Tab 1

SPSMUN’25
BACKGROUND GUIDE

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

AGENDA: Reviewing the Global Trade Impact of United

States Tariff Measures with Special Emphasis on
Multilateral Economic Stability
Letter from the Executive Board
Dear Delegates,

We are delighted to welcome you to the simulation of the World Trade

Organization at SPSMUN’25. The agenda prepared for this committee has been a
critical and highly relevant topic that has sparked extensive global debate and
analysis, and we trust it will inspire insightful debate and meaningful contributions
from all participants.

As you begin exploring this background guide, we encourage you to view it as a

foundational resource - an essential starting point rather than the entirety of your
preparation. While it provides foundational knowledge compiled through thorough
research and evaluation by the Executive Board, we encourage you to go beyond
this document to deepen your understanding. Please note that this guide is intended
for preparatory purposes only and should not be referenced as definitive evidence
during committee sessions.

We recognize that participating in a Model United Nations conference may feel

daunting, especially for those new to the experience. However, our expectations
focus less on the level of experience or oratory skills and more on your ability to
navigate differing perspectives with respect and diplomacy. Success in this
committee will come from balancing national interests with collaborative efforts to
foster consensus and propose innovative solutions to complex challenges. While
fresh ideas can sometimes unsettle traditional viewpoints, they are vital for
progress amid the global uncertainties and tensions that underscore the need for
effective policy reforms.

In case of any query, feel free to contact us. We look forward to engaging debates
and an enriching experience with all delegates.

Regards,​
The Executive Board​
SPSMUN’25 - World Trade Organization Committee​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​
​
​
Rules of procedure

UNA- USA Rules of Procedure

1.​ ROLL CALL : At the beginning of each Session , the Chairpersons shall call in an
alphabetical order on all Member States in order to state their status of attendance.
Member States may reply “present” or “present and voting”.
●​ Representatives stating just “present and voting” shall have no right to abstain
from any vote on the substantial matter.
●​ If any of the Representatives were not present during the Roll Call, upon their
arrival they shall send a note to the Chairpersons clarifying their status of
presence.
●​ QUORUM - The quorum signifies the minimum number of delegates who need to
be present in order to open Session for the debate. The quorum is met when at
least one-third of all delegates registered are present at the committee session.
●​ A simple majority is required to vote on substantive matters.

2.​ GSL : GSL is the default format of debate.

The first motion is usually:
“Motion to open the General Speaker’s List with a speaking time of 90 seconds per
speaker.”
●​ The speakers are recognised by the Chair. GSL is a non exhaustive list. When the
GSL is exhausted (no new names are added), the committee automatically moves
into voting procedure unless another motion is raised.
●​ Additionally, no delegate may have their name on the list twice; delegates must
wait until after they have spoken to re-add themselves to the list.

3.​ MODERATED CAUCUS : The moderated caucus is aimed to facilitate and accelerate
the discussion on the issues deemed as essential and critical for the topic on agenda.
●​ The motion for the moderated caucus can be introduced by any of the delegates
once the Floor is open for Points and Motions. The delegate shall specify the total
time of the Motion (not exceeding 20 minutes), individual speaker´s time for each
of the delegates (not exceeding the speaker´s time set for the general Speaker's
List) and the purpose of the Motion. The purpose, i.e. the topic of the Motion
shall be connected to the issue currently being discussed on the agenda and shall
be more particular that the general topic of the discussion.
●​ A Simple Majority of the quorum is required for the motion to pass. In case that
there are more Moderated Caucuses proposed, the Committee will vote upon them
 in descending order according to the total time of the Caucus (i.e. from the longest
to the shortest) as set by the Chairs.

4.​ UNMODERATED CAUCUS : Unmoderated Caucus is the most informal out of all
forms of debate, during which delegates are able to freely discuss all issues with other
delegations, lobby for their interests, resolve difficult questions about the topic on the
agenda and create working papers and resolutions.
●​ The motion for Un-moderated caucus can be introduced by any of the delegates
once the Floor is open for Points and Motions. The delegate shall specify the
purpose of the motion and shall state the total time of the motion (not exceeding
30 minutes). 3. A Simple Majority of the quorum is required for the motion to
pass.

