LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Greetings delegates!

We welcome all of you to the Historic Crisis Committee, to be simulated at

Assam Valley School Model United Nations Conference, 2025. As the
Executive Board, we would like to ensure that this committee offers you all a
value addition and great learning experience during the two days of the
conference. We believe that as the Executive Board, it is our primary
responsibility to ensure that the proceedings are as flexible and productive as
possible. Delegates are encouraged to research all aspects of the negotiations
and deliberations that leads us towards and up for the discussion related to the
agenda: “Saving the USSR”.

While the theme here has been developed keeping in mind the above mentioned
scenario, this document merely acts as a tool for substantive negotiations in the
council proceedings. Please keep in mind your national interests and your
country's limitations during the entirety of the council proceedings.
1. Anything that this study guide provides is a framework for further
research. The Executive Board has made every effort to ensure that this study
guide is as comprehensive as possible, including a range of perspectives and
approaches to give you a solid understanding of the subject matter covered in
the agenda. The readings included in it come from a variety of sources. We
cannot emphasise enough how crucial it is that you look up your own sources,
particularly since we place a high value on foreign policy conformity and the
study guides won't address your specific foreign policies. It is also probable
that, due to my incomplete understanding, we have also overlooked some vital
viewpoints, ideas, or efforts that are highly successful or might be put into
practice in the future.
2. Although the content in some of the readings in this guide may be
outdated, the primary objective is to use them to understand the core ideas and
principles of certain policies. You would both benefit greatly from becoming
familiar with the main idea and pertinent aspects of the agenda.
3. We are following a flexible procedure in the committee, which looks for
consensus-building rather than conflicting and adverse debate. Please use this as
the foundation for your investigation. Delegates frequently just follow studies
that take a more hostile and accusing stance. We would strongly advise against
this. Please focus on issues where there may be common ground across all
states.

Read widely and attentively. Be mindful of your domestic and foreign policies.
We wish you all the best and please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any
queries or even if you just want to have a casual chat about the agenda item.
Warm Regards
Executive Board
Committee Name: Historic Crisis Committee
Agenda: Saving the USSR
Freeze Date: August 19, 1991

