese side, be-
tween the islands Tsushima and Kyushu. Similarly, the ROKN would take the
western channel—the Korean side, between Tsushima and the peninsula—as

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its area of responsibility. In this light, the present strength of the South Korean
15
MCM force seems questionable.
A new question therefore arises: How will the navy achieve a balance between
its “spear” (its destroyers and submarines) and its MCM force? The answer to
this question is not apparent now, but construction in the MCM force in the
near future may show the strategic direction of the ROKN in this regard.
The Strategic Mobile Fleet/Strategic Mobile Group
In 2001, the administration of then-president Kim Dae-Jung announced a plan
for building a “Strategic Mobile Fleet” in order to achieve “the protection of the
national interests in the five oceans in the world and the contribution to the
16
world peace.” Later the plan was downscaled from a “fleet” to a “group,” of flo-
tilla size. The first SMG is scheduled to be completed by 2010; according to the
plan, it will be composed of the LPD Dokdo, some KDX-IIIs (Aegis DDGs), and
17
six KDX-IIs.
Additionally, a new naval base for this group is under construction on
Cheju Island off the southern coast. The navy has announced that the mission
of the SMG will be to gain sea control in the waters surrounding the Korean
18
Peninsula. The combination of amphibious assault ships, destroyers, and
guided-missile destroyers—a mix of “L-ships” and “D-ships”—with their dif-
ferent operational requirements and characteristics, seems a little irregular for
a group intended to establish sea control. In fact, the declared employment
concept for this SMG—which resembles a small U.S. amphibious ready group
with escorting destroyers—is a bit ambiguous. The question may naturally
arise: What is the real objective of SMG? Is it amphibious warfare (that is,
power projection) or sea control, or both?
This argument aside, however, the noteworthy point is that this SMG will be
the first major tactical unit in the ROK fleet to focus on operations far from
home waters. The final number of SMGs to be organized is a point worth
watching.

TWO POWERS DESTINED TO COOPERATE

The ROKN grew steadily at first, then rapidly in recent years, overcoming vari-
ous difficulties and limitations. The navy has set as its first mission the protec-
tion of coastal areas, in light of the more than half-century of confrontation
between South and North on the peninsula and also of its geopolitical relation-
ships with the capable navies of nearby nations. The ROKN has endeavored to
build up this capability, aware of its heavy responsibility to its country and the
South Korean people.

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32 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

Simultaneously, as the economic development has deepened the country’s in-

terdependence with foreign nations, the ROKN, like the nation itself, became
acutely aware of the necessity to secure its national interests abroad. The impor-
tance to those interests of the security of the nation’s SLOCs was fully recognized
as well. Around the year 2000 the ROKN started to turn itself into a navy capable
of operations far from home waters. Since then, the navy has aimed to meet the
needs of both missions, coastal and distant, in its force planning, and as a result
the ROKN has become one of the most notable navies in the region today. There
seem to be many areas that could be improved and shortcomings to be resolved
in the ROKN; no navy in the world is free from such problems.
Nonetheless—and fully recognizing the challenges and issues that exist—there
are many areas in which the capable Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the
emerging Republic of Korea Navy can cooperate in the future. With regard to the
strategic viewpoints of the two navies, the most important factor for both the
JMSDF and ROKN to understand is that a contingency on the Korean Peninsula
could affect Japan and that a contingency in Japan could affect South Korea. The
United States, having independent alliances with each country, will respond to any
contingency involving either state. In such a case, it will expect the JMSDF and
ROKN to cooperate and coordinate between themselves, fully respecting the pres-
ent situation, current capabilities, and existing limitations and constraints of both
navies. Conversely, inadequate cooperation will not only help the adversary in a
specific contingency but also serve a third party in the region. In the worst case it
would greatly damage the national interests of both nations, as well as those of the
United States.
Without question, the more the ROKN develops as a blue-water navy, the
more conscious it will become of the Japanese archipelago, ranging from the
southernmost Yonaguni Island, immediately east of Taiwan, to Hokkaido and
the northern territorial islands of Japan. If so, the geography and geopolitics of
the region would make it natural for the South Korean navy to strengthen its re-
lationship with the JMSDF. The converse is true for the JMSDF as well. The two
nations, both formidable, regional maritime powers, are destined to cooperate,
in the interest of their common values.
I have undertaken the analysis and evaluation of the development of the Re-
public of Korea Navy as a maritime defense expert and ex-JMSDF leader who
was involved in the start of official exchanges between the two services. I have
not hesitated to refer to the past, because the ancient history of the Korean Pen-
insula and the foundational era after World War II form collectively a strong ba-
sis for pride in the mind of South Korea’s sailors, judging by my own experience
with them. If we are to have a correct view of the ROKN, we must take into
proper account not only visible equipment of the navy but the “invisible minds”

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KODA 33
Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

of its sailors. For that reason, the promotion of mutual understanding should be
actively pursued by sailors of both the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and
the Republic of Korea Navy, from the lowest to the highest levels. The mutual
understanding they achieve will be the key to the lasting security of the region.

NOTES

This article represents the personal opinion still in the fleet inventory in large number in
of the author and not any official position of the 1950s and ’60s. The program was also
the JMSDF or the government of Japan. The intended to upgrade the ASW capability of
author expresses special appreciation to Mr. many Gearing- and Sumner-class destroyers
John Niemeyer, a special adviser to the Com- in order to cope with the rapidly growing
mander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan (CNFJ), Soviet submarine threat. Major new ASW
and Ms. Amiko Imaizumi, a civil-affairs liai- systems installed on these DDs were the
son and language specialist in the CNFJ Japan SQS-23 sonar, ASROC (antisubmarine
Liaison Office, for substantial contributions rocket), DASH (the drone antisubmarine
to the development of the English text of this helicopter), and Mk-44 torpedo. It also re-
article. Japanese names are given in Western placed the electronic equipment of these
fashion, surname last; Korean names are ships with new radars and electronic warfare
given with surnames first. systems and thoroughly overhauled their
1. Kim Yan-gi, Monogatari-Kankoku-shi [Ko- propulsion plants.
rean History] (Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, 9. ROKN website.
1989), pp. 123–24, 156. 10. Ibid.
2. “KDX” means “next-generation destroyer, 11. Ibid.
designed and built in South Korea.” The
KDX-1 class is the first generation of this 12. For example, the force strength of the JMSDF
group. since 2000 has been about fifty DDs, sixteen
SSs, twenty-five MCM ships, eighty P-3Cs,
3. Kim, Korean History, pp. 241–45. and eighty SH-60s. Of fast small craft for
4. Ibid., pp. 247–48. coastal operation, there are only six PGs. The
5. Ibid., pp. 266–73. JMSDF, which traditionally has laid relatively
light stress on coastal defense, has been allo-
6. At the third session of navy-to-navy talks, cating most of its national resources instead
held at MSO in January 2002, I (by then a to blue-water forces, especially ASW forces,
rear admiral and director of Operations and which the JMSDF thinks indispensable for its
Plans Department of MSO) was impressed by SLOC defense and cooperation with U.S. car-
the high morale and strong pride exhibited rier strike groups. In contrast, the strength of
by the ROKN representatives. They told me the ROKN in the early 2010s seems likely to
of this episode, which suggested the spiritual remain at about twelve DDs, eighteen SSs,
superiority of South Korean sailors in com- ten MCM ships, between eight and sixteen
parison to the members of the nation’s other P-3Cs, twenty-five Lynx helicopters, and
services. eighty to a hundred fast small craft of various
7. Republic of Korea Navy (English-language), types. This difference clearly points to the ex-
www.navy.mil.kr/english/main/main.jsp tremely heavy responsibility of the ROKN for
[hereafter ROKN website]. its nation’s coastal defense.
8. Gyrodyne Helicopter Historical Foundation, 13. In the fall of 1994, before the start of official
www.gyrodynehelicopters.com. The U.S. exchanges like the navy-to-navy talks, the au-
FRAM program was meant to extend, by thor (then a captain, deputy of the Plans and
five to eight years, the service lives of its Policy Division of MSO) escorted then–vice
World War II–era destroyers, which were admiral Ahn on a tour of the JMSDF’s Kure

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34 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

District and the Etajima education and train- developing the idea of staff talks between the
ing complex. Vice Admiral Ahn, the com- JMSDF and ROKN, which began three years
mander in chief of the ROK fleet, was visiting later.
unofficially, but I was a bit tense and ner- 14. Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein,
vous—it was a rare visit by a South Korean “China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force:
VIP, and I had to escort him alone. I was sur- Insights from Chinese Writings,” Naval War
prised to learn that Vice Admiral Ahn was College Review 60, no. 1 (Winter 2007), pp.
quite familiar with the Imperial Navy and the 55–79.
JMSDF. Also, during the three-day trip his
frank and honest personality gradually re- 15. The practical strengths of the MCM forces of
moved my tension. Shown around the head- the two navies are in strong contrast. The
quarters and base facilities, including those of JMSDF has two MLs/tenders, three ocean
submarines, the Kure District, and Etajima minehunters and minesweepers with deep-
(where the historic brick building of the Im- water MCM capability, and twenty-one
perial Naval Academy still stood), the admi- coastal minehunters and minesweepers, as
ral was impressed by the legacy, both physical well as a squadron of MCM helicopters. For
and intellectual, of the Imperial Navy to the its part, the ROKN has one ML, three MSCs
JMSDF. During the return “bullet train” trip, and MHCs, and six MHCs. This difference
he quietly but emphatically told me of his de- may generate serious strategic problems in
termination that the ROKN would build a securing the two channels of the Tsushima
submarine force and become a blue-water Strait in case of a peninsular contingency.
navy in the future, and of the necessity that it 16. Global Security, www.globalsecurity.org/
do so. By chance, this was just prior to his military/world/rok/navy.htm.
change-of-command speech. This encounter
17. ROKN website.
is one of the reasons why I, as a captain re-
sponsible for JMSDF policy, started 18. Ibid.

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Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

ARCTIC SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AND THE U.S.

NAVY’S ROADMAP FOR THE ARCTIC

Rear Admiral David W. Titley, U.S. Navy, and Courtney C. St. John

A rctic sea-ice melting associated with global climate change has caused leaders
from the United States and the international community to reconsider the
national security implications of the region. Taking into account nearly a century
of experience in the Arctic, new national policy, existing strategy, and geopolitical
implications of the changing environment, the U.S. Navy has developed an Arctic
Roadmap that will guide policy, investment, and action regarding the region.
With key themes of improved environmental understanding, informed invest-
ments, increased experience, cooperative partnerships, and support for the UN
Rear Admiral Titley is Oceanographer of the Navy and Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Arctic Roadmap
Director, Task Force Climate Change. Commissioned is meant to ensure Navy readiness and capability and
as a surface warfare officer, he transferred in 1984 to the
Oceanography community. In afloat assignments as an result in recognition of the Navy as a valued partner by
oceanographer he has deployed seven times; ashore, he the joint, interagency, and international communities.
has commanded the Fleet Numerical Meteorological
and Oceanographic Center, Monterey, California, and
the Naval Oceanography Operations Command; his
THE CHANGING ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT
first tour as a flag officer was as Commander, Naval The Arctic has long been a dynamic and harsh envi-
Meteorology and Oceanography Command. Rear Ad- ronment where maritime operations of any kind have
miral Titley holds a PhD in meteorology from the U.S.
Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey. been hazardous, if not impossible. Yet traditional
Ms. St. John is a John A. Knauss Marine Policy Fellow views of the Arctic as a nonnavigable region are begin-
in the Office of the Oceanographer of the Navy, con- ning to shift. Relative to the 1970s, the Earth’s temper-
ducting interagency and international outreach on be-
ature has increased sufficiently to cause significant
half of Task Force Climate Change. She holds a master’s
in city and regional planning from Clemson University melting of glaciers and diminishment in Arctic sea ice.
and is a coauthor of articles on shoreline management The prevailing and well established scientific view at-
and Chesapeake Bay.
tributes this temperature change to anthropogenic
Naval War College Review, Spring 2010, Vol. 63, No. 2 emissions of “greenhouse” gases.1

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36 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

The “greenhouse effect” is the well-known process that keeps the Earth’s tem-
perature above the -18°C temperature it would have if greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere did not absorb the sun’s heat and reradiate it back to the surface.
However, the anthropogenic loading of additional greenhouse gases into the at-
mosphere since the Industrial Revolution has been massive, accelerating the
2
natural climate change processes. Since the 1880s, temperatures have risen
3
0.8°C—a significant increase in a relatively short period. Greenhouse gases trap
more heat in the atmosphere, thereby increasing the average global temperature
4
of the surface and atmosphere. The Arctic is especially vulnerable to global
warming, because as snow and ice melt, darker land and ocean surfaces absorb
more solar energy. As warming reduces the extent of sea ice, the solar heat ab-
sorbed by the oceans in the summer is more easily transferred to the atmosphere
5
in the winter, which makes the air temperature warmer.
As a result, the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the globe. Specifi-
cally, scientists are observing retreating sea ice, melting glaciers, and shrinking
6
snow and permafrost areas. The summer ice cap is estimated to be only half the
7
size it was fifty years ago. Sea-ice extent in the Arctic has decreased steadily since
the 1950s and in September 2007 reached a record low that was 39 percent below
the 1979–2000 mean. September 2008 experienced the second-lowest Arctic ice
extent on record, at 34 percent below the 1970–2000 mean. In September 2009,
when the Arctic reached its minimum ice extent for the year, it was recorded at
the third-lowest extent since 1979 satellite measurements began, further dem-
onstrating the declining trend in summer sea ice over the past thirty years (see
8
the figure).
Although estimates for when the Arctic will experience ice-free conditions in
the summer range from 2013 to 2060, the consensus of most models and re-
searchers is that the Arctic will experience ice-free conditions for a portion of
9
the summer by 2030. It is important to point out that no research or model sim-
ulations indicate that winter sea-ice cover of the Arctic Ocean will disappear
during this century. This reinforces the point that the Arctic will still be a very
challenging environment in which to operate.
Regardless of the exact year that the Arctic becomes ice free in the summer,
the widespread warming trend will continue. Multiyear sea ice has also declined
rapidly in the central Arctic Ocean; one study based on satellite data for winters
during 1978–98 showed that multiyear sea ice declined at a rate of 7 percent per
10
decade. A second study examined twenty-five years of summer ice minima
(from 1978 to 2003) and demonstrated a decline of multiyear sea ice as high as
11
9.2 percent per decade. The multiyear ice is being replaced by first-year sea ice
that is considerably weaker and thinner. Because ice cover naturally cools air and

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TITLEY & ST. JOHN 37

Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

DAILY ARCTIC SEA ICE EXTENT AS OF 9 JANUARY 2010

Source: National Snow and Ice Data Center

Note: Area of ocean with at least 15 percent sea ice.

water masses and plays a significant role in ocean circulation and the reflection
of solar radiation back into space, weaker and thinner sea ice has the potential to
12
change the global climate system significantly. The well observed decline in
multiyear and summer sea ice is a clear indicator that some of the most rapid cli-
13
mate change on Earth is occurring in the Arctic.
The effects of climate change in the Arctic are observed in the sea, in the air, and
on land. Indigenous Arctic people are facing relocation and loss of communities
as sea-ice melt causes increased shoreline erosion and melting of permafrost. Im-
pacts on Arctic species include the well publicized decline of the polar bear popu-
lation and a decline in the algae that attach to the bottom of the ice. The algae form
14
the base of the food chain linking microscopic animals and fish to other animals.
In other cases, flora and fauna are experiencing extended growing seasons, and the
Arctic is playing host to new species migrating northward with shifting climate
patterns; changes in fish migrations coupled with intensified sea-ice melt will
yield greater access to fish stocks. These trends clearly demonstrate the need to un-
15
derstand the complex processes occurring in the Arctic.
However, changes in sea ice, sea-level rise, and ocean acidity and their im-
pacts on ecosystems are not well modeled. Most numerical modeling to date has

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38 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

focused on global change predictions, which have greater confidence than re-
gional change predictions, where weather patterns and ecosystem impacts vary
16
considerably. Present climate projections based on the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change Assessment Report (2007) show substantial uncer-
tainty in regional and decadal scales, especially with respect to ice-sheet dynam-
ics and sea-level rise. Data-gathering methods used for climate data are typically
designed for other purposes (like agricultural services, weather prediction, or
water-resources management) and therefore do not accurately reflect the intri-
17
cacies needed to detect gradual climate trends. Because the Arctic is such a hos-
tile environment, in situ observations are challenging, if not impossible, in
many locations. If it is to understand near- and long-term trends better, the in-
ternational Arctic science community will need to deploy its resources in the
most effective manner.
Natural Resources
One future change in the Arctic region is greater accessibility to, and availabil-
ity of, natural resources, including offshore oil and gas, minerals, and fisheries.
The Arctic contains 10 percent of the world’s known petroleum reserves and
approximately 25 percent of its undiscovered reserves.18 The U.S. exclusive
economic zone has a potential thirty billion barrels of oil reserves and 221 bil-
19
lion cubic feet in natural gas reserves. Minerals available for extraction in the
Arctic include manganese, copper, cobalt, zinc, and gold. Coupled with a rise
in global demand for natural oil and gas resources and improved accessibility,
the Arctic has become a new focus for oil companies looking for untapped re-
sources. Already $2.6 billion has been spent on active oil and gas leases in the
20
Chukchi Sea. Yet the extraction of these minerals and petroleum reserves de-
pends heavily upon development and deployment of resilient technology that
can function in such harsh conditions, marked by lack of infrastructure and
long distances to markets.
The warming experienced recently in the Arctic region may improve the
availability of certain resources, but it will redistribute others. In the United
States alone, redistribution of fish stocks will cause changes for indigenous Alas-
kans who depend upon the stocks for subsistence. In August 2009 the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) released a fishery manage-
ment plan for the Arctic waters of the United States, including the Chukchi and
Beaufort seas, which prohibits commercial fishing in the region until enough in-
21
formation is available to manage the fishery sustainably. Fisheries managers
require an understanding of how to maintain sustainable fisheries while taking
into account likely intensification in commercial fishing operations. Resource

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TITLEY & ST. JOHN 39

Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

planners and policy makers will need to examine closely the best ways to manage
newly opened areas of the Arctic, balancing multiple and competing uses.
Transportation Access and Operational Challenges
As for natural-resource availability, shipping and transportation will benefit
from a more open Arctic. The fabled Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route
will both be navigable for greater periods of time during the summer, and may
be utilized more often for commercial shipping. Indeed, the Northern Sea Route
offers a 35–60 percent savings in distance—and therefore in time and money
— for shipping between Northern Europe and the Far East in comparison to the
22
Suez or Panama canals, making it a very attractive option. Surface-vessel access
to “open water” areas within the Arctic will gradually increase from the current
few weeks a year to a few months a year, centered around mid-September (the
minimum ice extent), although better access will be tempered by the challenges
23
that operation in the Arctic environment poses for the shipping industry. For
example, marine insurers are currently offering insurance only on a case-
by-case basis, and marine operations are impeded by lack of ice-navigator train-
24
ing programs, most of which are ad hoc in any case. Sea-ice forecasts are lim-
ited by a lack of understanding of the exact interrelationships among ice, polar
oceans, and the atmosphere, and inability to model variables like sea ice at a fully
coupled, regional scale, taking account of complexities that arise from the inter-
25
actions of global, regional, and local processes. National standards that regu-
late ship-source pollution vary among Arctic states; shipping companies will
also need to invest substantial amounts of money to develop new ice-
strengthened vessels and ensure that they operate within environmental compli-
ance guidelines.
Boundary Disputes, Security Concerns
Despite present good relations among Arctic nations, recent media attention
paints the area as a source of potential international conflict as countries flex
their muscles and seek to identify portions of the region to which they can lay
claim. After a team of scientists planted a Russian flag on the seabed of the North
Pole, a well publicized article in Time magazine in October 2007 posed the ques-
tion, “Who owns the Arctic?” Over the past few years, in the wake of Russia’s ac-
tions, the recent years of decreased summer ice extent, and a swell of scientific
reports published on climate change, the Arctic has experienced a rise in media
attention. Media speculation has spoken of the Arctic as the site of a new Cold
War, suggesting that the question of who “owns” the Arctic will cause interna-
tional conflict. In reality, the “new” Arctic will be one with multiple competing
uses by many countries. Indeed, the likelihood of large-scale international

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40 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

conflict is small, and the Arctic environment will continue to be harsh and chal-
lenging for much of the year, making operations difficult and dangerous for the
remainder of the twenty-first century.
The legal regime applicable in the Arctic is the customary international law as
reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
While the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, it considers the convention’s
navigation and jurisdiction provisions to be binding international law. The con-
vention advances and protects the national security, environmental, and eco-
nomic interests of all nations, including the United States, codifying the
navigational rights and freedoms that are critical to American military and com-
26
mercial vessels. It also secures economic rights to offshore natural resources.
Article 76 of the convention allows nations to claim jurisdiction past their exclu-
sive economic zones on the basis of undersea features that are considered exten-
sions of the continental shelf, if a structure is geologically similar to a nation’s
27
continental landmass. In May 2008 five of the Arctic nations adopted the
Illulissat Declaration, which acknowledges that “the Law of the Sea is the rele-
vant legal framework in the Arctic” and that there is “no need to develop a new
comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic,” committing the
28
signatories to an “orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims.”
Currently there are overlapping, unresolved maritime boundary claims be-
tween the United States and Canada, Canada and Denmark, Denmark and Nor-
way, and Norway and Russia. At this time, none of these disputed boundary
claims pose a threat to global stability. While the United States and Canada dis-
agree on the location of the maritime boundary in and northward of the Beau-
fort Sea, the United States considers Canada a close ally, and the dispute does not
29
jeopardize this relationship. Unfortunately, the United States is the only Arctic
nation that has not joined UNCLOS, despite support from President Barack
Obama and the Bush and Clinton administrations. Because the Illulissat Decla-
ration recognizes the law of the sea as the framework for deciding issues of Arc-
tic territoriality, the United States will likely find itself at a disadvantage when
30
critical Arctic conversations occur.
The U.S. Navy is mindful of other international challenges and opportunities
in the Arctic. There is some concern in Japan that a renewed Arctic emphasis by
the U.S. Navy may lead to a corresponding decrease in western Pacific presence
and security. Conversely, there are unique opportunities for the U.S. Navy to de-
velop “soft” partnerships with other nations, such as Russia and China, on re-
search like hydrographic surveys. While present boundary disputes and security
concerns pose no major risk to international stability and security, the long-
term potential for significant change in the Arctic must be recognized and thor-
oughly assessed.

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TITLEY & ST. JOHN 41

Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

THE U.S. NAVY’S ROLE IN A CHANGING ARCTIC

The Navy understands the wide range of security considerations in the Arctic re-
gion and that the effects of climate change in the Arctic will influence the
geostrategic landscape. Future maritime activity in the region will encompass
many non-Arctic stakeholders; the potential exists for the overlap of new opera-
tions with indigenous uses and for the occurrence of multiple uses in Arctic wa-
31
ters. The Navy must carefully assess the effects of more severe weather and the
rise of sea level on existing installations, while concurrently determining future
installation needs. Security, stability, and safety have been, and continue to be,
the objectives of the Navy’s Arctic activities, despite a potential shift in the type,
scope, and location of future missions in the region.
The U.S. Navy has been operating in the Arctic for nearly a century, beginning
with Admiral Richard E. Byrd’s historic flight over the North Pole in 1926. The
Navy sustained its presence in the Arctic during and immediately after World
War II, a presence that peaked in 1958, when the USS Nautilus (SSN 571) per-
formed the first submerged transit of the North Pole. Navy submarines have re-
mained active in the region ever since and continue to use the area for research
and training. Surface assets routinely operate in subarctic conditions. In the
1990s a program known as Science Ice Expedition (SCICEX) used Sturgeon-
class (SSN 637) nuclear-powered attack submarines to conduct collaborative
scientific cruises carrying civilian specialists to the Arctic basin. Six SCICEX
missions took place from 1993 to 2000. The missions allowed scientists to gather
data on the biological and physical properties of the northern waters and placed
emphasis on understanding the dynamics of sea-ice cover, circulation patterns
32
in the water, and the structure of the Arctic Ocean’s bathymetry.
Navy surface, aviation, and special warfare forces have participated in joint
and combined exercises, such as NORTHERN EDGE, and will continue to do so.
Navy surface vessels are able to operate up to the marginal ice zone but will re-
quire ice-strengthening to operate in higher ice conditions; Navy aircraft are ca-
pable of operating in the Arctic, but the lack of divert fields limits their duration
and range. The Navy’s Arctic Submarine Laboratory leads the ICEX series, Arc-
tic research-and-development missions whose activities include temporary
33
Arctic ice camps on the edge of the perennial ice. The most recent camp was es-
tablished in the spring of 2009 on a piece of Arctic pack ice approximately two
hundred nautical miles north of Prudhoe Bay, Alaska; it supported about sixty
34
personnel. Great Britain’s Royal Navy shares the use of these camps, and coop-
erative operations involve both U.S. and British submarines. After military op-
erations are concluded, ice camps have on occasion been turned over to civilian
researchers, allowing them to take advantage of facilities that would otherwise
be beyond their budgets.

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While the Navy has a rich history in the Arctic, several challenges must be met
to ensure successful operations in the future. These include the lack of support
infrastructure and logistics support, environmental hazards such as drifting sea
ice and icing on exposed surfaces, and communications difficulties. Antiquated
nautical charts, drifting ice, low visibility, and the paucity of electronic and vi-
sual navigation aids hinder safety of navigation. A lack of coastal installations
also contributes to the difficulty of search and rescue (SAR) operations. The
only American-owned deepwater port near the Arctic basin is Dutch Harbor, in
35
the Aleutian Islands.
The Navy and other federal government agencies are taking steps to address
some of these challenges. The U.S. State Department recently hosted a confer-
ence of representatives from the Arctic Council nations to begin development of
a memorandum of understanding for SAR in the Arctic. Senators Mark Begich
and Lisa Murkowski of Alaska have recently supported bills that would study the
feasibility of a deepwater port in the Arctic. Also, of course, the U.S. Navy has de-
veloped a roadmap to ensure its own readiness and capability in the region.

THE U.S. NAVY’S ARCTIC ROADMAP

Despite uncertainty in scientific projections and operational challenges, the
time line for change in the Arctic points to a challenge, not a crisis. The Navy’s
role in the Arctic is to foster and sustain cooperative relationships with other
Arctic nations and, within the joint, interagency, international, and academic
communities, to improve its understanding of the Arctic environment, enhance
its ability to predict changes to it, and prevent or contain any regional instability,
through the creation and maintenance of security at sea.
Drivers
In October 2007 the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps released “A Coopera-
tive Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”—commonly referred to as the “Mari-
time Strategy”—which states: “Climate change is gradually opening up the
waters of the Arctic, not only to new resource development, but also to new ship-
ping routes that may reshape the global transport system. While these opportu-
nities offer potential for growth, they are potential sources of competition and
conflict for access and natural resources.” The Maritime Strategy clearly identi-
fies freedom of navigation as a top national priority. Preserving the rights of
navigation and overflight in the Arctic region supports the Navy’s ability to exer-
cise these rights throughout the world, including transit rights in strategic
straits.
The Maritime Strategy applies fully in the Arctic as it does in other regions of
the globe; it sufficiently addresses the opening Arctic and the potential

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challenges and opportunities that phenomenon represents. The core capabilities

of the Maritime Strategy that are most applicable to the Arctic are forward pres-
ence, deterrence, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
(HA/DR), through the formation and sustainment of cooperative relationships
with international partners. As in every other region, the naval services must be
prepared to prevent or limit regional conflict when required.
In January 2009, President George W. Bush signed National Security
Presidential Directive-66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-25
(NSPD-66/HSPD-25), which established Arctic-region policy priorities for the
nation. The policy declares that the “United States is an Arctic nation, with var-
36
ied and compelling interests in that region.” The directive takes into account
altered policies on homeland security and defense, the effects of climate change
and increasing human activity in the Arctic, the work of the Arctic Council, and
37
the increasing awareness that the Arctic region is fragile yet rich in resources.
The Arctic Region Policy directs the departments of State, Homeland Security,
and Defense to develop greater capabilities and capacity as necessary to protect
U.S. borders; increase Arctic maritime domain awareness (MDA); preserve
global mobility; project a sovereign American maritime presence; encourage
peaceful resolution of disputes; cooperate with other Arctic nations to address
likely issues arising from greater shipping activity; establish a risk-based capa-
bility to address hazards in the region, including cooperative SAR, basing, and
logistical support; and evaluate the feasibility for using the Arctic for strategic
sealift. These requirements do not promulgate new Navy missions but imply
that the service must be prepared to increase Arctic engagement.
In May 2009 the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Gary Roughead,
convened a CNO Executive Board to answer questions about the Arctic center-
ing on the changing environment, past and present Navy activity in the Arctic
region, future Navy investments, security requirements, fleet capabilities and
limitations, and activities of other Arctic nations. The result was the establish-
ment of the Navy’s Task Force Climate Change (TFCC) to address Navy implica-
tions of climate change, with a near-term focus on the Arctic.
TFCC is directed by the lead coauthor of this article—the Oceanographer of
the Navy, Rear Admiral David Titley—and is composed of representatives from
offices within the CNO’s staff, the fleet, NOAA, and the U.S. Coast Guard. TFCC
also includes representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and various inter-
agency, international, scientific, and academic organizations, acting in advisory
capacities; the task force consists of a flag-level steering committee, a Navy Cli-
mate Change Coordination Office, and several action-oriented working groups.
TFCC was initially tasked to develop a document to guide Navy policy, invest-
ment, and public discussion regarding the Arctic.

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The Vice Chief of Naval Operations approved the resulting Arctic Roadmap
in November 2009. The document is synchronized with a science-based time
line, provides a framework for Navy discussion of the Arctic, and lists appro-
38
priate objectives and actions, tempered by fiscal realities. The need for a
science-based time line is clear: if the Navy acts too early it will waste re-
sources, but acting too late will result in mission failure. Understanding the
complex changes occurring in the Arctic region requires sound scientific in-
formation, upon which policy, strategy, and operations are based. Greater un-
derstanding leads to sound decision making that utilizes assets in the safest
and most efficient manner.
The roadmap features a five-year action plan that implements both the na-
tional Arctic Region Policy and the Navy’s Maritime Strategy and lays out initia-
tives, such as science and technology and combined exercises, to carry out its
goals. The roadmap seeks to answer several questions:
• What is the time line for naval Arctic access?
• What is the national security threat?
• Will the Navy be required to increase engagement in the Arctic?
• In what does the Navy need to invest to meet expected Arctic
requirements?
Objectives
The main objectives of the Arctic Roadmap are readiness, capability, and secu-
rity. Specifically, the U.S. Navy seeks to gain improved understanding regarding
the current and predicted environment, gain greater experience through estab-
lished exercises, and make informed investments that will provide the right ca-
pability at the right time. The roadmap recognizes that key to its success is
cooperative partnerships with interagency and international stakeholders that
will improve the Navy’s capability to assess and predict climate changes in the
Arctic. To achieve these objectives, the roadmap focuses on five areas: Strat-
egy, Policy, Missions, and Plans; Operations and Training; Investments; Com-
munications and Outreach; and Environmental Assessment and Prediction.
Strategy, Policy, Missions, and Plans. Actions in this focus area include the iden-
tification of Navy strategic objectives in the Arctic region and the development
of guidance to achieve these objectives so as to preserve a safe, stable, and secure
Arctic region. Policy and recommendations to operational staffs will be devel-
oped to strengthen existing and foster new cooperative relationships.
Operations and Training. Actions in this focus area were identified by U.S. Fleet
Forces Command and the geographic combatant command staffs with the

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intent of providing a Navy enterprise–wide approach for action regarding the

Arctic. Participation in Arctic exercises, operations, and supporting activities is
identified, with the intent of increasing Navy experience in the region.
Investments. This focus area seeks to ensure that Arctic requirements are as-
sessed and included in the development of the Program Objective Memoran-
dum or Navy budget. Investment areas that are addressed include weapons
platforms and sensors; C4ISR (command, control, communications, comput-
ers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance); and installations and
facilities.
Communications and Outreach. This focus area addresses the facts that the
Navy can benefit from exchanging information with the wide array of Arctic
stakeholders and that media attention will grow as the Arctic endures further
rapid and severe change. Targeting organizations within the media, govern-
ment, Department of Defense, international, scientific, academic, and indige-
nous communities, actions in this focus area are intended to ensure that the
Navy is recognized as contributing to a safe, secure, and stable Arctic region.
Environmental Assessment and Prediction. Actions in this focus area will foster
a comprehensive and improved understanding of the current and predicted
Arctic physical environment on the tactical, operational, and strategic scales. Be-
cause of limited resources and the potential for significant requirements, reduc-
ing uncertainty in predictions of the magnitude, timing, and regional location
of Arctic environmental change is essential to efficient and responsible Navy ac-
tion and investment.
Phasing
The roadmap specifies Navy action over three phases, allowing necessary back-
ground studies and assessments to be completed, partnerships formed, and
knowledge cultivated. TFCC will be responsible for execution of the roadmap
and will provide quarterly progress reports to the Chief of Naval Operations.
Phase 1—Fiscal Year (FY) 2010. The first phase of the Arctic Roadmap will in-
clude a Fleet Readiness Assessment and an assessment of strategic objectives and
mission requirements in the Arctic region. External studies regarding Arctic se-
curity will be reviewed, and an Arctic strategic implementation plan for the
Maritime Strategy will be completed. The Navy will continue working with
NOAA to develop a next-generation, coupled, air-ocean-ice modeling system to
predict accurately Arctic environmental change; the Navy will also perform a
joint hydrographic survey in the Bering Strait with NOAA. The Navy partici-
pated in an Arctic tabletop exercise in November 2009 with the Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense and plans to participate in a “Limited Objective experiment”

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46 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

with U.S. Northern Command and National Defense University in February

2010.
Phase 2—FYs 2011 and 2012. Significant actions in Phase 2 include initiation of
capabilities-based assessments regarding required Navy Arctic capabilities,
completion of environmental assessments, and support for implementation of
the national ocean policy and coastal and marine spatial planning framework in
39
the Arctic. Recommendations will also be developed to address Arctic require-
ments in “sponsor program proposals” for the Navy’s Program Objective Mem-
orandum for FY 14 (POM 14). Biennial participation in Arctic exercises such as
ICEX-11 will continue, and the Navy will formalize new cooperative relation-
ships that increase experience and competence in SAR, MDA, HA/DR in the
Arctic, and defense support of civil authorities in Alaska.
Phase 3—FYs 2013 and 2014. During Phase 3, the Navy will oversee execution of
POM 14 budget initiatives while implementing and expanding new cooperative
partnerships. The Navy will commence Arctic environmental survey operations
using unmanned undersea vehicles. In fiscal year 2014 the Arctic Roadmap will
be updated in coordination with the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, to en-
sure that the Navy presence in the Arctic is aligned with the strategic objectives
of the Department of Defense.
{LINE-SPACE}
The scope and magnitude of changes to the Arctic region as a result of a chang-
ing climate are great, and they cannot all be identified within the scope of this
article. Overall, continued sea-ice melting will cause shifts in species popula-
tions and distribution, more navigable transportation passages, and increased
shipping activity and resource extraction. It also has the potential to modify sig-
nificantly global circulation patterns around the world, the consequences of
which scientists are just beginning to model and comprehend. Each of these
changes will shape safety and security in the Arctic.
The Navy’s Task Force Climate Change is addressing security considerations
in the Arctic by implementing a science-based roadmap for action. Emphasizing
the key themes of improved environmental understanding, informed invest-
ments, increased experience, cooperative partnerships, and support for the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Arctic Roadmap will ensure the Navy’s
readiness and capability to operate successfully and safely in the changing Arctic
environment in the twenty-first century.