5.​ YIELDS : A delegate who was granted the permission to speak by the Chairpersons shall
have the right to yield his time- if remaining- to:
●​ Yield to another delegate- the remaining time will be offered to another delegate
as allotted by the former speaker. The delegate, if accepting the yield, cannot yield
the floor to any other person with the exception of Chairpersons.
●​ Yield to POINT OF INFORMATION- If the delegate is open to questions, it is at
the discretion of the Chairpersons to grant this right to any delegate willing to
pose an inquiry to the delegate within the remaining time allocated to the
delegate. Inquiries are not counted into the remaining speaker´s time, unlike the
answers provided by the delegate. The delegate who yielded his time to questions
can refuse to answer any of them at his discretion. Also, Chairpersons shall call to
order any delegate whose inquiry by its character does not comply with the
standards.
●​ Yield back to the Chairs- if there is remaining time left, but the delegate is not
wishing to answer any questions or give his allocated time to another delegate, he
/she can yield his time back to the Chairpersons, who will proceed with another
delegate on the Speaker´s List/ wishing to speak afterwards.

6.​ POINTS : Points are raised to clarify or fix something. They do not require a vote.
●​ Point of Personal Privilege- A delegate may raise the Point of Personal Privilege
in case of whichever kind of personal discomfort which prevents him from full
participation in the debate. Such things can be for example audibility of other
speakers, switching of air conditioning etc. A Point of Personal Privilege can
interrupt a speaker only in the case of bad audibility.
●​ Point of Parliamentary Inquiry- A delegate may raise the Point of Parliamentary
Inquiry in order to clarify certain aspects of the Rules of Procedure by the
 Chairpersons. Such Point may not interrupt speakers and can be introduced only
when the Floor is open for Points and Motions.
●​ Point of Order- A delegate may raise the Point of Order if there is a discrepancy
or any improperness in the application of the Rules of Procedure by the delegates
or Chairpersons. It is in the discretion of Chairs to decide whether their point is
valid and to clarify any irregularities. The Point of Order may not interrupt a
speech.
●​ Point of Information- If the delegate is open to questions, it is at the discretion of
the Chairpersons to grant this right to any delegate willing to pose an inquiry to
the delegate within the remaining time allocated to the delegate. Inquiries are not
counted into the remaining speaker´s time, unlike the answers provided by the
delegate. The delegate who yielded his time to questions can refuse to answer any
of them at his discretion.

7.​ DRAFT RESOLUTION : Draft Resolution means a document drafted in the official
format of the resolution.
●​ No Draft Resolution shall be circulated without the previous approval of its
required format and number of Sponsors and Signatories by the Chairpersons.
●​ The ones recognized as the writers of the Draft Resolution are called “Sponsors”.
Chairpersons will set the required minimum number of Sponsors accordingly.
●​ “Signatories” are the ones supporting the discussion regarding the Draft
Resolution on the Floor and bear no further obligation. Chairpersons will set the
required minimum number of Signatories.
●​ One Member State cannot be “Sponsor” and “Signatory” at the same time.
●​ Once the Draft Resolution has been introduced delegates cannot add themselves
to the list of Sponsors anymore. However, they can be removed from the list by
passing a request in written form to the Chairs. If the Draft Resolution does not
have the number of Sponsors or Signatories required, the document will be
removed from the Floor immediately.
●​ Delegates wishing to be added or removed from the list of Signatories can do so
at any time. The request to do so should be passed to the Chairs in written form.

AMENDMENTS : An amendment is a document which modifies, deletes, adds

or revises one or more parts of the Draft Resolution.
●​ Amendments can be proposed by any delegate on any part or Clause of the
Draft Resolution. All amendments shall be submitted in the written form
to the Chairpersons. There are two types of Amendments:
a. Friendly Amendment- Amendments accepted and approved by all
Sponsors of the Draft Resolution shall be considered Friendly. They shall
be implemented in the Draft Resolution without the need to be voted upon.
 b. Unfriendly Amendment- Amendments not approved by all the Sponsors
shall be considered Unfriendly. The required number of Sponsors needed
for Unfriendly Amendment shall be set by the Chairpersons according to
each Committee. Any Amendments to Unfriendly Amendment are out of
order. Unfriendly Amendment can be withdrawn from the Floor by all its
Sponsors before being voted upon; such withdrawal shall be submitted in
the written form to the Chairpersons.

