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2025 SCC OnLine SC 1471

In the Supreme Court of India

(BEFORE P.S. NARASIMHA AND MANOJ MISRA, JJ.)

BGM and M-RPL-JMCT (JV) … Appellant(s);

Versus
Eastern Coalfields Limited … Respondent(s).
Civil Appeal No……….. of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (C) Diary No.
21451/2024)
Decided on July 18, 2025
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MANOJ MISRA, J.:— Leave granted.
2. This appeal impugns an order of the High Court1 dated
2
19.01.2024 whereby the application of the appellant, under Section 11
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19963, was dismissed on the
ground that there exists no arbitration agreement between the parties.
FACTS
3. The appellant and the respondent entered into a contract relating
to transportation/handling of goods. Disputes arose between the parties
during the subsistence of the contract. Clause 13 of the General Terms
and Conditions, appended to the e-tender notice, which forms part of
the contract and relied upon by the appellant as an arbitration
agreement, is the subject matter of interpretation. The same is
extracted below:
“13. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
It is incumbent upon the contractor to avoid litigation and
disputes during the course of execution. However, if such disputes
take place between the contractor and the department, effort shall
be made first to settle the disputes at the company level.
The contractor should make request in writing to the Engineer-in-
charge for settlement of such disputes/claims within 30 (thirty) days
of arising of the cause of dispute/claim failing which no
disputes/claims of the contractor shall be entertained by the
company.
Effort shall be made to resolve the dispute in two stages.
In first stage dispute shall be referred to Area CGM, GM. If
difference still persist the dispute shall be referred to a committee
constituted by the owner. The Committee shall have one member of
the rank of Director of the company who shall be chairman of the
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company.
If differences still persist, the settlement of the dispute shall be
resolved in the following manner:
In the event of any dispute or difference relating to the
interpretation and application of the provisions of commercial
contract(s) between Central Public Sector Enterprises (CPSEs)/Port
Trusts inter se and also between CPSEs and Government
Departments/Organizations (excluding disputes concerning railways,
Income Tax, Customs & Excise Departments), such dispute or
difference shall be taken up by either party for resolution through
AMRCD as mentioned in DPE OM No. 4(1)/2013-DPE (GM)/FTS-1835
dated 22-05-2018.
In case of parties other than Govt. Agencies, the redressal of the
dispute may be sought through ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION
ACT, 1996 as amended by AMENDMENT ACT OF 2015”
(Emphasis supplied)
4. Treating the underscored portion of clause 13 as an arbitration
agreement, the appellant filed an application under Section 11(6) of
the 1996 Act for appointment of an Arbitrator for settlement of the
disputes inter se the parties.
5. The respondent objected to the prayer for appointment of an
Arbitrator, inter-alia, on the ground that clause 13 is bereft of the
essential ingredients to constitute an arbitration agreement and
therefore the application seeking appointment of an Arbitrator deserves
rejection.
6. The High Court accepted the objection and dismissed the
application. While rejecting the prayer, the High Court laid emphasis on
use of the word “may” before “be sought” in the underscored portion of
clause 13 and, inter alia, relied on two decisions of this Court, namely,
4
Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander and Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v.
5
IVRCL AMR Joint Venture to hold that where the word “may” is used
there is no clear intention of the parties to refer the dispute between
them to arbitration and therefore, the prayer to appoint an Arbitrator is
not sustainable.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused
the materials on record.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
8. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the use of
the word “may” is only to indicate that parties to the agreement have
an option to take recourse to settlement of dispute(s) through
arbitration under the 1996 Act. However, once that option is exercised
by any of the parties to the agreement, as in the present case, it
becomes a binding contract to settle inter se dispute(s) through
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arbitration. It was contended that the decisions of this Court in Jagdish