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NOTES

1. S. Solomon, D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, 13. Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assess-
M. Marquis, K. B. Averyt, M. Tignor, and H. ment 2009 Report, p. 26.
L. Miller, eds., Climate Change 2007: The 14. Thomas R. Karl, Jerry M. Melillo, and
Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Work- Thomas C. Peterson, eds., Global Climate
ing Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of Change Impacts in the United States (Cam-
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate bridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009),
Change, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate p. 85.
Change AR4 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2007), available at ipcc-wg1.ucar 15. J. Richter-Menge and J. E. Overland, eds.,
.edu/wg1/wg1-report.html. Arctic Report Card 2009, available at
www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard.
2. Ralph Cicerone, “Climate-Change Science
and NAS Activities” (presentation given at 16. National Research Council, Understanding
the Consortium for Ocean Leadership, Wash- and Responding to Climate Change: Highlights
ington, D.C., 15 October 2009). of National Academies Reports (Washington,
D.C.: 2008), p. 9.
3. G. Marland, T. A. Boden, and R. J. Andres,
“Global, Regional, and National CO2 Emis- 17. Ibid., p. 11.
sions,” in Trends: A Compendium of Data on 18. Kenneth J. Bird et al., Circum-Arctic Resource
Global Change (Oak Ridge, Tenn.: Carbon Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and
Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Gas North of the Arctic Circle, U.S. Geological
Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department Survey Fact Sheet 2008-3049 (Denver, Colo.:
of Energy, 2007). U.S. Geological Survey Information Services,
4. Cicerone, “Climate-Change Science and NAS 2008).
Activities.” 19. As defined by the UN Convention on the
5. Susan Joy Hassel, Impacts of a Warming Arc- Law of the Sea, a nation’s exclusive economic
tic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Cam- zone is “an area beyond and adjacent to the
bridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), territorial sea” that is not to extend “beyond
executive summary, p. 25. 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is
6. Erland Kallen, The Vertical Structure of Arctic measured.”
Warming (Stockholm: Stockholm Univ., De-
partment of Meteorology, 2009). 20. Tim Holder, “Arctic Science: Alaska Outer
Continental Shelf Focus for IWG Workshop”
7. U.S. Navy Dept., “Task Force Climate (presentation given at the Consortium for
Change and the Arctic Roadmap,” Rhumb Ocean Leadership, Washington, D.C., 4 De-
Lines, 30 November 2009. cember 2009).
8. National Snow and Ice Data Center, “Arctic 21. National Marine Fisheries Service, Alaska Re-
Sea Ice Reaches Annual Minimum Extent,” gional Office, “Arctic Fisheries,” NOAA Fish-
Arctic Sea Ice News & Analysis, 17 September eries, www.fakr.noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/
2009, nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2009/ arctic/.
091709.html.
22. Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assess-
9. Navy Arctic Talking Points, September 2009. ment 2009 Report, p. 43.
10. Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assess- 23. The term “open water,” nomenclature of the
ment 2009 Report, 2nd printing (Tromsö, World Meteorological Organization (WMO),
Norway: April 2009), p. 31. is defined as water that has a total ice concen-
11. Ibid., p. 32. tration of less than one-tenth sea ice at any
12. C. P. McMullen and J. Jabbour, Climate stage of development.
Change Science Compendium 2009 (Nairobi, 24. Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assess-
Kenya: United Nations Environment ment 2009 Report, pp. 68–69.
Programme, 2009), p. 17. 25. “Coupled modeling” can be defined as the
combination of energy and interfaces

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48 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

between two different fluids, e.g., the atmo- 34. U.S. Navy Dept., “Ice Exercise 2009,” Rhumb
sphere and the ocean. U.S. Navy Dept., Task Lines, 9 March 2009.
Force Climate Change, Prioritized Climate 35. Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assess-
Science & Technology Requirements (Wash- ment 2009 Report, p. 177.
ington, D.C.: 9 October 2009).
36. White House, Arctic Region Policy, National
26. Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, letter Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-66,
endorsing U.S. accession to the Convention Homeland Security Presidential Direc-
on the Law of the Sea, 16 October 2009. tive/HSPD-25 (Washington, D.C.: Office of
27. Rear Adm. David Gove, USN (Ret.), “Arctic the Press Secretary, 12 January 2009).
Melt: Reopening a Naval Frontier,” U.S. Na- 37. Ibid.
val Institute Proceedings (February 2009).
38. Adm. J. W. Greenert, USN, Task Force Cli-
28. U.S. Navy Office of the Judge Advocate Gen- mate Change Charter (Washington, D.C.:
eral, “Arctic Legal Issues,” informational U.S. Navy Dept., Vice Chief of Naval Opera-
working PowerPoint document, July 2009. tions, 30 October 2009).
29. Ibid. 39. In June 2009, an Ocean Policy Task Force
30. Gove, “Arctic Melt.” was formed by President Obama to develop a
31. Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assess- National Ocean Policy and Framework for
ment 2009 Report, p. 5. Marine and Coastal Planning. Recommenda-
tions from the task force are expected to be
32. Gove, “Arctic Melt.” approved by the president in March 2010.
33. Ibid.

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THE U.S. NAVY’S TRANSITION TO JETS

Robert C. Rubel

Definition of an optimist: a naval aviator with a savings account.

QUIP POPULAR IN NAVAL AVIATION

A s we approach 2011, the centennial year of aviation in the U.S. Navy, the jet
engine and jet-powered aircraft have become ubiquitous. Today millions
travel safely in jet airliners, and the military jet fighter is almost a cultural icon.
However, in the late 1930s the prospect for powering aircraft with anything but
piston engines seemed remote, except to a few visionary engineers in Great Brit-
ain and Germany. In the early 1940s their work resulted in the first flights of
jet-powered aircraft, but due to the low thrust of their engines these aircraft were
outclassed by existing piston-engine fighters. Additional advances in engine de-
sign in Germany resulted in the fielding of the Me-262 Swallow fighter, which,
although not as maneuverable as the American P-51 Mustang or other Allied
fighters, had a top speed 100 mph faster, due to its jet engines and swept wings,
giving it significant operational advantages. After the
Professor Rubel is Dean of Naval Warfare Studies at the
Naval War College. Before retiring from the U.S. Navy
war, aeronautical engineers from all the Allied nations
in the grade of captain, he was an aviator, participating studied German technical advances and worked to in-
in operations connected with the 1973 Yom Kippur corporate them into their new generations of fighters.
War, the 1980 Iranian hostage crisis, the TWA Flight
847 crisis, and DESERT SHIELD. He commanded Strike When the U.S. Navy introduced its first operational
Fighter Squadron 131 and served as the inspector gen- jet, the McDonnell F1H Phantom, in 1947, it began
eral of U.S. Southern Command. He attended the
a transition phase that turned out to be extended and
Spanish Naval War College and the U.S. Naval War
College, where he served on the faculty and as chairman very costly in terms of aircrew lives and airplanes
of the War Gaming Department, in the Center for Na- lost. The higher speeds and altitudes of jets presented
val Warfare Studies, before his present appointment. He
a new set of problems to the aircraft designers and
has a BS degree from the University of Illinois, an MS in
management from Salve Regina University in Newport, manufacturers, as well as to the Navy squadrons that
Rhode Island, and an MA in national security and stra- operated them. In 1946, nobody knew that a high-
tegic studies from the Naval War College (1986).
performance jet fighter needed such appurtenances
Naval War College Review, Spring 2010, Vol. 63, No. 2 as a stabilator (instead of an elevator); irreversible,

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50 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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F8U-2N Crusader

U.S. Navy

hydraulic flight controls with artificial feel; redundant hydraulic systems; pitch
1
and yaw stability augmentation; ejection seats; air conditioning; and others.
Learning these lessons required a trial-and-error process that resulted in the
fielding and rapid obsolescence of a series of different jets, each reflecting solu-
tions to the defects discovered in earlier models.
It is central to the story presented in this article to consider how long this
“transition” to jets lasted. Some histories of naval aviation regard the transition
to jets to be substantially complete with the phasing out of the last propeller-
driven fighter, the F4U Corsair, while others maintain that the transition lasted
until the introduction of the F-8 Crusader and F-4 Phantom II—the first Navy
carrier-based fighters that were the equals of their land-based counterparts. An-
other way of looking at it is through the lens of safety: one might declare the
transition to have been complete when the Navy aviation accident rate became
comparable to that of the U.S. Air Force. The logic behind this reasoning is that
whereas a multitude of factors—technical, organizational, and cultural—con-
stitute the capability to operate swept-wing jets, the mishap rate offers an overall
indicator of how successful an organization is in adopting a new technology.
Using this criterion, the Navy’s transition process lasted until the late
1980s—which was, not coincidentally, the era in which the F/A-18 arrived in
the fleet in numbers. This article argues that tactical jet aircraft design and
technology presented Navy aircrews, maintenance personnel, and leaders with
several major challenges that were in fact not substantially overcome until the
introduction of the F/A-18 Hornet in 1983. These challenges included such
technical problems as engine reliability and response times, swept-wing flight

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RUBEL 51
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characteristics, and man/machine interface issues. The Air Force also encoun-
tered these challenges, but the Navy’s operating environment and, indeed, its or-
ganizational culture kept it from achieving a fully successful transition until well
after the Air Force did.
Between 1949, the year jets started showing up in the fleet in numbers, and
1988, the year their combined mishap rate finally got down to Air Force levels,
the Navy and Marine Corps lost almost twelve thousand airplanes of all types
(helicopters, trainers, and patrol planes, in addition to jets) and over 8,500
aircrew, in no small part as a result of these issues. Perhaps the statistics for the
F-8 Crusader, a supersonic fighter designed by Vought in the late 1950s, provide
a good illustration of the problem. The F-8 was always known as a difficult air-
plane to master. In all, 1,261 Crusaders were built. By the time it was withdrawn
from the fleet, 1,106 had been involved in mishaps. Only a handful of them were
2
lost to enemy fire in Vietnam. While the F-8 statistics might have been worse
than those for most other models, they make the magnitude of the problem
clear: whether from engine failure, pilot error, weather, or bad luck, the vast ma-
jority (88 percent!) of Crusaders ever built ended up as smoking holes in the
ground, splashes in the water, or fireballs hurtling across a flight deck. This was
naval aviation from 1947 through about 1988. Today, the accident rate is nor-
mally one or less per hundred thousand hours of flight time, making mishaps an

F/A-18 Hornet

U.S. Navy

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unusual occurrence. This is in stark contrast to the landmark year of 1954, when
naval aviation (that is, Navy and Marine combined) lost 776 aircraft and 535
crew, for an accident rate well above fifty per hundred thousand flight hours—
and the rate for carrier-based tactical aviation was much higher than that.
During this extended transition period, naval aviation participated in three
major wars and numerous crises, and, of course, many planes and crews were
lost to enemy fire. However, the vast majority of aircraft losses over this period
were due to mishaps, many of which were associated with the technical and or-
ganizational problems just mentioned. In other words, the airplanes that popu-
lated the flight decks of aircraft carriers from the introduction of the F1H
Phantom through the retirement of the F-14 Tomcat were, with few exceptions,
hard to fly and maintain and would kill the unwary crew. Many men and a few
women gave their lives trying to operate these machines in the challenging envi-
ronment of the sea. This history is meant to recognize their sacrifice and honor
their service.

THE OPERATIONAL IMPERATIVE

U.S. naval aviation ended World War II at the pinnacle of success; its propeller-
driven aircraft were the best in the world, and the requirements of carrier suit-
ability did not compromise their performance versus that of land-based fighters.
By the early 1940s the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics had received word of jet en-
gine developments in Germany and Great Britain and had commissioned West-
inghouse and Allis Chalmers to build American versions. However, the high fuel
consumption, low power at takeoff, and poor reliability of early engines did not
make them attractive for use in carrier-borne planes. Moreover, when details of
German aerodynamic advances, specifically the swept wing, became known,
Navy planners felt that high landing speeds and adverse handling characteristics
would make aircraft equipped with them unsuitable for carrier use.
On the other hand, the Navy was faced with a new opponent, the Soviet
Union, that had also capitalized on captured German knowledge. If the Soviets
were to build a high-speed jet bomber, carriers might be defenseless if they could
not launch high-speed interceptors from their decks. As the Cold War came into
being, this knowledge pressurized the development of jet aircraft, adding to the
rapidity with which it took place but also imposing brutal material and human
costs.
An additional source of pressure was the new U.S. Air Force, whose leadership
in the postwar environment believed that the combination of the atomic bomb
and the ultra-long-range bomber rendered naval aviation irrelevant. The Navy
had long regarded strikes against land targets to be a fundamental mission of its

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own air arm, and the prospect of being sidelined in the business of nuclear at-
tack seemed to threaten the very existence of naval aviation. In April 1949 the
secretary of defense, Louis Johnson, canceled the construction of USS United
States, a very large aircraft carrier that had been designed to support a new gen-
eration of big Navy jet bombers capable of carrying the large and heavy nuclear
weapons of the day. This cancellation, along with Air Force efforts to push the
huge B-36 bomber program at the expense of the other services, produced in
October 1949 an incident that has been termed the “Revolt of the Admirals.” Ad-
miral Arthur Radford and other aviation flag officers, as well as the Chief of Na-
val Operations (CNO), Admiral Louis Denfeld, testified before Congress
arguing the need for an atomic delivery capability for naval aviation and alleging
the deficiencies of the B-36—in direct contravention of the secretary of de-
fense’s wishes. Although Admiral Denfeld was subsequently fired by the
secretary, Congress was sufficiently convinced of the Navy’s utility in strike
warfare to authorize in 1951 the construction of USS Forrestal, the first of the
“supercarriers” that could adequately handle the heavy, fast jets. However, the
Navy still needed a jet to perform the mission of nuclear strike, and development
pressures continued.
The early Cold War operational environment was challenging for naval avia-
tion, to say the least. Knowing that the Soviet Union was working on jet fighters
and jet bombers that could carry nuclear weapons and drop them on naval for-
mations, the Navy needed to develop fighter/interceptor aircraft that could de-
fend the carrier and its escorts from attack while sailing into position to launch
its own strike, and also strike aircraft that had enough range to hit meaningful
targets and enough speed to survive enemy defenses. These general require-
ments propelled naval aviation development efforts from the late 1940s through
the 1970s. During this period, the actual employment of naval aviation in two
wars—Korea and Vietnam, as well as later in DESERT STORM—demanded of
Navy jets the flexibility to conduct conventional bomb delivery, close air sup-
port, and dogfighting. Thus carrier jets morphed over time to designs that were
more general in purpose, resulting ultimately in the F/A-18 Hornet, an aircraft
that is a true strike-fighter.
Thus there was no opportunity for naval aviation to rest on its laurels after
World War II. In combination with a massive postwar demobilization, it had to
forge ahead with a program to adopt the new engine and aerodynamic technol-
ogy. It attempted to reduce strategic risk, by letting multiple contracts to differ-
ent aircraft companies in hopes that at least one of the designs would be viable.
On the other hand, it accepted a high degree of operational risk, by ordering se-
ries production of various models before flight-testing was complete. The net

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effect of this strategy was that between 1945 and 1959 twenty-two Navy fighters
made their first flights, whereas over the following forty-six years only five did
3
so. Some of the designs spawned during the early period, such as the F2H Ban-
shee, were useful machines and had lengthy service lives, while others, like the
F7U Cutlass and F-11 Tiger, were disappointments and saw only brief service.
As mentioned previously, the first years of the jet era in the Navy were disas-
trous in terms of aircraft and crews lost, but the Navy had little choice but to con-
tinue sending jets to sea. The gas-guzzling nature of jets made getting them back
aboard the carrier in a timely manner a matter of utmost urgency and increased
the pressure on carrier captains, admirals, and their staffs to adapt to an opera-
tional tempo very different from what had been the norm. In 1950, a future vice
admiral, Gerald Miller, was on a carrier group staff operating F9F-2 Panthers in
Korea. On one occasion the group staff meant to swap sixty-four Panthers from
an outgoing carrier to one just coming into the theater. The weather was bad at
airfields ashore, and heavy seas were causing the flight decks to pitch. The staff
work and planning did not adequately take into account the limited endurance
of the new jet-powered aircraft. Miller’s description of what happened next il-
lustrates the consequences of learning to operate jets in a wartime environment:
We had a lot of these fighters in the air. Then we tried to bring them down and it was
a tough job of getting them on board. They were running out of fuel and there was
no base on the beach to send them to. We had to get them back on board those two
carriers, and we broke up those planes in some numbers.

F9F-2 Panther

Courtesy National Naval Aviation Museum

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It was awful. It was so bad, I can still remember the admiral walking over to the op-
posite side of the bridge, putting his head down on his hands and shaking. It was so
bad he couldn’t even get mad. It was a horrible mess. Well, that was all because of the
size of the ship, the nature of the airplanes and straight deck operations. We started
from debacles of that kind to get something better.
Considering the upheaval in the navy caused by demobilization and the introduction
of new technologies, it’s amazing that we kept together as much as we did. . . . We
worried, but we did proceed with the jet program.4

At the same time that naval aviators were attempting to master the new jet air-
craft, they were also grappling with two new missions that increased the degree
of difficulty even more: night or all-weather operations, and nuclear weapons
delivery. In a sense, these two missions were connected, in that it was felt that
when the call came, weather or darkness must not be allowed to stand in the way
of getting the nuclear weapon to its target. These two missions exerted consider-
able pressure on aircraft design and on the risks naval aviation was willing to en-
dure to put these capabilities to sea. Coupled with the hazards inherent in
jet-powered aviation in those years, they significantly contributed to the loss of
aircraft. Gerald O’Rourke, USN (Ret.), describes the environment in Composite
Squadron Four (VC-4, based at Naval Air Station Atlantic City, New Jersey), the
Navy’s East Coast night/all-weather fighter squadron in the early 1950s:
All naval aviators are routinely exposed to, or involved in, aircraft accidents. That’s
accepted as almost a hazard of the trade. In carrier work, where dangers abound, ac-
cidents tend to be more frequent. In the night carrier operations of those days, acci-
dents were so frequent that they were considered commonplace and unexceptional.
Whenever a det [detachment of four to six aircraft sent out on a carrier] departed,
the aircraft they flew off were more or less written off. No one expected that all of
them would ever come back to Atlantic City. . . . Unfortunately, the same negativism
tended to extend to the pilots as well, whose safe return wasn’t much better than the
aircraft. Between pilots lost, the pilots maimed, and the pilots who decided to throw
in their wings, precious few dets ever returned with the same resources they took
with them.5

NAVAL AVIATION CULTURE AND THE TRANSITION TO JETS

In order to understand the catastrophic price the Navy paid in its march to oper-
ate swept-wing jets from aircraft carriers, we must look at the organizational
culture onto which this new technology was grafted. After all, the majority of the
mishaps that occurred were due to aircrew errors of some sort, whether precipi-
tated or exacerbated by design problems or the result of gross error, negligence,
or irresponsibility not connected with design issues.

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Naval aviators always viewed themselves as daredevils. The difficulties of tak-

ing off from and landing on ships were unequaled in the land aviation domain,
and naval aviators therefore considered themselves exceptionally skilled—and
expendable. The accident rate (if not the sheer number of mishaps) in naval avi-
ation from its inception to World War II was hardly less than the awful rates ex-
perienced in the early jet era. Naval aviators always regarded themselves as a
different breed from their surface-ship brethren, but for all that they shared, and
still do, the Navy’s culture of independence and self-reliance. The simplicity and
relative inexpensiveness of early naval aircraft allowed this culture to thrive;
flight instruction was personal, and aviators had few detailed procedures or
rules to follow in mastering their aircraft. “Seat of the pants” flying and individ-
uality in technique were the orders of the day. Since piston-engine aircraft all op-
erated essentially in the same way and roughly at the same speeds, especially
when landing, and since they rarely flew at night or in bad weather, pilots could
transition between aircraft easily and informally. Mr. Richard “Chick” Eldridge,
a member of the Naval Safety Center staff for several decades, remembers his
Navy flight training in 1943: “To my recollection, there was little emphasis on
aviation safety. What safety information was imparted to the fledgling aviator
came from the primary instructors. Lessons learned usually came in the form of
‘gems of instructor wisdom.’ You were simply told to fly certain maneuvers in a
6
specific way or wind up as a statistic.”
The first thing to change was the technology. Culture change lagged by more
than a decade, and the result was a virtual bloodbath. In addition to the specific
challenges of flying jets must be added greatly increased speeds. Things happen
much faster in jets, and a different mind-set and discipline are called for to avoid
disaster. Pilots who had spent a good deal of time operating at propeller-aircraft
speeds tended to have more difficulty adjusting to jet speeds than those who
were introduced to jets early. The author observed this during the Navy’s transi-
tion from the piston-engine S-2 Tracker carrier antisubmarine aircraft to the
jet-powered S-3 Viking. The more senior pilots seemed to have the most diffi-
culty, and indeed a number of them either quit, had accidents, or failed to pass
flight checks. This was a serious issue as well for the fleet introduction of the A-3
Skywarrior. Initially, in addition to carrier pilots, the Navy brought into the A-3
program senior aviators from the land-based patrol community. A series of acci-
dents and difficulties involving former patrol pilots prompted the commander
of the Sixth Fleet to write a letter to the CNO recommending that only carrier-
7
trained pilots be assigned to A-3 squadrons.
In the early years of the jet transition, naval aviation remained wedded to its
individualistic culture. Structured programs of training, detailed reference
manuals, and disciplined evaluations of pilot performance did not exist in any

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A-3 Skywarrior

Courtesy National Naval Aviation Museum

coherent way across naval aviation. But jets, with their higher speeds, challeng-
ing handling characteristics, and ever more complex systems, required just that.
The horrible accident rates eventually drove the Navy to do something. Mean-
while, the Air Force, which had been suffering an increase in mishaps also,
formed a Flight Safety Directorate, with 525 personnel, and undertook to im-
pose discipline on the aviation corps by punishing crews after mishaps when
fault and culpability could be assigned. The Navy’s first effort at a flight-safety
agency was puny by comparison, with only twenty-five personnel. However, in
1953 a war hero, Captain James F. “Jimmy” Flatley, wrote a highly critical and in-
fluential report on naval aviation safety that generated organizational and pro-
8
cedural changes that in turn went far to change the culture. Along with them, a
more structured program of flight training was introduced, eventually culmi-
nating in the establishment of replacement training squadrons that provided in-
tensive and detailed instruction for newly “winged” aviators in the aircraft they
would fly in the fleet. These squadrons would also become centers of flight and
maintenance evaluation of fleet squadrons based with them. A variety of other
measures also served to professionalize and discipline the naval aviation culture,
including formal training for squadron safety officers, improved accident inves-
tigation techniques, specially trained medical personnel (called “flight sur-
geons”), the publication of a safety magazine to share stories of accidents and
near misses, and top-down leadership that countered the laissez-faire cultural
heritage.
However the “ready room” culture was resistant to change. Thus the authors
of a 1961 Naval Aviation News article felt compelled to say, “Some people view

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the idea of everyone in Naval Aviation doing everything ‘the one best way’ with
some misgivings. They fear that general use of standardized procedures, while it
may reduce the accident rate, will result in a reduction of a pilot’s ability to
‘think on his feet’ and deal flexibly with emergencies and combat situations. Ex-
9
perience in other fields has proved that fear unfounded.” A major element of
the resistance to change was the fact that adaptation to the new technology had a
value content—that is, it made irrelevant certain skill sets that had been associ-
ated with being a “good” aviator. The issue was not so much the difficulty of
learning new skills as reluctance to abandon old ones that were associated with
professional virtue. The naval aviation culture that had grown up from 1911 to
1947 was intense, parochial, and value-centric. Moreover, likely because of the
acrimonious relationship that developed between the two services in the late
1940s, there was a reluctance to view anything the Air Force did as appropriate
for naval aviation.
The Navy has always placed considerable responsibility and authority in the
hands of the individual officer. An imperative of war at sea, this delegated style
of command and control has both enhanced and afflicted U.S. naval aviation.
Throughout its history, outstanding decision making by relatively junior offi-
cers has made the difference in battle, such as when, during the battle of Midway,
Lieutenant Commander Wade McClusky decided, in the air, to take his strike
group in the direction a Japanese destroyer was headed and thus found the en-
emy aircraft carriers. Faced in the 1940s and ’50s with new technology that de-
manded new types of procedural discipline and centralized management, the
culture was slow to adapt, and many naval aviators lost their lives as a result.

FINDING THE RIGHT COMBINATION OF INGREDIENTS

The development of aviation technology between the Wright brothers’ first
flight and 1947 was amazingly fast. In just forty-five years aviation progressed
from machines that were hardly more than powered kites to jets that pushed the
speed of sound. This rapid development meant that individual models of com-
bat aircraft became obsolete fairly quickly. This had been the case prior to and
during World War II, and it was to be the case over the early years of jet transi-
tion in the Navy. The initial echelon of straight-wing jets had an operational life
span in the fleet of only a few years, although some of them had longer, second
lives in the reserves or specialized shore-based uses, such as in training com-
mands. In the late 1940s and the early ’50s, as whole squadrons transitioned
from propeller airplanes to jets, pilots who had developed habits molded to
straight-wing propeller planes that were slower, lighter, and simpler and burned
fuel more slowly were put into fast, gas-guzzling jets. It was a lethal
combination.

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As the centennial of naval aviation approaches, it is interesting to observe that

it has been jet powered for over half of its history. The transition was long and
brutally expensive in terms of life and aircraft. However, it was, by any measure, a
success. Throughout the Cold War and a series of hot wars—Korea, Vietnam,
DESERT STORM, and others—naval aviation has been able to provide effective
tactical airpower from the sea. Its ability to do this despite a long and difficult
process of learning how to operate jet aircraft at sea is a tribute to the brilliance
of various aircraft designers, the ingenuity of countless “airdales,” the sailors
who struggled to keep those complex and touchy machines flying, and the brav-
ery (and perhaps foolhardiness) of the crews who would climb into jets that
were hard to fly and lacked reliability and in those aircraft perform missions that
took them to the edge of what man and machine could do.

NOTES

This article is adapted from a paper delivered E. T. Wooldridge (Annapolis, Md.: Naval In-
at the U.S. Naval Academy’s 2009 Naval His- stitute Press, 1995), pp. 12–13.
tory Symposium, held at Annapolis, Mary- 5. Gerald O’Rourke, “We Get Ours at Night,” in
land, 10–11 September 2009. It will appear in Into the Jet Age, ed. Wooldridge, pp. 31–32.
different form in the forthcoming proceed-
ings of that conference, 100 Years of U.S. 6. Richard A. “Chick” Eldridge, “A Look Back:
Navy Air Power. Forty Years of Reminiscing,” U.S. Naval
Safety Center, safetycenter.navy.mil/
1. Tommy H. Thomason, U.S. Naval Air Superi- media/approach/theydidwhat/eldridge.htm.
ority: Development of Shipborne Jet Fighters
1943–1962 (North Branch, Minn.: Specialty, 7. Jerry Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft
2007), p. 123. Carriers (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian In-
stitution, 2001), p. 104.
2. Naval Safety Center aviation safety database.
Unless otherwise cited, all mishap statistics 8. Steve Ewing, Reaper Leader (Annapolis, Md.:
are from this source. Naval Institute Press, 2002), pp. 198–99.

3. Thomason, U.S. Naval Air Superiority, p. 265. 9. “The One Best Way: New Standards for Na-
val Air,” Naval Aviation News (August 1961),
4. Gerald E. Miller, “Transition to the Jet Age,” p. 6, available at www.history.navy.mil/.
in Into the Jet Age: Conflict and Change in Na-
val Aviation 1945–1975—an Oral History, ed.

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 Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

PIECES OF EIGHT
An Appraisal of U.S. Counterpiracy Options in the Horn of Africa

Lesley Anne Warner

O ver the course of the past five years, maritime piracy off the coast of Soma-
lia has been on the rise as the country has spiraled deeper and deeper into
anarchy.1 The United States responded in late 2008 and early 2009 with a variety
of counterpiracy measures, ranging from strengthening the multinational naval
presence in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean to the signing of a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) with Kenya to facilitate the prosecution of suspected
pirates. However, despite assertions that lawlessness on land allows maritime
piracy to emerge, present counterpiracy methods have failed to address poor
governance and instability within Somalia. Instead, they have dealt only with
the sea-based manifestations of land-based malaise. Ideally, a sustainable coun-
terpiracy strategy would address root causes as well as symptoms, in both the
short and long terms. By disaggregating Somalia’s maritime insecurity from the
insecurity it suffers on land, the United States and its international partners may
well be unable to achieve a sustainable solution to piracy.
This article outlines the causal logic that led to the
Lesley Anne Warner is an analyst at CNA’s Center for spike in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia in re-
Strategic Studies, in Alexandria, Virginia, where she
cent years. It will then, after an overview of the na-
focuses on African security issues, including maritime
piracy and the U.S. Navy’s growing engagement with ture of maritime piracy in this region, highlight the
African countries. She holds an MA in security studies counterpiracy methods employed by the United States
from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service,
and assess their prospects for success or failure. It will
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. She is also
the author of an article on Somali piracy in the Janu- conclude by proposing a comprehensive and sustain-
ary/February 2010 issue of the Journal of Interna- able counterpiracy strategy that targets both the root
tional Peace Operations.
causes of piracy and the symptoms that emerge from
Naval War College Review, Spring 2010, Vol. 63, No. 2 lawlessness on land.

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Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

UNDERSTANDING PIRACY AS A SYMPTOM OF LAWLESSNESS ON

LAND
Since maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia is a result of the absence of gover-
nance on land projected out to sea, the unremedied collapse of the Somali state
will be an insurmountable obstacle to a sustainable counterpiracy strategy. So-
malia has been in a persistent anarchic state since 1991, when General Mohamed
Siad Barre was overthrown and the country descended into clan-based civil war
for control of the government. Eventually, the Somali state collapsed, destroy-
ing social services and the security-sector institutions that might have protected
the country, its resources, and its citizens against internal and external threats.2
The lack of governance and human security created a permissive environment
on land and at sea that offered Somalis not only incentives to participate in
criminal enterprises but also sanctuaries from which to do so. Given Soma-
lia’s proximity to one of the world’s main sea lines of communications through
the Gulf of Aden, Somali fishermen, unrestrained by a functioning coast guard
or navy, seized the opportunity to engage in maritime piracy starting in the
1990s—initially claiming to be protecting Somali waters from foreign vessels
that were fishing illegally off the country’s coast.3 (Current estimates state that
more than three hundred million dollars’ worth of fish is stolen each year from
Somali waters.) 4
To put piracy off the coast of Somalia in its contemporary context, pirate
attacks off the coast of Somalia have increased overall during the course of the
past five years, as shown below on figure 1.
However, pirate attacks decreased in 2006, which many analysts attribute to
the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in the middle of that year. The ICU
was an umbrella movement comprising various factions that had gained control
of much of south and central Somalia, essentially providing a degree of gov-
ernance that had not existed in these regions since 1991. Asserting that it ran
contrary to Islamic law, the ICU declared a war on piracy during the latter half
of 2006. As a result of the ICU’s grasp on power, attacks on maritime vessels
dropped during these six months of relative order.5 However, this relative order
was short-lived, as extremist elements within the ICU provoked a conflict with
Ethiopia, as a result of which Ethiopia invaded Somalia in December 2006 and
the ICU lost control over the territory it had previously controlled. Pirate attacks
subsequently increased in early 2007 and continue to plague the region to the
present day.6
This chronic lack of governance on land and resultant absence of maritime
security spurred a rash of pirate attacks that escalated in frequency, range, and
cost to global maritime commerce in 2008, as pirate attacks off the coast of
Somalia accounted for 111 of the 293 reported incidents of piracy worldwide.7

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FIGURE 1
PIRATE ATTACKS OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA, 2005–2009

250

200

150

100

50

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Source: ICC—International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report: Report for the Period 1 January–31 December 2009.

In 2009, attacks in this region accounted for 217 out of 406 attacks worldwide.8
Attempted and successful pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia by month in
2009 are detailed in figure 2.
The trends that appear to be emerging suggest that pirates in this region
have been able to adapt rapidly to their changing environment. In 2009, pirates
greatly expanded their range of operations, operating as far north as Oman and
as far south as the Seychelles and Madagascar, attacking up to 1,100 miles from
Somalia’s coast. In addition, to decrease the chance of detection, pirates have
increasingly operated at night.9

U.S. GOVERNMENT COUNTERPIRACY POLICY

Recent American maritime security strategy and policy documents related to
piracy include but are not limited to the United States Maritime Security (Piracy)
Policy (released in 2007 as a new annex, “Policy for the Repression of Piracy and
Other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea,” to the 2005 National Strategy for Mari-
time Security) and Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action

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Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

FIGURE 2
SUCCESSFUL AND ATTEMPTED PIRATE ATTACKS OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA,
JANUARY–DECEMBER 2009

Source: ICC—International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report: Report for the Period 1 January–31 December 2009.

Plan, published in 2008.10 The Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy identifies piracy
as a threat to national security, associating it with such other forms of maritime
insecurity as illegal fishing, smuggling, and terrorism and urging that it be ad-
dressed within a multilateral and interagency policy framework. The Partner-
ship and Action Plan outlines three lines of action to repress piracy—preventing
pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain, interrupt-
ing acts of piracy, and holding pirates accountable by prosecuting them.11
The week following the MV Maersk Alabama incident in April 2009, Secre-
tary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton articulated a new counterpiracy strategy.12
It included developing an expanded and better-coordinated multinational re-
sponse, exploring the tracking and freezing of pirate assets, working with the
shipping industry to address gaps in self-defense measures, and engaging diplo-
matically with Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and authori-
ties in Puntland to combat piracy in their territories.13 Finally, it addressed im-
provement in Somalia’s capacity to police its own territory, assistance to Somali
authorities in cracking down on pirate bases, and reduction of incentives for
Somalis to engage in piracy.14

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In spite of the evolving contemporary U.S. maritime security strategy and its
efforts to explore diplomatic, military, economic, and legal means by which to
combat piracy, specific counterpiracy methods have thus far been unbalanced,
with more emphasis placed on addressing the symptoms of instability on land
than on the actual conditions that allowed lawlessness on land to create lawless-
ness at sea. Nonetheless, it appears that the United States is gradually recogniz-
ing the need to adapt to the limitations of current policies and turn its coun-
terpiracy strategy in the direction of conceptually linking efforts to eliminate
insecurity at sea with those to eliminate insecurity on land.