8.​ VOTING PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE VOTES : Substantive votes shall be

considered those referring to resolutions, amendments or their parts. During substantive
votes, delegates can vote either in favor, against or can abstain.
●​ Delegates stating “Present and voting” during the Roll Call cannot abstain.
Substantive voting is being done by the Member States only, i.e. observers have
no right to vote.
●​ Procedural vote shall be considered those referring to other voting procedures
with the exception of those mentioned above. During procedural vote, no
abstentions are allowed. During procedural voting, all observers have the right to
vote.
●​ MAJORITIES - A Simple Majority requires a majority of ½ + 1 of all delegates
“Present and voting” to be in favor. A Qualified Majority requires 2/3 of all
delegates “Present and voting” to be in favor. 3. All procedural and substantive
matters shall be passed by a Simple Majority unless stated otherwise.
WTO & ITS FUNCTIONING

The World Trade Organization came into being in 1995. One of the youngest of the international
organizations, the WTO is the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
established in the wake of the Second World War. The overall objective of the WTO is to help its
members use trade as a means to raise living standards, create jobs and improve people's lives.

The WTO operates the global system of trade rules, helps developing economies build their trade
capacity and seeks to create a more inclusive trading system. Global rules of trade provide
assurance and stability. Decisions in the WTO are typically taken by consensus among all
members and they are ratified by members’ parliaments. Trade frictions are channelled into the
WTO’s dispute settlement process, where the focus is on interpreting agreements and
commitments and how to ensure that members’ trade policies conform with them. That way, the
risk of disputes spilling over into political or military conflict is reduced. By lowering trade
barriers through negotiations among member governments, the WTO’s system also breaks down
other barriers between peoples and trading economies.
At the heart of the system – known as the multilateral trading system – are the WTO’s
agreements, negotiated and signed by a large majority of the world’s trading economies, and
ratified in their parliaments. These agreements are the legal foundations for global trade.
Essentially, they are contracts, guaranteeing WTO members' important trade rights. They also
bind governments to keep their trade policies transparent and predictable which is to everybody’s
benefit. The agreements provide a stable and transparent framework to help producers of goods
and services, exporters and importers conduct their business. The current body of trade
agreements comprising the WTO consists of 16 different multilateral agreements (to which all
WTO members are parties) and two different plurilateral agreements (to which only some WTO
members are parties).
Functions of WTO:​
More specifically, the WTO's main activities are:
• Negotiating the reduction or elimination of obstacles to trade (import tariffs, other barriers to
trade) and agreeing on rules governing the conduct of international trade (e.g. antidumping,
subsidies, product standards, etc.)
• Administering and monitoring the application of the WTO's agreed rules for trade in goods,
trade in services, and trade-related intellectual property rights
• Monitoring and reviewing the trade policies of our members, as well as ensuring transparency
of regional and bilateral trade agreements
• Settling disputes among our members regarding the interpretation and application of the
agreements
• Building capacity of developing country government officials in international trade matters
• Assisting the process of accession of some 30 countries who are not yet members of the
organization
• Conducting economic research and collecting and disseminating trade data in support of the
WTO's other main activities
• Explaining to and educating the public about the WTO, its mission and its activities.
Our committee will simulate a meeting of the WTO’s Ministerial Conference, which occurs
biannually and brings together trade ministers from all 164 member states. These member states
account for 98% of world trade and represent diverse economic, political, and social systems. All
decisions must be made by consensus, which requires that no member formally rejects a
resolution. Given the plurality of members’ backgrounds, reaching a consensus requires a
high-level of negotiating tact, a willingness to compromise, and a bit of ingenuity. That being
said, this committee does NOT require unanimous vote. As long as the majority of
non-abstaining votes are in favor, the draft resolution is passed. If a draft resolution passes, then
subsequent draft resolutions will not be voted on. If otherwise, the next draft resolution
introduced will be considered.
Important WTO agreements:​
GATT 1994 ​
Agreement on Safeguards Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) ​
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) ​
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) ​
Agreement on Safeguards Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS)
AGENDA
Reviewing the Global Trade Impact of United States Tariff Measures with
Special Emphasis on Multilateral Economic Stability