Chander (supra) and Mahanadi Coalfields (supra) dealt with entirely
different clauses than the one in question and, therefore, the High
Court erred in placing reliance on them to reject the application of the
appellant.
9. In addition to above, it was argued that at the stage of
appointment of an arbitrator the court is required to examine whether
arbitration agreement exists or not. Such examination is for the Court
to satisfy itself that, prima facie, an arbitration agreement exists,
though the final call on its existence is to be taken by the arbitral
tribunal, which is competent to rule on its own jurisdiction, including
ruling on any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the
arbitration agreement. Thus, it was argued, the appropriate course for
the High Court was to appoint an arbitral tribunal and leave the issue
open for the arbitral tribunal to decide.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
10. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent supported the
impugned order and also referred to Clause 32 of the Instructions to
Bidders to contend that there was no definite agreement between the
parties to settle their disputes through arbitration. According to the
learned counsel for the respondent, the use of the word “may” in the so
-called arbitration clause clearly indicates that at the time of entering
the agreement, parties were not ad idem on referring present or future
disputes between them to arbitration. The clause only enabled the
parties to agree on any future date to refer the disputes to arbitration.
Therefore, in the absence of proof of any such agreement, reference to
arbitral tribunal has been justifiably declined.
11. In addition to above, by referring to Clause 32 of the
Instructions to Bidders, the learned counsel for the respondent
contended that disputes between the parties were to be settled through
regular court proceedings and not through arbitration. Clause 32 is
extracted below:
“Clause 32- Legal Jurisdiction : - Matters relating to any dispute
or difference arising out of this tender and subsequent contract
awarded based on this tender shall be subject to the jurisdiction of
District Court where the subject work is to be executed.”
12. Besides above, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted
that if, on a plain reading of the relevant clause, relied by any one of
the parties as an arbitration agreement, it does not appear that parties
are ad idem on settlement of inter se, present or future, disputes
through arbitration to the exclusion of domestic courts, the very
existence of an arbitration agreement comes into question, which can
be taken notice of by the Court so as to decline the prayer for
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appointment of an arbitral tribunal under Section 11 of the 1996 Act.

ISSUES
13. Having regard to the facts and the submissions made before us,
we are of the view that following three issues arise for our
consideration:
(i) Whether the question of existence of an arbitration agreement
should be left for the arbitral tribunal to decide?
(ii) Whether clause 13 (supra) would constitute an arbitration
agreement between the parties as contemplated under Section 7
of the 1996 Act?
(iii) Whether clause 32 of Instructions to Bidders negates the
existence of an arbitration agreement?
ISSUE (I)
14. Insofar as issue (i) is concerned, a seven-Judge Constitution
Bench of this Court in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under
Arbitration, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re6, after surveying several
decisions as also the impact of the 2015 Amendment on the 1996 Act,
has settled the law in the following terms:
“164. The 2015 Amendment Act has laid down different
parameters for judicial review under Section 8 and Section 11.
Where Section 8 requires the Referral Court to look into the prima
facie existence of a valid arbitration agreement, Section 11 confines
the Court's jurisdiction to the examination of the existence of an
arbitration agreement. Although the object and purpose behind both
Sections 8 and 11 is to compel parties to abide by their contractual
understanding, the scope of power of the Referral Courts under the
said provisions is intended to be different. The same is also evident
from the fact that Section 37 of the Arbitration Act allows an appeal
from the order of an Arbitral Tribunal refusing to refer the parties to
arbitration under Section 8, but not from Section 11. Thus, the 2015
Amendment Act has legislatively overruled the dictum of Patel Engg.
[SBP & Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618] where it was held
that Section 8 and Section 11 are complementary in nature.
Accordingly, the two provisions cannot be read as laying down a
similar standard.
165. The legislature confined the scope of reference under Section
11(6-A) to the examination of the existence of an arbitration
agreement. The use of the term “examination” in itself connotes that
the scope of the power is limited to a prima facie determination.
Since the Arbitration Act is a self-contained code, the requirement of
“existence” of an arbitration agreement draws effect from Section 7
of the Arbitration Act. In Duro Felguera [Duro Felguera, S.A. v.
Gangavaram Port Ltd., (2017) 9 SCC 729 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 764],
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this Court held that the Referral Courts only need to consider one
aspect to determine the existence of an arbitration agreement —
whether the underlying contract contains an arbitration agreement
which provides for arbitration pertaining to the disputes which have
arisen between the parties to the agreement. Therefore, the scope of
examination under Section 11(6-A) should be confined to the
existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section 7.
Similarly, the validity of an arbitration agreement, in view of Section
7, should be restricted to the requirement of formal validity such as
the requirement that the agreement be in writing. This interpretation
also gives true effect to the doctrine of competence-competence by
leaving the issue of substantive existence and validity of an
arbitration agreement to be decided by Arbitral Tribunal under
Section 16. We accordingly clarify the position of law laid down in
Vidya Drolia [Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 :
(2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 549] in the context of Section 8 and Section 11
of the Arbitration Act.
166. The burden of proving the existence of arbitration agreement
generally lies on the party seeking to rely on such agreement. In
jurisdictions such as India, which accept the doctrine of competence-
competence, only prima facie proof of the existence of an arbitration
agreement must be adduced before the Referral Court. The Referral
Court is not the appropriate forum to conduct a mini-trial by allowing
the parties to adduce the evidence in regard to the existence or
validity of an arbitration agreement. The determination of the
existence and validity of an arbitration agreement on the basis of
evidence ought to be left to the Arbitral Tribunal. This position of law
can also be gauged from the plain language of the statute.
167. Section 11(6-A) uses the expression “examination of the
existence of an arbitration agreement”. The purport of using the
word “examination” connotes that the legislature intends that the
Referral Court has to inspect or scrutinise the dealings between the
parties for the existence of an arbitration agreement. Moreover, the
expression “examination” does not connote or imply a laborious or
nd
contested inquiry. [P. Ramanatha Aiyar, The Law Lexicon (2 Edn.,
1997) 666.] On the other hand, Section 16 provides that the Arbitral
Tribunal can “rule” on its jurisdiction, including the existence and
validity of an arbitration agreement. A “ruling” connotes adjudication
of disputes after admitting evidence from the parties. Therefore, it is
evident that the Referral Court is only required to examine the
existence of arbitration agreements, whereas the Arbitral Tribunal
ought to rule on its jurisdiction, including the issues pertaining to
the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. A similar view
was adopted by this Court in Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh
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Optifibre Ltd. [Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd.,