Introduction to the Crisis

The Soviet Union in 1991 is a state on the verge of collapse. Once a towering
superpower rivaling the United States, the USSR now faces internal
disintegration, economic paralysis, and political chaos. The fragile unity that
held together 15 ethnically diverse republics under the banner of socialism is
rapidly unraveling. Decades of centralized planning have produced not
prosperity, but stagnation. Citizens stand in lines for bread, inflation spirals, and
black markets flourish. The ideological foundations of the Communist Party
have eroded, and public confidence in the government is at an all-time low.
Gorbachev’s reforms—intended to modernize the state—have instead exposed
the systemic rot at its core. The introduction of glasnost (openness) and
perestroika (restructuring) has unleashed pent-up frustrations, emboldened
republics to seek autonomy, and fragmented the once monolithic Soviet
apparatus. Now, on August 19, 1991, a group of conservative hardliners from
within the government has launched a coup, detaining Gorbachev and
attempting to seize power. The streets of Moscow are flooded with tanks, and
the fate of the Union hangs in the balance. This committee is tasked with
navigating this moment of unprecedented crisis. Delegates must make critical
decisions to prevent the Soviet Union from disintegrating while mitigating the
severe economic shocks that are already underway. Whether through reform,
negotiation, or force, each action will shape the trajectory of a collapsing
empire. The challenge is immense, and the time is short. Will the USSR
survive, evolve, or vanish into history?
Historical Context and Key Events Leading to the Crisis
A. The Brezhnev Stagnation (1964–1982)
The era of Leonid Brezhnev, spanning nearly two decades, is often
characterized by political conservatism, bureaucratic inertia, and economic
stagnation. During this time, the Soviet Union continued its geopolitical rivalry
with the West, but domestically, it suffered from chronic inefficiency. The
economy became increasingly dependent on extractive industries like oil and
gas, while innovation, particularly in consumer goods and services, lagged
severely. Central planning ensured production quotas were met, but the quality
and usefulness of goods produced were often questionable. Productivity slowed,
technological advancement stalled, and corruption became systemic. The rigid
command economy rewarded compliance rather than creativity, further
disincentivizing reform or innovation. The state spent enormous resources on
military expansion, arms development, and maintaining control over satellite
states in Eastern Europe, diverting funds from domestic welfare and
modernization. Agriculture was plagued by inefficiencies, and frequent
shortages of basic goods eroded public trust. The average Soviet citizen began
to experience a decline in living standards, while the nomenklatura—the party
elite—enjoyed privileges that widened the social divide. The era also saw the
proliferation of a vast and inefficient bureaucracy that became resistant to any
attempts at reform. While the Soviet Union remained a formidable global power
on paper, the internal weaknesses seeded during this period laid the groundwork
for future turmoil. These structural flaws were inherited by Gorbachev and
became glaringly apparent as the Union moved into the 1980s. The Brezhnev
years created a brittle socio-political environment where superficial stability
masked deep-seated decay, and by the time Gorbachev took power, the
momentum for systemic breakdown was already well underway.
B. Gorbachev’s Reforms (1985–1991)
Mikhail Gorbachev assumed leadership of the Soviet Union in 1985 with a
reformist agenda aimed at reviving the stagnating economy and reinvigorating
the political system. His twin policies of perestroika (economic restructuring)
and glasnost (political openness) were historic in scope and intention.
Perestroika sought to decentralize economic decision-making by allowing
limited private enterprise, encouraging foreign investment, and reforming state-
owned enterprises. However, these economic reforms were poorly timed and
inconsistently implemented, leading to disorientation within a system that had
for decades functioned under strict centralized control. Productivity failed to
improve, inflation soared, and basic goods became even scarcer, resulting in a
severe decline in public trust and living standards.
Concurrently, glasnost opened up the political sphere to public discourse,
criticism of the government, and a more transparent media. While it earned
Gorbachev international acclaim and a Nobel Peace Prize, domestically it had
unintended consequences. Glasnost emboldened national and ethnic movements
in the republics, exposed the brutal history of Stalinist repression, and weakened
the legitimacy of the Communist Party. Gorbachev’s weakening of central
authority without providing strong alternative institutions created a vacuum of
power. His reforms alienated both hardliners who wanted to maintain the status
quo and radicals who sought complete liberalization and independence.
Furthermore, Gorbachev’s indecisiveness in dealing with the dual pressures
from reformists and conservatives made him appear weak. Although he hoped
to build a reformed socialist federation through a proposed New Union Treaty,
the growing push for independence in the republics, the collapse of allied
regimes in Eastern Europe, and internal economic freefall undermined his
authority. His vision of a renewed but unified USSR was increasingly at odds
with the reality on the ground. By August 1991, much of the population had lost