POTENTIAL COUNTERPIRACY METHODS

Eight counterpiracy methods are either currently in use or under consideration
by the United States:
• Accepting piracy as a cost of doing business
• Tracing and targeting pirate finances
• Increasing the defenses of merchant vessels
• Addressing legal impediments to combating piracy
• Continuing multinational naval patrols
• Pursuing kinetic operations on land
• Building local and regional maritime security–sector capacity
• Building local and regional security-sector capacity on land.
The following pages examine these methods, assessing the strengths and weak-
nesses of each.
Accepting Piracy as a Cost of Doing Business
In 2009, of the approximately thirty thousand vessels that pass through the
Gulf of Aden every year, 217 were attacked. Of these, only forty-seven were suc-
cessfully hijacked.15 Given that only 0.72 percent of the ships that traversed the
gulf were attacked in 2009, it is easy to argue that the international community
should simply accept the payment of ransoms to pirates in this region as an
added business expense.
Despite the fact that there is no universally accepted method for enumer-
ating the various costs of piracy, several analysts have attempted to assess the
cost of piracy to global maritime commerce. Contemporary estimates range be-
tween $500 million and $25 billion per year.16 The burdens imposed on govern-
ments and the shipping industry by piracy are often passed on to taxpayers and
consumers:

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• Rerouting ships to bypass pirate-infested waters such as the Gulf of Aden,

adding three thousand miles and from two to three weeks to voyages,
incurring additional fuel costs of $3.5 million per year for tankers and $74.4
million per year for the liner trades
• Opting to pay higher insurance premiums, which have increased from only
five hundred dollars in 2007 to approximately $20,000 per ship per voyage,
excluding injury, liability, and ransom coverage
• Paying ransoms, totaling between $30 million and $150 million in 2008
• Paying ransom-delivery costs, negotiation fees, and lawyer fees
• Hiring licensed private security guards (up to $60,000 for the voyage through
the Gulf of Aden), as well as absorbing the additional insurance costs
associated with embarked security teams or armed sailors
• Installing nonlethal deterrent equipment and employing personnel to
operate it, at a cost of $20,000 to $30,000
• Paying higher wages to crews of vessels transiting waters where pirate attacks
are considered likely
• Sustaining a multinational naval presence in the Gulf of Aden and Indian
Ocean, at a cost of between $250 million and $400 million per year.17
To put these figures into context, global maritime commerce ranges in the
trillions of dollars, so current estimates of losses to piracy are comparatively
small.18 Nonetheless, continued piracy off the coast of Somalia poses a grave
threat to global maritime commerce because of the country’s proximity to the
Gulf of Aden, which is a major sea line of communication. With the opportu-
nity to target any of the thirty thousand vessels that transit the Gulf of Aden
every year, pirate attacks would not only continue, but also escalate in range, fre-
quency, and possibly even lethality due to the opportunity for high and reliable
profits from continued ransom payments and the lack of sufficient deterrents
to continuing such activity. Ransoms paid to pirates operating off the coast of
Somalia have increased from 2004 to the present—from about $500,000 per ves-
sel to upwards of $5.5 million.19 Pirates have learned quickly that publicity pays.
For example, publicity from the fall 2008 hijackings of the MV Faina and the
MV Sirius Star, large ships with controversial or valuable cargoes, enabled the
pirates to negotiate higher ransoms—a process for which a clear, yet elaborate,
mechanism has been established.20
Continued piracy off the coast of Somalia also has negative implications for
other littoral states, especially for Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen, whose port cit-
ies may receive fewer port calls as a result. Additionally, continued attacks have

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negative effects on Egypt, in terms of forgone revenue from vessels that would
have passed through the Suez Canal and paid tolls but decided not to transit the
pirate-infested Gulf of Aden.21 Furthermore, inland markets in East and Central
Africa that depend on imports from ports on the Indian Ocean may also face
increased costs when many of their economies are struggling to recover from
the recent global financial crisis. Finally, continued pirate attacks off the coast
of Somalia risk disrupting the United Nations World Food Programme’s (UN
WFP) food shipments to Somalia—90 percent of which are delivered by sea, to
feed a third of the nation’s population.22
Naturally, one option would be for shipping companies that own hijacked
vessels to refuse to pay ransoms. By paying ransoms these companies contribute
to further destabilization of the region, because the influx of cash enables war-
lords to continue their conflicts on land. Additionally, concerns have emerged
regarding the possibility that pirates might cultivate ties to terrorist groups that
may be affiliated with al-Qa‘ida such as al-Shabaab—albeit out of convenience,
not shared ideology.23 However, prohibiting payment of ransoms by shipping
companies may be impractical, because these companies could face pressure
from politicians, the media, and the families of captured sailors to pay in order
to ensure the safety of the crews and cargoes of hijacked ships.24
Tracing and Targeting Pirate Finances
Pirate gangs operating out of Somalia derive funding, among other benefits,
from an extensive network of support.25 One way to erode this network could be
to trace and target pirate finances, much as is being done to counter other illicit
activities, such as drug trafficking and terrorism.
Investigation of pirate finances would reveal information concerning the
structures of pirate gangs, relationships within and among them, and their do-
mestic and foreign financiers. Targeting pirate finances might erode some of
the active or tacit support pirates gain from spreading money to local officials
and relatives, who then become part of the pirates’ logistical and intelligence
networks.26 Since piracy in this region is a crime of economic incentives and not
one of ideology, once the money dries up, this support network is likely to do the
same. Integral to this approach would be increased information sharing regard-
ing pirate financials among local, regional, and international partners.
A limitation of tracing and targeting pirate finances, however, is that not all
ransoms are paid through formal banking processes. In fact, some involve the
transfer of money through informal channels that leave no paper trail; some
have even been paid in cash, parachuted onto the decks of hijacked vessels. Ap-
plying pressure on such informal banking methods could have the unfortunate
and unintended consequence of driving them farther underground, making

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them more difficult to trace. The question also arises as to whether authorities
in Somalia or even regional states are capable of targeting and seizing pirate as-
sets.27 Some government officials in Somalia and abroad have been accused of
complicity in networked pirate activity, raising the prospect of pirate gangs be-
ing tipped off in time to protect their assets. The country’s cash-based economy
also poses challenges for tracking ransoms or start-up logistical money from So-
mali businessmen.28 Finally, pirates have proved to be adaptive, and it is safe to
assume that they will learn to adapt to the tracing and targeting of their finances
until the underlying economic incentives—for the pirates and for the commu-
nities that provide them sanctuary—are eliminated once and for all.29
Increasing the Defenses of Merchant Vessels
The shipping industry has been an integral part of the search for a counterpiracy
strategy. In January 2009 representatives of twenty-four countries held the inau-
gural meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, creating
four working groups.30 Working Group 3 is led by the United States, with the
support of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and is working to
strengthen shipping industry self-awareness, security, and commercial industry
coordination. The Contact Group now has nearly forty countries and interna-
tional organizations as members or observers, including the United Nations,
the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
the African Union (AU), and the IMO. In February 2009 representatives of the
international shipping industry released a document of best management prac-
tices, advising vessels transiting afflicted areas on how to avoid, deter, or delay
pirate attacks.31 Finally, at the Contact Group’s May 2009 meeting, Panama, Li-
beria, the Bahamas, and the Marshall Islands—whose flag registries together
comprise more than half of the world’s shipping by gross tonnage—signed the
New York Declaration, stating that they agreed to promulgate best practices to
protect ships against pirate attacks.32
Thus far, nonlethal ship protection against pirate attacks has evolved to in-
clude increased surveillance; transit of piracy-prone areas at night, utilizing night
vision equipment for early detection of pirate skiffs; frequent course changes
and evasive maneuvers; transit in convoys, possibly escorted by warships, or
at least in frequent contact with them; operational communications security
protocols preventing disclosure on radio channels of cargoes, intended routes,
or the presence or absence of onboard security, in order to prevent intelligence-
driven attacks; use of maximum safe speeds; rehearsal of lockdown procedures
and seclusion of crews in the pilothouse out of the reach of pirates; the lining
of ships with netting, barbed wire, or electric fencing; the spraying of slippery
foam on deck in the event of attack; and onboard training teams for nonlethal

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response techniques, such as long-range acoustic devices, lasers, flares, micro-

waves, and water hoses.33
Increasing the defenses of merchant vessels generally is certainly a step in
the right direction, since it provides some degree of protection for ships that
have been relatively vulnerable. Particularly, nonlethal techniques have been so
successful that 80 percent of attempted pirate attacks are now foiled without as-
sistance from warships on patrol.34 Nevertheless, they have limitations: they can
still represent delaying tactics at best for the remaining 20 percent of merchant
vessels that were successfully hijacked; also, crew members operating them are
often vulnerable to fire from heavily armed pirates. In contrast, lethal defenses,
such as firearms, could have a deterrent effect on the calculations of pirates, who
might consider the risks of death or capture higher if they know that merchant
vessels may be armed. Possibilities that have been broached are training and
equipping seamen with small arms and embarking private security teams on
board merchant vessels transiting pirate-infested waters.
In June 2009 the House of Representatives proposed two bills designed to in-
crease the security of U.S.-flag vessels against pirates. An amendment to House
Resolution 2647 (signed into law in October 2009 as the National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010), requires the Department of Defense to
place military personnel on the approximately fifty-four U.S.-flag vessels that
carry weapons or military supplies through the waters off the Horn of Africa
each year, in order to prevent military equipment from falling into the hands of
pirates. This requirement will last until either 30 September 2011 or when the
Secretary of Defense notifies Congress that there is no longer a credible piracy
threat to U.S.-flag vessels carrying government cargo—whichever comes ear-
lier.35 House Resolution 2984, the “Mariner and Vessel Protection Act,” in com-
mittee at this writing, would allow vessels carrying arms to enter international
ports, authorize the embarkation of Coast Guard maritime safety and security
teams on U.S.-flag ships transiting pirate-infested waters, and grant immunity
to civilian sailors who, having received firearms training from the Coast Guard,
wound or kill pirates during attacks.36
On the downside, arming seamen or embarking security teams on merchant
vessels presents a new set of questions. First, arming merchant vessels may well
escalate the violence of pirate attacks by encouraging gangs to invest in the qual-
ity and quantity of weapons and to alter their calculations with regard to the use
of force.37 Second, arming crews poses safety and training issues and offers no
guarantee that they would be proficient enough to fend off heavily armed pi-
rates.38 Third, there may be increased insurance costs associated with embarked
security teams or armed sailors, and the shipping industry may calculate that

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it is cheaper to pay ransoms on the odd chance that a ship does get successfully
hijacked.39 Fourth, many international ports do not allow armed merchant ves-
sels to enter, although this obstacle could be overcome by dispatching armed
security teams in separate escort ships, which would stay at sea. Finally, arming
merchant vessels raises legal and liability issues, specifically as they pertain to
whether recognized governmental authorities will provide armed protection or
whether the task will be outsourced to private security firms. The latter opens
the door for very complicated debates regarding rules of engagement, jurisdic-
tion over captured pirates, and the oversight and regulation of private security
counterpiracy operations.
Addressing Legal Impediments to Combating Piracy
The current legal framework for addressing maritime piracy has been one of
the many impediments to combating piracy, with regard to how it addresses is-
sues of state sovereignty, rules of engagement, jurisdiction, and “persons under
control” (PUCs).40 Compounding these difficulties is the fact that the Somali
government is incapable of providing its own legal deterrent to piracy. Nor can
other states in the region process the number of pirates apprehended by navies
patrolling the waters of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and
the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation collectively establish the definition of modern piracy and
the basis of the legal framework, including provisions to render suspected pi-
rates to littoral states (if they are signatories to these conventions) where attacks
take place. In addition, between June 2008 and December 2009 six UN Security
Council resolutions were passed urging states to use the necessary means in
conformity with international law for the repression of acts of piracy, including
authorization for states cooperating with the TFG to enter Somali land or ter-
ritorial waters to combat piracy.41
Among the many impediments that remain is the fact that multinational na-
val patrols off the coast of Somalia have occasionally been obliged to “catch and
release” suspected pirates after confiscating their weapons and skiffs, because
no nations would accept them for trial. In some of these countries, penal codes
do not treat piracy as a punishable offence; other countries can arrest suspected
pirates only if their own interests are directly affected.42 Compounding these
challenges, jurisdiction can be difficult to determine, because several countries
might be affected by an actual or attempted act of piracy, such as the vessel’s flag
state, the state of the company that owns the vessel, the state of the company that
owns the cargo, the states of which crew members are nationals, and the state of
the warship that disrupted the attack.43

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The alternative, prosecuting pirates outside the region—in the United States
or in Europe, for example—would bring its own set of complications. Whether
trials of suspected pirates are held in the region of the attacks or further abroad,
adherence to international norms of human rights means that countries that
accept pirates for prosecution must ensure that suspects are not detained for
long periods of time, which could be a problem for countries with overburdened
legal systems or for cases that require the transport of pirates, witnesses, and
evidence over long distances.44 Additionally, suspected pirates may claim asy-
lum if brought to Europe or the United States, asserting that their lives would
be endangered by the continual warfare and desperate human conditions they
would face should they be found innocent and returned to Somalia.45 This latter
factor threatens the legal deterrent effect that an enhanced international legal
framework should ideally have.
One solution to these impediments would be to strengthen the ability of re-
gional states’ judicial systems to investigate and prosecute suspected pirates and
to incarcerate those convicted. Kenya has signed MOUs with the United States,
the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the EU to prosecute captured pirates in
their court systems on a case-by-case basis. Regional states have also explored
the possibility of assembling teams of law enforcement ship riders that can
board warships, begin criminal investigations at sea, arrest suspected pirates in
the name of the teams’ countries, and then send them for trial in those nations
in order to address some of the problems with PUCs, jurisdiction, and regional
legal capacity.46 Such initiatives could be supported through capacity-building
activities coordinated by the U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement detachments
(LEDETs) and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) teams support-
ing Combined Task Force 151 (discussed below). Finally, an international tri-
bunal for prosecuting pirates could resolve many of the jurisdictional problems
that have arisen, make trials more efficient, and speed up prosecutions that
would have burdened the underdeveloped judicial systems of regional states.47
The evolution of an international legal framework to combat piracy is a posi-
tive development, because it seeks to bolster the presently weak legal deterrent
for current and prospective pirates. Kenya, in exchange for agreeing to try some
of the suspected pirates, will receive assistance to strengthen its judicial system,
which should have the broader benefit of expanding the country’s capacity to
enforce the rule of law and address other threats to security and stability. This
method, if applied to other regional states, could have similar impact on their
judicial systems.
However, as things stand now, prosecution of suspected pirates in regional
countries may present bureaucratic and financial burdens, clogging jails and

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courts and even fomenting social unrest. For instance, Kenya’s judicial system
is engulfed in a debate over whether to prosecute those who instigated violence
following the 2007 presidential election; allegedly, the country’s judicial system
already has a backlog of cases.48 In addition, Kenya may wish not to be a dump-
ing ground for captured pirates, because making it the centerpiece of pirate
prosecution efforts could inflame the country’s Somali refugee population, as
well as its own Muslim population.49
Continuing Multinational Naval Patrols
In support of UN Security Council resolutions passed in 2008 and 2009 in re-
sponse to the rise in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia, the United States and
several international partner nations began to increase air and sea patrols of the
areas where attacks were most likely to take place. In August 2008, the United
States established a movable Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) along the
Yemeni coast to allow a limited number of warships to protect a greater number
of merchant vessels by concentrating the vessels in number and proximity. In
January 2009, ships from over twenty nations joined or otherwise cooperated
with Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) to engage in counterpiracy operations
in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, Gulf of Oman, and Gulf of Aden. CTF
151 is one of three task forces of Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a coalition
of over twenty countries operating in a 2.5-million-square-mile area.50 CMF
had been established in February 2002 by U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command
to “deter destabilizing activities to create a lawful maritime order by defeating
terrorism, deterring piracy, reducing illegal trafficking of people and drugs as
well as promoting the maritime environment as a safe place for mariners with
legitimate business.”51 In order to increase the effectiveness of coordination on
counterpiracy measures at sea, CMF hosts Shared Awareness and Deconfl iction
(SHADE), which involves regular workshop-style meetings of staff-level officers
from the various operational headquarters. SHADE is designed to provide op-
portunities for navies to share information, streamline tactics, and ensure that
assets are used efficiently and with the desired effect.52
In February 2009, the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor
(IRTC), extending 464 miles along the southern coast of Yemen and the north-
ern coast of Somalia, became operational, and coalition warships began to es-
cort merchant vessels through it. The area off the coast of Somalia is patrolled
by approximately thirty warships contributed by CMF, the EU’s Operation ATA-
LANTA, NATO’s Operation OCEAN SHIELD, and navies from such countries as
Russia, India, China, Iran, and Japan.53 In addition, the United States and its
partners monitor pirate activity on the high seas; conduct visit, board, search,
and seizure (VBSS) of suspected pirate skiffs; and provide surveillance of vessels

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that have been hijacked—much as USS Bainbridge and Boxer did during the
Maersk Alabama incident.
As both the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard have the authority to conduct coun-
terpiracy operations, CTF 151 is supported by both Coast Guard law enforcement
detachments and teams of NCIS personnel on board ships in order to address
some of the legal impediments to combating piracy that have arisen.54 LEDETs
are responsible for supplementing Navy VBSS teams in maritime interdiction
operations, training them on issues concerning maritime law, boarding poli-
cies and procedures, evidence collection and preparation, and safe and humane
treatment of suspects. Upon encountering a suspected pirate vessel, air and sea
assets attempt to compel it to allow boarding.55 A LEDET team goes on board
first, to secure and search the skiff, preserve evidence, and radio its assessment
of the situation. Once the vessel is secured, an NCIS team joins the LEDET, and
together they perform a crime-scene investigation, collecting, logging, and se-
curing evidence so as to ensure chain of custody until it can be handed over to a
judicial authority. If the CTF 151 commander determines that there is sufficient
evidence to prosecute, suspected pirates are detained until they can be rendered
for trial in a state willing to accept them.56
A naval presence off the coast of Somalia presumably forces pirates to project
their attacks farther out to sea, aside from disrupting or deterring attacks where
warships are close enough to protect threatened vessels. Additionally, depend-
ing on weather, naval patrols can be scaled back between May and September
and from December to March, when Indian Ocean monsoons produce swells
reaching ten to fifteen feet and pirate skiffs cannot effectively stalk vulnerable
merchant vessels. (However, pirate attacks tend to increase following periods of
poor weather conditions.) 57 Finally, a measure that has not been taken thus far
but may be under consideration is the establishment of a maritime exclusion
zone adjacent to the Somali coastline.58
Despite the palpable deterrent that a naval presence represents, pirates ap-
pear to have developed a fair understanding of the gaps in naval capabilities.
Notwithstanding the MSPA, IRTC, and the patrols of warships from over twenty
navies, pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia in 2009 still accounted for over
half of the attacks worldwide.59 However, on average the success rate for pirate
attacks for this time period was just over 21 percent, compared with 40 percent
for the year 2008.60 Success rates by month in 2009 are detailed in figure 3.
Although pirate attacks had lower rates of success in 2009 than in 2008, coali-
tion maritime forces on the whole simply do not have enough warships to patrol
off the coast of Somalia and protect the tens of thousands of ships that traverse
these waters annually. Responding to an analysis positing that it would take a

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FIGURE 3
SUCCESS RATES OF PIRATE ATTACKS OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA,
JANUARY–DECEMBER 2009

Source: ICC—International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report: Report for the Period 1 January–31 December 2009.

force over three times the size of the entire U.S. Navy to fight piracy effectively,
Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pointed out that
the Navy has other pressing priorities as well, in other parts of the world.61 Fur-
thermore, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead has pointed
to a need for counterpiracy approaches that complement naval patrols, such as
the combined sea and shore strategy that was so instrumental in curbing piracy
in the Strait of Malacca earlier this decade.62 Both the attack trends and the
statements of Navy leadership highlight the limitations inherent in a purely na-
val approach to countering piracy.63
There are specific operational difficulties as well. For example, it has been
estimated that escorting merchant vessels between the Red Sea and Mombasa
alone would require seventy-two ships—more than currently operate in the en-
tire region at any given time.64 In any case, organizing convoys under escort
would compel merchant ships to follow schedules that may not meet market re-
quirements.65 Since convoys move at the speed of the slowest member, a contain-
ership would have to travel as slowly as a tanker.66 Finally, for many countries,
contributing to a sustained naval presence off the coast of Somalia is extremely
costly and plagued by logistic hurdles.

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Pursuing Kinetic Operations on Land

One of the options to consider in order to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia
might include a range of kinetic methods targeting the land-based aspects of pi-
racy. On the lower end of the scale, the international community could mobilize
to launch air strikes or amphibious raids designed to dismantle pirates’ bases
and infrastructure and to destroy their ability to launch attacks out at sea. At
the higher end, surgical air strikes could be followed by military occupation of
the territories from which pirates launch their attacks, providing security (and
eventually enabling governance) and preventing pirates from operating.
The unequivocal attractiveness of kinetic methods applied ashore lies in the
argument that as pirates and their support networks reside ashore, they should
be targeted there. Furthermore, a credible threat of military force could compel
Somali clan leaders and businessmen to clamp down on pirate activity, reducing
it to a level that may turn a profit but that the international community may be
willing to ignore.67
In reality, the United States is unlikely to launch air strikes or send in troops
for several reasons.68 First, attacks on pirate bases or an outright military oc-
cupation would certainly undermine President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed’s TFG,
which already has plenty of obstacles to overcome. Even with—or especially
with—the consent of the TFG, an American attack could provoke greater sup-
port among the population for the pirate gangs or even for ideological groups
like al-Shabaab. Second, there is resistance within the United States to reengag-
ing militarily on land in Somalia, as a result of the October 1993 Black Hawk
Down incident, in which eighteen American soldiers were killed while support-
ing the United Nations Operation in Somalia, known as UNOSOM II, which
was attempting to avert a humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Third, there appears
to be insufficient intelligence to allow pirate infrastructure to be targeted with-
out inflicting civilian casualties, which could further destabilize the country
and energize al-Shabaab.69 Fourth, international norms of human rights dictate
that the United States could not simply kill suspected pirates encountered but
would have to develop a method to capture them, put them on trial within an
acceptable and humane amount of time, and incarcerate those convicted, which
raises legal complications similar to those already discussed. Lastly, were there
to be any sort of military intervention, Western humanitarian relief organiza-
tions currently providing services that the Somali government has been unable
to offer since 1991 could be targeted for reprisals.70
Building Local and Regional Maritime Security–Sector Capacity
Building local and regional maritime security–sector capacity may provide a
deterrent against pirate attacks, finally making pirates accountable for their

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destabilizing activities. To make these countries capable of contributing to mar-

itime security in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, the United States and its
partners could enhance their engagement with maritime security–sector insti-
tutions in Somalia and neighboring littoral countries, such as Djibouti, Kenya,
Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Tanzania, and Yemen.
Somalia has already requested assistance in the form of training and equip-
ment from the international community to establish a coast guard to help tackle
piracy. The TFG has also been training five hundred young men to serve in the
Somali navy, which its chief hopes will eventually have five thousand men.71
However, training has thus far taken place on land, since the force has no op-
erational ships. Although Somalia would like to provide for its own maritime
security, its transitional government is likely to be preoccupied in the short term
with staving off defeat by various insurgent groups and gaining control of its
own capital city.72 Consequently, the maritime security gap will have to be fi lled
by regional and international partners in the meantime.
Regrettably, however, most countries in the region are currently ill equipped
to provide maritime security even for themselves, let alone Somalia; they lack
the requisite training and equipment, and their security forces have tradition-
ally been land focused. In order to build their capacity to deal with maritime
threats, the United States and international partners could augment security
cooperation agreements, offering to train maritime security personnel; equip
and assist in the maintenance of vessels; share best practices for the collection,
sharing, and synchronization of intelligence; provide aerial surveillance; and
coordinate multilateral naval training exercises designed to increase regional
cooperation.73 Ideally, these countries would eventually be able to patrol with
international partners by air and sea; conduct surveillance of the littoral zone;
facilitate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information on possible
maritime threats; encourage interagency and multinational cooperation; and
harmonize maritime doctrines.74
As a step in the right direction, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, the
Maldives, the Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Yemen signed in February
2009 a code of conduct to counter piracy, agreeing to establish counterpiracy
information centers in Mombasa, Dar es Salaam, and Sanaa and a counterpiracy
training center in Djibouti.75 Also, in June 2009, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jor-
dan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, and
Yemen agreed upon the formation of an Arab Anti-Piracy Task Force to provide
maritime security for states in the region and enhance cooperation with multi-
national naval patrols.76 In addition, Kenya and Tanzania have pledged to start
joint naval operations, and in the spring of 2009 the Seychelles became the first

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East African nation to assist in operations carried out by the EU’s Operation
ATALANTA.77
Increased coordination among regional stakeholder states could set prec-
edents for sustained regional maritime security cooperation that could be ex-
tended to other maritime security threats, such as arms trafficking, human
trafficking, drug trafficking, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing
(which was arguably what drove Somali fishermen to pursue piracy on a much
smaller scale in the 1990s). Regardless, the present limitations of local and re-
gional maritime capacity mean that the benefits of such regional and interna-
tional initiatives are more likely to have concrete impact over the long term than
in the immediate future.
Building Local and Regional Security-Sector Capacity on Land
As a result of the security and governance vacuum in Somalia, lawlessness ashore
is likely to continue to create lawlessness at sea unless security-sector capacity
can be built up both in Somalia and in neighboring states. In order to build
this capacity with the intent that these countries would increasingly contribute
to the provision of security in the region, the United States and international
partners could enhance engagement with local and regional security-sector in-
stitutions on land.
Given the fact that Somalia lacks functional governing institutions to sup-
port a security sector, one will have to be built from scratch, which will require
a costly and sustained whole of government multinational commitment. Inter-
national security assistance could equip Somalia to develop a police force and
military supported by robust security-sector institutions that could enable the
country to address the security and governance vacuum that allows pirates and
insurgents to thrive. That said, the TFG is currently extremely weak, controlling
little territory within the country it purports to govern. In the meantime, the
United States and its partners could address capability gaps in regional partner
nations like Kenya and Djibouti, in nations that do not share a border with So-
malia (such as Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda), and in regional and
subregional organizations like the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development. Ideally, the regional militaries could become more able and will-
ing to build governing institutions in Somalia and help provide security there,
in the event of a more viable and inclusive peace agreement.
However, it is for all intents and purposes impossible to disaggregate Soma-
lia’s problems, whether on land or at sea, from other conflicts in the region, such
as the proxy war often fought on Somali soil between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and
Ethiopia’s internal security concerns in the Ogaden region.78 Though it is impor-
tant to attempt to maintain dialogues with Ethiopia and Eritrea on the situation

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in Somalia, it might be advisable therefore to exclude them from efforts to build

capacity specifically to address instability there. Furthermore, the international
community will have to remain sensitive to Kenya’s concerns via-à-vis its own
internal security issues. With lucrative foreign investments, a tourism industry
shaken by electoral violence two years ago, and almost three hundred thousand
Somali refugees along the porous border with Somalia, Kenya takes very seri-
ously the threats issued by al-Shabaab to launch terrorist attacks in Kenya if the
country were to become militarily involved in Somalia.79
The international community should also consider concrete financial, logis-
tical, and political support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
and any successor multinational peacekeeping forces so that they might be-
come capable of achieving their strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.80
AMISOM was authorized by a communiqué of the sixty-ninth meeting of the
Peace and Security Council of the African Union, on 19 January 2007.81 One of
just a handful of AU peacekeeping missions, AMISOM was essentially stillborn
in the face of a challenging security environment in Somalia as well as opera-
tional and tactical setbacks. It was initially authorized for six months from the
date of the communiqué, with a mandate (set out in paragraph nine of the UN
Security Council Resolution 1772) that included:
• Providing support to transitional federal institutions, to help them carry out
their functions of government
• Supporting dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia
• Providing security for key infrastructure
• Assisting with the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization
Plan, in particular the effective reestablishment of the Somali security forces
• Facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance.82
AMISOM’s mandate has been extended several times, most recently to 31 Janu-
ary 2011, as authorized by UN Security Resolution 1910.83
In addition to a mandate that was restricted to self-defense and the protec-
tion of a weak and divided government, AMISOM has encountered several dif-
ficulties. AMISOM has suffered from unfulfi lled commitments made by the in-
ternational community. The original understanding was that AMISOM would
evolve into a UN peacekeeping mission upon the expiration of its initial man-
date in June 2007, but as of early 2010 this has not occurred. AMISOM has been
able to muster only 5,200 of its authorized troop strength of eight thousand
soldiers, which have been contributed by Uganda and Burundi, although Nige-
ria, Ghana, and Malawi pledged troops that were never deployed. Also, the AU,
unable to finance the mission on its own, had to rely on ad hoc international

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financial assistance for training and equipment, which has proved insufficient.
Additionally, although initiated and staffed by African personnel, AMISOM
was perceived in Somalia as a tool of Western interests, and its soldiers were
consequently targeted by insurgents.84 Finally, AMISOM forces were accused of
human rights violations, having used indiscriminate violence to defend them-
selves against attacks. Only in the spring of 2009 did AMISOM change tactics,
returning fire only if attackers could be visually identified, but by that time their
actions had already further alienated the population from the TFG.85

ADEPT AND CULTURALLY SENSITIVE ENGAGEMENT

Piracy off the coast of Somalia must be analyzed in the context from which it
emerged if a comprehensive and sustainable response is to be crafted. Piracy is
a symptom of instability on land; as such, counterpiracy methods that focus on
the symptoms of lawlessness on land rather than on its root causes do little to
mitigate the conditions that allowed piracy to emerge in the first place. Because
piracy is a land-based enterprise, possible counterpiracy solutions must be as-
sessed in terms of how they would positively impact conditions ashore.
In the preceding paragraphs, the author outlined a variety of counterpiracy
methods. Assuming pirate attacks would escalate in range, frequency, and le-
thality were they to be accepted as a cost of doing business, this option may be
infeasible. However, the remaining methods could have a positive impact if their
strengths are pursued in concert. In order to reach maximum effectiveness, an
ideal counterpiracy strategy would address the catalysts of instability as well as
its manifestations in the maritime domain.
A comprehensive and sustainable strategy to address piracy off the coast of
Somalia would entail the United States working with regional and international
partners to trace and target pirate finances, albeit with a clear understanding of
the limitations of this approach in Somalia’s cash-based economy. Additionally,
international stakeholders would have to be conscious of the inability of this
method to target the underlying conditions that allowed piracy to emerge in the
first place.
The U.S. government should also maintain its engagement with the shipping
industry, not only to make nonlethal ship defenses more effective and wide-
spread but also to explore how seamen utilizing them could make themselves
less vulnerable while under attack. Lethal defenses of merchant vessels should be
avoided if possible, due to the possibility of escalation of violence during pirate
attacks, as well as the various liability and oversight issues that could arise. In
any case, nonlethal or lethal merchant vessel defenses address only the symp-
toms of instability on land.

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To alleviate the bureaucratic and financial burdens on regional states willing

to accept suspected pirates for trial, the United States and its partners should
support a regional ship-rider program. In addition, international stakeholders
should emphasize building the capacity of the judicial systems in the region in
order to bolster legal deterrents to those who wish to foment instability in So-
malia or elsewhere in the region. Above all, a reliable process by which countries
apprehending pirates at sea can deliver suspects for trial and incarceration is
essential. However, addressing legal impediments to combating piracy fails to
address the conditions from which piracy emerged.
Multinational naval patrols should be continued, sensitive to seasonal fluxes
in pirate attacks and acknowledging the limited ability of these warships to pro-
tect the tens of thousands of merchant vessels that transit the region on a yearly
basis. However, such a method should recognize the limitations of a solely sea-
based approach to countering piracy, as it targets the symptoms of instability
and is no substitute for enhanced regional maritime capacity and law and order
on land in Somalia. Multinational naval patrols may also be unsustainable over
the long term.
However ill advised and improbable it may be in practice, a credible threat
of kinetic military action on land could encourage pirates to reduce their at-
tacks to a pre-2008 level that might not draw the attention of the international
community. If actually put in practice, a U.S. attack on Somali pirate bases or
an outright invasion might address some of the conditions that allowed piracy
to emerge, but at the cost of increasing the level of intensity of the insurgency
in Somalia as a whole. Therefore, this method should be avoided in spite of its
potential to address the security and governance gap in Somalia.
Building local and regional maritime security–sector capacity is an important
area for international engagement, since regional states must eventually bear
some of the burden of maritime security in their region under any long-term
counterpiracy strategy. Specifically, East African and Persian Gulf states should
continue regional maritime security cooperation supported by international
partners. The goal would be to harmonize regional maritime coordination ef-
forts by sharing information regarding suspicious activity and conducting joint
patrols with the support of nonregional partners. Like the multinational naval
patrols, this method is limited by the fact that it only targets the symptoms of
instability. However, it is possible that over the long term increased maritime se-
curity in the Horn of Africa could lessen seaborne threats that have contributed
to lawlessness on land in Somalia, such as illegal fishing and arms trafficking.
Although the methods above can contribute greatly to the eventual success
of the counterpiracy campaign, a truly comprehensive and sustainable counter-
piracy strategy in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean must address the security

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vacuum on land in Somalia that has created the conditions that allow piracy
to thrive. While UN boots on the ground are increasingly unlikely, the inter-
national community should continue to support the Djibouti Agreement, al-
though it is arguably handicapped by its lack of inclusivity.86 As an alternative,
the international community could encourage a new round of peace talks, advo-
cating maximum practical participation, encouraging clans and factions to buy
in to a peaceful Somalia where law and order thrive. More inclusive peace talks
may in fact be a prerequisite to any reduction in violence in Somalia, and they
could provide the space necessary to address the governance vacuum.
Flaws notwithstanding, it is crucial that the international community sup-
port initiatives such as AMISOM with a strong and sustained commitment to
provide financing, training, and equipment, since it is an attempt to create and
sustain an African peacekeeping force whose mere existence is at the very least a
positive development for African regional security. Stronger international sup-
port may make African countries that have pledged troops but have not sent
them more willing to do so. Although peacekeeping is by no means nation
building, the presence of a sufficiently trained and equipped peacekeeping force
could contribute to an environment amenable to political, social, and economic
development in Somalia.
In any long-term diplomatic or military engagement with Somalia, the inter-
national community will have to decide how best to deal with nonstate entities
in Somalia. It should be open to abandoning the notion of a unified Somali state
in order to accommodate entities like Somaliland, which declared independence
from Somalia in 1991, and Puntland, which declared its autonomy in 1998. So-
malia as it stands now does not act like a state; for the international community
to engage with Somalia as it would with a state presents more complexities than
can be managed in the current security and humanitarian situation. In particu-
lar, the United States and its international partners should weigh the costs and
benefits of dealing directly, on a case-by-case basis, with legitimate and effective
local authorities within Somalia, regardless of their affi liation or lack thereof
with the Somali government. In the long run, these alternative identities and
centers of authority may prove capable of providing law and order in Somalia in
a way that a central government has been unable to do for two decades.87 Select-
ing local authorities for engagement could, admittedly, intensify competition
among them and undermine the authority of the TFG; nonetheless, an adept
and culturally sensitive engagement strategy may reveal that state and nonstate
authorities are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
As a precaution, any support the United States gives to Somalia should not
be too overt, as it could backfire, empowering hard-liners and reversing gains in
governance and security. On one hand, Somali president Sheikh Sharif Ahmed

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needs external support to maintain the TFG’s current position; on the other hand,
he needs broad support within Somalia if his government is to be successful. If he
relies too much on the former, it will compromise his success with the latter.88
In the end, by addressing the security and governance vacuum in Somalia by
building local and regional capacity through a long-term multinational com-
mitment, the United States and international partners may be able to assist in
eliminating insecurity on land and the resultant insecurity at sea that has mani-
fested itself in the recent spike in pirate attacks. The key to success in countering
piracy off the coast of Somalia lies in conceptually linking the positive elements
of current sea-based counterpiracy methods with approaches designed to rem-
edy the underlying instability ashore that produced piracy in the first place.