(2005) 7 SCC 234]
xxx xxx xxx
169. When the Referral Court renders a prima facie opinion,
neither the Arbitral Tribunal, nor the Court enforcing the arbitral
award will be bound by such a prima facie view. If a prima facie view
as to the existence of an arbitration agreement is taken by the
Referral Court, it still allows the Arbitral Tribunal to examine the
issue in depth. Such a legal approach will help the Referral Court in
weeding out prima facie nonexistent arbitration agreements. It will
also protect the jurisdictional competence of the Arbitral Tribunals to
decide on issues pertaining to the existence and validity of an
arbitration agreement.”
15. The legal principles deducible from the above decision qua the
scope of Referral Court's power under Section 11 of 1996 Act are as
follows:
(a) Section 11 confines the Court's jurisdiction to the examination
regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement.
(b) The use of the term “examination” in itself connotes that the
scope of the power is limited to a prima facie determination.
(c) Referral Courts only need to consider one aspect to determine the
existence of an arbitration agreement — whether the underlying
contract contains an arbitration agreement which provides for
arbitration pertaining to the disputes which have arisen between
the parties to the agreement. Therefore, the scope of examination
under Section 11(6-A) should be confined to the existence of an
arbitration agreement on the basis of Section 7. Such a legal
approach will help the Referral Court in weeding out prima facie
non-existent arbitration agreements.
(d) The purport of using the word “examination” connotes that the
legislature intends that the Referral Court has to inspect or
scrutinise the dealings between the parties for the existence of an
arbitration agreement. However, the expression “examination”
does not connote or imply a laborious or contested inquiry.
(e) The burden of proving the existence of arbitration agreement
generally lies on the party seeking to rely on such agreement.
Only prima facie proof of the existence of an arbitration
agreement must be adduced before the Referral Court. The
Referral Court is not the appropriate forum to conduct a mini-trial
by allowing the parties to adduce the evidence in regard to the
existence or validity of an arbitration agreement. The
determination of the existence and validity of an arbitration
agreement on the basis of evidence ought to be left to the Arbitral
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Tribunal.
(f) Section 16 provides that the Arbitral Tribunal can “rule” on its
jurisdiction, including the existence and validity of an arbitration
agreement. A “ruling” connotes adjudication of disputes after
admitting evidence from the parties. Therefore, when the Referral
Court renders a prima facie opinion, neither the Arbitral Tribunal,
nor the Court enforcing the arbitral award is bound by such a
prima facie view. If a prima facie view as to the existence of an
arbitration agreement is taken by the Referral Court, it still allows
the Arbitral Tribunal to examine the issue in depth.
16. What can be deduced from the above decision is that the
Referral Court before appointing an arbitral tribunal will have to be
prima facie satisfied that an arbitration agreement as contemplated in
Section 7 of the 1996 Act exists. For this limited purpose it can
scrutinize the documents relied upon by the parties in proof of its
existence. Though the burden of proving the existence of arbitration
agreement lies on the party seeking to rely on such agreement, only
prima facie proof of its existence must be adduced before the Referral
Court because the Referral Court is not the appropriate forum to
conduct a mini-trial by allowing the parties to adduce the evidence in
regard to its existence.
17. However, where professed arbitration agreement is found in an
undisputed document, no trial or inquiry is required as to its existence.
In such a situation, the Court would have to simply peruse the same to
satisfy itself whether it, prima facie, fulfills the essential ingredients of
an arbitration agreement as contemplated under Section 7 of the 1996
Act. But where the professed arbitration agreement is not contained in
any one document and is to be inferred from two or more documents,
such as exchange of letters or communications, parties may raise
various pleas and place various documents to prove or disprove its
existence. In such a scenario, if from the documents placed, existence
of an arbitration agreement, as defined in Section 7, is prima facie
made out, Referral Court, instead of undertaking a deeper probe or
inquiry, should refer the matter to the arbitral tribunal. More so,
because opinion of the Referral Court as to existence of an arbitration
agreement is neither binding on the arbitral tribunal nor the Court
dealing with the arbitral award.
18. In the instant case, the appellant is relying on just one clause in
the contract which, according to the appellant, constitutes an
arbitration agreement whereas according to the respondent, though the
clause is not disputed, the same does not constitute an arbitration
agreement. In such circumstances, the Court while exercising power
under Section 11 would not have to hold a mini-trial or an enquiry into
its existence rather a plain reading of the clause would indicate whether
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it is, or it is not, an arbitration agreement, prima facie, satisfying the