Theories of International Trade ere primarily exist two perspectives of global trade, that have
developed since the advent of the era of imperialism, and shaped by the history that devolved
since. Each Nation’s Economic and Trade Policy is directed in one of these directions, or
attempts to strike a balance in the two, hence it is necessary to know for the sake of proper
debate for each delegate where their nation lies on this spectrum. In brief, they are:​

Economic liberalism
Economic liberalism is the ideology that free trade benefits all nations by allowing them to focus
on what they do best. It is rooted in Comparative Advantage theory, developed by David
Ricardo, which argues that even if one country is more efficient in producing everything, it still
benefits from trading with others by specializing in goods it can produce at relatively lower
opportunity cost. At the national level, this leads to specialisation of production, increasing
overall efficiency, innovation, and consumer choice. Liberalism also suggests that economic
interdependence prevents war—when countries’ economies are deeply enmeshed through trade
and supply chains, the cost of conflict becomes too high. It is supported by reports such as the
World Bank’s “Peace rough Trade” analysis, which shows high trade integration correlates with
lower interstate conflict. Free trade agreements and global value chains (like those within the
WTO framework) are seen as stabilizing forces, making war less attractive compared to
cooperation. Thus, economic liberalism promotes open markets, minimal tariffs, and multilateral
institutions like the WTO to regulate and facilitate global commerce while fostering peace
through mutual economic dependence.

Protectionism
Protectionism prioritizes national interest over global integration, focusing on safeguarding
domestic industries and sovereignty. It is especially prevalent among post‑colonial states, many
of which historically suffered exploitation under liberal trade regimes and now seek to protect
infant industries, preserve jobs, and avoid overdependence on developed economies.
Protectionist strategies use tariff measures (import duties raising the cost of foreign goods) and
non - tariff measures. Non‑tariff measures include:
1. Import quotas – directly limiting the quantity of foreign goods that are brought in.
2. Subsidies – financial support for domestic production, consumption, or sales to make local
goods cheaper.
3. Domestic regulations – such as health, safety, or environmental standards that indirectly
restrict foreign imports.
Protectionism rejects blind faith in comparative advantage, arguing that global free trade often
leaves weaker economies trapped in resource extraction or low‑value production. By shielding
local industries, nations can achieve self-reliance, food security, and industrialization. While
critics say it reduces efficiency, many argue it is necessary to correct historic inequalities,
balance power asymmetries, and maintain economic resilience.

Doctrinal principles of the WTO:

WTO’s Goals and Operations can be summarized by around 7 principles, which reflect its
commitment to ensure economic liberalisation in international trade.
These 7 principles are as follows: ​

Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Treatment : A country cannot discriminate between trading
partners - if you grant one member lower tariffs or better access, you must extend the same
treatment to all WTO members. It ensures non‑discrimination and equal footing in trade. Under
GATT, MFN already existed but was riddled with waivers and exceptions. The WTO version is
stricter and expanded beyond goods to also cover services (GATS) and intellectual property
(TRIPS).

National Treatment : Imported goods, once they enter a market, must be treated the same as
domestically produced goods. It prevents hidden protectionism through domestic taxes or
regulations that unfairly disadvantage imports. GATT’s national treatment applied only to goods;
WTO extended it to services and intellectual property, broadening its scope significantly.

Trade Liberalization through negotiation : The WTO encourages members to progressively

reduce trade barriers (tariffs, quotas, subsidies) through multilateral negotiations, ensuring
transparency and gradual opening of markets. Under GATT, liberalization focused mostly on
tariffs for goods.In the WTO, it expanded to agriculture, services, and IP rights, making the
scope of negotiations far more comprehensive.

Transparency & Predictability : Members must publish trade regulations, notify changes, and
bind tariffs at agreed maximum levels. It makes trade more predictable, allowing businesses to
plan long‑term without sudden policy shifts. Under GATT, tariff bindings existed but were
weakly enforced; WTO made these commitments universal, binding, and legally enforceable.