faith in the government's ability to maintain order or provide basic services. It is
against this backdrop of failed reform and fractured unity that the August Coup
was launched, marking a decisive moment in the unraveling of the Soviet
Union.
C. Rising Nationalism and Independence Movements
By the late 1980s and into 1991, nationalist sentiments had surged across the
various Soviet republics, driven by historical grievances, economic disparities,
cultural suppression, and the newfound political freedoms unleashed by
Gorbachev’s glasnost. The USSR was a multi-ethnic federation consisting of 15
republics, each with its own language, culture, and historical identity. For
decades, the central government in Moscow had tightly controlled these
republics, promoting Russian as the lingua franca and Soviet identity as a
unifying ideology. However, glasnost lifted the veil on long-standing ethnic
injustices and the suppression of regional autonomy, prompting widespread re-
evaluation of the republics’ roles within the Union.
The Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—were among the first to
demand independence, asserting that their incorporation into the USSR during
World War II had been illegal. Their independence movements gained
international sympathy and momentum, especially after they staged peaceful
protests such as the 1989 Baltic Way, where citizens formed a human chain
across the three countries. In Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, and Ukraine,
nationalist leaders emerged who challenged the authority of Moscow and
pushed for sovereignty. Ethnic tensions also flared in Central Asia and the
Caucasus, where internal strife further strained the cohesion of the Union.
These movements were accelerated by the deteriorating economic conditions,
which varied widely among republics. Wealthier republics like the Baltics
resented subsidizing poorer regions, while less developed republics felt
exploited and neglected by Moscow. Gorbachev’s proposed New Union Treaty,
aimed at transforming the USSR into a more decentralized federation, was seen
by some republics as a last-ditch effort to hold the Union together, while others
dismissed it as too little, too late.
The growing assertion of national sovereignty posed a direct challenge to the
idea of a unified Soviet identity. As more republics held referenda or passed
declarations of independence, the cohesion of the USSR weakened irreversibly.
By August 1991, nearly all republics had asserted some level of autonomy or
independence, either de facto or de jure. The central government’s authority
was in free fall, and without a coherent response to these secessionist drives, the
Union faced an existential threat. The challenge for this committee will be to
determine how, if at all, this trend of nationalism can be reconciled with the
preservation of a functioning and cohesive Soviet state.
D. Economic Challenges and Collapse
The Soviet economy by 1991 was in a state of severe crisis, teetering on the
edge of collapse. For decades, the centrally planned model had masked
inefficiencies and propped up failing industries through artificial subsidies and
state-controlled production quotas. However, by the late 1980s, the flaws in the
system had become unmanageable. Gorbachev’s introduction of perestroika
aimed to decentralize economic control and stimulate growth through market-
like reforms, but instead led to increased instability. The hybridization of the
economy—neither fully market-driven nor entirely planned—created confusion
and paralysis among enterprises, many of which were uncertain about pricing,
supply chains, or profit-making mechanisms.
Inflation skyrocketed due to loosening price controls and increasing monetary
supply, while industrial and agricultural output fell. The Soviet ruble, already a
non-convertible currency, lost much of its domestic value, and bartering became
a common method of exchange. Consumer goods disappeared from stores,
creating long queues and breeding resentment. Simultaneously, the black
market flourished, becoming a parallel economy that outperformed state
distribution in both efficiency and availability. Economic disparities widened
between republics and even within major cities, eroding the egalitarian
foundations of the socialist system.
Foreign debt also mounted during this period. To finance internal reforms and
maintain subsidies, the USSR borrowed heavily from the West and international
banks. However, repayment capacity diminished as the economic decline
deepened. Western confidence in the Soviet economy dwindled, and credit lines
began to shrink. The growing financial dependency on foreign loans placed
additional pressure on Soviet policymakers to implement neoliberal reforms,
which further fueled internal tensions.
One of the most damaging consequences was the breakdown of inter-republic
trade. Each Soviet republic had traditionally specialized in certain sectors,
creating a highly interdependent economic structure. As nationalist movements
gained ground, republics began asserting economic independence, hoarding
resources, and disrupting existing supply chains. The result was widespread
shortages, a sharp decline in industrial productivity, and the effective
dismantling of the internal economic ecosystem.
For the delegates of this committee, these economic challenges present a critical
juncture. Decisions must be made on how to stabilize currency, maintain trade
within the Union, address food shortages, and balance liberalization with state
control. Without urgent and coordinated economic interventions, the collapse of
the Soviet economy could render the Union’s political survival impossible.