necessary ingredients of it, as required by Section 7 of the 1996 Act. In
our view, such a limited exercise would not transgress the limit set out
7
by sub-section (6-A) of Section 11 of the 1996 Act as introduced by
2015 Amendment because the object of such an exercise (i.e., of
examination) is to weed out frivolous claims for appointment of an
arbitrator/reference to an arbitral tribunal.
19. In view of the above discussion, the argument of the appellant
that Referral Court should straight away refer the matter and leave it to
the arbitral tribunal to decide whether the arbitration agreement exists
or not cannot be accepted. Issue (i) is decided accordingly.
ISSUE (II)
20. Before we proceed to consider whether Clause 13 would
constitute an arbitration agreement, it would be useful to examine the
law as to when an arbitration agreement comes into existence. An
arbitration agreement is the foundation of arbitration as it records the
consent of the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration. Section 2
(b) of the 1996 Act defines an arbitration agreement to mean an
agreement referred to in Section 78 . In Bihar State Mineral
9
Development Corporation v. Encon Builders , this Court culled out the
essential ingredients of an arbitration agreement as follows : (a) there
must be a present or future difference in connection with some
contemplated affair; (b) the parties must intend to settle such
difference by a private tribunal; (c) the parties must agree in writing to
be bound by the decision of such tribunal; and (d) the parties must be
ad idem.
21. In Cox and Kings Limited v. SAP India Private Limited10, a
Constitution Bench of this Court held:
“61. An arbitration agreement is a contractual undertaking by two
or more parties to resolve their disputes by the process of
arbitration, even if the disputes themselves are not based on
contractual obligations. An arbitration agreement is a conclusive
proof that the parties have consented to submit their dispute to an
arbitral tribunal to the exclusion of domestic courts. The basis for an
arbitration agreement is generally traced to the contractual freedom
of parties to codify their intention to consensually submit their
disputes to an alternative dispute resolution process.”
22. The principles regarding what constitutes an arbitration
agreement were summarized by this Court in Jagdish Chander (supra)
in the following terms:—
“8. …..this Court held that a clause in a contract can be construed
as an ‘arbitration agreement’ only if an agreement to refer disputes
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or differences to arbitration is expressly or impliedly spelt out from