NOTES

The author would like to thank Captain 5. Clive Schoefield, “Plaguing the Waves: Rising
Peter Swartz, USN (Ret.), and Dr. Eric V. Piracy Threat off the Horn of Africa,” Jane’s
Thompson for their substantive comments Intelligence Review, 1 July 2007, www.janes
on earlier drafts. Any remaining errors are .com. See also Roger Middleton, “Piracy in
the author’s alone. Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feed-
1. This article uses the UNCLOS definition of ing Local Wars,” Chatham House Briefing
piracy, which states (article 101), “Piracy con- Paper (October 2008), available at www
sists of any of the following acts: (a) any il- .chathamhouse.org.uk/. See also Scott
legal acts of violence or detention, or any act Baladauf, “Piracy Raises Pressure for New
of depredation, committed for private ends International Tack on Somalia,” Christian
by the crew or the passengers of a private Science Monitor, 6 January 2009, available at
ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on www.csmonitor.com.
the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, 6. Martin Murphy, “High Resolution: Trying
or against persons or property on board such to Tame Somalia’s Piracy Problem,” Jane’s
ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, Intelligence Review, 17 July 2008, available at
persons or property in a place outside the www.janes.com.
jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of 7. ICC—International Maritime Bureau [here-
voluntary participation in the operation of a after IMB], “IMB Reports Unprecedented
ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts Rise in Maritime Hijackings,” ICC Commer-
making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act cial Crime Services, 16 January 2009, www
of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an .icc-ccs.org/.
act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).”
8. IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
2. Gary E. Weir, “Fish, Family, and Profit: Piracy Report: Report for the Period 1 January–31
and the Horn of Africa,” Naval War College December 2009 (London: January 2010).
Review 62, no. 3 (Summer 2009), pp. 15–29.
9. Abdiqani Hassan, “Somali Pirates ‘Smell
3. Ken Menkhaus, “Dangerous Waters,” Survival Money’ as Good Times Return,” Reuters UK,
51, no. 1 (February–March 2009), pp. 21–25. 10 April 2009, available at uk.reuters.com/.
See also Clive Schoefield, “The Other Pirates See also “Pirates Expand into Oman’s Wa-
of the Horn of Africa,” RSIS Commentaries, 5 ters,” BBC News, 12 June 2009, news.bbc
January 2009, available at www.rsis.edu.sg/. .co.uk/.
4. Johann Hari, “You Are Being Lied to about 10. “Memorandum from the President: United
Pirates,” Huffington Post, 12 April 2009, www States Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy,”
.huffingtonpost.com/. 14 June 2007, available at www.marad.dot
.gov/ as annex 1 of National Security Council,
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Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: 16. Peter Chalk, Maritime Piracy: Reasons,
Partnership and Action Plan (Washington, Dangers and Solutions—Testimony Presented
D.C.: December 2008). See also The National before the House Transportation and Infra-
Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, structure Committee, Subcommittee on Coast
D.C.: September 2005), available at www.dhs Guard and Maritime Transportation, February
.gov/. 4, 2009, RAND Corporation Testimony,
11. National Security Council, Countering Piracy CT-317, February 2009, www.rand.org/. See
off the Horn of Africa. also Martin N. Murphy, Contemporary Piracy
and Maritime Terrorism, Adelphi Paper 388
12. The U.S.-flag containership Maersk Alabama (London: International Institute for Strategic
was hijacked on 8 April 2009 approximately Studies, 2007).
three hundred miles off the coast of Somalia,
while en route to Mombasa, Kenya. Follow- 17. “The Long Way Around,” Lloyd’s List, 26
ing a scuffle with the pirates, Alabama’s crew November 2008. See also “Piracy Could Add
of twenty U.S. nationals was able to retake $400m to Owners’ Insurance Cover Costs,”
the ship; the master, Richard Phillips, who Lloyd’s List, 21 November 2008; Murphy,
had surrendered to ensure the safety of his Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terror-
crew, was taken hostage aboard a twenty- ism; U.S. Transportation Dept., Economic
eight-foot lifeboat. The USS Bainbridge Impact of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden on Global
(DDG 96, a guided-missile destroyer), USS Trade (Washington, D.C.: Maritime Adminis-
Boxer (LHD 4, an amphibious assault ship), tration, 2009), available at www.marad.dot
and USS Halyburton (FFG 40, a guided- .gov/; and John Knott, “Somalia: Clan
missile frigate) were dispatched to the scene. Rivalry, Military Conflict, and the Financial
The standoff was resolved on 12 April, when and Human Cost of Piracy,” Mondaq.com, 17
three of the four pirates were killed by SEAL March 2009.
snipers on board Bainbridge when it was 18. Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime
determined that Captain Phillips was in im- Terrorism. See also Robert Wright, “Somali
minent danger. The fourth pirate, who had Pirates Release Captured Ship,” Financial
been on board Bainbridge to receive medical Times, 19 January 2010, available at www
treatment and negotiate the master’s ransom, .ft.com.
was taken into custody and at this writing 19. House Committee on Transportation and In-
awaits trial in New York. Although short- frastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard
lived, the hijacking of Alabama was the first and Maritime Transportation, Summary of
successful pirate seizure of a U.S.-flag ship in Subject Matter: International Piracy on the
almost two hundred years. High Seas, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 4 February
13. The leaders of Puntland, a region in north- 2009, available at transportation.house.gov/.
east Somalia, declared it an autonomous 20. “Who Do Pirates Call to Get Their Cash?”
state in 1998 as a result of the collapse of the BBC News, 29 January 2009, news.bbc.co.uk/.
central government in Somalia in 1991. In
the spring of 2009, a UN Security Council 21. Analysts attribute the drop in canal traffic
report named Puntland as home to several and revenue to the economic crisis but warn
pirate bases and accused the government that it has the potential to be affected by
that had been in power at the end of 2008 of piracy. “Suez Canal Revenue down 26%,”
complicity in pirate activity. Ban Ki-moon, AMEInfo.com, 24 March 2009. See also “Suez
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Canal Revenue Drops,” Agence France-Presse,
Security Council Resolution 1846 (2008) (New 23 March 2009, available at www.straitstimes
York: UN Security Council, 16 March 2009), .com/.
available at daccessdds.un.org/doc/. 22. United Nations, “Countries: Somalia,” United
14. “Announcement of Counter-piracy Initia- Nations World Food Programme, www.wfp
tives: Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of .org/countries/somalia.
State, Washington, DC, April 15, 2009,” U.S. 23. Bruno Schiemsky, “Piracy’s Rising Tide: So-
Department of State: Diplomacy in Action, mali Piracy Develops and Diversifies,” Jane’s
www.state.gov/. Intelligence Review, 16 January 2009, www
15. IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships .janes.com. See also Tim Sullivan, “A Wicked
Report. Brew: Piracy and Islamism in the Horn of

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Africa,” Small Wars Journal, 29 November 30. “Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
2008, smallwarsjournal.com/. See also “The Somalia: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Lawless Horn,” Economist, 20 November Fact Sheet, January 14, 2009,” U.S. Depart-
2008. ment of State: Diplomacy in Action, www
24. J. Peter Pham, “‘Strategic Interests’: Ponder- .state.gov/. Working Group 1 is led by the
ing Somali Piracy,” World Defense Review, 23 United Kingdom, with the support of the
April 2009, worlddefensereview.com/. International Maritime Organization, and is
addressing activities related to military and
25. According to a UN report released in Decem- operational coordination, information shar-
ber 2008, revenues gained from the payment ing, capacity building, and the establishment
of ransoms are distributed as follows: 30 per- of a regional coordination center. Working
cent for sponsors, 20 percent for financiers, Group 2 is led by Denmark, with the sup-
30 percent for the maritime militia (pirates port of the United Nations Office of Drugs
involved in the actual hijacking), 10 percent and Crime (UNODC), and is addressing
for the ground militia (controlling the ter- the judicial aspects of piracy and assisting
ritory where the pirates are based), and 10 regional states in building the legal capacity
percent for local community, including elders to prosecute pirates. Working Group 4, led
and local officials. In addition, the families by Egypt, is seeking to improve diplomatic
of pirates killed during an operation are paid and public information efforts on all aspects
compensation. Dumisani Shadrack Kumalo, of piracy.
“Letter dated 10 December 2008 from the
Chairman of the Security Council Commit- 31. Oil Companies International Marine Forum
tee Established Pursuant to Resolution 751 [hereafter OCIMF], Piracy: The East Africa/
(1992) Concerning Somalia Addressed to the Somalia Situation: Practical Measures to
President of the Security Council,” United Avoid, Deter, or Delay Piracy Attacks (London:
Nations Security Council, 10 December 2008, 2009), available at www.marad.dot.gov/.
available at www.securitycouncilreport.org/. 32. Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the
26. Xan Rice and Abdiqani Hassan, “Life Is Sweet Spokesman, “The Bahamas, the Republic of
in the Piracy Capital of the World,” Guardian, Liberia, the Republic of Marshall Islands and
19 November 2008, available at www the Republic of Panama Announce Their
.guardian.co.uk/. Commitment to Best Practices to Avoid,
Deter or Delay Acts of Piracy,” 29 May 2009,
27. Tabassum Zakaria, “US Chase of Somali U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Ac-
Pirate Assets Faces Rough Seas,” Reuters, 21 tion, www.state.gov/.
April 2009, www.reuters.com/.
33. Patrick Lennox, “Contemporary Piracy off
28. It costs investors approximately six thousand the Coast of Africa,” Canadian Defence and
dollars to send a team of pirates out search- Foreign Affairs Institute (December 2008). See
ing for ships to hijack. This money goes also OCIMF, Piracy.
toward the purchase of food, ammunition,
and fuel and the rental of rocket-propelled- 34. Brian Murphy, “US Admiral: Pirates Facing
grenade launchers and speedboats. Rob Tougher Merchant Ships,” Associated Press,
Walker, “Inside Story of a Somali Pirate At- 21 August 2009, available at news.yahoo.com/.
tack,” BBC News, 4 June 2009, news.bbc 35. H. Amdt. 269, available at www.govtrack
.co.uk/. See also Antonio Maria Costa, .us/. See also Rebekah Gordon, “Amendment
“Fighting Somali Piracy on Land, Not at Sea,” Mandates Military on US Cargo Ships Facing
Globeandmail.com, 22 April 2009. Piracy Risk,” Inside the Navy, 29 June 2009.
29. Compared to an estimated average annual 36. H.R. 2984, available at www.govtrack.us/. See
income of $650 per year, pirates may be able also Susan Gvozdas, “House Bill Would Give
to earn ten thousand dollars per raid, creat- Immunity to Mariners,” Navy Times, 23 June
ing a high potential for reward in a situation 2009.
with very few risks or punishments. Roger 37. “Fighting Off the Somali Pirates,” BBC News,
Middleton, “Piracy a Symptom of a Bigger 16 April 2009, news.bbc.co.uk/.
Problem,” BBC News, 15 April 2009, news
.bbc.co.uk/.

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38. Mark Bernstein, “How Do We Make the Sea 48. Alisha Ryu, “Paris-Based Group Says Accused
Lanes Safe?” World Trade Magazine, 11 June Somali Pirates Denied Rights,” Voice of Amer-
2009, available at www.worldtrademag.com/. ica, 27 August 2009, www.voanews.com/.
39. Mark Mazzetti, “Standoff with Somali Pirates 49. James Butty, “Kenyan Foreign Minister Shed
Shows US Power Has Limits,” New York Light on US-Kenya Piracy Agreement,” Voice
Times, 10 April 2009. of America, 28 January 2009, www.voanews
40. In the case of maritime piracy, not only .com/.
suspected pirates but witnesses and victims 50. In addition to CTF 151, CMF has Combined
of pirate attacks might be PUCs. See James Task Force 150 (CTF 150) and Combined
Kraska and Brian Wilson, “Fighting Piracy,” Task Force 152 (CTF 152). CTF 150 operates
Armed Forces Journal (February 2009). in the same area of responsibility as CTF 151
41. The UN Security Council resolutions and was given the counterpiracy mission,
(UNSCRs) passed in 2008 and 2009 that as a gap filler, until the latter was in place.
concern piracy are UNSCRs 1816 (June CTF 150, however, had been established in
2008), 1838 (October 2008), 1844 (Novem- 2001 to deter destabilizing activities such as
ber 2008), 1846 (December 2008, renewing drug, arms, and human smuggling and to
UNSCR 1816), 1851 (December 2008), and counter acts of violent extremism. CTF 152
1897 (December 2009, renewing 1846 and was established in 2004 to coordinate theater
1851). security cooperation activities with navies
in the southern and central Persian Gulf.
42. Sonia Phalnikar, “Governments Struggle Richard Scott, “Policing the Maritime Beat:
to Combat Piracy with Legal Measures,” Combined Maritime Forces,” Jane’s Defence
Deutsche Welle, 26 August 2009, available at Weekly, 22 April 2009, www.janes.com.
www.dw-world.de/.
51. Nathan Schaeffer, “Deterring Piracy at Sea,”
43. Kraska and Wilson, “Fighting Piracy.” All Hands, no. 1103 (February 2009), pp.
44. Costa, “Fighting Somali Piracy on Land, Not 18–23.
at Sea.” 52. Nathan Schaeffer, “Combined Maritime
45. U.S. Coast Guard, Statement of RADM Wil- Forces Works with International Navies to
liam Baumgartner on International Piracy Counter Piracy,” Navy.mil, 28 May 2009. See
on the High Seas before the Subcommittee also Lisa M. Novak, “Naval Officials Discuss
on Coast Guard & Maritime Transportation, Anti-piracy Tactics,” Stars and Stripes, 28 May
Committee on Transportation & Infrastruc- 2009; and Scott, “Policing the Maritime Beat.”
ture, U.S. House of Representatives, February 53. The EU’s Operation ATALANTA, commenced
4, 2009, available at www.marad.dot.gov/. in December 2008, is focused on deterring,
46. This policy is currently in force in the Carib- preventing, and repressing acts of piracy
bean to facilitate criminal and legal prepara- and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia
tions for the trials of drug traffickers. Costa, by escorting UN WFP vessels and protect-
“Fighting Somali Piracy on Land, Not at Sea.” ing other vulnerable vessels transiting these
waters. NATO’s OCEAN SHIELD was begun in
47. At the May 2009 meeting of the Contact
August 2009 to build the maritime capacities
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,
of regional states to combat piracy. OCEAN
members endorsed the creation of an Inter-
SHIELD will also continue the mission of
national Trust Fund to defray expenses of
Operation ALLIED PROTECTOR, launched
prosecuting suspected pirates. Bureau of
in March 2009, to deter, disrupt, and defend
Public Affairs, Office of the Spokesman,
against pirate activity off the coast of Soma-
“Third Plenary Meeting of the Contact
lia. A previous operation, ALLIED PROVIDER,
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,”
lasted from October to December 2008 and
29 May 2009, U.S. Department of State:
escorted UN WFP vessels off the coast of
Diplomacy in Action, www.state.gov/. See also
Somalia.
Adam Gonn, “Kenya Mulls Hosting Piracy
Tribunal,” Allheadlinenews.com, 20 April 54. U.S. Coast Guard, Statement of RADM Brian
2009. M. Salerno, Assistant Commandant for Marine

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Safety, Security, and Stewardship, on Piracy 68. Gary J. Ohls, Somalia . . . From the Sea,
on the High Seas: Protecting Our Ships, Crews, Newport Paper 34 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War
and Passengers, before the Subcommittee on College Press, July 2009).
Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine 69. Andrew Gray and Sue Pleming, “US Said Un-
Infrastructure, Safety, and Security, Committee likely to Attack Somali Pirate Bases,” Reuters,
on Commerce, U.S. Senate, May 5, 2009, avail- 20 April 2009, available at www.reuters.com/.
able at www.marad.dot.gov/. See also Baladauf, “Piracy Raises Pressure for
55. “Navy, Coast Guard Join Forces to Combat New International Tack on Somalia.”
Piracy,” CGNews, 21 January 2009, available 70. “Somalia: Piracy and the Policy Vacuum,”
at coastguardnews.com/. allAfrica.com, 22 November 2008.
56. James Warden, “The Law of the Seas: U.S. 71. “Somali Anti-pirate Coastguard Bid,” BBC
Troops Gather Evidence for Prosecution of News, 18 May 2009, news.bbc.co.uk/.
Aden Piracy,” Stars and Stripes, 30 March
2009. See also James P. Terry, “Eliminating 72. Alisha Ryu, “Analyst Skeptical New Somali
High Seas Piracy: Legal and Policy Consid- Navy Can Fight Piracy,” Voice of America, 18
erations,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 54 (3rd June 2009, www.voanews.com/.
Quarter 2009); Monique K. Hilley, “NCIS 73. Lars Bangert Struwe, For a Greater Horn
Lends Expertise to Counterpiracy Opera- of Africa Sea Patrol: A Strategic Analysis of
tions,” Navy.mil, 20 February 2009; and U.S. the Somali Pirate Challenge (Copenhagen:
Coast Guard, Statement of RADM William Danish Institute for Military Studies, March
Baumgartner. 2009), available at www.difms.dk/. See also
57. OCIMF, Piracy. James Jay Carafano, Richard Weitz, and
Martin Edwin Andersen, Maritime Secu-
58. James Kraska, “Fresh Thinking for an Old rity: Fighting Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and
Problem: Report of the Naval War College Beyond, Heritage Foundation Special Report
Workshop on Countering Maritime Piracy,” (Washington, D.C.: 24 June 2009), available
Naval War College Review 62, no. 4 (Autumn at www.heritage.org/.
2009), pp. 141–54.
74. J. Peter Pham, “‘Strategic Interests’: A Sus-
59. IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships tainable Response to the Scourge of Somali
Report. Piracy,” World Defense Review, 26 February
60. Lauren Caldwell, “Pirate Attacks off Africa 2009, worlddefensereview.com/. See also
Less Successful, Official Says,” America.gov, 7 Peter Chalk, “Maritime Violence, Crime and
July 2009. Insecurity: Nigeria—a Case Study,” Journal
61. Andrea Shalal-Esa, “Fight against Pirates Also of International Peace Operations 4, no. 3
Needed Ashore: US Navy,” Reuters, 4 May (November–December 2008), pp. 17–19.
2009, available at www.reuters.com/. 75. J. Peter Pham, “‘Strategic Interests’: Despite
62. Ibid. Progress, Somali Pirate Threat Persists—and
May Grow Larger,” World Defense Review, 19
63. Jacquelyn Porth, “East Africa: Piracy off February 2009, worlddefensereview.com/.
the Horn of Africa Threatens Relief Efforts,
Trade,” allAfrica.com, 31 October 2008. 76. “Arab Mission to Combat Piracy off Somalia,”
Bernama.com, 30 June 2009. See also Paul
64. Bernstein, “How Do We Make the Sea Lanes Handley, “All-Arab Red Sea Anti-piracy Force
Safe?” See also Donna Miles, “Admiral Cites Proposed in Riyadh,” Agence France-Presse,
Partnership, Commitment as Keys to Piracy 29 June 2009, available at www.google.com/.
Crackdown,” Navy.mil, 13 May 2009.
77. “Somali Anti-pirate Coastguard Bid.” See also
65. Anne Gearan, “US Military Ponders Options Helmoed-Römer Heitman, “Seychelles Con-
to Combat Piracy,” Associated Press, 18 April tributes to Anti-piracy Efforts,” Jane’s Defence
2009, available at Google.com Weekly, 6 May 2009, www.janes.com.
66. Bernstein, “How Do We Make the Sea Lanes 78. Originally an Italian colony until 1941, Eri-
Safe?” trea became federated with and was annexed
67. Zakaria, “US Chase of Somali Pirate Assets by Ethiopia, in 1950 and 1962, respectively.
Faces Rough Seas.” Eritrea fought for independence for over

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thirty years, expelling Ethiopian forces from 81. African Union, Communiqué of the 69th
the majority of its territory by 1991. In a UN- Meeting of the Peace and Security Council
sponsored referendum held in 1993, Eritrea of the African Union (Addis Ababa: African
voted for independence. The two countries Union Peace and Security Council, 19 Janu-
returned to war between 1998 and 2000 as ary 2007), available at www.iss.co.za/.
the result of a border conflict concerning 82. UN Security Council Resolution 1772, 20 Au-
the city of Badme. Eritrea has been accused gust 2007, available at daccessdds.un.org/.
of arming and supporting rebel movements
throughout the Horn of Africa, particu- 83. UN Security Council Resolution 1910, 28
larly in Somalia and Ethiopia. Following January 2010, available at www.un.org/.
the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006, 84. Paul D. Williams, “AMISOM’s Five Chal-
Eritrea hosted exiled members of the ICU lenges,” Africa Policy Forum, 12 May 2009,
and its successor organization, the Alliance forums.csis.org/.
for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS)—like
85. Ibid.
Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, who had sus-
pected terrorist connections. This worsened 86. From 31 May to 9 June 2008, the UN medi-
already strained relations between Eritrea ated a conference between the TFG and the
and the United States. Peter Clottey, “Somalia ARS (the ICU’s successor organization) in
Has Proof of Eritrea’s Meddling in Internal Djibouti. The eleven-point Djibouti Agree-
Affairs, Says Minister,” Voice of America, 5 ment, signed 9 June 2008, called for a ninety-
May 2009, www.voanews.com/. day cease-fire, set a withdrawal timetable for
the Ethiopian troops within 120 days of the
The Ogaden is an eastern region of Ethiopia
signing of the agreement, and requested that
that borders Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya;
the UN authorize and deploy an interna-
it has a predominantly Muslim and ethnic
tional stabilization force from countries
Somali population. Between 1977 and 1978
that were friends of Somalia, excluding
Ethiopia and Somalia went to war as a result
neighboring states. However, ARS chair-
of General Mohamed Siad Barre’s desire to
man and current Somali president Sheikh
incorporate ethnic Somalis into a “Greater
Sharif Ahmed had negotiated it without first
Somalia” encompassing Somalia, Djibouti,
securing the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops
the North Eastern Province of Kenya, and the
from Somalia; accordingly, the hard-line
Ogaden. It is believed that the ICU’s stated
Islamist Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and like-
aim to form a “Greater Somalia” during the
minded supporters rejected the agreement
short period in which it ruled Somalia was
and continue to be part of the insurgency in
one of the reasons for the Ethiopian inva-
Somalia today. The AU and all states in the
sion of the country in late 2006. Ethiopia
region except for Eritrea have endorsed the
withdrew its troops in December 2008 but
agreement. See Alisha Ryu, “Somali Opposi-
has acknowledged that it continues recon-
tion Splits amid Conflict,” Voice of America,
naissance missions in Somalia and reserves
29 May 2009, www.voanews.com/. Also see
the right to intervene again if its interests
U.S. State Dept., “Background Briefing on
are directly threatened. A second Ethiopian
US Assistance to the Somalia Transitional
invasion would likely exacerbate the security
Federal Government: Background Briefing
and humanitarian situation in Somalia and
by a Senior Department Official, June 26,
should thus be avoided if at all possible.
2009,” U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in
“Ethiopia Admits Somalia Presence,” BBC
Action, www.state.gov/.
News, 4 June 2009, news.bbc.co.uk/.
87. Kraska “Fresh Thinking for an Old Problem.”
79. “A Government under the Cosh,” Economist,
25 June 2009. 88. Alisha Ryu, “Somalia Stability Challenged
by Complex and Shifting Politics,” Voice of
80. “Somalia: Piracy Problem Inseparable from
America, 29 April 2009, www.voanews.com/.
Overall Crisis, Ban Warns,” allAfrica.com, 17
December 2008.

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Andrew S. Erickson is an associate professor in the

Strategic Research Department at the Naval War Col-
lege and a founding member of the department’s Chi-
na Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI). He is an as-
sociate in research at Harvard University’s Fairbank
Center for Chinese Studies, a fellow in the National
Committee on U.S.-China Relations’ Public Intel-
lectuals Program (2008–11), and a member of the
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
(CSCAP). Proficient in Mandarin Chinese and in
Japanese, Dr. Erickson has traveled extensively in Asia.
Erickson received his PhD in international relations
and comparative politics from Princeton University.
His research, which focuses on East Asian defense, for-
eign policy, and technology issues, is available at www
.andrewerickson.com.
Gabriel B. Collins is a former ONA Research Fellow
at CMSI and is now a private-sector commodity mar-
ket analyst focusing on China and Russia. Collins is
an honors graduate of Princeton (AB Politics) and is
proficient in Mandarin Chinese and Russian. His pri-
mary research areas are Chinese and Russian energy
policy, maritime energy security, Chinese shipbuild-
ing, and Chinese naval modernization. Collins’s en-
ergy and shipping related work has been published in
such venues as Oil & Gas Journal, Jane’s Intelligence
Review, Geopolitics of Energy, Proceedings, Naval
War College Review, The National Interest, Hart’s
Oil & Gas Investor, LNG Observer, and Orbis.

Naval War College Review, Spring 2010, Vol. 63, No. 2

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CHINA’S OIL SECURIT Y PIPE DREAM

The Reality, and Strategic Consequences, of Seaborne Imports

Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins

B etween now and 2025—a widely used strategic planning horizon—the

world’s major economies will likely still depend to a large degree on tra-
ditional energy sources. Oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG), despite their eco-
nomic and strategic differences, are the two with inherent naval significance, as
they must be transported by sea to the extent that domestic supplies or overland
pipelines are insufficient.1 Indeed, maritime transport is properly conceived
as a default, as it is almost always significantly cheaper than any overland al-
ternatives, many of which are simply impractical in any case. The recent
global recession has further reduced tanker rates. Private-sector analysts have
produced detailed forecasts of supply and demand for these two critical com-
modities. But no researchers have yet produced a detailed study of the strategic
and naval implications of Chinese energy access.2 The market focus of energy
intelligence firms and the lack of security and technical information informing
journalists in the energy field have so far precluded analysis of the issue.
This gap must be fi lled. The National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends
2025 report “projects a still-preeminent U.S. joined by fast developing powers,
notably India and China, atop a multipolar international system” that “will
be subject to an increased likelihood of conflict over scarce resources”—one
of them being energy.3 Russia will have great influence as an energy supplier.
“No other countries are projected to rise to the level of China, India, or Russia,
and none is likely to match their individual global clout.”4 More specifically,
“Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and
modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue-water
naval capabilities.”5

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Useful insights into these potential trends can be gained by considering the
physical and economic realities of oil transshipment. This article assesses the
relative dependence of China (as a consumer) on seaborne oil flows between
now and 2025. China’s oil security concerns will help shape its military and
policy priorities fundamentally, with significant implications for the U.S. Navy
in coming years. For the present, it underscores a question of fundamental im-
portance concerning China’s strategic orientation: To what extent will China
seek to transform itself from a continental to a continental-maritime power?6
Chinese oil demand, growing rapidly, has reached 8.5 million barrels* per
day (mbpd), even amid the global recession.7 China became a net oil importer
in 1993 and likely became a net gasoline importer by the end of 2009. While still
a very significant oil producer, China is now the world’s second-largest oil user.
It now imports half of its crude oil, with imports reaching a record 4.6 million
bpd in July 2009.8 Seaborne imports, which overland pipelines will not reduce,
constitute more than 80 percent of this total.9 At present, therefore, 40 percent
of China’s oil comes by sea.
Chinese security analysts and policy makers worry about their nation’s “ex-
cessive” reliance on seaborne oil shipments. Many believe that by investing in
pipelines to deliver oil from neighboring oil producers like Russia and Kazakh-
stan and building additional lines to “bypass” the Malacca Strait, China can
protect its oil imports from possible interdiction during a conflict.
A robust internal debate is being waged within China at multiple levels and
across a number of disciplines regarding how to ensure access to oil supplies.
At stake is the extent to which China should cooperate with international eco-
nomic institutions versus seeking unilateral military solutions; 10 should de-
velop as a maritime versus continental power; and should focus on defending
against state, as opposed to nonstate, actors.11 Despite this diversity of opinion,
a wide variety of influential Chinese experts, including scholars, policy analysts,
and members of the military, believe that the United States can sever China’s
seaborne energy supplies at will and in a crisis might well choose to do so.12 It
is widely claimed, for instance, that “whoever controls the Strait of Malacca ef-
fectively grips China’s strategic energy passage, and can threaten China’s energy
security at any time.”13
Such views are widely cited to justify pipeline construction, which is proceed-
ing rapidly. China already has fifty thousand kilometers of oil and gas pipelines
and will nearly double the amount, to ninety thousand, during the Twelfth Five-
Year Plan (2011–15).14

* There are 7.3 barrels of oil in a ton.

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Yet as this analysis will demonstrate, China’s overland oil supply plans may
largely be a “pipe dream,” driven by a combination of a misunderstanding of
global oil market mechanisms, incomplete assessment of security issues, and the
lobbying by sectoral and local commercial and political interests of a massively
overtaxed national energy policy-making apparatus. Some projects—such as
the line from Russia that is now under construction and an existing line from
Kazakhstan—are indeed economically viable overland projects that will bring
at least limited diversity to China’s oil supplies. Others, however, like the pro-
posed lines through Burma and Pakistan, make much less economic and secu-
rity sense.
In the end, pipelines are not likely to increase Chinese oil import security in
quantitative terms, because the additional volumes they bring in will be over-
whelmed by China’s demand growth; the country’s net reliance on seaborne oil
imports will grow over time, pipelines notwithstanding. If we estimate Chinese
oil-import-demand growth conservatively at an average of 2.5 percent annually
over the next five years, Beijing’s imports will still increase by a total of around
650,000 barrels a day—more than the combined volume that the pipelines from
Russia and Kazakhstan will likely be able to bring in by 2013.15 Of that total,
the 300,000 bpd from Russia will not be “new” overland supplies but, rather,
consist primarily of a transfer from rail to pipe as the crude volumes previously
carried into China by train are moved into the pipeline instead. The proposed
Burma–China and Pakistan–China lines are simply “shortcut” routes, not true
overland supply alternatives; oil will still have to be carried by sea in tankers to
the pipelines’ starting points.
A total figure for these two sources, Russia and Kazakhstan, of around
500,000 bpd may seem low, but it reflects the reality that China’s neighbors have
limited capacity to offset its seaborne oil imports. Their reserves are limited in
key potential supply areas (e.g., eastern Siberia), and politics further complicate
the picture. Kazakhstan, for its part, is pursuing a three-vector oil export policy.
It entails shipping oil through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium line to the Rus-
sian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk; to China through the Atasu–Alashankou
line; and, soon, through the $1.5 billion Kazakhstan Caspian Pipeline System to
a port on the Caspian Sea, from which it will be carried by tanker to Azerbaijan,
there to enter the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline.16 Russian sources say the third
route may ultimately be able to pump up to fifty-six million tons a year of oil.17
Russia, meanwhile, may prioritize oil supplies to the East Siberia–Pacific
pipeline, feeding the port of Kozmino, on the Sea of Japan near Nakhodka; from
there it can be exported to Japan, South Korea, China, the United States, and
other Pacific Basin consumers, not China alone. A spur pipeline from Russia to

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China is now under construction and is scheduled to enter service in the second
half of 2010. Detailed analysis of the project is included later in the study.
Pipelines are more vulnerable to sabotage and military interdiction than
seaborne shipping is. Projects (like the Burma–China pipeline) designed to help
seaborne shipments bypass choke points are expensive, can be blockaded, and
are themselves vulnerable to physical attack by nonstate actors or other parties.
Seaborne shipping, by contrast, is very flexible and can be routed around dis-
ruptions. For this reason, pipeline plans predicated on the idea that bypassing
the Strait of Malacca increases oil security are fundamentally flawed. Even if
Malacca were completely sealed off by blockade or accident, tankers could be
diverted through the Sunda, Lombok, or other passages with some disruption
in deliveries and at an additional cost of as little as one or two dollars per bar-
rel.18 Some Chinese analysts now share this conclusion, one noting that “SLOC
[sea line of communication] security is much more important than pipeline
transport lines.”19
Finally, as figure 1 demonstrates, pipelines are far more expensive than tankers
in terms of what must be spent to move a given volume of oil a given distance.20
Certain pipelines—such as the Pakistan, and possibly the Burma, projects—
will likely require substantial subsidies if they are to compete with seaborne
imports. Much of the cost of supporting such uneconomical projects, which are
driven more by politics than profits, will fall on the Chinese government, which
already faces substantial energy-subsidy costs as well as the demands of its four-
trillion-RMB stimulus package.
The first portion of the analysis will examine operational and prospective
pipelines oriented toward China. The projects are arranged chronologically
in the order that they have, will, or might become operational. At present, the
Kazakhstan–China pipeline is operating at partial capacity, a Russia–China line
could become operational by late 2010 (and is likely to be in commercial op-
eration by 2011), the Burma–China pipeline is now under construction, and a
China–Pakistan pipeline remains entirely aspirational.21

FIGURE 1
SAMPLE OIL TRANSPORT COSTS TO CHINA

MODE ROUTE DISTANCE (KM) COST (US$/BBL) COST (US$/BBL/1000 KM)

Tankera Ras Tanura–Ningbo 7000 1.25 0.18
b
Pipeline Angarsk–Daqing 3200 2.41 0.75
Trainc Angarsk–Manzhouli 1000 7.19 7.19

Notes:
a. VLCC at $150k/day charter, 2 million bpd cargo.
b. Transneft tariff of 15.41 rubles/ton/100 km.
c. Based on weighted average of Russian Railways’ oil tariffs to Zabaikalsk and Naushki.

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The second portion of the study will examine Chinese views of how pipelines
might enhance China’s oil security and assess the potential for, and utility and
disadvantages of, a pipeline-centric oil-security strategy. The final, and conclud-
ing, section will suggest how China might enhance its energy security at lower
financial and diplomatic cost.

In the outline that follows of current and possible pipeline projects, fear that
nonstate actors or foreign navies could interdict oil shipments to China will be
prominent as a factor that impels the national government to support overland
supply projects. Yet it should be noted at the outset that national oil companies
may be playing on that fear, the sense of oil insecurity among high-level decision
makers, in order to obtain further state support. Provincial and local officials
are likely doing so to secure projects that could create substantial local invest-
ment and job growth.
Indeed, if one averages labor-demand numbers for sample refinery expansion
and newbuild projects in the West and the developing world, a 200,000 bpd re-
finery, such as that which may be built near Kunming, could create ten thousand
or more construction and engineering jobs while it is being built and at least
several hundred permanent positions to run the plant thereafter.22 Building the
pipeline itself and associated storage and pumping facilities would create addi-
tional temporary and permanent jobs.
Understanding the real benefits that pipeline and associated refinery con-
struction would bring local governments makes it imperative to remember in
what follows that local interests and overall Chinese national energy-security
interests must be kept separate. What is beneficial at the local level, or to a cer-
tain subset of corporate actors, may not always be the most effective policy for
addressing national strategic concerns. In this sense, significant portions of Chi-
na’s push for pipelines mirror the “Going Out” oil security strategy, in which the
state oil companies cultivated fears of oil insecurity in Beijing and then turned
around and wrapped themselves in the flag as they sought overseas oil projects.
These projects have boosted their incomes and reserves but have done little to
enhance China’s oil security on the national level; these firms have even dam-
aged China’s image abroad, through their dealings with Sudan and other pariah
states.23

KAZAKHSTAN–CHINA PIPELINE
The Kazakhstan–China pipeline is currently China’s only operational overland
oil pipeline project. China previously imported Kazakh crude by rail through
the entry port of Alashankou, in Xinjiang. To move larger volumes and to lower
shipping prices, however, both sides desired a pipeline. In September 1997, the

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Chinese and Kazakh governments signed the General Agreement on the Proj-
ect of Oil Deposits Development and Pipeline Construction.24 The initial stage
of the line was built from Kenkiyak to Atyrau during 2002–2004, the second
stage during 2004–2006 from Atyrau to the Chinese border at Alashankou.25
The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) funded the construction
cost of $806 million for the thousand-kilometer leg from Atasu to Alashankou,
as well as the cost of a 252 km extension from Alashankou to the refinery at
Dushanzi, also in Xinjiang.26
The pipeline is operated by a joint stock company called MunaiTas North-
West Pipeline Company CJSC, which is backed by China National Petroleum
Corporation and KazMunaiGaz. Its current capacity is approximately 200,000
bpd. In 2008, however, China imported an average of only 115,000 bpd of crude
oil from Kazakhstan by pipeline and rail.27 In December 2007, the pipeline car-
ried an average of 102,600 bpd—only about half of its total capacity—due to
pricing disputes and problems with supply availability that created gaps, only
partially fi lled with Russian crude from western Siberia. The line has carried
Kazakh Kumkol crude as well as crudes from Russia.28 This situation is due to
the fact that current Kazakh production does not yet completely fi ll the line and
also because lighter, less waxy Russian oils are blended with waxy Kazakh crudes
during the winter to prevent them from solidifying and blocking the line.
Figure 2 shows the current pipeline and future planned additions. Now that
the segment from Kenkiyak to Kumkol is completed, Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea
production (in the Tengiz and Kashagan fields) can enter a pipeline network
reaching deep into China. In August 2007, CNPC opened a 400,000-bpd-capacity
crude oil pipeline from Shanshan in Xinjiang to the refining center at Lan-
zhou, in Gansu Province.29 This line, and a parallel oil products pipeline, will
allow crude and refined products from Xinjiang to be shipped to Lanzhou and
then into CNPC’s existing pipeline network serving central and southwestern
China. This will permit Kazakh crude to penetrate deep into China, because
as crude oil and products from the Dushanzi refinery can be shipped farther
east, boosting oil supplies to the inland regions that will be a focus of Beijing’s
development program, regional economic disparities will be reduced. The
Kazakhstan–China pipeline will also be integrated with a new strategic petro-
leum reserve site under construction near Ürümqi, which will store fifty-one
million barrels of crude once completed.30 The line could reach a maximum
throughput capacity of 400,000 bpd in 2011, if its final stage, from Kenkiyak to
Kumkol, reaches its full capacity by that time.
While this pipeline project originated in part due to oil-supply security con-
cerns, it is easily justifiable as the most economic way to bring Kazakh crude

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FIGURE 2
KAZAKHSTAN–CHINA OIL PIPELINE: EXISTING ROUTE

existing

oil into the western Chinese market. China wins, because it gains what it sees
as “secure” oil supplies; Kazakhstan gains a crude export route independent of
Russia and a new market for its oil; and Russian companies gain an additional
route for getting western Siberian crude oil production into the Chinese market.