Promoting Fair Competition : WTO agreements aim to create level playing fields—discouraging
dumping, harmful subsidies, and unfair practices while allowing countermeasures when
necessary. GATT had soft anti-dumping codes; the WTO strengthened them through the
Subsidies and Anti-Dumping Agreements with clearer, enforceable rules.
Special & Differential Treatment for Developing Countries : Recognizing their needs, WTO
grants longer implementation periods, technical assistance, and preferential market access to
developing and least-developed countries. Under GATT, developing country preferences were
vague; WTO formalized SDT provisions with concrete timelines and assistance mechanisms.

Enforceable Dispute Settlement : The WTO provides a binding Dispute Settlement Mechanism,
ensuring trade rules are respected and members can resolve conflicts through a legal, rules-based
system, not unilateral retaliation. Under GATT, panel rulings needed consensus—allowing losers
to block them; WTO created an automatic Dispute Settlement Body and Appellate Body, making
rulings binding.

Major problems arising from these principles :

1. Consensus Decision-Making : WTO decisions require consensus, meaning even a single
member can block an agreement. It effectively allows developed countries to veto reforms
needed by developing nations, despite representing the majority of the world’s population. For
example, agricultural subsidy reforms demanded by poorer nations have been stalled by
developed members protecting their own farm lobbies.

2. No Permanent Provisional Application (PPA) & Postcolonial Disadvantage : Unlike GATT’s

Protocol for Provisional Application (Grandfather Clause), which allowed countries to
temporarily maintain pre‑existing domestic laws, the WTO has no such transitional leniency. It
disproportionately hurts postcolonial states, whose domestic industries and legal systems are less
developed, leaving them less policy space to protect infant industries or restructure economies.

3. Non-Discrimination Between “Enemy” and Domestic Goods : The WTO’s National Treatment
principle prohibits discrimination between foreign and domestic goods once they enter the
market. Critics argue this is counterintuitive to national security, as it limits the ability of states to
restrict imports from geopolitical adversaries without invoking rare security exceptions (Article
XXI), which are controversial and risk retaliation.

4. Hypocrisy in Enforcement & Power Imbalance : Developing states are often strong‑armed into
liberalizing their markets and reducing protectionism, while powerful developed countries
frequently violate WTO rules without serious consequences. For example, the U.S. under Trump
openly imposed tariffs on steel, aluminum, and Chinese goods, bypassing WTO
rulings—highlighting a double standard where weaker states are punished but major powers act
with impunity.

5. Retaliation Principle in Dispute Settlement When the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) rules
against a country, the winning state can impose retaliatory trade measures. While this is meant to
enforce compliance, it disproportionately harms smaller developing nations that cannot afford
retaliation or withstand the economic damage, effectively favoring states with larger markets and
trade power.

6.Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) at the Cost of Development : The TRIPS Agreement
enshrines strict intellectual property protections, benefiting developed nations with large
pharmaceutical and tech industries. For developing countries, this has raised medicine prices,
limited technology transfer, and restricted access to essential innovations, reinforcing the global
North-South divide in economic and knowledge power.

7. US Blocking of the Appellate Body rough Consensus Veto : The same consensus
decision-making rule has allowed the United States to block appointments to the WTO Appellate
Body, paralyzing it since 2019. For developing nations, the Appellate Body was the sole neutral
forum to argue domestic contexts and challenge unfair practices by powerful states. By crippling
it, the U.S. undermined the only refuge for weaker economies to defend themselves, leaving
them vulnerable to unilateral trade measures.

CASE STUDIES

United States – Steel Safeguard Measures (2002)

In March 2002, the United States under President George W. Bush imposed safeguard tariffs
ranging from 8% to 30% on a broad range of imported steel products. The U.S. government
justified the move under the WTO’s Safeguards Agreement and GATT Article XIX, claiming
that a sudden surge in steel imports was causing serious injury to its domestic steel industry.
These measures were intended to give the industry temporary relief and time to restructure.

The tariffs, however, triggered immediate backlash from major U.S. trading partners, including
the European Union, Japan, South Korea, China, and others. They argued that the U.S. had failed
to provide sufficient evidence of an unforeseen increase in imports or of actual injury to its
industry. These countries filed formal complaints at the WTO, initiating one of the most
prominent dispute settlement cases related to tariffs.