the clause. We may at this juncture set out the well settled
principles in regard to what constitutes an arbitration agreement:
(i) The intention of the parties to enter into an arbitration
agreement shall have to be gathered from the terms of the
agreement. If the terms of the agreement clearly indicate an
intention on the part of the parties to the agreement to refer
their disputes to a private tribunal for adjudication and a
willingness to be bound by the decision of such tribunal on
such disputes, it is arbitration agreement. While there is no
specific form of an arbitration agreement, the words used
should disclose a determination and obligation to go to
arbitration and not merely contemplate the possibility of going
for arbitration. Where there is merely a possibility of the parties
agreeing to arbitration in future, as contrasted from an
obligation to refer disputes to arbitration, there is no valid and
binding arbitration agreement.
(ii) Even if the words ‘arbitration’ and ‘arbitral tribunal (or
arbitrator)’ are not used with reference to the process of
settlement or with reference to the private tribunal which has
to adjudicate upon the disputes, in a clause relating to
settlement of disputes, it does not detract from the clause
being an arbitration agreement if it has the attributes or
elements of an arbitration agreement. They are : (a) The
agreement should be in writing. (b) The parties should have
agreed to refer any disputes (present or future) between them
to the decision of a private tribunal. (c) The private tribunal
should be empowered to adjudicate upon the disputes in an
impartial manner, giving due opportunity to the parties to put
forth their case before it. (d) The parties should have agreed
that the decision of the private tribunal in respect of the
disputes will be binding on them.
(iii) Where the clause provides that in the event of disputes
arising between the parties, the disputes shall be referred to
arbitration, it is an arbitration agreement. Where there is a
specific and direct expression of intent to have the disputes
settled by arbitration, it is not necessary to set out the
attributes of an arbitration agreement to make it an arbitration
agreement. But where the clause relating to settlement of
disputes, contains words which specifically excludes any of the
attributes of an arbitration agreement or contains anything that
detracts from an arbitration agreement, it will not be an
arbitration agreement. For example, where an agreement
requires or permits an authority to decide a claim or dispute
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without hearing, or requires the authority to act in the interests