A RUSSIA–CHINA PIPELINE
China views Russia as a rich and secure oil source capable of delivering crude
overland, far from U.S. Navy–patrolled sea routes. China and Russia first began
discussing a pipeline in 1994. Yukos unveiled plans in 2001 to construct a pipe-
line from Angarsk to Daqing. These plans were suspended during the Kremlin’s
2004–2007 assault on Yukos and have been superseded by Transneft’s massive
East Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline. The ESPO’s first section, from
Taishet to Skovorodino, is complete and can now pump crude, although as of
September 2009 the line was running in reverse, moving crude into the existing
western Siberian pipeline network. The second half of the line runs 2,100 km

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from Skovorodino to Nakhodka, on the Sea of Japan, and the entire line may
not be fully operational until 2025.31 Figure 3 shows oil pipelines existing, under
construction, and planned from Russia.
In the meantime, China has been importing increasing volumes of crude
from Russia by rail (as well as smaller volumes through the Kazakhstan–China
pipeline). In 2007 and 2008, China imported an average of more than 300,000
bpd of Russian crude.32 Shipping crude by rail can cost twice as much as shipping
it by pipeline, however.33 Driven by this reality and by the fact that regional rail
infrastructure likely cannot handle China’s ultimately desired crude volumes,
CNPC and Sinopec (the primary Chinese buyers of Russian crude) pushed for
construction of a spur pipeline from Skovorodino to Daqing, in Heilongjiang
Province. The entire spur line will run roughly a thousand kilometers (seventy
kilometers on the Russian side and 965 km on the Chinese side) and will cost
around $436 million.34 The Chinese side is financing the majority of the spur’s
length, as it lies largely on Chinese soil. Initial capacity is slated to be fifteen mil-
lion tons per year (300,000 bpd), with the possibility of later expansion to thirty
million tons annually (600,000 bpd).35
Pricing disputes and a relative lack of profitability restrained Russian pipeline
export plans to China for more than a decade. Until very recently, CNPC and
Rosneft had serious disputes over rail crude-pricing formulas, and it is likely
that similar issues may have affected the pipeline project. This would not be
surprising, as the Kazakhstan–China pipeline has often run at below capacity

FIGURE 3
RUSSIA–CHINA OIL PIPELINES: EXISTING, UNDER CONSTRUCTION, AND PLANNED

under construction existing

planned

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due to pricing disputes.36 Russian Railways, run by Viktor Yakunin, a Putin ac-
quaintance and former KGB officer, also opposed pipeline construction, which
would erode Russian Railways’ substantial income from hauling oil to China.
The global financial crisis and Russian companies’ need for cash have changed
the landscape, however. In April 2009, Transneft and Rosneft signed an agree-
ment for a $25 billion loan from China Development Bank in exchange for de-
livering 300,000 bpd of oil to China for the next twenty years and also building a
64 km spur pipeline from Skovorodino to the Chinese border, according to RIA
Novosti. Russia’s powerful railway lobby originally opposed the pipeline plan
but in June 2008 the Russian Railways CEO retracted his prior opposition to the
plan, saying instead that he hopes to ship marginal high-grade crude volumes
of a few million tons per year to China.37 Higher-quality crudes lose value when
blended with lower-quality oils for pipeline shipment.
Russia’s decision to ship oil to China by pipeline was driven in part by eco-
nomic necessity, as Rosneft and Transneft needed a cash infusion in early 2009.
It was also driven by the imperative of cementing the Sino-Russian energy re-
lationship with a large-scale supply deal. During summer 2008, sources close
to Rosneft indicated that despite the Russian government’s growing desire for a
pipeline to China, the company wanted to stall the spur pipeline for as long as
possible due to the route’s lower profitability relative to other options.38
The immediate economics of crude export from eastern Siberia changed in
July 2009 as the Kremlin ordered a nine-month-long suspension of oil export
duties on production from thirteen key oil fields, including Rosneft’s large new
Vankor field. That said, given Russia’s gaping budget deficit as of December 2009
and resulting hunger for tax revenues, we believe there is a medium probability
that the tax holiday will not be extended for more than twenty-four months,
since it is more politically expedient to raise revenue by ending an oil tax holiday
than by taxing citizens on food, alcohol, and other goods.
While the China–Russia pipeline deal is presently on track, there are still
a number of potential friction points. Rosneft may still worry that near- and
medium-term production from eastern Siberia cannot fi ll the spur line and en-
sure adequate supplies to the new 400,000 bpd refinery that the company plans
to build near the Pacific port of Nakhodka.
Perhaps of greatest concern to Beijing, Moscow has and will have options to
divert oil from China if it so desires. While the initial capacity of Russia’s line to
China will be 300,000 bpd, and could rise to 600,000 bpd, an alternative pipe-
line to the Pacific coast (perhaps with initial capacity available within ten years;
and spurred by the potential Rosneft refinery at Nakhodka) could ultimately
offer Moscow oil diversion alternatives that it might possibly use to pressure
China. Russia can also move sufficient volumes of crude oil by rail to the Pacific

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Ocean to allow it to cut off a substantial portion of pipeline exports to China

in the event of a dispute. Transneft does not operate under the normal eco-
nomic incentives that U.S. and European pipeline operators do, meaning that
if ordered by the Kremlin, the company will favor achieving political objectives
over the need to keep capacity utilization high to maximize earnings and please
shareholders.

A BURMA–CHINA PIPELINE
The proposed Burma–China oil pipeline aims to reduce China’s reliance on oil
shipped through the Malacca Strait. The idea of the pipeline was first articulated
publicly in 2004 by Yunnan University professor Yang Xiaohui.39 Yang argued
that given Burma and Southeast Asia’s historical collective role as a “backdoor”
supply line for China, a Burma–China line would reduce reliance on Malacca
and help secure Chinese oil imports.40
National and local economic development interests then worked to generate
additional support for the project. The Yunnan provincial government subse-
quently professed its support for the project, and in early 2006 the Burma–China
pipeline emerged on the national radar screen when the National Development
and Reform Commission’s (NDRC’s) 2005 “Refining Industry Development
Overview” named it one of four key oil import channels.41 Figure 4 shows the
proposed pipeline route and facilities that might be associated with the project.
It appears that CNPC will finance the bulk of the line’s construction costs,
in addition to supporting infrastructure. If the project proceeds, by 2010 CNPC
plans to construct an oil wharf capable of berthing tankers of 300,000 dead-
weight tonnage, as well as storage facilities capable of holding more than four
million barrels of crude.42 The project will be a key element of China’s plans to
promote inland economic development, as its southwest provinces of Yunnan,
Tibet, Guizhou, and Guangxi, as well as Chongqing Municipality, often have
difficulty receiving stable fuel supplies from the refining centers at Lanzhou and
Guangzhou.43
One proposal includes constructing a 400,000 bpd refinery and a co-
located million-ton-per-year ethylene plant near Kunming, Yunnan.44 The gov-
ernment of Chongqing Municipality, with the support of Sinopec, has also pro-
posed extending the line to Chongqing and building refining facilities there.45
The pipeline’s initial capacity is slated to be 200,000 bpd, but if it is expanded
to 300,000 or 400,000 bpd both Kunming and Chongqing could build refiner-
ies of significant size. It is currently unclear whether or not the tragic May 2008
Sichuan earthquake might cause national and provincial officials to reconsider
locating a large refinery near an active seismic zone.
The NDRC might prefer constructing refineries near both cities, as it allows
both areas to gain economically and would also permit the central government
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FIGURE 4
BURMA–CHINA OIL PIPELINE: PROPOSED ROUTE AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES

under construction

disputed area

to reward both of the main state-owned refiners, CNPC and Sinopec. Southwest
China is currently a zone of competition between the two, with traditional oil
company “spheres of influence” overlapping increasingly as each company seeks
a greater degree of vertical integration and tries to seize market share.46 For ex-
ample, CNPC and Sinopec competed vigorously in early 2007 to win approval to
build a 200,000 bpd refinery in Guangxi.47 CNPC emerged victorious, probably
because it can use its flagship Sudan project to guarantee crude oil supplies to
the refinery.
From the economic perspective, a Burma–China pipeline may make sense,
as the costs of piping crude to inland refineries in southwest China and then
distributing refined products through the expanding pipeline network likely ap-
proximate those of shipping crude by tanker to southeast China, refining it there,
and then shipping products by pipe or rail to southwest Chinese consumers.
A comparative example of overland pipeline crude competing successfully
with seaborne crude in a continental market is that of Canadian oil imports into
the midwestern United States. Recently, the well developed American pipeline
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network has allowed Canadian crude to penetrate almost to the Gulf Coast, the
epicenter of U.S. seaborne crude imports.48 China’s pipeline network for crude
and products cannot compare with that of the United States at present, but the
NDRC and the state oil companies are working quickly to expand China’s do-
mestic pipeline systems for oil and refined products, so regional markets are
likely to become increasingly integrated over time.
The Burma–China pipeline also provides an impetus for enhancing crude
and product supplies by building additional regional refineries and expanding
the area’s product pipeline networks. Oil product demand, particularly for mo-
tor fuels, has been growing strongly in southwestern China in recent years as
the area undergoes rapid economic development and consumer incomes rise.
Historically, the region has been short on refining capacity and a refinery at the
terminus of the pipeline from Burma would help to address this deficiency.49
Expanding regional oil-processing capacity will also create significant employ-
ment, through construction work and, later, for manning the facilities. As China
reforms its domestic oil pricing system, having refineries in remote southwest
China might give the owner of those plants a high degree of price-setting power
and the ability to charge a premium for fuel produced.
From the security perspective, however, a Burma–China pipeline largely fails
the test. It would allow around 200,000 bpd of oil imports to bypass the Ma lacca
Strait, yet it would be exposed to major security risks in Burma, which is ruled by
a capricious junta and still struggles with ethnic separatism in regions through
which the pipeline will pass.50 Separatism still smolders in Burma’s hinterlands,
as evidenced by the August 2009 clashes in Burma’s Kokang region that sent at
least thirty thousand refugees streaming into China’s Yunnan Province. Transit
countries hosting pipelines gain significant strategic leverage. This leverage can
manifest itself in calculated strategic moves or in disputes over other factors,
such as pricing and transit payments. For example, Ukraine effectively reduced
European natural-gas supplies in the winter of 2005–2006 by siphoning off gas
to replace supplies to Ukraine that Gazprom had cut and was able thereby to put
Russia in a very difficult position diplomatically. The same dynamic unfolded in
even starker fashion when Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Ukraine in January
2009 and gas supplies actually stopped for several days to a number of Eastern
and Central European consumers of Russian gas.
China would also be seen as directly financing the Burmese junta’s rule and
its repression of the population, since an operational oil line would likely gen-
erate direct transit payments of at least fourteen million dollars a year.51 Fur-
thermore, in the event of conflict, the oil port/pipeline terminus at Sittwe on
Burma’s coast would be a concentrated target set, highly vulnerable to blockade
or precision strike.

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A proposed canal across Thailand’s Kra Isthmus, now stalled, appears un-
realistic. Zhang Xuegang, a scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary
International Relations, maintains optimistically that it “could . . . provide a
strategic seaway to the Chinese navy” through which “fleets could . . . more
easily protect the nearby sea-lanes and gain access to the Indian Ocean.”52 But
a canal across the isthmus could cost twenty billion dollars or more to build
and, like the Burma–China pipeline, would simply concentrate the target set for
potential blockaders.

A PAKISTAN–CHINA PIPELINE?
Some Pakistani and Chinese analysts have also suggested the possibility of
building an “energy corridor,” including oil pipelines, from Pakistan into west-
ern China to diversify China’s oil import routes and avoid the Malacca Strait.53
Yet other Chinese analysts increasingly recognize that geographic and security
barriers render a Pakistan–China oil pipeline unfeasible in the near and me-
dium terms.54
These Chinese analysts express grave reservations about the security situa-
tion in Pakistan in light of the country’s perpetual violence and increasing po-
litical instability, along with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist
attacks against outsiders. Indeed, Chinese workers have been kidnapped and
killed in at least three separate incidents in western and northwestern Pakistan,
the regions that would be traversed by a Pakistan–China pipeline.55 The pipeline
would also transit a part of Kashmir that, while controlled by Pakistan, is also
claimed by India. Figure 5 shows the currently proposed route of a Pakistan–
China oil pipeline. In addition to security problems, there would also be serious
financial barriers, since oil transport costs could run to at least ten dollars a bar-
rel to achieve payout plus a 10 percent rate of return.
Even at a price above a hundred dollars a barrel, a transport cost of nine
to ten dollars a barrel is very high compared to that of seaborne shipping. If a
Chinese oil company chose to move 200,000 bpd of crude through the Burma–
China pipeline and 250,000 bpd through the Pakistan–China line, it could lose
roughly a billion dollars a year compared to what it would have paid to move the
oil by sea to eastern China.* Beijing would likely have to subsidize such opera-
tions, either directly or indirectly. A billion dollars is roughly 6.8 billion RMB at
today’s exchange rates and exceeds by 30 percent the Chinese government’s total
of 4.9 billion RMB in subsidy payments to refiners in 2007.
If the Chinese government allowed fuel to be sold at market prices, compa-
nies might have a much higher incentive to build pipelines into remote areas
* This assumes a transport cost difference between pipeline and sea transport of $3/bbl for oil moving
through the Burma–China line and $7/bbl for oil moving through the Pakistan–China line.

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FIGURE 5
PAKISTAN–CHINA OIL PIPELINE: PROPOSED ROUTE

Line of Actual Control

Line of Control

speculative

disputed area

like western and southwestern China; regional fuel deficits could allow them
to charge premium rates for fuels produced by refineries at the end of the pipe-
line. Under these conditions, pipeline plans might be more financially attractive
than they are now, with Chinese oil product prices lagging international market
prices by 15–20 percent during times of high crude oil prices, such as those of
midsummer 2008.
Geography and cost alone would pose major challenges, however, even under
the best of conditions. The pipeline would have to be constructed in some of
the world’s most challenging terrain. Moreover, it would need to lift oil from
sea level at Gwadar up to the 15,400-foot-high Khunjerab Pass, requiring mas-
sive pumping power and steady electrical supplies in remote areas vulnerable
to insurgent activity. By way of comparison, the Trans-Alaska and Baku–Tbilisi–
Ceyhan pipelines climb from sea level to apogees of 2,800 feet and 9,000 feet,

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respectively, before returning to sea level.56 The Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline

(TEP) climbs from a thousand feet above sea level to 13,300 feet above sea lev-
el in the relatively short distance of 125 miles, making some cite the TEP as
an example of the “technical feasibility” of a pipeline from Pakistan to China.
However, further analysis causes that comparison to fall short, because at 310
miles the TEP is only about one-fifth the length of the proposed pipeline from
Pakistan to China and does not cross territory rife with insurgent activity and
general instability.
Despite the major challenges, there is still considerable discussion from a va-
riety of Pakistani and Indian sources regarding the latent strategic value of the
new port at Gwadar, in western Pakistan along the Arabian Sea, a likely start-
ing point for any Pakistan–China oil pipeline. For all of the hype about the
development of Gwadar as a facility to support Chinese naval operations in the
Indian Ocean, however, there is in fact very little hard evidence to suggest this
is the case, and the contract for the management of the port was awarded to the
Port Authority of Singapore. In fact, barring a major shift by the Chinese side, it
appears that the main impetus for establishing an “energy corridor” is coming
from the Pakistani side.57 President Pervez Musharraf pushed the idea in June
2006 and apparently raised the issue again during talks with President Hu Jintao
during the April 2008 Bo’ao Forum, but with no apparent results to date.58

DOWNSIDES
The enthusiasm with which some Chinese analysts contemplate these pipeline
projects is based, as we have seen, on a conviction that they will reduce China’s
reliance on seaborne oil imports, which, they fear, may be easily interdicted in
time of crisis. Too many of the (relatively few) analyses of these issues produced
thus far have, however, failed to consider the physical and economic realities of
oil transshipment, which greatly complicate seaborne oil blockade operations.
High Transport and Construction Costs
Importing oil into southwest China through a Burma–China pipeline rather
than through an expanded pipe network serving existing oil ports at Maoming
and elsewhere in South China will be very costly. Pipelines are expensive to con-
struct in frontier regions like Burma, and new deepwater oil-import jetties and
associated storage facilities will have to be built at the pipeline start point on the
Burmese coast. Pipeline shipping will also be very expensive relative to mari-
time shipping, as pumping oil through the planned Burmese line could cost
more than four dollars a barrel, assuming that CNPC seeks at least a 10 percent
internal rate of return in operating the line.59
In contrast, shipping oil by sea from the Persian Gulf to South China can
cost as little as US$1.00 per barrel for transport costs, and piping it to interior

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refineries in areas likely to be served by the Burma–China line would cost an

additional two or three dollars a barrel.* This represents a substantial cost sav-
ings over moving crude through the proposed Burma–China line to refineries
in Yunnan. To lower “stated” project costs, the NDRC might subsidize project
financing or take other measures to reward CNPC, any of which would cost the
Chinese government more than if it relied on seaborne imports to South China
for supplying pipelines to the interior.
At newbuild prices for very large crude carriers (VLCCs), roughly $140 mil-
lion per vessel, one could build fourteen ships for the two-billion-dollar estimat-
ed price of the Burma–China pipeline. Given that each VLCC carries roughly
two million barrels of crude and that the round-trip from the Persian Gulf to
southeast China takes thirty total days, fourteen additional supertankers could
deliver an average of 666,000 bpd of crude, versus 200,000 bpd for the planned
pipeline. The cost disparity between maritime and pipeline shipping would be
even greater for the Pakistan–China line, through which it could cost up to 10
dollars to move a barrel of oil to Ürümqi in western China.60 After reaching
Ürümqi, the oil would have to be piped an additional three or four thousand
kilometers to reach major east coast demand centers, meaning that transport
costs from the Persian Gulf to Chinese end users could exceed fifteen dollars a
barrel, as opposed to closer to US$2.00/barrel (bbl) for oil transported from the
Gulf to eastern China on supertankers as of March 2009 (the peak equivalent
approached $4–$5/bbl in July 2008; during this time, however, pipeline opera-
tors raised rates as well).61
Growing Demand in Pipeline Terminus Region
Driven by earthquake reconstruction in Sichuan, the rapid development of
Chongqing, and other regional growth, oil product demand in interior southwest
China is on the upswing and will continue to grow strongly as the government
promotes further growth of domestic consumption. Chongqing’s mayor says the
city, which is analogous to “China’s Chicago” for its position as a linchpin inland
economic powerhouse, will see 14.5 percent year-on-year gross domestic prod-
uct growth in 2009.62 Building more local refining capacity and expanding the
domestic pipeline system into underserved areas would be a more secure and
lower-cost way of ensuring oil and product supplies while still creating jobs.
Physical Security Risks
Pipelines face substantial physical security risks. In fact, with the Burma and
Pakistan pipelines, there would be a twofold vulnerability. First, oil would have

* Based on costs of moving oil and refined products from the sea to and from inland Russian refineries,
which are at a distance from seaports similar to that at which plants at the terminus of the Burma–China
line would be.

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to be brought by sea to the pipeline terminus via long sea-lanes, concentrating

the target set for an enemy force.63 Then, it would have to be pumped through a
long line traversing remote terrain in potentially insecure areas.64
Pipelines are typically more vulnerable to sustained disruptions than are
ships. Tankers at sea can be rerouted, while pipelines are fi xed links between a
producer and consumer. Terrorists and insurgents have mounted only a handful
of successful attacks on oil tankers (for example, Limburg, off Yemen in 2002;
and Sirius Star, off Kenya in November 2008). However, nonstate actors in Co-
lombia, Nigeria, Iraq, and other countries have been able to disrupt oil pipeline
operations on a consistent basis despite preventative efforts by local security
forces. As for China, CNPC reports that from 2002 to 2006, thieves “have il-
legally drilled into” its pipelines “18,382 times . . . causing the company a loss of
more than 500 million RMB ($72 million).”65
Pipelines offer a wealth of targeting options to nonstate actors and opposing
militaries.66 Destroying or damaging the pipeline itself is relatively simple; an at-
tacker simply needs to know where the line is, dig down to it if necessary (some,
though not all, pipelines are buried), and use explosives to rupture it.67 Such
attacks typically cause only brief disruptions, as spare line is relatively cheap
and simple to stock, and repairs can usually be carried out quickly—although
repair crews would have more trouble working in remote areas, whose popula-
tions in Burma or Pakistan might be armed and hostile. More critical pipeline
vulnerabilities include pump stations, storage facilities, pipeline termini, and
the power supplies that run pumps and other key equipment.68 On one hand,
most of these facilities would be more difficult for nonstate groups to target
successfully, because government forces could concentrate their resources on
protecting such discrete facilities, as opposed to several thousand kilometers of
pipe. On the other hand, electrical power generators, transmission towers, and
buried cables can be attacked as readily as pipelines. Disrupting power supplies
would reduce throughput in the best case and could halt it completely if attacks
became sufficiently severe (e.g., were conducted simultaneously at different
points). According to Li Wei, director of the center for counterterrorism studies
at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, “Though ter-
rorists are more likely to aim at causing a large number of casualties instead of
attacking pipelines in China, there is still the possibility.”69
During an interstate conflict, however, the dynamics would be quite different.
Modern military forces equipped with precision-guided munitions could target
pumping stations and other vital points, many of which run through remote
areas with low populations, and rapidly disable pipelines carrying oil or gas into
China. A maritime blockade, on the other hand, would be extremely difficult
to conduct effectively. Oil cargoes in normal commerce may change ownership

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ten or more times while a ship is at sea, which reduces the effectiveness of a
distant blockade since it is challenging to identify a cargo’s final destination.70
Moreover, if implementing a close blockade of the Chinese coast would solve
the destination-identification problem, it would also bring the blockader’s forces
within range of numerous and capable Chinese access-denial systems, including
ballistic and cruise missiles, naval mines, and submarines.71 In short, the flex-
ibility of modern maritime oil transport confers far greater oil-supply security
benefits than would pipelines supplied by sea or traversing unstable regions.

A BAROMETER OF CHINESE TRUST IN MARKETS

Absent discovery of an economically viable large-scale substitute for crude oil,
pipeline development will likely be insufficient to offset China’s rising seaborne
oil import demand. A simple comparison of planned oil pipeline supply addi-
tions to China’s likely overall demand growth in coming years bears this out, as
demand growth will very likely outstrip overland supply additions under even
the most optimistic scenarios.
Some projects (e.g., the Burma line) make sense from local and corporate
perspectives but not that of national oil security. The Burma line will be expen-
sive to build. The numbers can be “massaged” to ensure that officially tabu-
lated project costs remain near the stated figure of two billion dollars, but the
real costs could be much higher. Also, given Burma’s high political risk and
the fact that placing a pipeline terminus along the poorly defensible Burmese
coast might invite interdiction during wartime, relying on shipments through
the Burma line would not enhance China’s oil security. This increases transport
cost and concentrates the target set for an adversary during a conflict but does
not provide the same supply security gains that a pipeline from Kazakhstan or
Russia can deliver.
A more secure approach might entail building a more comprehensive pipe grid
connecting southern Chinese oil ports in Guangdong to the interior southwest
provinces. Construction costs would likely be similar (possibly lower, without
the political and security risks inherent in Burma). In addition, the immediate
and long-term economic benefits could be high, since enhancing China’s inter-
nal oil and products transportation grid would boost and stabilize fuel supplies
to Guangxi and other relatively impoverished inland provinces in which Beijing
hopes to catalyze development.
Other lines are simply unviable from nearly all perspectives. The very idea of
a Pakistan line, with its formidable geography, its regional instability, and the
absence of a major demand center at the terminus, exemplifies this chimera.
That is not to say that there is no logical role for pipelines in China’s oil import
portfolio. Some pipeline projects are driven by geographic reality (e.g., the line

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already delivering oil from Kazakhstan and the line under construction from
Russia). The fields fi lling these lines are so far from the sea that an overland line
is the most effective way to transport their oil into the Chinese market. Pipelines
move oil much more cheaply than rail can. But, as happened in the early years
of China’s “Going Out” strategy, special interests also appear to be playing the
security card to benefit themselves in the face of more rational, comprehensive
calculations of national interest.
At the strategic level, a productive area for future research concerns the na-
val implications of Eurasian energy access, taken more broadly. This could be
investigated by methodologies similar to those employed in this study to assess
the relative dependence of China and India (as consumers) and Russia (as a
supplier) on seaborne energy flows between now and 2025. It might be expected
that Russia’s preponderance of overland energy transport routes will tend to
reinforce that nation’s traditional continental orientation, whereas increasing
reliance on seaborne energy imports in China and India will further the blue-
water naval development cited in the Global Trends 2025 report.72

A continued quest for higher overland oil deliveries will not enhance China’s
oil supply security substantially but will rather be a barometer of Chinese trust
in global oil markets and maritime oil transport security. As this article has
demonstrated, however, Chinese decision makers will ultimately have to face
the fact that their nation’s dependence on seaborne oil imports is likely only to
increase. This reality and China’s other growing overseas interests have already
stimulated debate concerning the extent to which China should develop a blue-
water navy to defend its commerce on the high seas.
Before Beijing commits firmly to such a substantial investment, which is likely
to have tremendous geopolitical ramifications—some of them likely to involve
counterbalancing by regional nations discomfited by such ambitious Chinese
naval growth—it would be wise to see if China and the United States can come
to a better understanding of their respective roles in the Asia-Pacific as well as
work to clarify areas ripe for mutually beneficial energy security cooperation.
Such strategic dialogue would be difficult to pursue, and it would not in itself
resolve the substantial differences in national interests. But the economic inter-
dependence between the two nations and the potential costs of miscommunica-
tion are so high that repeated efforts must be made.
This is a critical time in China’s naval development, and the events of the next
few years will have disproportionate influence. As a Chinese analyst at a high-
level government institution told one of the authors recently, China’s naval de-
velopment will hinge on “China’s understanding of the international system. If
China feels that it is possible to rely on the international oil market, at least some

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in China believe that a larger navy is unnecessary.” A good first step would be to
encourage Beijing to join two related international organizations. Washington
should take the lead in trying to bring Beijing into the International Renewable
Energy Agency (IRENA); as well as the International Energy Agency (IEA), as
it meets the requirement to store 90 days of import reserves, so that strategic
petroleum reserve inventories can be tracked and reported.
Even these modest measures may require time. The Chinese government is
unlikely to immediately initiate a detailed oil inventory reporting system. Re-
cent steps—such as the decision in late 2009 to stop publishing PetroChina and
Sinopec’s refined products inventories—are worrisome. The growing acrimony
over proposed carbon emission restrictions in the wake of the disappointing
December 2009 Copenhagen climate meetings also does not bode well for quick
progress on diplomatic initiatives seeking Chinese oil inventory transparency in
the next one to two years.
Despite these ongoing challenges, there remains room for optimism. The Oc-
tober 2007 issuance of a new maritime strategy by the U.S. sea services suggests
that Washington is eager to support cooperative, collective approaches to mari-
time energy security. Discussion among China, the United States, and other key
energy market stakeholders may facilitate adoption of energy security measures
far more effective and mutually beneficial than expensive, limited-capacity, and
vulnerable pipelines.

NOTES

The content of this analysis reflects only the inexpensive and the import infrastructure is
authors’ personal assessments and opinions ubiquitous. The trade of LNG, by contrast,
and does not represent the official policies or is shaped by a series of bilateral agreements
assessments of the U.S. Department of De- and regional markets, because LNG is costlier
fense or Curium Capital Advisors, LLC. The to store and to move on and off ships. The
authors thank Daniel Kostecka and several strategic implications of China’s small but
anonymous individuals for their useful com- increasing LNG imports are beyond the
ments and suggestions. scope of this article, but an excellent discus-
Where possible the maps accompanying sion can be found in Mikkal Herberg, “The
this article, within their respective areas of Geopolitics of China’s LNG Development,”
coverage, portray clearly all major territorial in China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Bei-
disputes relevant to China, the focus of this jing’s Maritime Policies, ed. Gabriel B. Collins,
study. Any failure to note territorial disputes Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and
or to characterize them in a certain way does William S. Murray (Annapolis, Md.: Naval
not imply a failure to acknowledge them or a Institute Press, 2008), pp. 61–80.
judgment concerning the relative validity or 2. For a regionwide perspective, see Bernard D.
state of claims among the parties involved. Cole, Sea Lanes and Pipelines: Energy Security
1. Oil and LNG differ fundamentally in com- in East Asia (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2008).
mercial and strategic significance. There is a 3. Office of the Director of National Intel-
single world oil market, because transport is ligence, ODNI Releases Global Trends

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Projections, ODNI News Release 19-08 14. China National Petroleum Corporation
(Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Office, 20 (CNPC), as cited in Xin Dingding, Li Jing,
November 2008). and Wan Zhihong, “China Faces New Risk:
4. Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World Attacks on Pipelines,” China Daily, 6 January
(Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence 2010, www.chinadaily.com.cn/.
Council, November 2008), p. vii, available at 15. In a best case scenario, by 2015, 700,000 bpd
www.dni.gov/. supply potential piped into China from both
5. Ibid., p. x. countries combined would be a reasonable
assumption.
6. For thorough analysis of this subject, see
Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and Carnes 16. “Казахстан приступает к строительству
Lord, China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transfor- нефтепровода для экспорта своей нефти
mation in Comparative Historical Perspective по Каспию” [Kazakhstan Prepares to Build a
Pipeline for Exporting Its Oil across the Cas-
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009).
pian], Oil and Capital, 7 June 2008, available
7. Skyrocketing car ownership will ham- at www.oilcapital.ru/.
per efforts to make China’s economy less
17. Ibid.
petroleum-intensive.
18. Dennis Blair and Kenneth Lieberthal,
8. This was despite the worst global recession
“Smooth Sailing: The World’s Shipping Lanes
since the 1930s. Grant Smith and Chris-
Are Safe,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2007).
tian Smollinger, “Crude Oil Rises in New
We assume that chartering a VLCC cur-
York on Speculation of Inventory Decline,”
rently costs $65,000/day, that a disruption
Bloomberg, 11 June 2008, www.bloomberg
and rerouting would add four days’ steaming
.com/; National Bureau of Statistics.
time, and that the disruption would trigger
9. See Andrew S. Erickson, “Pipe Dream: China additional vessel demand sufficient to double
Seeks Land and Sea Energy Security,” Jane’s rates to $130,000/day. With a 1.9 million bbl
Intelligence Review (China Watch) 21, no. 8 cargo, this would cause transport costs to
(August 2009), pp. 54–55. rise by only twenty-seven cents a barrel. We
10. See, for example, 查道炯 [Zha Daojiong], cite the higher cost figure because spot rates
“相互依赖与中国的石油供应安全” could climb much higher if a large number
[Interdependence and China’s Oil Supply Se- of ships are locked up under long-term char-
curity], 世界经济与政治 [World Economics ters and are not available for spot-market
and Politics], no. 6 (2005), pp. 15–22. hire. Also, insurance costs are uncertain and
would depend on the contingency that trig-
11. 赵宏图 [Zhao Hongtu], “‘马六甲困局’
gered the blockage.
与中国能源安全再思考” [The “Malacca
Dilemma” and Rethinking China’s Energy 19. 李杰 [Li Jie], “石油,中国需求与海道安全”
Security], 现代国际关系 [Contemporary [Oil, China’s Requirements, and Sea-Lane
International Relations], no. 6 (2007), pp. Security], 舰船知识 [Naval and Merchant
36–42. Ships] (September 2004), p. 12.
12. Numerous Chinese articles and discussions 20. These weaknesses inherent in pipelines are
with Chinese interlocutors from all these recognized by Zhao Hongtu, “‘Malacca
communities underscore this point. For Dilemma’ and Rethinking China’s Energy
complete analysis, see Andrew Erickson and Security,” pp. 40–41.
Gabriel Collins, “Beijing’s Energy Security 21. “Yunnan to Build New Gas Pipeline,” China
Strategy: The Significance of a Chinese State- Daily, 19 November 2008, available at www
Owned Tanker Fleet,” Orbis 51, no. 4 (Fall .chinadaily.com.cn/.
2007), pp. 665–84.
22. See, for example, “Motiva Port Arthur Re-
13. 李小军 [Li Xiaojun], “论海权对中国石油安 finery to Become Largest Refinery in United
全的影响” [On the Influence of Sea Power States,” Motiva Enterprises LLC, 21 Sep-
upon China’s Oil Security], 国际论坛 [Inter- tember 2007, www.motivaenterprises.com;
national Forum] 6, no. 4 (July 2004), p. 18. “Marathon’s Garyville Refinery Expansion

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Project Expected to Create Jobs for Louisi- 41. 林锡星 [Lin Xixing], “中国新石油通道的两
ana,” Marathon: Garyville Major Expansion, 难选择” [The Two Difficult Choices Facing
23 February 2007, www.marathongme.com/; China’s New Oil Passage], 中国新闻周刊
and “Reliance Industries Pushes to Complete [China News Weekly], no. 9 (2004), p. 50; 尹
Jamnagar Refinery,” ICIS Chemical Business, 振茂 [Yin Zhenmao], “中缅管道大器将成”
23 July 2007, www.icis.com. [Sino-Burmese Pipeline Will Achieve High
23. Erica Downs, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Capacity], 中国石油石化 [China Petroleum
Energy Security Series: China (Washington, and Petrochemical], 15 February 2007, p. 29.
D.C.: Brookings Institution, December 2006), 42. Yin Zhenmao, “Sino-Burmese Pipeline Will
available at www3.brookings.edu/. Achieve High Capacity,” p. 29.
24. “‘MunaiTas’ North-West Pipeline Company 43. 张娥 [Zhang ‘E], “能源走廊的来客” [A
Joint Stock Company,” www.munaitas.com. Visitor to the Energy Corridor], 中国石油
25. Ibid. 石化 [China Petroleum and Petrochemi-
cal], 1 March 2006, p. 29. The recent Sichuan
26. Isabel Gorst, “Welding New Relations: Pipe- earthquake and Chongqing gas explosion
lines; Kazakhstan,” Petroleum Economist, 1 are unlikely to offer further justification for
February 2006. the Burma pipeline. Local refineries fed by a
27. Argus China Petroleum 2, no. 2 (February Burma line would be much harder to repair
2008), p. 23. after an earthquake than would product
pipelines or rail lines bringing fuel from
28. Nadia Rodova, “Russia Eyes 2007 Start of
other provinces.
Exports to China, Crude Would Transit Ka-
zakhstan on Atasu–Alashankou Line,” Platts 44. Lin Xixing, “Two Difficult Choices Facing
Oilgram News, 4 June 2007. China’s New Oil Passage,” p. 33.
29. Winnie Lee, “CNPC Opens 400,000 b/d Oil 45. 林锡星 [Lin Xixing], “中国应建设南亚能
Line to Gansu; Gathers Crude from 3 Major 源 ‘双通道’” [China Must Build an Energy
Fields in Xinjiang,” Platts Oilgram News, 6 “Double Passage” in South Asia], 中国新闻
August 2007. 周刊 [China News Weekly], 20 March 2006,
p. 52.
30. “China’s CNPC Starts Building Xinjiang Re-
serve,” Platts Oilgram News, 11 March 2008. 46. Traditionally, Sinopec has had smaller pro-
duction but greater refining capacity, China
31. Argus China Petroleum, p. 23.
National Petroleum Corporation/PetroChina
32. Energy Intelligence Group, “China Oil Im- has had large upstream production but less
port Data 2007,” Energy Intelligence, www refining capacity, and the China National
.energyintel.com/. Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has
33. Authors’ models. had substantial production but no refin-
ing capacity at all. Now, Sinopec is boosting
34. “Variables in Construction of China–Russia
exploration and production, and CNPC and
Oil Pipeline,” Zhongguo Tongxun She, BBC,
CNOOC are seeking more refining capacity.
16 December 2007.
Each company’s moves typically require the
35. Lyudmila Podobedova, “Bogdanchikov Tells NDRC and central government to mediate
Chinese to Wait,” RosBisnesConsulting, 6 as the companies encroach on each other’s
September 2007, www.rbcdaily.ru. traditional “turf.”
36. Interview, Tokyo, April 2007. 47. “China NDRC Approves PetroChina’s
37. Dmitry Zhdannikov, “Russian Rail Hopes Guangxi Refinery,” Reuters, 14 February
to Ship Oil to China Post-2010,” Reuters, 22 2007, available at uk.reuters.com/.
February 2008, available at www.reuters.com. 48. “Spearhead Pipeline,” Enbridge U.S. Opera-
38. Podobedova, “Bogdanchikov Tells Chinese tions, www.enbridgeus.com/.
to Wait.” 49. Yin Zhenmao, “Sino-Burmese Pipeline Will
39. Yang Xiaohui, “Chinese Oil Strategy’s Achieve High Capacity,” p. 29.
Southwestern Orientation,” Contemporary 50. As experience in Iraq and Colombia has
Asia-Pacific, no. 3 (2004), p. 13. shown, pipelines are highly vulnerable to
40. Ibid. insurgent attacks.