Key Stakeholders and Factions

As the Soviet Union hurtles toward disintegration, several competing factions—
each with their own ideological visions, power bases, and objectives—are vying
for control of the USSR’s future. Understanding these stakeholders is essential
for any strategic decision-making in this committee.
A. The State Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP)
The most immediate threat to the fragile reformist balance in the USSR comes
from the GKChP—the self-proclaimed State Committee on the State of
Emergency—composed of hardline Communist Party members, high-ranking
military officials, and KGB leadership. On August 19, 1991, this group initiated
a coup to arrest the reform process, citing the need to preserve law, order, and
the Union itself. Members include Gennady Yanayev (Vice President), Valentin
Pavlov (Prime Minister), Dmitry Yazov (Defense Minister), Vladimir
Kryuchkov (KGB Chief), and others. Their motivations stem from fears that
Gorbachev's New Union Treaty will effectively dissolve the USSR by giving
too much autonomy to the republics. The GKChP aims to reverse perestroika
and glasnost, restore centralized control, and maintain the dominance of the
Communist Party. However, their legitimacy is weak—internally divided and
without Gorbachev’s consent—and their crackdown risks further inflaming
public unrest and accelerating secessionist movements.
B. Gorbachev and the Reformist Camp
Mikhail Gorbachev, though detained during the August Coup, remains the
internationally recognized leader of the USSR. His reformist faction includes
moderate technocrats, Communist Party reformers, and parts of the
intelligentsia. Their primary goal is to modernize the Soviet system through a
carefully negotiated transition toward a democratic socialist federation, most
notably through the New Union Treaty. Gorbachev envisions a decentralized
but unified state where republics retain significant autonomy while remaining
within a federal structure. However, his faction is hampered by declining
credibility, slow economic progress, and diminishing control over both
conservative institutions and radical secessionists. His indecisiveness and lack
of coercive power leave him dependent on public opinion, international support,
and coalition-building.
C. Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Nationalists
The most potent rival to Gorbachev's authority is Boris Yeltsin, President of the
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), who has emerged as the
symbolic and practical leader of the anti-coup resistance. Representing the
reformist-populist wave, Yeltsin advocates for rapid democratization, free-
market reforms, and Russian sovereignty. While nominally supporting the
Union, Yeltsin’s policies prioritize Russian national interests and often sideline
broader Soviet goals. His popularity among the urban middle class, his control
over Russian institutions, and his bold public opposition to the coup have
positioned him as a legitimate alternative to both the GKChP and Gorbachev.
However, his confrontational style and nationalist rhetoric risk alienating other
republics and exacerbating tensions within the Union.
D. Republic Leaders and Secessionist Movements
Across the 15 Soviet republics, a diverse array of leaders—some democratically
elected, others entrenched party officials—are pursuing paths toward greater
autonomy or outright independence. In the Baltics, leaders like Vytautas
Landsbergis (Lithuania) and Anatolijs Gorbunovs (Latvia) reject any restoration
of central control and demand full recognition of independence. In Ukraine,
Leonid Kravchuk balances nationalist sentiment with cautious negotiation,
while Georgia and Armenia deal with ethnic conflicts and anti-Soviet uprisings.
Many republics are forming their own military forces, asserting control over
local economies, and refusing to comply with central directives. These republics
are both a cause and a consequence of the Soviet Union’s fragmentation. Their
cooperation—or defiance—will critically determine the USSR’s political
viability.
E. The Military and KGB
The Soviet military and KGB are powerful but fractured institutions during this
crisis. While elements of both supported the GKChP’s coup, significant portions
remain loyal to constitutional order or are hesitant to intervene without clear
directives. The armed forces are demoralized, underpaid, and increasingly
unsure of their role—whether as enforcers of unity or guardians of national
sovereignty. The KGB, long a pillar of internal control, is facing internal purges
and public backlash due to its association with repression. Control over these
security forces is pivotal; without their loyalty, neither the central government
nor the republics can enforce authority. However, overreliance on military
intervention could trigger civil conflict or further delegitimize state power.