of only one of the parties, or provides that the decision of the
Authority will not be final and binding on the parties, or that if
either party is not satisfied with the decision of the Authority,
he may file a civil suit seeking relief, it cannot be termed as an
arbitration agreement.
(iv) But mere use of the word ‘arbitration’ or ‘arbitrator’ in a
clause will not make it an arbitration agreement, if it requires
or contemplates a further or fresh consent of the parties for
reference to arbitration. For example, use of words such as
“parties can, if they so desire, refer their disputes to
arbitration” or “in the event of any dispute, the parties may
also agree to refer the same to arbitration” or “if any disputes
arise between the parties, they should consider settlement by
arbitration” in a clause relating to settlement of disputes,
indicate that the clause is not intended to be an arbitration
agreement. Similarly, a clause which states that “if the parties
so decide, the disputes shall be referred to arbitration” or “any
disputes between parties, if they so agree, shall be referred to
arbitration” is not an arbitration agreement. Such clauses
merely indicate a desire or hope to have the disputes settled by
arbitration, or a tentative arrangement to explore arbitration as
a mode of settlement if and when a dispute arises. Such
clauses require the parties to arrive at a further agreement to
go to arbitration, as and when the disputes arise. Any
agreement or clause in an agreement requiring or
contemplating a further consent or consensus before a
reference to arbitration, is not an arbitration agreement, but an
agreement to enter into an arbitration agreement in future.”
(Emphasis supplied)
23. In Jagdish Chander (supra), the issue that arose for
consideration was whether paragraph 16 in the partnership agreement
constituted an arbitration agreement. Clause 16 under consideration
there, is extracted below:
“16) If during the continuance of the partnership or at any time
afterwards any dispute touching the partnership arises between the
partners, the same shall be mutually decided by the partners or shall
be referred for arbitration if the parties so determine.”
While holding that clause 16 did not constitute an arbitration
agreement, this Court observed:
“9. Para 16 of the Partnership deed provides that if there is any
dispute touching the partnership arising between the partners, the
same shall be mutually decided by the parties or shall be referred to
arbitration if the parties so determine. If the clause had merely said
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that in the event of disputes arising between the parties, they “shall
be referred to arbitration”, it would have been an arbitration
agreement. But the use of the words “shall be referred for arbitration
if the parties so determine” completely changes the complexion of
the provision. The expression “determine” indicates that the parties
are required to reach a decision by application of mind. Therefore,
when clause 16 uses the words “the dispute shall be referred for
arbitration if the parties so determine”, it means that it is not an
arbitration agreement but a provision which enables arbitration only
if the parties mutually decide after due consideration as to whether
the disputes should be referred to arbitration or not. In effect, the
clause requires the consent of parties before the disputes can be
referred to arbitration. The main attribute of an arbitration
agreement, namely, consensus ad idem to refer the disputes to
arbitration is missing in clause 16 relating to settlement of disputes.
Therefore, it is not an arbitration agreement, as defined under
section 7 of the Act. In the absence of an arbitration agreement, the
question of exercising power under section 11 of the Act to appoint
an Arbitrator does not arise.”
(Emphasis supplied)
24. In Mahanadi Coalfields (supra), this court was required to
consider whether clause 15 constituted an arbitration agreement.
Clause 15 under consideration there, is extracted below:
“15. Settlement of Disputes/Arbitration:
15.1 It is incumbent upon the contractor to avoid litigation and
disputes during the course of execution. However, if such disputes
take place between the contractor and the department, effort shall
be made first to settle the disputes at the company level. The
contractor should make request in writing to the Engineer-in-Charge
for settlement of such disputes/claims within 30 (thirty) days of
arising of the case of dispute/claim failing which no disputes/claims
of the contractor shall be entertained by the company.
15.2 If differences still persist, the settlement of the dispute with
Govt. Agencies shall be dealt with as per the Guidelines issued by
the Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India in this regard. In case of
parties other than Govt. Agencies, the redressal of the disputes may
be sought in the Court of Law.”
25. Following the decision in Jagdish Chander (supra), this Court, in
Mahanadi Coalfields (supra), held that Clause 15 of the Contract
Agreement though is titled “Settlement of Disputes/Arbitration”, the
substantive part of it makes it abundantly clear that there is no
arbitration agreement between the parties to refer either present or
future dispute to arbitration.
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26. What is clear from the judgment in Mahanadi Coalfields (supra)

is that mere use of the word “arbitration” or “arbitrator” in a clause will
not make it an arbitration agreement, if it requires or contemplates a
further or fresh consent of the parties for reference to arbitration. In
Jagdish Chander (supra), use of words such as “parties can, if they so
desire, refer their disputes to arbitration”, or “in the event of any
dispute, the parties may also agree to refer the same to arbitration”, or
“if any disputes arise between the parties, they should consider
settlement by arbitration”, in a clause relating to settlement of
disputes, were found not indicative of an arbitration agreement.
Similarly, a clause which states that “if the parties so decide, the
disputes shall be referred to arbitration” or “any disputes between
parties, if they so agree, shall be referred to arbitration” would not
constitute an arbitration agreement. Because such clauses merely
indicate a desire or hope to have the disputes settled by arbitration, or
a tentative arrangement to explore arbitration as a mode of settlement
if and when a dispute arises. This is so, because such clauses require
the parties to arrive at a further agreement to go to arbitration, as and
when disputes arise. Therefore, any agreement, or clause in an
agreement, requiring or contemplating a further consent or consensus
before a reference to arbitration, is not an arbitration agreement.
27. Now, the question which arises for our consideration is whether
Clause 13 constitutes an arbitration agreement or it is just an enabling
provision for parties to agree to refer the dispute(s) for settlement
through arbitration.
28. Clause 13 in its first paragraph sets out intent to avoid litigation
and advises the contractor to make effort to settle the dispute at the
company level. Second paragraph sets out the procedure for raising the
dispute/claim for settlement at the company level. It provides that the
contractor should make request in writing to the Engineer-in-charge for
settlement of disputes/claims within 30 days of arising of the cause of
dispute/claim failing which it shall not be entertained by the company.
Thereafter, clause 13 provides for a two-stage procedure for resolution
of the dispute. In the first stage, dispute is to be referred to Area CGM,
GM. If difference persists, the dispute is to be referred to a committee
constituted by the owner. If difference continues to persist, the second
stage procedure becomes applicable. According to which, if the dispute
or difference relates to the interpretation and application of the
provisions of commercial contracts between Central Public Sector
Enterprises CPSEs/Port Trusts inter se, or is between CPSEs and
Government Departments/Organizations (excluding disputes
concerning railways, income tax, Customs and Excise departments),
such dispute or difference shall be taken up by either party for
resolution through AMRCD as mentioned in DPE OM No. 4(1)/2013-DPE
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(GM)/FTS-1835 dated 22-05-2018. However, in case of parties other