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51. The authors use the example of the BTC 60. This was calculated using a model that as-
pipeline as a proxy. The government of sumes a 3,300-kilometer line moving 240,000
Georgia receives $.12/bbl of crude shipped bpd of crude and operated by an operator
through the Georgian section of the BTC seeking a 10 percent rate of return on
line. The Burma–China pipeline would not investment.
have multiple countries competing for shares 61. “OPEC Output Cuts Send VLCC Rates to
of transit revenues, and the junta could Seven-Year Low,” Lloyd’s List, 19 March 2009,
likely receive a larger fee per barrel than via LexisNexis.
Georgia did from the BTC Consortium. If
the Burmese government negotiated a $.20/ 62. “今年重庆GDP预计增14.5% 明年预计增
bbl transit fee with CNPC, the Burmese side 15%” [Chongqing’s GDP Is Forecast to In-
would receive, assuming an initial capacity crease by 14.5% This Year, and by 15% Next
of 200,000 bpd (or 73 million barrels/year), Year], 重庆搜房网 [Chongqing Real Estate
$14.6 million/year in transit fees. Net], 18 December 2009, www.168028.com.

52. Zhang Xuegang, “Southeast Asia: Gateway 63. The proposed Kra Canal would also simplify
to Stability,” China Security 3, no. 2 (Spring interdiction of China-bound energy
2007), p. 26. shipments.

53. 文丑 [Wen Chou], “民企步入中巴 ‘能源走 64. We focus on sabotage and military-
廊’” [People Look Forward to the Implemen- interdiction risks to pipelines. In many parts
tation of the Sino-Pakistani “Energy Corri- of the world, such as Nigeria and even China,
dor”], 中国石油石化 [China Petroleum and thieves often tap into crude-oil and product
Petrochemical], 15 May 2006, p. 65. lines and then sell their take on the black
market. However, theft requires a sustained
54. See, for example, 吴永年 [Wu Yongnian], “论 presence near the line; modern sensing
中巴辟新 ‘贸易-能源’ 走廊” [A Discussion systems would help security forces detect,
of China and Pakistan Opening Up a New deter, and fight that threat. They would be
“Trade-Energy” Corridor], 世界经济研究 less effective against forces quickly planting
[World Economic Research], no. 11 (2006), explosives near the line.
p. 86.
65. Xin, Li, and Wan, “China Faces New Risk.”
55. “Three Chinese Dead in Pakistan ‘Terrorist
Attack,’” Reuters, 8 July 2007, available at 66. Zhao Hongtu, “‘Malacca Dilemma’ and Re-
www.reuters.com/. thinking China’s Energy Security,” p. 41.

56. “At a length of 1,768km, the Baku Tbilisi 67. More sophisticated attackers, such as the
Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline is one of the great FARC in Colombia, often mine the area and
engineering endeavours of the new millenni- set ambushes for repair crews after blowing
um.” See “Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan Pipeline,” BP up a line.
Caspian, www.bp.com/; and “Pipeline Facts,” 68. Process-control equipment is vulnerable to
Alyeska Pipeline, www.alyeska-pipe.com/. both physical and cyber attacks.
57. “Gwadar–China Oil Pipeline Study Under- 69. Xin, Li, and Wan, “China Faces New Risk.”
way,” Pakistan Observer, 4 September 2006,
70. For a more detailed analysis of possible diffi-
available at pakobserver.net/.
culties in conducting an oil blockade against
58. “Pakistan Proposes Building Oil and Gas China, see Gabriel B. Collins and William S.
Pipelines to China to Diversify Maritime Murray, “No Oil for the Lamps of China?”
Energy Delivery Routes,” Oil and Capital, 14 Naval War College Review 61, no. 2 (Spring
April 2008, available at www.oilcapital.ru. 2008), pp. 79–95.
59. Calculated in April 2008 on the basis of a 71. See ibid.
large regional pipeline operator’s estimates of
72. For further analysis, see Vitaly Kozyrev,
tariffs necessary to ensure a 10 percent rate of
“China’s Continental Energy Strategy: Russia
return and cover the financing and operating
and Central Asia,” in China’s Energy Strategy,
costs of the then-proposed Burma–China
ed. Collins, Erickson, Goldstein, and Murray,
pipeline.
pp. 202–51.

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Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

FORMAL MENTORING IN THE U.S. MILITARY

Research Evidence, Lingering Questions, and Recommendations

W. Brad Johnson and Gene R. Andersen

M entoring is a developmental relationship in which a more experienced

person serves as a guide, role model, teacher, and sponsor for a less experi-
enced person—usually in the same organization. A mentor typically becomes
invested in the career progression and development of the protégé or mentee
and often provides such essential functions as counsel, challenge, and support.
At times, mentorships evolve into enduring friendships, even after the active
1
phase of the relationship has ended.
In the last several years, mentoring has become a hot
Dr. Johnson is professor of psychology in the Depart-
ment of Leadership, Ethics, and Law at the U.S. Naval topic among military leaders. The U.S. Army’s field
Academy and a faculty associate in the Graduate School manual series now includes a specific publication on
of Education at Johns Hopkins University. A clinical
the development and effective conduct of mentorships
psychologist and former lieutenant commander in the
2
U.S. Navy Medical Service Corps, he served as a psy- with subordinates. In his 2003 “Guidance for the
chologist at Bethesda Naval Hospital and the Medical Navy,” the Chief of Naval Operations at that time,
Clinic at Pearl Harbor. Dr. Johnson is the author of nu-
merous publications, including ten books, in the areas of
Admiral Vernon Clark, specified that mentoring sailors
mentoring, professional ethics, and counseling. should be a preeminent focus of the Navy; Admiral
Gene R. Andersen is associate professor of leadership Clark went so far as to direct that a mentor be assigned
education in the Naval War College’s College of Opera- 3
for every service member on active duty. In the last
tional and Strategic Leadership. A retired naval avia-
tor, he is a former director of leadership education in the three years alone, formal mentoring programs and on-
Department of Leadership, Ethics, and Law at the U.S. line e-mentoring matching services have proliferated
Naval Academy and project leader for the Primary Pro-
within the armed forces.
fessional Military Education course at the Center for
Naval Leadership. He edited two leadership texts for use Why has mentoring so captured the military’s at-
at the Naval Academy. He is a graduate of the U.S. Na- tention? There are several good reasons. Evidence in
val Academy and the U.S. Naval War College.
the civilian world suggests that effective mentoring re-
Naval War College Review, Spring 2010, Vol. 63, No. 2 lationships can enhance corporate recruitment and

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114 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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retention efforts, help to bring new hires up to speed, support diversity initia-
tives, enhance employee satisfaction and promotion success, support strategic
succession planning, and improve communication and knowledge transfer
4
within organizations. In the military, anecdotal evidence and survey research
suggest that flag officers often report having been mentored by senior officers at
key junctures in their careers; mentors play a role in getting new talent noticed
5
and promoted.
Perhaps even more important, extensive literature reviews of three decades of
research on mentoring outcomes in civilian organizations reveal that mentoring
6
clearly fosters career success. Across organizations, settings, and research de-
signs, those who report having had a mentor enjoy more rapid promotions,
greater productivity, better professional confidence, higher competence, lower
levels of job-related stress, more positive attitudes toward work, more career sat-
isfaction, and even a greater perceived chance of becoming eminent in their
fields. What’s more, mentored employees are more committed, both to their or-
7
ganizations and to their careers. The most extensive meta-analytic cross-
disciplinary review of mentoring research to date reviewed 15,131 articles and
8
reports on the topic. Findings from 112 studies that satisfied the rigorous
inclusion criteria of that review revealed that mentoring had significant posi-
tive correlations with work performance, retention, organizational citizenship
behavior, positive work attitudes, personal health, quantity of interpersonal re-
lationships, greater career recognition, and general career competence. Al-
though a variety of other variables clearly influence career success (e.g., ability,
personality, motivation), it is clear that the positive effects of mentoring are per-
9
vasive and consistent.
In light of the success of mentoring in the business arena, many organizations
have instituted formal mentoring programs. “Rather than leave mentoring to
happenstance, formal programs give the organization control over who is
10
mentored, when they are mentored, and even how they are mentored.” Consid-
ering the “war for talent” in the contemporary business environment, institu-
tions such as the military are well served by programs that attract, retain, and
11
develop top-notch talent. Further, recent survey research indicates that new
college graduates are more attracted to organizations depicted as having formal
12
mentoring programs.
Although formal mentoring programs are multiplying in the military and
other organizations, there is relatively little research evidence bearing on the de-
13
sign, key ingredients, and ultimate efficacy of these programs. Further, very
few organizations have strategically aligned their mentoring programs with
14
long-term objectives; like other organizations, the military has implemented
formal mentoring programs in the absence of a corporate- or command-level

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Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

mentoring strategy. Getting the programmatic cart before the strategic horse
may help to explain the negative emotional reactions that the term “mentoring”
15
tends to elicit in some surveys of military personnel.
The purpose of this article is to review evidence related to mentoring in orga-
nizations, particularly military organizations. The authors specifically empha-
size the literature bearing on formal mentoring programs and highlight the
salient variables linked with program outcomes. The article concludes with nu-
merous recommendations for military leaders who wish to integrate formal
mentoring programs into their strategic planning.

MENTORING IN THE MILITARY

There are relatively few published studies of mentoring prevalence and out-
comes in military organizations. Two studies of Naval Academy midshipmen,
with sample sizes of 568 and 576, show that between 40 percent and 45 percent
of midshipmen report having significant mentoring relationships at the Acad-
16
emy. Female midshipmen are more likely (63 percent) than male midshipmen
(45 percent) to be mentored, and mentors are most often military officers (41
percent), civilian faculty members (30 percent), or more senior midshipmen (28
percent). Although having a mentor was not correlated by these studies with ac-
ademic standing, students mentored at the Naval Academy are significantly
more satisfied with their education and significantly more likely to mentor oth-
17
ers in return.
A large survey of mentoring in the Army (N = 3,715) revealed that 84 percent
of both senior noncommissioned officers and commissioned officers report
18
having at least one mentor in the course of their careers. There were no dispari-
ties in prevalence or perceived value of mentoring based on gender or race of re-
spondents. The most recent study of mentoring in the military surveyed 305
19
senior military officers attending the National War College. Findings revealed
that 91 percent had been mentored during their military careers and that 87 per-
cent had mentored other military members in turn. These officers reported ben-
efiting from both career and psychosocial mentoring functions or mentor
behaviors.
Finally, there is one published study on the mentoring experiences of
20
flag-rank officers in the Navy. Six hundred ninety-one retired admirals re-
sponded to a Navywide survey of their mentoring experiences while in the fleet.
A full 67 percent reported having at least one salient mentor during their careers
as officers, and most had had at least three important mentors. In most cases, the
mentorships formed due to the mentors’ initiative or through mutual interest.
Admirals who had been mentored were extremely satisfied with the experience,
more satisfied with their Navy careers than were nonmentored respondents,

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and significantly more likely to rate mentoring as extremely important for the
Navy.
The sparse published research on mentoring in the military shows that the
probability of finding a mentor increases the longer one serves and that
mentoring seems to bolster satisfaction with one’s military education or ca-
reer. Mentoring also begets mentoring; mentored military personnel are more
likely to report mentoring others. Mentoring appears to be an equal-opportunity
relationship in the military, in that women and minority respondents are
mentored at rates equivalent to men and majority-group members. Finally,
when mentoring occurs, it is often because a senior person in the military initi-
ates the relationship; it is possible that hierarchical elements of the military
culture make mentee-initiated relationships less likely.

FORMAL MENTORING PROGRAMS

Formal mentoring programs are now ubiquitous features of most organizations
and institutions. Informal, or traditional, mentoring relationships emerge slowly
and naturally through informal interactions between junior and senior members
of organizations; without any external intervention, these relationships are often
21
spontaneous, rooted in shared interests, and mutually initiated. In contrast, a
formal mentoring relationship is instigated by an organization and usually in-
22
volves formal assignment or matching of mentee to mentor. One researcher re-
cently distinguished formal from informal mentorships using four salient
23
dimensions. Intensity is the first dimension; informal mentorships are more in-
tense emotionally, because both members are committed naturally and intrinsi-
cally. Visibility is the second dimension; while formally assigned mentorships are
known and accepted by the organization, informal pairings are less visible and of-
ten operate without the endorsement or even awareness of the organization. The
third dimension is focus. In formal mentoring programs, the organization often
prescribes who can mentor, what training will occur, and what the focus of
mentorship shall be; this is in contrast to informal dyads, which tend to be more
generally focused on the mentee’s career and psychosocial development. Finally,
formal and informal mentorships vary on the basis of duration. Whereas informal
relationships are unconstrained with regard to parameters and are therefore
much longer in duration, formal pairings usually operate within clear guidelines
for meeting frequency and have expectations about termination. Many formal
mentoring programs share common goals, such as socializing new members into
organizational culture, planning succession, lowering attrition, or retaining more
24
women and minority employees.
What does the outcome research show about the efficacy of informal versus
formally assigned mentorships? Both traditional and meta-analytic literature

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reviews consistently indicate that when formal and informal mentoring rela-
tionships are compared, informal mentoring is superior to that formally as-
25
signed. In fact, not a single well-controlled study has shown formal mentoring
26
to be superior to informal mentoring. In several studies, formal mentorships
result in equivalent or even superior levels of psychosocial support (e.g., emo-
tional encouragement), but formal programs rarely produce equivalent career
support. The fact that formal mentorships are limited in duration may help to
explain why there is less time for the mentor to offer career-related functions.
“The difference between how protégés in informal and formal programs were
selected could explain the improved success of informal mentoring. In informal
mentoring, mentors and protégés select each other naturally as part of a mutual
27
attraction and similarity of interests and personality characteristics.”
Similarly, it has been noted that in formal programs, perfect strangers may be
paired on the basis of little data or with little communication about the match-
ing process: “Finding a mentor in a formal program may be like trying to find
28
true love on a blind date—it can happen, but the odds are against it.”
One of the problems with evaluating the efficacy of formal mentoring pro-
grams is the wide heterogeneity across programs with respect to program design
and implementation. Programs vary wildly with regard to rigor of the matching
process, recruitment and training of mentors, promulgation of clear program
expectations to both members of the dyad, level of mentor commitment, and
29
ongoing organization oversight and support. When formal mentoring pro-
grams are compared on the basis of level of facilitation by the organiza-
tion—high-facilitation programs provide thorough training for both parties,
monthly oversight meetings, etc.—outcomes indicate that employees in
high-facilitation programs report greater levels of satisfaction and organiza-
tional commitment.
In spite of the fact that U.S. military commands have instituted broad and
sweeping requirements for mentoring, including formal mentoring programs in
many locations, a careful review of the literature reveals not a single published
evaluation of the efficacy of formal military mentoring. The only outcome re-
port evaluating mentoring with American military personnel was presented at a
conference in 1998; it generally supported the conclusions of researchers in ci-
vilian organizations. Compared to a small sample of Medical Service Corps offi-
cers in a formal mentoring program, officers in informal mentorships had
slightly higher job satisfaction and firmer intentions to remain in the Navy;
however, officers in both formal and informal programs were more satisfied and
30
more likely to remain in the Navy than those reporting no mentor relationship.
In a broad survey of formal mentoring programs in six Taiwan service acade-
mies (N = 1,083), participation in a formal mentoring program led to greater

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satisfaction, greater career commitment, and decreased stress than was the case
31
for students with no mentors; there was no comparison to students who were
informally mentored. Finally, it has been reported that a formal peer mentoring
program in the British Royal Marines was used successfully to identify and ame-
liorate trauma-related mental-health problems. This program, however, had lit-
tle connection to mentoring as commonly conceptualized and more to do with
32
trauma risk management and peer support.
A survey of officers in the U.S. Army revealed that although many officers
want mentorships, they do not want formal programs to legislate these rela-
tionships.33 For many in the military, mentoring has become a faddish buzz-
word; a traditionally meaningful developmental relationship has slowly
become saddled with the baggage of programmatic requirements and check-
lists. Various authors have warned organizations about the pitfalls of institut-
ing formal mentoring programs in the absence of a thoughtful strategy: “The
absence of a corporate mentoring strategy can lead to inconsistencies and inef-
ficiencies across formal mentoring programs within an organization. This in-
effectiveness can lead to formal mentoring programs being attacked,
34
discredited, and ultimately, discontinued.”

MILITARY MENTORING: VEXING PARADOXES AND LINGERING

QUESTIONS
The foregoing literature review sets the stage for a survey of the ongoing ques-
tions and perennial tensions regarding efforts to formalize mentoring in the
military. We now summarize the most pressing of the lingering issues and unan-
swered questions.
Few Mentoring Programs Operationally Define the Term “Mentoring.” Even a
cursory review of the formal mentoring–program research reveals that re-
searchers and program administrators employ a heterogeneous collection of
mentoring definitions or, worse, fail to define the term altogether.35 Within the
military, the term “mentoring” is used so cavalierly and applied to such a wide
array of command programs and initiatives that service members—including
program participants—may have little idea what mentors are supposed to “do”
and what these dyads are supposed to accomplish; this, of course, may elicit a
36
range of reactions to formal programs, from enthusiasm to cynicism. Al-
though the Army’s Field Manual 6-22 now differentiates mentorship from
counseling and coaching, defining it as “the voluntary developmental relation-
ship that exists between a person of greater experience and a person of lesser ex-
perience that is characterized by mutual trust and respect,” we suspect that this
definition and the subsequent discussion in the manual only scratch the surface

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37
when it comes to helping the average soldier execute an effective mentorship. It
will behoove senior military leaders to operationalize clearly such terms as
“mentor” and “mentoring” and to differentiate the mentor relationship from
sponsorship, coaching, counseling, and leadership more broadly.
For Better or Worse, the Term “Mentoring” Comes with Baggage in the Military.
Perhaps more than many organizations, the U.S. military—owing to a high de-
gree of functional specialization—contains a wide array of distinct subcultures.
A number of groups within the military harbor entrenched negative views re-
garding the mentoring construct. For instance, some officers equate mentoring
38
with exclusivity, unfairness, and cronyism. Nowhere was this negative reaction
more evident than in reactions to the “Green Bowlers,” a secret fraternity of Na-
val Academy graduates whose members aroused fierce condemnation in the
39
early twentieth century by helping one another gain promotion in the fleet; to
this day, many senior naval officers equate mentoring with favoritism. In con-
trast, recent interviews with a large sample of U.S. Navy admirals revealed that
40
mentorship is associated with meritocracy in the minds of many. That is, many
admirals believe that star-quality officers get mentored and that such extra at-
tention is well deserved and even essential if the Navy is to achieve sound succes-
sion planning in its leadership. Either way, a successful military-wide mentoring
program must address the historical baggage.
Does Everyone Deserve to Be Mentored? Many formal mentoring programs are
rooted in the assumption not only that everyone deserves to be mentored but
that everyone will benefit from it. In fact, however, traditional mentorships are
by nature exclusive and designed to nurture and promote the rising stars in any
41
organization. If high-quality and purposeful mentoring offers one avenue for
military leadership succession planning, the military will need both to encour-
age broad career-development programs for all military members and to craft
more intensive and selective mentoring pipelines for its most promising junior
talent.
Mentoring Is Only One Predictor of Career Success in the Military. At times, or-
ganizations are smitten with the idea of mentoring; charging ahead with manda-
tory mentoring programs for all employees, program administrators can easily
forget that mentoring—while profoundly helpful to many—is just one of sev-
eral variables predicting career success. For instance, various strands of organi-
zational research indicate that—in addition to being protégés—persons who
have more need for achievement, intelligence, goal orientation, career motiva-
tion, self-confidence, and flexibility are likely to achieve greater career success
than those with lower scores on those variables.42 It is important to keep in mind
that mentoring accounts for only a portion of the explained variance in career

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success for military personnel. In addition to developing mentoring programs,

military leaders should consider educational and skill-development modules
designed to enhance career self-efficacy, initiative taking, and goal orientation in
military personnel.
Developmental Networks Are More Powerful than One-on-One Mentoring
Alone. Although most human resources leaders still think in terms of traditional
one-on-one mentoring when formulating mentoring programs, recent theoret-
ical and empirical developments support the comparative virtues of develop-
mental networks or mentoring constellations. One team of researchers defines a
developmental network as “the set of people a protégé names as taking an active
interest in and action to advance the protégé’s career by providing developmen-
43
tal assistance.” Rather than place the entire burden for career and personal de-
velopment on a single mentor, military organizations should recognize the value
of multiple short-term mentors, peer mentors, mentoring groups, and online
support communities. The more diverse an individual’s developmental net-
work, the greater the depth and breadth of career support.
Not All Mentoring Is Effective Mentoring. Officers and senior enlisted personnel
often bemoan programmatic efforts aimed at making mentoring universal and
mandatory. These leaders know that merely assigning everyone to a “mentor”
does little to ensure effective and helpful developmental relationships. There are
two primary problems here. First, there is tremendous variation in the motiva-
44
tions, interests, and skill levels of prospective mentors; frankly, not just anyone
can become an effective mentor. Many military members possess strong techni-
cal skills but poor interpersonal ones; they will probably not be effective men-
tors. Second, disgruntled, indifferent, or hostile mentors can wreak havoc on the
lives and careers of junior personnel. Even a marginal mentor—one who disap-
45
points or ignores protégés—can be worse than no mentor at all. Military lead-
ers must become selective when inviting personnel to become formal mentors;
careful vetting and selection should be followed by thorough training and ongo-
ing supervision and support.
Extrinsic Rewards Don’t Work as Well as Intrinsic Rewards. Like many organi-
zations, the military has failed to appreciate the power, and the fragility, of in-
trinsic motivation to mentor. In any organization, the most powerful, effective,
and valuable mentors are those who are naturally invested in and personally
46
committed to developing junior talent. Intrinsically motivated mentors un-
dertake the task for the internal pleasure of seeing protégés develop and succeed.
But when an organization requires these same people to mentor and even makes
performance appraisals contingent upon it, the magic, pleasure, and satisfaction
47
of mentoring declines and may even be lost entirely. It is clear that, in what is

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known as the “overjustification effect” in behavioral science research, extrinsic

rewards or requirements may temporarily increase frequency of the behavior
while decreasing long-term interest and commitment; what was once done for
48
pleasure now becomes drudgery. Military leaders must wrestle not only with
selecting excellent mentors but also with nurturing their intrinsic motivation
and protecting them from burnout.
The Paradox of Program Oversight. Should military mentoring programs em-
ploy stringent program oversight or a hands-off approach? The answer to this
question remains elusive. When protégés perceive strong management support
for mentoring, they often report more positive career and psychosocial benefits
49
and fewer negative outcomes. Further, when formal mentoring programs
adopt high-level facilitation strategies, engaging and overseeing the mentoring
dyads frequently, protégés report higher levels of job satisfaction, organizational
commitment, and even job performance. But here is the paradox: the more
mentors perceive that they are being held accountable and scrutinized, the less
willing they are to serve as mentors. Thus while greater perceived management
support for mentoring predicts better outcomes, perceived mentor accountabil-
ity results in less willingness of potential mentors to volunteer. “The negative re-
lationship with mentor willingness to mentor, coupled with the likely low base
rate of serious problems with mentors suggests that increasing mentor account-
ability may backfire on organizations by turning off potentially good mentors to
50
mentoring.” Clearly, military program strategists will have to find the “right”
balance among public support, oversight, and accountability.

NOT EVERYONE HAS WHAT IT TAKES

Mentoring matters; several decades of empirical research confirm that
mentorships in nearly any setting offer measurable benefits to both protégés and
those organizations that employ them. In comparison to their nonmentored
peers, protégés are more rapidly promoted, better compensated, more confi-
dent, more competent, more likely to achieve leadership positions, and more in-
clined to serve as mentors in their turn.51 But the vast majority of mentoring
research pertains to more traditional or informal mentoring relationships, and
there is nearly no published evidence regarding formal mentoring efforts in the
military.
In this concluding section, we offer several recommendations for military
leaders and human resources personnel tasked with developing, managing, and
evaluating programmatic mentoring efforts for military personnel. These best
practice considerations are designed to provide a way forward notwithstanding
the sparsity of empirical evidence and of answers to lingering questions.

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Develop a Master Strategy before Implementing Mentoring Programs. Rather

than charge ahead with mentoring programs—especially those of the manda-
tory variety—wise leaders will first enter into a process to envision a corporate
or military-wide mentoring strategy. A successful mentoring strategy will take
into account organizational dynamics such as culture, hierarchical structures,
traditions, and resources, as well as mentoring objectives specific to an entire
military branch or a local command. An overarching military mentoring strat-
egy will provide a clear rationale and framework for mentoring and, subse-
quently, a sense of cohesion among the varied programs within the military.
Such a strategy will also help to reduce the probability that mentoring programs
will be seen as passing fads, ultimately phased out.
Avoid Mandatory Programs: Facilitate a Sense of Choice. Nothing undermines
the efficacy of a formal mentoring program more quickly than the sense that one
has no choice about participating. The evidence is clear: when mentors and
mentees both feel that they have clear choices—about both participating and
52
whom with—both parties report more positive outcomes. When third parties
match mentoring dyads, matching criteria may be unrelated to interpersonal
compatibility or, worse, entirely haphazard. Military program planners will do
well to make participation in formal mentoring programs entirely voluntary.
Moreover, they should solicit input from participants regarding preferences for
specific interests, values, or characteristics in prospective mentoring partners.
“By perceiving that they have a voice in the matching process, mentors and
protégés may start to invest in the relationship prior to its official beginning; ac-
cordingly, both parties are likely to feel greater motivation to maximize the rela-
53
tionship.” This will require a culture shift in many military organizations. At
present, many commands require each new member to be assigned a formal
mentor; participation is not voluntary, and little consideration is given to issues
of match. Further, few of these programs articulate an overarching strategy, de-
sired outcomes, or relationship “contours,” such as anticipated duration or fre-
quency of contact.
Demonstrate Top-Down Support for Mentoring. Mentoring relationships will
occur naturally in any context; mentoring in the military has flourished for cen-
turies without command intervention. But if the military is serious about en-
hancing the quality of mentoring and extending the benefits of these
relationships to a wider swath of the military population, it will be critical for
key leaders to support mentoring efforts publicly. Organizational evidence
shows that when leadership clearly communicates commitment to develop-
mental relationships and even models effective mentoring behaviors itself,
54
mentoring frequency and quality increase. Nonetheless, and although vocal

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public leadership support for mentoring, backed by appropriate resources, is

key, military leaders must take care to avoid micromanaging mentors and re-
quiring participation in formal mentoring programs.
Develop a Mentoring Continuum. Heretofore, many military programs have
operated under the assumption that developmental relationships are dichoto-
mous—that a person is either being mentored in a traditional one-to-one
mentorship or that person is not being developed. In fact, considerable theoreti-
cal and empirical research supports a developmental network or mentoring
constellation model that helpfully broadens definitions of mentoring. A contin-
uum model bearing on talent development and retention in the military should
focus on a range of programs designed to facilitate and reinforce career and per-
sonal growth. At one end of the continuum are career-development classes,
short-term sponsorship at new duty stations, and other soft-sell approaches. At
the other end of the spectrum are formal mentoring programs involving pair-
ings between protégés and mentors designed to endure for substantial periods
of time. However, even in the case of formal programs, it will behoove military
planners to support flexibility and culture-specific program development in lo-
cal commands; mentoring programs should be customized to cultural expecta-
tions, participant preferences, deployment schedules, and other relevant
variables. Finally, the continuum should include mentoring tools, such as online
and in-class training opportunities, and access to social networking communi-
ties to facilitate good communication over time.
Select Mentors Carefully. Not everyone has what it takes to mentor effectively. In
the military culture, where frequent duty-station changes and expectations for
equity in the workplace are fixtures, it is often assumed that personnel can easily
be plugged in to new jobs and work settings with only cursory training. Al-
though this strategy may be effective in technical situations, the same is not the
case for interpersonal roles. Interpersonal skills like communication ability, em-
pathy, listening, and emotional intelligence forecast greater success in the men-
55
tor role. When developing formal mentoring programs, planners should
consider vetting mentors and deliberately selecting those with demonstrated ef-
ficacy in other interpersonal relationships. Formal mentors who are disengaged,
unreliable, exploitive, or lacking in essential communication skills may cause
considerable harm to protégés and to the military’s efforts at retention and tal-
ent development.
Develop High-Quality Training Programs for Mentors. It is unreasonable to ex-
pect military leaders—no matter how experienced—to understand fully the
form and function of mentorship. Research in varied organizations indicates
that the quality of mentor-training programs can literally make or break them. If

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the military is serious about developing an excellent mentoring continuum, it is

essential to create cutting-edge training in the art and science of mentoring at a
central setting. In order to ease the burden on individual local commands, mentor-
training workshops, online skill-development modules, and other resources
should be created and distributed through the services’ Web portals. Excellent
mentor training can also be integrated into periodic leadership training often
required in various schools required for promotion throughout the military.

NOTES

1. Lillian T. Eby, “Alternative Forms of R. Ragins, John L. Cotton, and Janice S.

Mentoring in Changing Organizational Envi- Miller, “Marginal Mentoring: The Effects of
ronments: A Conceptual Extension of the Type of Mentor, Quality of Relationship, and
Mentoring Literature,” Journal of Vocational Program Design on Work and Career Atti-
Behavior 51 (1997), pp. 125–44; W. Brad tudes,” Academy of Management Journal 43
Johnson and Charles R. Ridley, The Elements (2000), pp. 1177–94.
of Mentoring, rev. ed. (New York: Palgrave 7. Stephen M. Colarelli and Ronald C. Bishop,
MacMillan, 2008). “Career Commitment: Functions, Correlates,
2. U.S. Army Dept., Army Leadership: Compe- and Management,” Group and Organizational
tent, Confident, and Agile, Army Field Manual Studies 15 (1990), pp. 158–76.
[hereafter FM] 6-22 (22-100) (Washington, 8. Eby et al., “Does Mentoring Matter?”
D.C.: 2006).
9. Zinta S. Byrne, Bryan J. Dik, and Dan S.
3. See W. Brad Johnson and Gene Andersen, Chiaburu, “Alternatives to Traditional
“How to Make Mentoring Work,” U.S. Naval Mentoring in Fostering Career Success,”
Institute Proceedings (April 2009), pp. 26–32. Journal of Vocational Behavior 72 (2008), pp.
4. Johnson and Ridley, Elements of Mentoring; 429–42; Kammeyer-Mueller and Judge, “A
Delores M. Wanguri, “Diversity, Perceptions Quantitative View of Mentoring Research.”
of Equity, and Communicative Openness in 10. Chao, “Formal Mentoring,” p. 314.
the Workplace,” Journal of Business Commu-
nication 33 (1996), pp. 443–57. 11. Ernest Friday and Shawnta S. Friday, “Formal
Mentoring: Is There a Strategic Fit?” Manage-
5. W. Brad Johnson et al., “Does Mentoring ment Decision 40 (2002), pp. 152–57.
Foster Success?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceed-
ings (December 1999), pp. 44–46; Edgar F. 12. Tammy D. Allen and Kimberley E. O’Brien,
Puryear, American Admiralship: The Moral “Formal Mentoring Programs and Organiza-
Imperatives of Naval Command (Annapolis, tional Attraction,” Human Resource Develop-
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005). ment Quarterly 17 (2006), pp. 43–58.