In 2003, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body ruled that the U.S. steel tariffs were inconsistent
with WTO rules. The panel found that the U.S. had not met the legal criteria for imposing
safeguard measures and had improperly excluded certain trading partners, further violating the
principle of non-discrimination. The European Union threatened retaliatory tariffs worth over $2
billion on U.S. goods, including politically sensitive products like oranges and motorcycles.

Faced with this pressure and the adverse ruling, the United States withdrew the tariffs in
December 2003, less than two years after they were implemented. This case remains a landmark
example of how the WTO’s dispute resolution system can be used to challenge and overturn
protectionist measures. It also highlights the delicate balance between protecting domestic
industries and upholding international trade obligations.

European Communities – Tariff Preferences (2004)

In 2002, India filed a complaint at the WTO against the European Communities (EC),
challenging its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme. While GSP programs allow
developed countries to offer preferential tariffs to developing countries, the EC had introduced a
special arrangement called GSP+, which granted additional tariff benefits to a select group of
countries that met certain “good governance” criteria, such as cooperating in the fight against
drug production and trafficking. Countries like Pakistan benefited from this arrangement, while
others, including India, were excluded.

India argued that this selective scheme violated the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) principle
under GATT Article I, which mandates that any trade advantage given to one WTO member
must be extended to all. The European Communities defended its position, claiming that the
preferences were designed to promote sustainable development and were permissible under the
GATT Enabling Clause, which provides flexibility in treating developing countries differently.

In 2004, the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel ruled in India’s favour. It found that the EC’s GSP+
scheme was discriminatory because it offered unequal treatment among developing countries
without objective and transparent criteria. The ruling emphasized that while preferences are
allowed, they must be non-discriminatory and available to all similarly situated countries. The
European Union subsequently revised its GSP program to comply with WTO rules.

This case is significant because it clarified the legal limits of preferential tariff schemes under the
WTO framework. It reinforced the importance of equal treatment and transparency in
trade-related development policies and reasserted the centrality of the MFN principle in
multilateral trade.

United States – Tariff Measures on Goods from China (2018–2020)

In 2018, the United States initiated a series of unilateral tariff hikes on Chinese imports under
Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act, citing unfair trade practices, forced technology transfers, and
intellectual property theft by China. The tariffs, which affected over $360 billion worth of
Chinese goods, marked the beginning of a prolonged U.S.–China trade war. In response, China
imposed retaliatory tariffs on over $110 billion of U.S. exports, targeting key sectors like
agriculture.

In 2019, China filed a formal complaint at the WTO, arguing that the U.S. tariffs violated core
WTO principles, including the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) obligation and the bound tariff
commitments under GATT Article II. China contended that the measures were unilateral and
bypassed WTO-sanctioned dispute resolution procedures.

In September 2020, a WTO panel ruled in favour of China, declaring that the U.S. tariffs were
inconsistent with WTO rules. The panel concluded that the U.S. had failed to justify its actions
under any permissible exceptions, including those related to public morals or national security. It
emphasized that unilateral action outside the WTO framework undermines the rules-based
trading system.

The United States rejected the ruling, criticizing the WTO for being ineffective in addressing
China’s trade abuses and maintaining that its actions were necessary for national and economic
security. Despite the ruling, most of the tariffs remain in place, and the dispute underscores the
growing strain on the WTO’s authority, particularly when dealing with major powers.

This case is emblematic of modern challenges in global trade governance and highlights the need
for institutional reform to ensure the WTO remains a relevant and effective arbiter in
international commerce.

QARMA​
1. How can the WTO ensure compliance and accountability when major economies (like the
U.S.) bypass or disregard dispute settlement rulings​
2. How can the WTO protect the economic interests of developing countries that are
disproportionately affected by tariff hikes between larger powers?

​
3. How can the WTO enhance its dispute settlement mechanism to prevent paralysis, such as the
current deadlock in the Appellate Body?

​
4. What special safeguards can be introduced for developing countries facing collateral damage
from tariff wars?

5.How can trade impact data be standardized for better multilateral assessment?

6. What emergency frameworks can WTO create to stabilize global trade after sudden tariff
escalations?