International Reactions and Strategic Interests

As the USSR teeters on the brink of collapse, the world watches with a mixture
of apprehension and anticipation. The disintegration of a nuclear superpower
has profound implications not just for its own people, but for the entire
international system. Global powers, regional neighbors, international
institutions, and financial markets are all invested in how this crisis unfolds.
Each actor brings its own strategic lens—some seeking stability, others
opportunity—and their reactions will shape the Soviet Union’s internal
decision-making.
A. The United States and Western Allies
For the United States and its NATO allies, the Soviet Union’s crisis represents
both an unprecedented opportunity and a significant risk. Since the end of
World War II, the USSR had been the West’s primary geopolitical rival. The
Cold War had shaped global diplomacy, defense spending, and ideological
alignments for nearly half a century. Now, with the Soviet system faltering, the
U.S. sees a chance to expand liberal democracy, open new markets, and reshape
the post-Cold War world order in its image. However, the path is fraught with
risks. A violent collapse could unleash a wave of instability, including nuclear
insecurity, mass migration, and civil war. The West fears that a failed Soviet
state could fragment into warring republics or fall into the hands of extremists.
President George H. W. Bush, while publicly supporting Gorbachev and his
reformist agenda, has also built quiet ties with leaders like Boris Yeltsin. The
U.S. advocates for a peaceful and democratic transition, but its policy remains
cautious. The goal is to prevent a return to authoritarianism without directly
interfering in internal Soviet affairs. Western financial institutions such as the
IMF and World Bank are prepared to offer aid packages, but only in exchange
for market reforms and commitments to political liberalization. At the same
time, NATO is monitoring the situation closely, wary of military escalation or
the potential misuse of Soviet nuclear assets.
B. Europe and the Eastern Bloc
For Western Europe, particularly Germany, France, and the UK, stability in the
USSR is paramount. Germany, recently reunified, seeks a cooperative partner to
secure its eastern frontier and avoid refugee inflows. The European Economic
Community (EEC) views the Soviet collapse as a chance to extend economic
influence eastward but is also concerned about potential trade disruptions,
especially involving energy supplies from Russia and Central Asia.
Former Warsaw Pact states, including Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia,
are navigating their own transitions from socialism to democracy. The Soviet
collapse is both a vindication and a danger. While it affirms the failure of
totalitarianism, it also threatens to unleash nationalist tensions and economic
turmoil across the region. Many of these countries had relied on the USSR for
energy, trade, and political alignment; now, they must reorient themselves
westward and build new institutional frameworks from scratch. They are also
wary of hardliners in Moscow attempting to reclaim dominance over Eastern
Europe in the name of Soviet restoration.
C. China and Non-Aligned Powers
China views the Soviet crisis with a complex mix of schadenfreude, fear, and
strategic calculation. Having distanced itself from Soviet-style communism
since the 1960s, China under Deng Xiaoping had begun its own economic
reforms while maintaining strict political control. To Chinese leaders,
Gorbachev’s glasnost appears reckless, and the chaos in the USSR serves as a
cautionary tale of what happens when political liberalization outpaces economic
reform. Beijing is primarily concerned with internal stability and views the
breakup of the Soviet Union as a threat to communist legitimacy worldwide.
Meanwhile, countries in the Non-Aligned Movement—such as India,
Yugoslavia, and Egypt—are monitoring the situation for its impact on global
trade, arms supply, and ideological alignment. India, a traditional Soviet ally,
worries about the security of defense contracts and energy agreements. Some
Middle Eastern and African nations, which had relied on Soviet support in
regional conflicts, are now looking for new patrons or diversifying their
diplomatic ties. For these countries, the Soviet collapse could mean either
abandonment or a new geopolitical alignment, particularly if Russia or
successor states emerge as more pragmatic partners.
D. International Organizations
The United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and
other institutions are preparing for various contingencies. A full-scale collapse
would trigger humanitarian crises—refugees, food insecurity, and political
violence—that require coordinated international response. However, the
legitimacy of Soviet institutions is in flux, making it unclear which actors these
organizations can negotiate with. The IMF and World Bank are in preliminary
discussions with reformist factions about conditional aid and restructuring
programs, while the UN is watching closely for human rights abuses,
particularly in areas like the Baltics and the Caucasus.
Nuclear security is also a top concern for the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and NATO. The USSR controls the world’s largest nuclear
arsenal, dispersed across multiple republics. A collapse in central command
could create dangerous ambiguities over who controls these weapons,
potentially inviting theft, rogue use, or environmental disasters. There is quiet
but urgent diplomatic activity around securing launch codes, silo access, and
disarmament pathways.