6. Georgia T. Chao, “Formal Mentoring: Les- 13. Tammy D. Allen, Lillian T. Eby, and Eliza-
sons Learned from Past Practice,” Professional beth E. Lentz, “Mentorship Behaviors and
Psychology: Research and Practice 40 (2009), Mentorship Quality Associated with Formal
pp. 314–20; Lillian T. Eby et al., “Does Mentoring Programs: Closing the Gap be-
Mentoring Matter? A Multidisciplinary tween Research and Practice,” Journal of Ap-
Meta-analysis Comparing Mentored and plied Psychology 91 (2006), pp. 567–78.
Non-mentored Individuals,” Journal of Voca- 14. Friday and Friday, “Formal Mentoring.”
tional Behavior 72 (2008), pp. 254–67; John
15. Gregg F. Martin et al., “The Road to
D. Kammeyer-Mueller and Timothy A.
Mentoring: Paved with Good Intentions,”
Judge, “A Quantitative View of Mentoring
Parameters 32 (2002), pp. 115–27.
Research: Test of a Model,” Journal of Voca-
tional Behavior 72 (2008), pp. 269–83; Belle

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16. Bret T. Baker, Susan P. Hocevar, and W. Brad 26. Chao, “Formal Mentoring.”
Johnson, “The Prevalence and Nature of Ser- 27. Underhill, “Effectiveness of Mentoring Pro-
vice Academy Mentoring: A Study of Navy grams,” p. 303.
Midshipmen,” Military Psychology 15 (2003),
pp. 273–83; W. Brad Johnson et al., “Men- 28. Chao, “Formal Mentoring,” p. 315.
toring Experiences among Navy Midship- 29. Egan and Song, “Are Facilitated Mentoring
men,” Military Medicine 166 (2001), pp. Programs Beneficial?”
27–31.
30. Michael J. Schwerin and Dean E. Bourne,
17. Baker, Hocevar, and Johnson, “Prevalence “Mentoring, Satisfaction, and Retention
and Nature of Service Academy Mentoring.” among Navy Medical Service Corps Officers”
18. Alma G. Steinberg and Diane M. Foley, (paper, annual meeting of the American Psy-
“Mentoring in the Army: From Buzzword to chological Association, San Francisco, Cali-
Practice,” Military Psychology 11 (1999), pp. fornia, August 1998).
365–79. 31. Changya Hu et al. “Formal Mentoring in
19. Mark A. McGuire, “A Joint Perspective on Military Academies,” Military Psychology 20
Mentoring: A Look by Senior Military Offi- (2008), pp. 171–85.
cers across the Services on the Prevalence and 32. Richard T. Keller et al., “Soldier Peer
Contribution of Mentoring Relationships,” Mentoring Care and Support: Bringing Psy-
Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: chological Awareness to the Front,” Military
The Sciences and Engineering (George Wash- Medicine 170 (2005), pp. 355–61.
ington University) 68(4-B) (2007), p. 2698.
33. Martin et al., “Road to Mentoring.”
20. Johnson et al., “Does Mentoring Foster
34. Friday and Friday, “Formal Mentoring,” p.
Success?”
153.
21. Georgia T. Chao, Pat M. Walz, and Philip D.
35. Allen, Eby, and Lentz, “Mentorship
Gardner, “Formal and Informal Mentorships:
Behaviors.”
A Comparison on Mentoring Functions and
Contrast with Nonmentored Counterparts,” 36. Martin et al., “Road to Mentoring.”
Personnel Psychology 45 (1992), pp. 619–36; 37. FM 6-22, pp. 8–14.
Toby M. Egan and Zhaoli Song, “Are Facili-
38. Johnson et al., “Does Mentoring Foster Suc-
tated Mentoring Programs Beneficial? A Ran-
cess?”; Martin et al., “Road to Mentoring.”
domized Experimental Field Study,” Journal
of Vocational Behavior 72 (2008), pp. 351–62; 39. “Old School Ties,” Time, 11 May 1942, avail-
Belle R. Ragins and John L. Cotton, “Men- able at www.time.com/.
toring Functions and Outcomes: A Compari- 40. Puryear, American Admiralship.
son of Men and Women in Formal and
Informal Mentoring Relationships,” Journal 41. See Johnson and Andersen, “How to Make
of Applied Psychology 84 (1999), pp. 529–50. Mentoring Work.”

22. Ragins, Cotton, and Miller, “Marginal 42. Allen and O’Brien, “Formal Mentoring Pro-
Mentoring.” grams”; Byrne, Dik, and Chiaburu, “Alterna-
tives to Traditional Mentoring”; Ellen A.
23. Chao, “Formal Mentoring.” Fagenson, “Mentoring—Who Needs It? A
24. Egan and Song, “Are Facilitated Mentoring Comparison of Protégés’ and Nonprotégés’
Programs Beneficial?” Needs for Power, Achievement, Affiliation,
and Autonomy,” Journal of Vocational Behav-
25. Chao, “Formal Mentoring”; Chao, Walz, and
ior 41 (1992), pp. 48–60; Underhill, “Effec-
Gardner, “Formal and Informal Mentor-
tiveness of Mentoring Programs.”
ships”; Ragins and Cotton, “Mentoring Func-
tions and Outcomes”; Christina M. Underhill, 43. Monica C. Higgins and Kathy E. Kram,
“The Effectiveness of Mentoring Programs in “Reconceptualizing Mentoring at Work: A
Corporate Settings: A Meta-analytical Review Developmental Network Perspective,” Acad-
of the Literature,” Journal of Vocational Be- emy of Management Review 26 (2001), pp.
havior 68 (2005), pp. 292–307. 264–88.

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44. Egan and Song, “Are Facilitated Mentoring Judge, “A Quantitative View of Mentoring
Programs Beneficial?” Research.”
45. Ragins, Cotton, and Miller, “Marginal 52. Tammy D. Allen, Lillian T. Eby, and Eliza-
Mentoring.” beth Lentz, “The Relationship between For-
46. Johnson and Ridley, Elements of Mentoring. mal Mentoring Program Characteristics and
Perceived Program Effectiveness,” Personnel
47. See Johnson and Andersen, “How to Make Psychology 59 (2006), pp. 125–53.
Mentoring Work.”
53. Allen, Eby, and Lentz, “Mentorship Behav-
48. Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner, and Rich- iors,” p. 575.
ard M. Ryan, “A Meta-analytic Review of Ex-
periments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic 54. Marc R. Parise and Monica L. Forret, “For-
Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation,” Psycholog- mal Mentoring Programs: The Relationship
ical Bulletin 125 (1999), pp. 627–88. of Program Design and Support to Mentors’
Perceptions of Benefits and Costs,” Journal of
49. Lillian T. Eby, Angie L. Lockwood, and Vocational Behavior 72 (2008), pp. 225–40.
Marcus Butts, “Perceived Support for
Mentoring: A Multiple Perspectives Ap- 55. Connie R. Wanberg, John Kammeyer-
proach,” Journal of Vocational Behavior 68 Mueller, and Marc Marchese, “Mentor and
(2006), pp. 267–91. Protégé Predictors and Outcomes of
Mentoring in a Formal Mentoring Program,”
50. Ibid., p. 286. Journal of Vocational Behavior 69 (2006), pp.
51. Chao, “Formal Mentoring”; Eby et al., “Does 410–23.
Mentoring Matter?”; Kammeyer-Mueller and

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RESEARCH & DEBATE

REFLECTING ON FUCHIDA, OR “A TALE OF THREE WHOPPERS”

Jonathan Parshall

It is fitting that I first set pen to pixel for this article on 4 June 2009 (the sixty-
seventh anniversary of the battle of Midway), because Midway will forever be
tied to the name of Mitsuo Fuchida. As I write this, I confess to feeling a sense of
ambivalence. It is true that in this article I hope to bury Fuchida, not to praise
him. Yet it is equally true that as a student of the battle I would have loved to have
had a beer with him, too. Fuchida was, by all accounts, lively, intelligent, and
charismatic—qualities well reflected in his writing. Yet unlike, say, the case with
a Civil War historian, the fact that there was at least some overlap in our lives
(I was thirteen when Fuchida died in 1976) means that my fantasizing about
knowing Fuchida is perhaps not completely far-fetched. So, while I am sure I
would have asked him some rather pointed questions while hoisting that beer, I
am equally certain that I would have had a wonderful time and would have been
personally enriched by meeting him.
Sadly, however, this article has less to do with beer than with the use of per-
sonal accounts in the study of naval history, since it is doubtful that any one per-
son has had a more deleterious long-term impact on the study of the Pacific War
Jon Parshall is the coauthor of Shattered Sword: than Mitsuo Fuchida. Because of his misstatements,
The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway and the
the American study of the Japanese side of such bat-
owner of a website on the Imperial Japanese Navy,
www.combinedfleet.com. Mr. Parshall has been pub- tles as Pearl Harbor and Midway (particularly the lat-
lished in such periodicals as the U.S. Naval Institute ter) was probably set back by decades. His untruths
Proceedings, World War II, and this journal, and he
also demonstrate the tremendous power of self-
has made frequent television and guest lecture appear-
ances on the topic of the Imperial Navy in World War serving ideas that may be wrong, but subtly support
II. He is also an adjunct lecturer for the Naval War Col- national self-images, particularly when carried for-
lege. Mr. Parshall is currently in the software industry.
ward by the mass media. This is a theme I will explore.
Naval War College Review, Spring 2010, Vol. 63, No. 2 I hope it will be instructive to other historians.

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It was during the research for our book Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of
the Battle of Midway that my coauthor, Anthony Tully, and I gradually became
aware of Fuchida’s half-truths. Our quest was not to discredit Fuchida or to ma-
lign any historian who used him as a source. Rather, we were motivated by curi-
osity, our great interest in the Japanese Imperial Navy, and our wish to learn the
truth. However, during the process of building a new foundation for our Mid-
way study, it became clear to us that an important part of the old foundation had
to be destroyed, for the simple reason that it was rotten. Things might have
ended there, had it not been for Fuchida’s other misstatements regarding Pearl
Harbor, as well as his later war activities. It was only in the past few years that I
became aware that Fuchida’s mistruths actually spanned the entire conflict.
Likewise, I have been constantly questioned in the course of giving presenta-
tions on Midway as to what Fuchida’s likely motivations were for his actions.
This has led to considerable ruminating, and not a little scratching of my balding
pate. This article will hopefully answer some of those questions.
The bottom line is that Fuchida was a complex individual with complex moti-
vations. What is clear is that his impact on the history of the Pacific War has been
enormously damaging, in that his elaborations have been parroted for years and
handed down as truth on the big screen, on television, and in countless Internet
chat rooms. What makes this even more surprising is that although Fuchida was
not a high-ranking officer, he created and influenced more of the postwar history
of the Pacific War than perhaps any admiral on either side of the conflict. Let us
turn to the three whoppers.
The first of Fuchida’s tall tales concerns the attack on Pearl Harbor, which
might be called “The Tale of the Missing Tank-Farm Attack.” Down through the
years, Western writers have duly noted that the Japanese navy let slip a poten-
tially crucial opportunity to cripple the U.S. fleet at the outset of hostilities. In
the months leading up to the war, the U.S. Navy carefully amassed 4.5 million
barrels of fuel oil at Pearl Harbor, reasoning correctly that it would be the life-
1
blood of any future naval war against Japan. The oil was stored at the base’s two
tank-farm complexes, primarily in aboveground tanks.
On the morning of 7 December, Japan’s carrier striking force, the Kidô Butai,
struck Pearl Harbor. In the course of their two attack waves, the Japanese accom-
plished two important goals. First, they crushed American land-based airpower,
destroying or damaging around 350 of the 400 American aircraft on Oahu. This
essentially eliminated the ability of the Americans to strike back effectively
against the Kidô Butai. Second, the Japanese sank or badly damaged the majority
of the American battleships in the harbor, thereby accomplishing (or so they
presumed) their overall goal of destroying the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s striking power.
Such a victory, it was felt, would give the Imperial Navy free rein in the Pacific to

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drive into the southern resource areas of Malaya, Borneo, and Java. Thereupon,
having accomplished these key goals, the Japanese task force came about and
headed home, ending the attack. However, the controversy over whether the
Japanese should have attempted a follow-up strike was already beginning.
As the overall tactical commander in the air, Mitsuo Fuchida loitered in the
area to assess the damage that his forces had caused. In Gordon Prange’s land-
mark At Dawn We Slept, Fuchida is quoted as making the claim that during his
return to the carrier Akagi he “mentally earmarked for destruction the fuel-tank
farms, the vast repair and maintenance facilities, and perhaps a ship or two
2
bypassed that morning for priority targets.” Upon landing, he allegedly
pressed vigorously for a follow-up attack aimed at these targets, becoming “bit-
ter and angry” when Admiral Chu- ichi Nagumo instead turned for home. This
3

same scene was mirrored in the movie Tora! Tora! Tora! thereby passing into the
4
American collective memory. In fact, it would appear that none of these events
ever took place.
H. P. Willmott and his coauthors Tohmatsu Haruo and W. Spencer Johnson
must be given credit for introducing these important clarifications into the
Western literature. They noted in 2001 that the targeting priorities for the at-
tack were as follows: land-based airpower; aircraft carriers; battleships, cruis-
ers, and other warships; merchant shipping; port facilities; and land
5
installations. In other words, fuel tanks were at the very bottom of the list, and
during the first two attack waves the Japanese had barely begun chewing their
way into item number three on that list.
Despite postwar American incredulity, these targeting priorities made
perfect sense in the context of the ultra-Mahanian Japanese fleet. Enemy
combat assets were axiomatically more important than the logistical apparatus
supporting those assets. Sea control devolved from sinking warships, not blow-
ing up fuel tanks. While it is true that the Japanese were perhaps shortsighted in
not having gauged the value of Pearl Harbor’s fuel tanks and logistical facilities,
they were also fighting a deliberately shortsighted war. If they could not bring
the United States to the bargaining table in 1942, they were going to lose the war
regardless. Yet there is little in the historical record on the American side to sug-
gest that the immolation of Pearl’s fuel stocks would have made the United
States any more willing to bargain with the Japanese in the short term—the very
nature of the initial assault precluded negotiation. All in all, it is clear that if a
follow-on attack had been launched by the Japanese, it almost certainly would
have been aimed at the large numbers of American cruisers, destroyers, and sub-
marines left in the harbor.
With respect to Fuchida’s tale, Willmott correctly points out, there was, first
of all, no independent confirmation of Fuchida’s claim that he had “earmarked”

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logistical targets. Indeed, had he actually done so, this would have represented a
complete renunciation of all his prior naval training and indoctrination. Second,
Admiral Ryu-mosuke Kusaka (Admiral Nagumo’s chief of staff) made no men-
6
tion of Fuchida’s protestations in his own postwar account. Instead, Kusaka
states that Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s alleged unhappiness over the result of
the attacks, as well as condemnations from others regarding the failure to attack
cruisers, other vessels, and the base’s fuel tanks, were all criticisms heard later,
7
nothing more than “afterthoughts of poor strategists.” Third, Commander
Minoru Genda, the First Air Fleet’s staff air officer, acknowledged in his own
memoirs that he was aware of the Tora! Tora! Tora! scene but explicitly denied
that such an incident had actually taken place or that any such proposal had been
8
put forward by Fuchida. Finally, Willmott notes that Fuchida had been interro-
gated in 1945 by the Americans and had been asked point-blank why there had
been no follow-up attack at Pearl Harbor. Fuchida responded that at the time the
extent of the degradation of American airpower on Oahu was unknown (and
hence the potential threat to Japan’s carriers was unknown) and that the de-
struction or damage to eight American battleships constituted success, as far as
9
Combined Fleet was concerned. He made no mention of the fuel tanks. Yet in
1963 he delivered an account to Prange that made himself appear a great deal
more prescient than he apparently had been willing to reveal in 1945.
Interestingly, Fuchida’s story continued morphing even after 1963. I was
amused recently by a posting to an Internet group dedicated to the study of the
battle of Midway. One of the group’s members, a gentleman who knew many
Midway participants personally, commented on the tank-farm oversight at Pearl
Harbor as follows: “Over the years I got to know a retired captain who was
aboard the USS Enterprise shortly after Midway. In his retirement years he be-
came well acquainted with Reverend Fuchida. [Fuchida had become a Christian
evangelist after the war.] [He] spent many hours with [Fuchida] and learned a
lot that few were privileged to know. One of the things [he] learned is that the
Japanese did not bomb the oil tanks because they planned to use them after they
10
invaded Oahu.”
This is not the first time I have run across this particular spin on the oil tanks,
and it is a truly incredible misstatement on Fuchida’s part. John Stephan’s well
researched Hawaii under the Rising Sun makes it clear that during the decades
leading up to the war the Japanese had intermittently mulled the notion of cap-
turing Hawaii in the event of war. It is equally clear, though, that there were no
concrete plans to this effect at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Such oper-
ations had been discussed during planning for the attack but rejected by
Yamamoto as too risky.11 It is unlikely that the Imperial Army would have agreed
to such a gambit in any case, given its general disinclination for operations

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outside of China and its keen awareness of the lack of available assault shipping.
Finally, of course, even if there had been such plans on the grand strategic level, a
mere air group commander like Fuchida almost certainly would not have been
privy to their details on 7 December. Yet Fuchida’s “privileged” statements to
this retired American captain played nicely to the whole American psychology
relating to this battle.
Being on the receiving end of extremely nasty surprises is the nature of war.
Sometimes, though, the enemy overlooks a temporary weakness and does not
inflict quite as awful a beating as it could have. Such was the case with the tank
farms at Pearl. In such cases it is tempting—after the fact, and when the war is
safely won—to call the enemy stupid for having overlooked the obvious. Had
the Japanese actually attacked and destroyed these facilities, the more pointed
question would have been why the tanks were devoid of antiaircraft defenses,
nonhardened, and relatively undispersed? While many postwar commentators
would have us believe that these tanks were the very key to victory or defeat in
the Pacific, apparently no one on the American side recognized that fact before
the attack either. Yet Fuchida provided his listeners with a plausible lie that made
U.S. oversights seem unimportant while simultaneously making himself appear
smarter and more privy to inside knowledge of Japanese strategic deliberations
than he actually was.
Regarding the treatment of source material, Fuchida’s first whopper illus-
trates an important point that my coauthor, Anthony Tully, has repeatedly em-
phasized—witnesses’ first accounts are often their best accounts. These reports
tend to be terser, less embellished, and more to the point. This is especially im-
portant to note here because within the next decade the voices of most of the
World War II veterans, the men and women who have firsthand insight into that
incredible era, will be gone. It seems clear that Fuchida’s most reliable account
regarding Pearl Harbor was the first one he gave to his interrogators in 1945. In-
triguingly, the very mode of questioning used by them may well have given
Fuchida the clue that the fuel tanks were of larger interest to the Americans.
Certainly by 1963 his story had changed dramatically. Fuchida was never slow to
detect the sort of tales his audiences liked to hear.
The second whopper might be called “The Tale of the Fallacious Five Min-
utes,” as it has to do with the climactic American dive-bomber attack at Midway.
This stunning attack caught the Japanese completely by surprise, crippling three
of their four carriers and effectively deciding the battle in America’s favor. The
events leading up to this attack can be roughly summarized as follows. Prior to
the battle, the Kidô Butai had been instructed by Admiral Yamamoto to keep
half of its aircraft ready for an antiship strike in case an American fleet was
present in the area. Several hours into the proceedings on the morning of 4 June,

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however, Nagumo ordered those reserve aircraft rearmed with land-attack

weapons to deliver a second blow against Midway. Barely half an hour later, one
of the two American carrier task forces, under Admirals Frank Jack Fletcher and
Raymond Spruance, was detected, whereupon the Japanese reserve force’s arma-
ment was ordered switched back to antiship weapons. A series of American air
attacks then occurred, which were roughly handled but managed to keep the
Japanese off balance. By 1020 on the morning of 4 June, according to Fuchida,
the Japanese were finally ready to counterattack the Americans. A famous pas-
sage in Fuchida’s Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan, entitled “A Fateful
Five Minutes,” describes the scene as follows:
One after another, planes were hoisted from the hangar and quickly arranged on the
flight deck. There was no time to lose. At 1020 Admiral Nagumo gave the order to
launch when ready. On Akagi’s flight deck all planes were in position with engines
warming up. The big ship began turning into the wind. Within five minutes, all her
planes would be launched. Five minutes! Who would have dreamed that the tide of
battle would shift completely in that interval of time? . . . At 1024 the order to start
launching came from the bridge by voicetube . . . and the first Zero fighter gathered
speed and whizzed off the deck. At that instant a lookout screamed: “Hell-divers!” I
looked up to see three black enemy planes plummeting toward our ship.12

This rendition of events—wherein Japanese carriers, their flight decks

packed with attack aircraft just moments from takeoff, are caught at the last sec-
ond and destroyed—has been echoed in every Western account of the battle
since 1955, when Fuchida’s book was first published in the United States. It is
part of the common psyche concerning Midway, creating a mental image for
every American who has ever studied the battle. Unfortunately, it is a mental im-
age that is incorrect.
During the course of the morning’s operations the Japanese carriers came
under attack no fewer than five times by nine separate groups of American
aircraft. Not surprisingly, Japanese flight decks were quite busy with combat
air patrol (CAP) requirements. These activities, as well as the interspersed
American attacks, made it nearly impossible for the reserve strike force to be
readied on the Japanese flight decks—a process that took around forty-five min-
13
utes. It was not until the publication of Shattered Sword that all these factors
were brought together. In the course of our research, Tully and I were able to use
the Japanese air group records for the carriers to show that the Japanese had
been recovering CAP fighters aboard Akagi a mere fifteen minutes before it was
14
bombed. Recovering aircraft meant that its flight deck had to be empty aft,
which in turn meant that there was no reserve strike force spotted. The official
Japanese war history on the battle, Senshi So-sho, explicitly states that at the time
of the American attack there were no attack aircraft on the Japanese flight decks,

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only combat air patrol fighters. Indeed, the Zero fighter whizzing off Akagi’s
flight deck in Fuchida’s dramatic passage can be shown in Akagi’s own air group
records to have been a CAP fighter, sent aloft to foil the ongoing American air at-
15
tacks. We even know the pilot’s name.
Thus, Fuchida’s entire rendition of the climax of the most important naval bat-
tle in American history was a lie. The Japanese were nowhere near ready to coun-
terattack at this time. The truly stunning thing about this, however, is that it
essentially paralyzed the American study of this pivotal battle for the better part of
fifty years. Fuchida’s tale was in English, while the operational records that belied
it were in handwritten Japanese stored on microfilms. For this reason, American
historians (perhaps not surprisingly) simply accepted Fuchida’s account verbatim
and declined to look further. It did not help matters that Fuchida had become
great friends with Gordon Prange, whose best-selling Miracle at Midway (1983)
became, hands down, the most important English-language account of the battle,
one whose details were subsequently incorporated into many other Western
histories. Intriguingly, Fuchida’s reputation as a reliable witness was demolished
in Japan as soon as the Senshi So-sho volume on the battle came out in 1971. Again,
because of the difficulty of the source materials, most American historians were
not even aware of the value of Senshi So-sho, let alone what it said about Midway in
particular, until around the turn of the twenty-first century.
I am convinced that one reason why Fuchida’s tale endured in American liter-
ature is that it tapped into an underlying national self-image that we Americans
have of the battle. Americans have always identified with tales of plucky under-
dogs prevailing against the odds. The story that Fuchida fed us was oriented
along those lines. With such a “reliable” witness providing ready-made images
for any screenplay, why would anyone think to look further into the (incredibly
difficult and tedious) Japanese sources? At the same time, Fuchida subtly shifted
the causes for Japan’s defeat away from individuals and more toward what might
be termed a “fates of war” explanation, which is more acceptable to Japanese
societal sensibilities. This made sense in a book written immediately after the
conflict by a former Japanese naval officer trying to salvage some honor from the
wreckage of both a career and a lost war. Indeed, Fuchida’s motivations were
probably along the same lines as those of individuals like Major General F. W.
von Mellenthin, whose famous book Panzer Battles (1956), along with memoirs
by other former Wehrmacht commanders, not only helped orient the terms of
study of the eastern front along essentially German lines for the better part of
fifty years but also implanted the myth of outsized German martial prowess that
reverberates in some audiences to this day.
Fuchida’s second whopper illustrates an important point in the use of
sources—that operational records (dull as they are) form the bedrock of any

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military historical account and must be given weight at least equal to that given
individual observations. If individual observations provide the narrative mate-
rial, operational records should provide the foundation for understanding the
larger picture into which the narrative must fit. Had American historians had
the good sense to use the Japanese operational records that were available to
them as early as the 1960s, Fuchida’s tales would never have been as pervasively
accepted. Instead, his word was accepted essentially as holy writ until 2005.
Fuchida’s third whopper is “The Tale of the Privileged Observer.” In some
ways it is the most egregious of the three, because unlike his tales from the Kidô
Butai there were literally thousands of potential American witnesses to this par-
ticular story, who might have come forward to debunk it. Yet this particular
whopper was the last of the three to be uncovered, having been exposed only in
2009. In 2008 I was a consultant to a writer working on a screenplay for a motion
picture, a major portion of which deals with the life of Fuchida and his postwar
conversion to Christianity. As part of that effort, I came across Fuchida’s claim,
made in Prange’s God’s Samurai, that he had attended the surrender ceremony in
16
Tokyo Bay aboard the USS Missouri. This statement triggered my by-now
finely honed Fuchida radar. Why, I asked myself, would Fuchida have been
aboard the Missouri? What possible business did he have there?
Fuchida’s explanation was that he had been in charge of arranging transpor-
tation for the Japanese surrender delegation and had then been allowed to come
aboard with a group of Japanese army and navy liaison officers to observe the
proceedings from a perch in Missouri’s superstructure. This flew in the face of
common sense. The photographic evidence of the ceremony makes two things
quite clear. First, except for the honored Allied dignitaries whose direct partici-
pation was required, this was an almost exclusively U.S. Navy affair. Second, it
was standing room only, with Missouri’s sailors jammed into every available
space to observe the proceedings. What possible motivation would any American
sailor have had to offer up his perch on this grand event (one that he had left
home and family for to fight for months or years) to some unknown Japanese
officer who happened to show up at the last minute? Likewise, why would any-
one have allowed someone like Fuchida, presumably in the company of other
Japanese military officers, to wander into the command spaces of the flagship of
the U.S. fleet? If he was there, why were there no photographs of him or the rest
of the liaison party, when we have numerous photographs of the surrender dele-
gation coming aboard? The more I thought about it, the more I came to believe
that no other Japanese besides the surrender delegation could have been there.
However, it turns out I was wrong. While looking over some of the photo-
graphs of the event, an image surfaced of someone who was clearly a Japanese
male, dressed in tropical military garb and sporting a camera, who was not a

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member of the surrender delegation. The acquaintance who uncovered this image
argued that since we now had photos of at least one Japanese outside the delega-
tion, perhaps Fuchida could have been there as well. This, in turn, raised the ugly
prospect of having to try to identify every face in every photograph of the cere-
mony to prove that Fuchida was not there, when in all fairness the onus should
have been on Fuchida to prove his rather incredible attendance claim.
Salvation in this case was provided by Martin Bennett, the screenwriter, who
very sensibly wrote to the Battleship Missouri Memorial on the matter. Michael
Weidenbach, the museum’s curator, returned the following testament of the
Missouri’s commander, Stuart Murray, that not only verified Fuchida’s absence
but also provided the identity of the unknown Japanese in the photographs.
Captain Murray noted,
The Japanese were allowed to have a newsreel photographer. My recollection is only
one, but there might have been two. But my orders since they only had the limited
number, he was assigned a position on the 40mm gun platform on the starboard
wing of the verandah deck [sic]. Two Marines had been assigned him to keep an eye
on him because I felt there was a possibility he might try to pull a fancy trick with his
camera or something and be a hero or a kamikaze by taking with him some of the
central people. So these two Marines each had a hand on his leg and put him in his
place and told him to stay there. . . . [T]hey had their other hand on the butt of their
Colt .45. . . . [T]here was no question that [he] got the word.17

Captain Murray’s account also makes it clear that security aboard the
ship—even for Allied guests—was very tight, reflecting (in the words of histo-
rian Alan Zimm) the Navy’s “corporate culture” for handling such events, which
18
emphasizes positive control and overorganization. Indeed, during the cere-
mony itself, a Russian photographer who tried moving to a different position in
order to get a better view was physically tackled by one of the Marine guards and
19
escorted back to his appointed spot. As Weidenbach pointed out, if Fuchida
had been aboard the Missouri in any capacity whatsoever, “his presence would
have been noted, and his placement would have been noted in the official
20
records . . . and would have been strictly monitored and recorded.”
The lesson from the third whopper is yet another reminder (if any were
needed) that proving a negative is oftentimes a lot harder than proving a posi-
tive. However, it is the historian’s job to produce positive evidence to support the
claims that are made by the participants in our narratives. In this case, the onus
was on Fuchida to support his rather incredible claims. His story, while superfi-
cially plausible, failed when subjected to the weight of the other positive evi-
dence we have on this highly documented ceremony. Despite the presence of
literally thousands of Americans who might have seen him, photographed him,
or recalled his presence, we still have nothing more than his word that he was

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there. Thus, by any reasonable measure of proof, Fuchida was not aboard the
USS Missouri for the ceremony.

The reader would be right to ask at this point: Why did Fuchida make this stuff
up? What was the motivation? Here we must set aside strictly objective historical
enquiry and venture into amateur psychology (a prospect that always makes me
queasy). However, as someone who has “lived with” Fuchida now for a number
of years I would make the following observations. A glimpse into the inner char-
acter of the man is revealed in the movie Tora! Tora! Tora! for which both Prange
and Fuchida were technical advisers. During one scene, near the beginning of
the movie, Fuchida lands his plane on the carrier Akagi. Dismounting, he is im-
mediately surrounded by other aviators. Fuchida tells them they’d better treat
him well, because he is their new air group commander. Surprised by this news,
one of the pilots asks how he rated another promotion. Fuchida responds, to the
general hilarity of all assembled, “Well, exceptional people get exceptional treat-
ment!” I believe this illustrates something central about the man. Fuchida con-
sidered himself exceptional. Above all else, he wanted to be perceived as being
intelligent and insightful, and if that meant depicting himself as armed with
wisdom that could only have been developed in hindsight, so be it.
After the war, Fuchida enjoyed the company of Americans, attending many
Pearl Harbor and Midway events. Indeed, Fuchida may have been more popular
in America than in Japan. Furthermore, by his conversion to Christianity and
ordination, Fuchida was vested with the aura that we typically confer on all
clergy. We are taught in Sunday school that priests do not lie, that their quests for
higher truths compel them to convey mortal truths faithfully as well. These
societal beliefs are particularly in evidence with members of the war generation.
I have been called to task more than once by World War II veterans who express
incredulity that a man of the cloth like Fuchida could have lied about his war-
time experiences, despite the many sordid modern examples we have of clerical
misadventures. Furthermore, in the eyes of veterans, Fuchida, despite being an
enemy during the war years, was still (as Bill Mauldin put it) a member of “The
Benevolent and Protective Brotherhood of Them What Has Been Shot At,”
21
whereas historians of the postwar era are decidedly not. Such beliefs are diffi-
cult to overturn.
Fuchida was hardly alone in having falsified the record, of course. Veterans of
every war, either intentionally or unintentionally, have misrepresented the
events they participated in, until the very term “war story” is interchangeable
with a tale of dubious veracity. Any military historian who has interviewed
veterans has learned to be cautious in accepting their narratives. Time, distance,
and the stress of combat can all distort a participant’s recollection of events,

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PARSHALL 137
Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

even setting aside the possibility of intentional misstatements. However, it is not

often that a veteran has the chance to distort the history of the two most impor-
tant battles of the Pacific War, throwing in the surrender ceremony for good
measure. Nor do many veterans get to see their personal versions of history
enshrined in not one but two major motion pictures (Tora! Tora! Tora! and Midway),
thereby ensuring that their distortions will be incorporated into the common
wisdom of the most important conflict of the twentieth century. In this sense
Fuchida was unique and his impact absolutely unprecedented.
How can historians prevent this? The great French historian Marc Bloch
wrote in The Historian’s Craft that “from the moment when we are no longer
resigned to purely and simply recording the words of our witnesses . . . cross-
examination becomes more necessary than ever. Indeed, it is the prime neces-
22
sity of well-conducted historical research.” Fuchida’s fables are a reminder of
what happens when this sort of basic “blocking and tackling” is neglected.
Yet additional narrative accounts are not necessarily required for this cross-
examination. In the case of Midway, it was not another person calling our atten-
tion to Fuchida’s “fateful five minutes” invention by giving a contradicting
report but rather ships’ flight records, as well as a sufficiently detailed under-
standing of how Japanese flight deck operations were conducted, that led to the
inevitable conclusion that Fuchida had not told the truth. Ships’ logs, technical
plans and diagrams, maps and geographic-information databases, weather re-
ports, photographs, radio intercepts, personnel records, and military doctrinal
tracts—all of these and more are sources that can be used to augment (and
cross-check) narrative sources. The key to combating overreliance on a single
source remains, as ever, the development of a portfolio of varied sources that can
be compared to each other.
It is unlikely that Fuchida’s legacy will be overturned any time soon, perhaps
not even within my lifetime. Yet as Bloch said, “The knowledge of the past is
something progressive which is constantly transforming and perfecting it-
23
self.” Therein lies the promise of a brighter future. The fundamental goal of
history rightly remains not the discrediting of Fuchida but rather the perfec-
tion of our collective knowledge about the events he witnessed. Pearl Harbor
and Midway still deserve study and will receive the attention they rightly de-
serve. That attention, however, will be increasingly directed via an array of
methodologies and sources, not just a simplistic compilation of narrative ac-
counts whose wellspring is now quickly running dry. The legacy of this most
profound and complex of wars deserves no less sophisticated and holistic a his-
torical approach.

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NOTES

1. H. P. Willmott, Empires in the Balance: Japa- (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1984), pp.
nese and Allied Strategists, April 1942 (Annap- 82–83, 85.
olis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982), p. 140. 12. Mitsuo Fuchida, with Masatake Okumiya,
2. Gordon Prange, At Dawn We Slept: The Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan
Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York: (Annapolis, Md.: Bluejacket, 1951), pp.
McGraw-Hill, 1981), p. 541. 155–56.
3. Ibid., pp. 542–47. 13. Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, Shat-
4. As a side note, another key scene from this tered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of
movie, wherein Admiral Yamamoto delivers Midway (Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2005),
the famously prophetic line, “I fear we have p. 230.
wakened a sleeping giant,” appears to have 14. Ibid., p. 501.
been purely the concoction of a (very tal- 15. Ibid.
ented) Hollywood screenwriter. Again, by
virtue of being part of a major motion pic- 16. Gordon Prange, with Donald M. Goldstein
ture, this scene has entered the layperson’s and Katherine V. Dillon, God’s Samurai: Lead
historical lexicon, even though Yamamoto Pilot at Pearl Harbor (Dulles, Va.: Potomac
apparently never uttered any such thing. Books, 2003), pp. 174–75.

5. H. P. Willmott, Tohmatsu Haruo, and W. 17. Capt. Stuart Murray, account, www.ussmissouri
Spencer Johnson, Pearl Harbor (Havertown, .com/sea-stories-mo-captain. The veranda
Pa.: Casemate, 2001), p. 64. deck is, in fact, precisely where the photo-
graphs of the event show this Japanese
6. Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. cameraman.
Dillon, eds., The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside
the Japanese Plans (New York: Brassey’s, 18. Alan Zimm to Parshall, 1 April 2009.
1993), p. 162. 19. Murray account.
7. Ibid. 20. Michael Weidenbach, curator, Battleship
8. Willmott, Haruo, and Johnson, Pearl Harbor, Missouri Memorial, correspondence with
pp. 156–57. Martin Bennett, 5 January 2009.

9. Ibid., p. 157. 21. Bill Mauldin, Up Front (1945; repr. New

York: W. W. Norton, 2000), p. 100.
10. Bill Vickrey, post to Battle of Midway
Roundtable, 29 March 2009, home.comcast 22. Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft (New York:
.net/~r2russ/midway//Backissues/2009-14 Knopf, 1953), p. 64.
.htm. 23. Ibid., p. 58.
11. John Stephan, Hawaii under the Rising Sun:
Japan’s Plans for Conquest after Pearl Harbor

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Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

REVIEW ESSAY

ISRAEL: A REVOLUTIONARY MIRACLE IN PALESTINE

Mackubin Thomas Owens

Adelman, Jonathan. The Rise of Israel: A History of a Revolu-

tionary State. London: Routledge, 2008. 269pp. $37.95
Cohen, Stuart A. Israel and Its Army: From Cohesion to Confu-
sion. London: Routledge, 2008. 210pp. $39.95

For much of the world, Israel remains a controversial, indeed reviled, state. It has
been described as a “racist, colonialist” nation; the subagent of American or
Western imperialism; a “stepchild” of the Holocaust or the Jewish Diaspora; the
“brutalizer of Arabs”; and an intransigent enemy of regional peace in the Middle
East. However, as Jonathan Adelman shows in The Rise of Israel, there are serious
shortcomings in all these descriptions of the Jewish state.
Adelman does more than merely debunk the negative stereotypes of Israel
arising from the “Arab victimization narrative” and post-Zionism. In this in-
teresting and informative book he argues that the creation and survival of the
Jewish state constitutes something of a miracle. The fact is that over the past
several centuries, only some 5 percent of the four thousand peoples (“na-
Dr. Owens is associate dean of academics for electives tions”) of the world have achieved statehood. Most
and directed research, and a professor of national se- have done so because they had large populations
curity affairs at the Naval War College. He also is ed-
constituting demographic majorities within given
itor of Orbis, the quarterly journal of the Foreign
Policy Research Institute. His numerous articles on regions, populations that possessed a common cul-
national security affairs have appeared in a variety of ture, language, history, and religion. Accordingly,
publications, and he is currently working on a book
they were able to predominate in single areas for
about American civil-military relations. Dr. Owens
served in the Marine Corps and Marine Corps Re- many centuries. The Jews who created the State of
serve 1964–1994, and in both the executive and legis- Israel lacked these normal attributes of statehood. So
lative branches of the U.S. government.
how did Israel come into being, and why did it flour-
Naval War College Review, Spring 2010, Vol. 63, No. 2 ish against all odds?