than Govt. Agencies, the redressal of the dispute may be sought
through arbitration as per 1996 Act.
29. The High Court opined that use of the words “may be sought
through Arbitration…” indicate that at the stage of entering the
contract, parties were not ad idem that inter se dispute shall be
resolved through arbitration, therefore the said clause would not
constitute an arbitration agreement.
30. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that
clause 13 provides option to the parties, which include any of one of the
parties, to seek dispute resolution through arbitration and, therefore, it
is nothing but an arbitration clause. According to him, use of the word
“may” in clause 13 does not provide choice to the parties to agree, or
not to agree, for arbitration, rather it is a choice given to either of the
parties to seek a settlement through arbitration and, therefore, when
one party exercises the option, the other party cannot resile from the
agreement. In that sense, according to him, clause 13 is an arbitration
agreement.
31. We do not agree with the aforesaid submission because clause
13 does not bind parties to use arbitration for settlement of the
disputes. Use of the words “may be sought”, imply that there is no
subsisting agreement between parties that they, or any one of them,
would have to seek settlement of dispute(s) through arbitration. It is
just an enabling clause whereunder, if parties agree, they could resolve
their dispute(s) through arbitration. In our view, the phraseology of
clause 13 is not indicative of a binding agreement that any of the
parties on its own could seek redressal of inter se dispute(s) through
arbitration. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the High
Court was justified in holding that clause 13 does not constitute an
arbitration agreement.
32. As it is not the case of the appellant that parties at any later
stage have agreed to refer the disputes to arbitration, in our view, the
High Court was justified in rejecting the application seeking
appointment of an arbitrator. Issue (ii) is decided in the aforesaid
terms.
ISSUE (III)
33. Having decided issue (ii) in the negative, deciding issue (iii) is of
no consequence. However, we may observe that clause 32 does not
exclude resolution of disputes through arbitration agreement. It only
fixes jurisdiction and in the event of there being an arbitration
agreement could determine the juridical seat. However, since we have
held that there is no arbitration agreement between the parties,
decision of issue (iii) is of no consequence.
34. In the light of our conclusion on the issues discussed above, the
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appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.

35. There is no order as to costs.
36. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
———
1
The High Court at Calcutta

2
A.P. No. 745 of 2023

3
1996 Act

4
(2007) 5 SCC 719

5
(2022) 20 SCC 636

6
(2024) 6 SCC 1

7
Section 11.

(6-A). The Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court, while considering any
application under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6), shall,
notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, confine to the examination of
the existence of an arbitration agreement.

8
Section 7. Arbitration Agreement. - (1) In this Part, “arbitration agreement” means an
agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or
which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual
or not.

(2) An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in

the form of a separate agreement.

(3) An arbitration agreement shall be in writing.

(4) An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in -

(a) a document signed by the parties;

(b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication including

communication through electronic means which provide a record of the agreement; or

(c) an exchange of statements of claim and defense in which the existence of the agreement
is alleged by one party and not denied by the other.

(5) The reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes

an arbitration agreement if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make
that arbitration clause part of the contract.

9
(2003) 7 SCC 418
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10
(2024) 4 SCC 1

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