Committee Objectives and Crisis Directive Guidelines

As the Soviet Union teeters on the brink of dissolution, this Historic Crisis
Committee must operate with urgency, nuance, and strategic foresight. The
primary objective is to explore and execute feasible policy interventions that
can prevent the total disintegration of the USSR, mitigate economic shocks, and
maintain national unity without resorting to large-scale violence or authoritarian
regression. Delegates will face real-time developments—both domestic and
international—and must craft adaptable, innovative solutions that reflect the
complexity of late-Soviet politics.
A. Core Objectives
1. Prevent the Fragmentation of the Union: The Committee must assess how
to respond to declarations of independence and nationalist movements.
Delegates will consider constitutional amendments, a revised federal
structure, or frameworks like the New Union Treaty that aim to offer
 republics greater autonomy while maintaining a common economic and
security system.
2. Restore Economic Stability: Immediate attention must be given to halting
inflation, stabilizing the ruble, restoring supply chains, and avoiding
famine or civil unrest. Delegates may pursue emergency price controls,
barter-based inter-republic agreements, restructured central banking
policies, or cautiously introduce market mechanisms.
3. Reassert Political Legitimacy: The Communist Party’s authority is
eroding. Delegates must navigate whether to preserve, reform, or
dismantle the existing political structure. Potential measures include
forming a provisional unity government, organizing new elections, or
drafting a transitional constitution that protects core socialist values while
allowing pluralism.
4. Manage the Coup and Internal Power Struggles: The August Coup has
divided the Soviet leadership. Delegates must determine whether to
negotiate with the coup leaders, suppress them, or use the crisis to usher
in a new governing order. The threat of military intervention or mass
protests looms over every decision.
5. Secure Nuclear and Military Assets: One of the greatest risks of a
collapsing USSR is the mismanagement of its nuclear arsenal. Delegates
must coordinate between republics and military bodies to ensure that no
weapons fall under rogue control. Protocols for centralized command,
disarmament oversight, or international monitoring may be explored.
6. Engage International Stakeholders: The Committee must respond to
foreign actors—whether they offer aid, push for reforms, or threaten
intervention. Delegates may open lines of communication with NATO,
the UN, and Western financial institutions to seek support without
compromising sovereignty.

Bloc Positions and Alliances

The internal dynamics of the USSR in 1991 were not binary but rather layered
with ideological nuance and regional complexity. To help delegates navigate
strategic alignments, this section outlines the major blocs that will likely emerge
in committee deliberations. These are not rigid political parties but rather fluid
alliances shaped by shared goals, cultural affinity, or short-term interests.
A. The Reformist Federalists
Key Figures: Mikhail Gorbachev, Alexander Yakovlev, Eduard Shevardnadze,
Gavriil Popov
Goals:
• Preserve a reformed Union through decentralization (New Union Treaty)
• Introduce gradual economic liberalization while maintaining some central
oversight
• Limit military or KGB involvement in civil governance
• Secure international financial and diplomatic support
This bloc believes the USSR is salvageable if it adapts. They favor institutional
compromise, open dialogue with republics, and protection of civil liberties
under a new constitution. Their main challenge lies in balancing the demands of
nationalist republics with the conservative center.

B. The Hardline Centralists

Key Figures: Gennady Yanayev, Vladimir Kryuchkov, Dmitry Yazov, Boris
Pugo
Goals:
• Preserve the USSR in its current or more centralized form
• Maintain control of the Communist Party
• Use military intervention if necessary to suppress secessionist tendencies
• Restore price controls and halt economic destabilization by pausing
reforms
Often associated with the coup attempt, this bloc is driven by fear of collapse
and ideological purity. They are likely to push for emergency powers and may
oppose any major concessions to republics or the West.

C. The Russian Nationalists and Liberal Capitalists

Key Figures: Boris Yeltsin, Yegor Gaidar, Grigory Yavlinsky, Gavriil Popov
Goals:
• Elevate the Russian SFSR as the primary successor state
 • Transition rapidly to a market economy (via “shock therapy”)
• Decentralize power from the USSR to republics
• Disband or restructure central Communist Party institutions
While they oppose the coup, this group does not aim to save the USSR. Instead,
they seek to redefine power structures, favoring independence and liberalism in
Russia. Their vision may conflict with other republics fearing Russian
dominance or economic instability.