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140 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

One of the strengths of this work is its treatment of Israel in a comparative

context. Some of the most telling questions that Adelman seeks to answer are
these: Why was it that among all the minorities of the Ottoman Empire (the Pal-
estinian Jews, Lebanese Christians, Armenians, and Kurds), only the Jews were
able to obtain a powerful state, when the others seemed better situated in 1917?
Why did a state besieged by powerful and numerous enemies avoid becoming an
authoritarian, militarist society, such as Prussia or Sparta?
The fact is that if in 1900, 1917, or 1942 it had been predicted that Israel
would emerge as a first-world regional power, the idea would have been laughed
to scorn. Even in 1948, after Israel had achieved its independence, the CIA pre-
dicted that the Jewish state would not survive for more than two years. Indeed as
late as 1967 and 1973 (when, on the third day of the Yom Kippur War, Defense
Minister Moshe Dayan had expressed his fear that “the Third Temple is falling”),
Israel’s survival was not assured.
Adelman reminds the contemporary reader that the Jews had to overcome
immense obstacles to establish and maintain the State of Israel. The Jews them-
selves were a weak and disempowered people, dispersed over the face of the
earth. For the most part, they did not possess anything resembling a martial tra-
dition. They faced numerous, powerful, and determined enemies: the great
powers (tsarist Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union,
and even the British Empire, from 1937 to 1949); the Arab states; strong transna-
tional religious movements (the Roman Catholic Church, the World Council of
Churches, Islam); international organizations, especially the United Nations
after 1951; most of the third world after 1967; and, most potently, global anti-
Semitism.
However, not all obstacles to the creation and survival of Israel were external.
Many arose from among the Jews themselves. Indeed, Zionism—the movement
calling for a return of the Jewish people to Palestine—was not universally ac-
cepted among Jews. Even Zionism itself suffered from internal divisions.
Nonetheless, Israel survived and flourished. Adelman attributes this outcome
to several factors. The first of these was a unique socialist revolution. Because of
the conditions facing the Jews during the mandate period and the early years of
independence, Israel was able to avoid the radical, violent, and repressive nature
of central state–socialist revolutions such as those that took place in Russia and
China. However, a second revolution also took place in Israel, beginning in the
1990s, this one capitalist. The impact of this second revolution is illustrated by
the astounding fact that oil-poor Israel, with only 2 percent of the population of
the oil-rich Arab-Persian Middle East, accounts for 33 percent of the richest
people in the region.

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REVIEW ESSAY 141

Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

Other factors contributing to the survival of Israel include the greatness of

such Israeli leaders as David Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir, and the Jewish will to
survive, reinforced by the Holocaust and the proclaimed intention of the Arab
states to drive Israel into the sea. The democratic nature of Israel was a blessing,
especially since the Arabs sided time and again with authoritarian, repressive,
and ultimately losing powers, from Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union. Ulti-
mately, argues Adelman, Israel came into existence and flourished “because of
the creativity, drive and determination of the Jews” themselves.
One of the anomalies that Adelman points out is the fact that the small State
of Israel, surrounded by enemies bent on its destruction, has remained a vibrant
democracy rather than devolving into an authoritarian or militaristic polity.
Much of the answer is to be found in the role of a key institution within Israel,
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which is the topic of Stuart A. Cohen’s Israel and
Its Army.
Civil-military relations in Israel differ greatly from those in the United States.
For Americans, the preferred relationship between civilian policy makers and
the uniformed military is what the late Samuel Huntington called “objective
control” of the military. In this arrangement—an ideal type that is rarely at-
tained in practice—civilian authorities grant the professional officer corps au-
tonomy in the realm of military affairs, in return for which the professional
military remains politically neutral and voluntarily subordinate to civilian
control.
Even allowing for the fact that U.S. civil-military relations rarely correspond
to Huntington’s ideal type, Israel’s civil-military boundaries are far more porous
than those in the United States; the IDF has played parts in education, nation
building, and land settlement. The traditional role of the IDF has been more
central to Israeli life than that of the U.S. military to American life in general.
The creation of a national army from preindependence military arms like
Haganah and Palmach was, like the creation of Israel itself, something of a mira-
cle. To begin with, there was no Jewish military tradition upon which first the
Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) and later Israel could draw, at least
since biblical times. In addition, many of those who had to be absorbed and ac-
culturated by the IDF were illiterate immigrants with nothing like military expe-
rience. Nonetheless, the IDF prevailed in the War of Independence and gained a
reputation for near invincibility in 1967. Its reputation was tarnished a bit in
1973, when it suffered a serious strategic surprise, but the IDF recovered the ini-
tiative and once again prevailed.
Cohen traces the decline of Israel’s love affair with the IDF, the reputation of
which reached its nadir in the summer of 2006 in the wake of the Second Leba-
non War against Hezbollah. That war revealed many deficiencies in the IDF;

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142 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

however, these problems had become apparent long before that conflict.
Cohen attributes them to the changing operational landscape—the shift from
state-on-state warfare to irregular conflict, such as the intifada; an overreliance
on technology, a mistake the U.S. military also made during the 1990s; and, most
significantly, societal changes within Israel, the post-Zionist version of “the
routinization of charisma,” in which “unquestioning commitment to ideals that
in the past seemed sublime gives way to frustration with the ordinariness of the
new order, which therefore itself becomes the butt of critical inquiry.”
After offering a no-holds-barred critique of the IDF, Cohen ends on a note of
optimism. While problems are likely to persist, he believes, reforms make it
likely that the IDF can correct their deficiencies. That is a good thing, because
the threats that Israel faces are not likely to disappear soon.

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Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

BOOK REVIEWS

NODES, NETWORKS, PLATFORMS, AND PICTURES

Friedman, Norman. Network-centric Warfare: How Navies Learned to Fight Smarter through Three Wars.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009. 424pp. $32.95

Norman Friedman’s latest book, Whether one agrees with Friedman or

Network-centric Warfare, should find a not, his account challenges many past
place on the shelves of all students of and current conceptions of warfare and
naval warfare. It provides a wealth of represents a frontal challenge to theo-
insights into contemporary and future rists of network-centric warfare. As
wars, by focusing on networks—the such, this work deserves to be read and
connection between weapons and sys- responded to by scholars and analysts
tems, the front line and the rear eche- alike.
lon, decision makers and analysts, and Network-centric warfare and its pre-
domains of warfare from land to sea to cepts, for better or worse, acknowl-
air to space to cyberspace. Friedman’s edged or not, are now embedded in
central thesis is that network-centric much of current thinking about mili-
warfare (NWCW) as articulated by ad- tary operations in both the United
vocates like the late vice admiral and States and countries as diverse as the
former Naval War College president United Kingdom, Sweden, Singapore,
Arthur Cebrowski is really “picture- and China. At the most basic level, pro-
centric warfare”—that is, as he explains, ponents of NWCW urge strategists,
warfare is “based on using a more or planners, operators, and even members
less real time picture of what is happen- of the acquisition community to think
ing.” Friedman then demonstrates the about war fighting in terms of nodes
evolution of picture-centric/network- and networks rather than of weapons
centric warfare by examining naval pro- platforms. At its most simple, this
grams from British admiral Sir John means that developing, sustaining, and
Fisher’s Mediterranean surveillance protecting connectivity (i.e., networks,
program at the beginning of the twenti- ranging from radios to fiber optics) is at
eth century to the sound surveillance least as important as ships, tanks, air-
system (SOSUS) in the latter half of craft, satellites, and sensors. Everything
that century. from combat power and combat effec-
tiveness to logistical efficiency is

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144 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

improved by taking full advantage of largely on relatively obscure develop-

the computer and telecommunications ments. It is not a popular history or an
advances made over the last half- anecdote-filled volume designed to
century. Friedman challenges NWCW thrill devotees of warfare. It lists nearly
proponents by redefining their central fourteen pages of acronyms!
arguments about the relationship be- These complaints aside, this book is
tween nodes and networks. In effect, he worth buying, reading, and studying. It
argues that the “picture” is more im- is a most useful corrective to histories
portant than the network itself for con- focusing on specific wars, campaigns,
ducting military operations. The battles, personalities, or weapons
network serves the development of ever systems.
more complex and, presumably, accu-
PETER DOMBROWSKI
rate “pictures” available to operators
Naval War College
and analysts.
If I have a problem with Friedman, it is
with his definition and explanation of
network-centric warfare, at least the
variant espoused by Vice Admiral Finkelstein, Sydney, Jo Whitehead, and Andrew
Cebrowski. (Full disclosure: Vice Admi- Campbell. Think Again: Why Good Leaders Make
ral Cebrowski was the president of the Bad Decisions and How to Keep It from Happening
Naval War College when I was hired to You. Boston: Harvard Business School, 2008.
204pp. $27.95
there, and I enjoyed more than a few
hours hashing out the intricacies of Bad decisions are common, but bad de-
network-centric warfare in his pres- cisions by good leaders are perplexing.
ence.) I do not agree that picture- This book delves into the root causes of
centric warfare is equivalent to faulty decisions made by leaders who
network-centric warfare: the “pictures” should have known better. The reader
highlighted by Friedman constitute will be intrigued by the cognitive dy-
only one dimension (albeit an impor- namics underlying defective decisions.
tant one) of the theory and practice of Neuroscience is making aspects of tra-
network-centric warfare. Another rela- ditional wisdom about decision making
tively minor quibble is that although obsolete. It turns out that rational deci-
the book’s title refers to three world sion making is not really all that
wars, and indeed the narrative contains rational.
analysis and examples from all
The book’s lead author, Sydney
three—World War I, World War II,
Finkelstein, teaches at Tuck School of
and the Cold War—this is somewhat
Business, Dartmouth, and has written ex-
misleading. As the table of contents
tensively on leadership. His coauthors
suggests, the real structure underlying
both earned their MBAs at Harvard and
the work is instead three technological
teach at the Strategic Management Center
eras, those associated with radios, radar,
at Ashridge Business School, outside Lon-
and computers.
don. Finkelstein also authored Why Smart
Network-centric Warfare is not an easy Executives Fail.
read. It is filled with jargon and focuses

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BOOK REVIEWS 145

Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

The authors identify two common flawed decisions made by exceptional

components in the flawed decisions military, business, and government
they studied: judgment error and the leaders richly illustrate the latent peril
absence of a corrective process. One ex- in red-flag conditions.
ample given is the case of Matthew The elements at play are subtle and sub-
Broderick, a retired Marine Corps gen- conscious. For example, the persistent
eral who was a seasoned decision maker tug of personal self-interest is hard to
in the Federal Emergency Management detect, because a self-serving bias is im-
Agency’s Operations Center during plicitly acceptable in our culture.
Hurricane Katrina. His experience had Self-interest becomes inappropriate
taught him that initial reports from a when it is unacknowledged and there is
crisis area are often exaggerated and in- no self-awareness. It corrosively distorts
accurate. Twelve hours after the hurri- the decision process. The authors’ re-
cane hit New Orleans, Broderick search found that inappropriate self-
received conflicting information about interest contributed to flawed strategic
breached levees and extensive flooding. decisions in more than two-thirds of
His rational analysis was that the sit- their research cases.
uation was not dire, and he went
The book is repetitive at times, but that
home. By the following morning,
minor distraction is more than offset
the magnitude of the catastrophe was
by its insightful advice and practical
unequivocal.
decision-process safeguards. The au-
Broderick was a competent leader with thors refer extensively to academic
proven crisis experience, so why did he cognitive research and challenge the
assign great validity to one source of in- invincibility of “rational and analytic”
formation while dismissing data from decision making, especially for leaders
other credible sources? The authors in complex situations where informa-
contend that his misjudgment resulted tion is ambiguous.
from two cognitive errors: he incor-
HENRY KNISKERN
rectly assumed that the Katrina situa-
Naval War College
tion “pattern-matched” his prior crisis
experiences; and he exacerbated the er-
ror by “emotionally tagging” the infor-
mation from his preferred source, the
Army Corps of Engineers. Pattern rec-
Horner, Charles. Rising China and Its Postmodern
ognition and emotional tagging are
Fate: Memories of Empire in a New Global Context.
powerful subconscious influences on Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 2009. 224pp.
decision making. $34.95
Based on the authors’ research, four This book connects China’s past, pres-
“red flag conditions” are evident in de- ent, and future and places them in a
fective decisions: misleading experi- larger, evolving context. Horner’s work
ences, misleading prejudgments, is nothing short of a tour de force of
inappropriate self-interest, and inap- world intellectual history as projected
propriate attachments. A red-flag con- and contested on the canvas that is
dition forecasts vulnerability to China. Eloquent and engaging, it is
cognitive bias. Notable examples of pointed without being overly

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Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

judgmental, incorporating an absorbing of the influence of history, Horner lik-

literature review that is surprisingly co- ens Zheng He’s voyages to the Apollo
gent, considering the sheer amount of moon landings in the long-term trans-
information conveyed. formations they brought in domestic
Horner takes a bold and transparent opinion regarding national capabilities,
approach: his “hypothetical history of despite their abrupt terminations.
the future” analyzes the past in the con- Strategic debate in the Qing dynasty re-
text of contemporary politics and de- garding the value of China’s western
bates, as post-1978 market reforms territories reveals enduring tensions in
have opened up intellectual discourse. its strategic orientation between conti-
He explores the international dimen- nental and maritime frontiers and be-
sions and domestic discourses of sinol- tween factions advocating their
ogy: “China’s intellectual scene is now respective emphases. Horner quotes
among the most vibrant in the world, one official, whose vividly expressed
bringing together . . . competing ideas viewpoint carried the day (perhaps to
both foreign and domestic.” The author Beijing’s detriment, in retrospect): “The
likewise reveals his own intellectual maritime nations are like a sickness of
journey. This self-conscious approach is the limbs, far away and light, but Russia
valuable, since perhaps nowhere other is like a sickness of the heart and stom-
than in China has history been so ach, nearby and dangerous.”
mined, misused, analyzed, exploited— Horner tackles the enduring puzzle of
and remained a subject of such fascina- why China’s leaders failed to anticipate
tion and debate. maritime threats from Western powers
Horner explores longtime Chinese bu- and finds that the Qing government de-
reaucratic practices of devising norms voted insufficient attention to diplo-
and lessons from history, offering ex- macy and intelligence abroad and failed
amples from the Yuan, Ming, and Qing to consult knowledgeable overseas Chi-
dynasties. Although all are invoked as nese. Nevertheless, by the dawn of the
positive or negative models today, twentieth century, China’s intelligentsia
“What they stand for now is very differ- had achieved a deep understanding of
ent from what they were once thought the sources of Western power and
to be.” More broadly, “China once in- “self-understanding.” Significant
terpreted its own past in light of yester- bureaucratic-curricular reforms proved
day’s failures, but now it is coming to a insufficient, however: a “painful con-
new appreciation of its past in light of sensus” emerged that “a new intellectual
today’s successes.” China’s usable past regime . . . would have to consolidate its
includes long if uneven “maritime and power before the country’s recovery of
naval traditions” that generated na- national power could begin in earnest.”
tional prestige and support for the rul- Then, as now, there is widespread de-
ing regime, supported vigorous termination to make China a prosper-
shipbuilding and trade, and incorpo- ous great power but uncertainty
rated Taiwan. It is hard to overlook the regarding how to do so. Questions
relevance, and resonance, of such issues abound: How should China relate to
today. In a useful comparative example the international system? How should it

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work with the existing hegemonic comprehensive, “three-dimensional”

power of the day? Also, to what extent study of Sino-U.S. relations in regard to
can, and should, Beijing further its in- the vital Middle East.
terests militarily? Horner sees this as Most important, the authors explain
part of a more fundamental question how Beijing’s keen awareness of its lim-
and cites a Chinese intellectual: “Do we ited power and its recognition of the
Chinese have the possibility or necessity importance of Sino-U.S. trade signifi-
to form our own discourse of moder- cantly restrain Chinese opposition to
nity, or do we open a ‘branch office’ of U.S. Mideast strategy. Despite China’s
the Western discourse of modernity in growing economic stake in the region
China”? and declaratory opposition to U.S. “he-
I commend this book to general readers gemony,” Beijing gives avoiding direct
in search of intellectually stimulating clashes with Washington higher priority
but accessible material, to teachers of than it does its relations with regional
survey courses at the advanced under- states. A key example is China’s deci-
graduate or graduate level, and to spe- sion in 1997 to scale back significantly
cialists seeking insights into their own cooperation with Iran on nuclear and
studies of Chinese history. missile technologies in response to
pressure from the Clinton administra-
ANDREW ERICKSON
Naval War College tion. The authors demonstrate how
Beijing paradoxically combines a prac-
tical policy of risk avoidance with the
rhetoric of antihegemonic solidarity,
allowing China to reap economic and
Alterman, Jon B., and John W. Garver. The Vital political profits from Western protec-
Triangle: China, the United States and the Middle tion of the flow of Mideast energy and,
East. Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2008. 144pp. simultaneously, from regional resent-
$16.95 ments of that same Western intervention.
In The Vital Triangle Jon Alterman and Beijing’s observations of rough Soviet
John Garver present a compact analysis and American experiences in Mideast
of relations among China, the United geopolitics reinforce its belief in the
States, and the countries of the Mideast. cost-effectiveness of a low regional
Alterman directs the Middle East Pro- security profile.
gram at the Center for Strategic and In- The book concludes with some reason-
ternational Studies, and Garver is a able, if not exactly groundbreaking, rec-
professor of international affairs at ommendations for managing frictions
Georgia Tech. They deliver a focused, in the China–United States–Mideast tri-
133-page narrative, peppered with angle. Of particular interest to the naval
charts illustrating statistical trends in community are those focused on secur-
the energy and arms trades. Based on ing the maritime domain within the
interviews and conferences with schol- Persian Gulf. Alterman and Garver ad-
ars in China and the Mideast, a review vocate collaboration among China and
of English- and Chinese-language sec- Western and Persian Gulf littoral states
ondary literature, and news reporting, on ship identification protocols, cargo
this study is the first attempt at a security initiatives, and multilateral

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148 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

search-and-rescue operations. The au- In an August 2009 Wall Street Journal

thors argue that because these steps are article, Seth Jones described meeting
limited, practical, and focus on the in- villagers in Afghanistan who had never
terests of all sides, China may be willing heard of President Hamid Karzai and
to engage here, and that further, be- even thought the U.S. military forces he
cause of Tehran’s desire to stay on good was traveling with were Soviets, “not re-
terms with Beijing, Chinese participa- alizing that the Soviet army withdrew in
tion might induce some restraint on 1989.” This lack of knowledge may
Iran’s part. seem implausible in an era of cell phone
The Vital Triangle is well worth reading. and Internet communication, but Jones
It provides a useful contextual frame- offers a detailed narrative of the histori-
work for placing in perspective over- cal and modern-day challenges in Af-
hyped news reports on Sino-U.S. ghanistan that makes this ignorance
disputes over Chinese arms deals with believable. He describes a country pop-
countries in the region, Beijing’s grow- ulated by diverse ethnic tribes with
ing concerns about ensuring the secu- strong aversions to central governance.
rity of its oil imports, threats from As the title implies, he recalls the failure
Egypt and Saudi Arabia that they may of foreign forces time and again to tame
seek Beijing’s political-military support and govern this disparate Afghan popu-
as an alternative to Washington, and at- lace. From Alexander the Great in 330
BC to the British Empire in the nine-
tempts by Iran to appeal to China as a
counterweight to Western pressures. teenth century, to the Soviet invasion of
Because the book cogently illustrates the 1970s, Afghanistan has been seem-
Beijing’s reluctance to take risks or ingly unconquerable. Against this back-
choose sides and thereby diminishes the ground Jones demonstrates the
credibility of China as a counterweight, monumental challenge that the United
Americans working diplomatically in States faces as it attempts to do what
the Mideast could even find it useful to other “empires” could not—“create a
provide copies to their host-country in- new order” in Afghanistan. He clearly
terlocutors the next time they try to demonstrates that “the lessons from the
play “the China card.” past empires provide a stark lesson.”
A well-respected political scientist at
ROBERT A. HARRIS
Defense Intelligence Agency, Burke, Va. RAND, Seth Jones clearly has the credi-
(The views and opinions expressed in this review are bility to take on the task of breaking
the author’s alone and do not reflect the official pol- down and explaining the complicated
icy or position of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
Afghan environment. Jones is an ad-
Department of Defense, or U.S. government.)
junct professor at Georgetown Univer-
sity, has taught at the Naval
Postgraduate School, and has visited
Afghanistan numerous times since 11
September 2001. In the Graveyard of
Jones, Seth G. In the Graveyard of Empires: Amer-
Empires is painstakingly researched,
ica’s War in Afghanistan. New York: Norton,
2009. 414pp. $27.95 with over a thousand notes citing inter-
views, documents, books, news articles,
video clips, and written statements

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BOOK REVIEWS 149

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from numerous U.S. and international Lee Zatarain, an attorney, has crafted a
figures who have played prominent compelling and immensely readable ac-
roles in Afghanistan since before and count of one of the least-known chapters
after 9/11. In fact, Jones’s many cita- of the U.S. Navy’s maritime combat op-
tions and his approach of listing diverse erations, the tanker war of 1987–88. The
players with one-line, anecdotal physi- tanker war was fought by three now very
cal descriptions or personality traits can familiar foes—Iran and Iraq (who had
be overwhelming and even detract from been at war with each other since 1980),
the narrative. and the United States, which became
Nonetheless, this book does a superb embroiled in the conflict when an Iraqi
job of filling in the details of Afghani- aircraft attacked and nearly sank one of
stan’s complex politics for scholars who its frontline warships in 1987. Using new
are interested in gaining a better under- information gained from the U.S. Navy
standing of the history, the state and and other U.S. government sources, as
nonstate actors involved, and the many well as extensive interviews with the offi-
civil and military leaders who have at- cers and crew who served in the Persian
tempted to calm the political upheaval Gulf during the fifteen-month war,
in Afghanistan. Jones ably explains Zatarain examines and explains with
how, after the United States and its al- lawyerly precision the events that consti-
lies quickly knocked the Taliban from tuted the U.S. Navy’s combat operations
power, routed al-Qa‘ida, and set up a against Iranian naval forces.
popularly elected central government, Tanker War begins with a detailed ac-
the country nonetheless failed to estab- count of the Iraqi attack on the guided-
lish an adequate justice system and se- missile frigate USS Stark in May 1987;
curity for its populace—instead the first successful antiship-missile at-
allowing a robust insurgency to de- tack on a U.S. Navy warship, it resulted
velop. With the experience of someone in thirty-seven deaths. That attack,
who has walked the ground and talked however, precipitated no military re-
to the leaders on all sides, Jones effec- sponse against Iraq by the United
tively argues that the drug trade, high- States, largely because it was considered
level government corruption, and the to have been an unfortunate accident,
lack of resources could, if not resolved, and Iraq was more of a friend than Iran.
lead to one more headstone in Afghani- Iran’s subsequent actions—laying
stan’s graveyard. mines in the heavily trafficked channels
of the Gulf to interrupt the flow of Iraqi
DOUGLAS J. WADSWORTH
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps oil and attacking civilian oil tankers—
Naval War College forced the United States to side with
Iraq. As Zatarain explains in straight-
forward fashion, the conflict that en-
sued nearly cost the U.S. Navy another
warship, USS Samuel B. Roberts, and
Zatarain, Lee Allen. Tanker War: America’s First subjected the Navy to several antiship-
Conflict with Iran, 1987–1988. Philadelphia: missile attacks by the Iranian military.
Casemate, 2008. 388pp. $32.95 In retaliation, the U.S. Navy destroyed a
good part of the Iranian navy and

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150 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

effectively established the American soon to be bound together in a tension-

maritime dominance in the Persian filled relationship with the ensuing wars
Gulf that exists to this day. initiated by the terrorist attacks of the
Among the key issues that Zatarain next day. This tension gives dramatic
raises in his gripping account of the shape to the career of Donald Rumsfeld
various battles fought between the as portrayed by Bradley Graham in his
United States and Iran is the controver- well researched book By His Own Rules.
sial claim by many U.S. Navy com- A veteran Washington Post correspon-
manding officers that Iran used dent, Graham intends that the title be re-
Chinese-made Silkworm antiship mis- garded literally, as his detailed story
siles against American ships. Their focuses on Rumsfeld as a master bureau-
claims were discounted by senior mili- cratic infighter who did indeed work by
tary commanders, who refused to ac- his own rules. (The rules encapsulated
knowledge that any such attacks had Rumsfeld’s views on serving and surviv-
occurred, despite extensive evidence to ing in government and were eventually
the contrary—such attacks would have printed in the Wall Street Journal.)
required a military response that the Rumsfeld applied the rules in his in-
United States and the U.S. military were tense commitment to the type of U.S.
neither willing nor able to undertake. military President George W. Bush had
As political tensions have continued to called for during his campaign, an “ag-
rise in recent years between the United ile, lethal, readily deployable” armed
States and Iran, Tanker War is a must- force. To build this force required a sig-
read for those who have a desire or a nificant transformation of the outsized
duty to understand how recent history and ponderous military developed dur-
may shape perceptions of these protag- ing and immediately after the Cold
onists in the future. War. Graham portrays Rumsfeld as a
reformer who “had never met an orga-
RON RATCLIFF
nization he didn’t want to change” and
Naval War College
who had come well prepared to trans-
form the Defense Department, but for
two untimely wars.
Rumsfeld’s personal goal of transform-
Graham, Bradley. By His Own Rules: The Ambi- ing the military seemed to overshadow
tions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of Donald his responsibilities for prosecuting the
Rumsfeld. New York: PublicAffairs, 2009. 803pp. wars. Graham describes at length how
$35 Rumsfeld’s missteps in managing the
In a speech given to Pentagon employees wars in Iraq and Afghanistan caused
on 10 September 2001, Secretary of De- him to become the “personification of
fense Donald Rumsfeld stated that the the arrogance and misjudgments of the
“adversary that poses a threat, a serious Bush Administration,” from damaging
threat, to the security of the United interagency power struggles to intoler-
States” is not “decrepit dictators” but ance of differing viewpoints, to a lack of
rather “the Pentagon bureaucracy.” The ability to acknowledge mistakes or
blunt message of this speech was very change strategies.

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BOOK REVIEWS 151

Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

Yet Graham also well portrays

Rumsfeld as a complex man who got
things accomplished. A tenacious colle-
Barlow, Jeffrey G. From Hot War to Cold: The U.S.
giate wrestler at Princeton and a Navy Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955.
pilot, Rumsfeld was elected to Congress Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2009.
at age thirty. He served four terms be- 710pp. $65
fore President Richard Nixon ap- The U.S. Navy that patrolled the
pointed him as head of the Office of world’s oceans with such unquestioned
Economic Opportunity and then as am- dominance in the 1990s did not spring
bassador to NATO. Under President into existence full-blown, nor was its
Gerald Ford, Rumsfeld would serve as creation a smooth evolution based on
White House chief of staff and as the dispassionate analysis and national con-
youngest-ever secretary of defense. In sensus. The early years of that postwar
Rumsfeld’s business career, he was a Navy, particularly its first, crucial de-
CEO responsible for the successful cade, were marked by storms, impas-
turnaround of several major corpora- sioned debate, and bitter political
tions. With his appointment in 2001, he battles. This turmoil had started before
would also become the oldest to serve the end of the Second World War and
as secretary of defense. In all of his would continue into the mid-1950s.
many appointments and responsibili- Unfortunately, there has been far too
ties, Rumsfeld comes across as an in- little written about this period in the
tense, capable, and ambitious operator U.S. Navy’s history.
with a “deep moral streak.”
Jeffrey Barlow, a noted naval historian
Graham’s well written and comprehen- and author, has done much to close
sive narrative implies an answer to the that gap and in the process has pro-
question of why an administrator duced a stunning book. Meticulously
known for his diligent and rational ap- researched and scrupulously docu-
proach to resolving complex issues ulti- mented, From Hot War to Cold is a
mately presided over a deeply dysfunc- gripping account of how the modern
tional policy-making process. In Navy was formed in the crucible of the
Rumsfeld, overconfidence eventually first ten years after the war. As a his-
converted a healthy skepticism about tory, this volume is first-rate. As a study
thorough organizational procedures of decision making, it is superb.
into near contempt for them. Trans-
forming the military, like countering an Barlow consistently reminds the reader
insurgency, proved to be more about just how important this decade was. As
changing minds than about building he relates, military and government
new weapons or using old ones. Gra- leaders wrestled with critical emerging
ham concludes that Rumsfeld’s “biggest technologies, tectonic political shifts,
failings were personal—the result of the and ferocious internal battles. He exam-
man himself, not simply of the circum- ines every aspect of these times, tracing
stances he confronted.” how military organizations were shaped
and affected by a series of defense reor-
WILLIAM CALHOUN
ganization acts, and how the Air Force
Naval War College
and Navy battled for a role in the na-
tion’s nuclear strategy. Over time,

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152 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

deployment patterns were established Barlow has captured the flavor of politi-
that would last for half a century. cal infighting at its best and worst.
This book not only speaks knowledge- Among the more dramatic accounts is
ably about technical, organizational, the tale of how Secretary of the Navy
and doctrinal shifts over a tumultuous Charles Thomas fired Admiral Robert
decade but gives full attention to the B. Carney, who, as Chief of Naval Oper-
personalities of the day. From the presi- ations, had tangled with the secretary of
dent on down, Barlow examines the de- state, infuriated President Eisenhower,
bates, discourse, plots, and planning, as and refused to exchange message traffic
well as the passion and emotion that with Thomas.
went into these decisions. There are gi- If there is a flaw with Barlow’s book, it
ants in these pages, including Ernest J. is the flaw to which every writer as-
King, Forrest Sherman, James Forrestal, pires—to instill in the reader a feeling
Harry Truman, and Dwight D. Eisen- of regret when the last page is turned
hower. There is also a myriad of other and the book is finished. It is pro-
officers and leaders whose names foundly to be hoped that this volume
should be more familiar, such as Admi- will be followed by a second and a
rals Richard Conolly and Edward C. third.
Ewen.
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College

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Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

OF SPECIAL INTEREST

CALL FOR PAPERS: THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

AFFAIRS
The editorial board of The Journal of International Security Affairs invites
submissions of papers for its Fall 2010 issue. The Journal (ISSN 1532-4060),
published twice yearly by the nonprofit, nonpartisan Jewish Institute for Na-
tional Security Affairs, covers the U.S. military and global security issues af-
fecting the United States and its allies abroad. All articles submitted to the
Journal are confidentially refereed. Submission guidelines can be found at
www.securityaffairs.org.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010 159

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Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

REFLECTIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s manager for the
Navy Professional Reading Program.

T here are sixty great books in the complete Navy Professional Reading Pro-
gram (NPRP) library. Sailors interested in participating in the NPRP often
ask where they should begin. While you can’t go wrong reading any of the care-
fully selected books, this article will give you just a “taste” of several books,
which may tempt you to read further. For example:
They were gone for five minutes, and they came back together. Ben Sharmak stood
for a few moments staring at me, and then he climbed away, back to his army. Gulab
walked down the hill to me and tried to explain Sharmak had handed him a note that
said, Either you hand over the American—or every member of your family will be killed.
Gulab made his familiar dismissive gesture, and we both turned and watched the
Taliban leader walking away through the trees. And the village cop offered me his
hand, helped me to my feet, and once more led me through the forest, half lifting me
down the gradients, always considerate of my shattered left leg, until we reached a
dried-up riverbed.
And there we rested. We watched for Taliban sharpshooters, but no one came. All
around us in the trees, their AKs ready, were familiar faces from Sabray ready to de-
fend us.

What happens next? Find out by reading Lone Survivor, by Marcus Luttrell with
Patrick Robinson (New York: Little, Brown, 2007).
{LINE-SPACE}
I once watched a man being kidnapped in Beirut. It took only a few seconds. I was on
my way to Beirut International Airport when my taxi became stalled in traffic. Sud-
denly I saw off to my right four men with pistols tucked into their belts who were
dragging another man out his front door. A woman, probably his wife, was standing
just inside the shadow of the door, clutching her bathrobe and weeping. The man
was struggling and kicking with all his might, a look of sheer terror in his eyes.

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REFLECTIONS ON READING 155

Naval War College: Full Spring 2010 Issue

Somehow the scene reminded me of a group of football players carrying their coach
off the field after victory, but this was no celebration. Just for a second my eyes met
those of a hapless victim, right before he was bundled into a waiting car. His eyes did
not say, “Help me”; all they spoke was fear. He knew I couldn’t help him. This was
Beirut.

Want to know more about this exotic city? Read: From Beirut to Jerusalem, by
Thomas Friedman (New York: Anchor Books, 1990).
{LINE-SPACE}
Captain Copeland picked up the intercom mike and addressed the Roberts’s crew.
That he was speaking for himself struck Ens. Jack Moore as unusual and urgent. Nor-
mally seaman Jack Roberts was the public address voice of his namesake warship. His
southern drawl was all but unintelligible to anyone not acquainted with Dixie’s
rhythms and diphthongs. But the skipper’s diction was as crisp as a litigator’s. He was
talking fast and sounding more than a little nervous.

“A large Japanese fleet has been contacted. They are fifteen miles away and headed in
our direction. They are believed to have four battleships, eight cruisers, and a num-
ber of destroyers.
“This will be a fight against overwhelming odds from which survival cannot be ex-
pected. We will do what damage we can.”

Did the men of the USS Roberts survive? Find out by reading The Last Stand of
the Tin Can Sailors, by James D. Hornfischer (New York: Bantam Books, 2004).
{LINE-SPACE}
The Enterprise marked her combat debut by launching twenty-one Phantoms and
Skyhawks in a strike against Vietcong installations near Bien Hoa, South Vietnam.
There were rough spots in that first day at war for the “Big E.” A Phantom pilot, ob-
viously shaken by his first exposure to combat, was forced to eject after making seven
unsatisfactory landing approaches and then being unable to plug into an airborne
tanker for emergency refueling. The pilot was picked up by the carrier’s plane guard
helicopter and returned to the Enterprise. He was uninjured in the parachuting but
was flown off on the first available carrier on-board delivery transport for transfer
back to the States and a naval career in an assignment that did not involve flying. A
second Phantom was lost when a premature bomb explosion put holes in the fuel
tank and the pilot and radar intercept officer (RIO) ejected over South Vietnam
when the tanks ran dry. Soldiers of the Army Special Forces group at Hon Quan ar-
rived thirty-five minutes later and brought an Air Force rescue helicopter to evacuate
the aircrew. By the afternoon, operations had smoothed out and the Enterprise and
Air Wing 9 had completed every mission on the daily flight schedule. CVW-9 flew
125 strike sorties on that date, unloading 167 tons of bombs and rockets on the
enemy.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010 161

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156 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 2, Art. 1

Find out more about the “Big E” by reading Aircraft Carriers at War, by Admiral
James L. Holloway III (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2007).
{LINE-SPACE}
Have we captured your interest? Go to the NPRP library at your command and
get the whole story!

JOHN E. JACKSON

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