D. The Strategic Separatists

Key Figures: Vytautas Landsbergis (Lithuania), Leonid Kravchuk (Ukraine),
Stanislav Shushkevich (Belarus), regional nationalist delegates
Goals:
• Full independence with international recognition
• Withdrawal from centralized military and economic systems
• Gain control over local resources, infrastructure, and institutions
• Avoid conflict while asserting sovereignty
This bloc sees the writing on the wall and seeks to exit the USSR as peacefully
but decisively as possible. They may cooperate temporarily with reformists to
secure transitional mechanisms but are unlikely to accept any new union unless
highly favorable to republics.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
1. Can I go beyond my character’s historical decisions?
Yes—within reason. This is an alternate-history crisis simulation. You may
diverge from historical actions if you can justify your moves ideologically,
politically, and strategically. Remember, your portfolio gives you leverage, not
a script.
2. Can we dissolve the USSR in this simulation?
Yes. The committee may fail to save the Union—intentionally or inadvertently.
Delegates should remain aware of that possibility and prepare contingencies.
However, the chair encourages delegates to explore creative alternatives first,
rather than merely reenacting history.
3. Can military actors declare martial law or deploy troops?
Yes—but only with valid directives and committee support. Any unilateral
military move may provoke backlash from republics, civil society, or
international actors. Use military options strategically and cautiously.
4. Will international players intervene in the committee?
Yes. International actors such as the USA, NATO, China, and the UN may
feature in crisis updates. Delegates may negotiate with them through directives,
though external support often comes at a cost.
5. What types of directives will we be using?
• Joint Directives: Represent committee consensus; typically used for
treaties, policy packages, or major declarations.
• Private Directives: Submitted individually or in small blocs; allow for
secret diplomacy, mobilization, or sabotage.
• Press Releases: Used to shape media narratives and public opinion within
and outside the USSR.
6. Can we create new institutions or propose structural reforms?
Absolutely. Proposals like a new constitution, economic council, or transitional
leadership board are encouraged. This simulation rewards bold, plausible
institutional creativity.
9. What tone or approach should I take as a delegate?
Think and speak like a high-ranking international. Use Cold War rhetoric,
political caution, and ideological framing. But also be strategic, persuasive, and
willing to compromise. This is a chess game at the edge of an abyss.

Suggestions for Research

To excel as a delegate in this historic crisis simulation, thorough research and
preparation are vital. The complexity of the USSR’s dissolution demands
understanding not only historical facts but also the political, economic, and
social currents shaping 1991.
A. Key Historical Events and Timeline
• The rise and policies of Mikhail Gorbachev: Perestroika and Glasnost
reforms
• The New Union Treaty negotiations
• The August 1991 Coup Attempt by hardliners
• The declarations of independence by Baltic states and others
 • The Belavezha Accords and formation of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS)
B. Political Structures and Power Dynamics
• The hierarchy of the Communist Party and KGB influence
• The role of the Soviet military in politics
• Republic-level governance and nationalist movements
• Economic ministries vs. regional economic councils
C. Economic Context
• The centrally planned Soviet economy and its collapse
• The impact of shock therapy vs. gradual reform debates
• Resource distribution and control (oil, gas, agriculture)
• Effects of international sanctions and trade relations
D. Nationalism and Ethnic Tensions
• Republic-specific aspirations for sovereignty (Lithuania, Ukraine,
Georgia, etc.)
• Inter-ethnic conflicts and demographic challenges
• The role of cultural identity and language policies
E. International Relations
• The end of the Cold War and U.S. policy toward Soviet reform
• NATO expansion concerns
• Relations with China, the European Community, and Japan
• UN involvement and humanitarian issues
F. Legal and Constitutional Issues
• Soviet constitution vs. emerging republic constitutions
• Legal basis for independence and secession
• Rights of minorities and repatriation policies
G. Primary Sources and Memoirs
• Speeches and writings of Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Yanayev, and others
• Official Soviet documents and transcripts of the coup
• Memoirs and accounts from participants (e.g., Alexander Yakovlev’s
“The Collapse of an Empire”)