JP 2.

05

JOINT DOCTRINE FOR

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS
© No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form by print, photo,
photocopy, microfilm or any other means without written permission of
Directorate of Doctrine, Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, New Delhi
110021.

August 2025

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Directorate of Doctrine, Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, New Delhi
110021

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thesis and conferences on the subject and citations placed at References.

Printing & Designing: HQ DAPP

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 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

General Anil Chauhan Chief of Defence Staff &

PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM, VSM Secretary DMA
South Block
New Delhi-110011

FOREWORD
1. The character of modern warfare is in a constant state of flux, marked by
rapid technological advancements, expansion of battlespace across traditional
and non-traditional domains and emergence of hybrid threats across the
spectrum of conflict. In this evolving operational environment, the necessity for
specially trained, motivated and equipped troops capable of executing high-risk
missions under adverse conditions is unequivocal.

2. Special Forces (SF), owing to their agility, strategic reach and mission-
specific capabilities, are uniquely suited to generate disproportionate operational
effects through precision engagement, deep insertion and unconventional
operations. Their employment in conventional, sub-conventional and emerging
domains has become integral to achieving national security objectives.

3. The Indian Armed Forces possess significant institutional experience in

the employment of Special Forces. Originating with raising of commando
battalions post-1965 war, the evolution has seen development of five battalions
of Parachute Regiment into Special Forces units, with subsequent raising of
three additional battalions. These units, designated as 'Parachute (Special
Forces)', operate under a mandate of strategic and operational missions.

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 Foreword

4. Parallely, the Indian Navy raised the Marine Commandos (MARCOS) for
maritime SF operations and the Indian Air Force inducted the Garud Special
Forces for air-centric and counter-terrorism roles. The establishment of the
Armed Forces Special Operations Division (AFSOD) under HQ IDS marks a
seminal step in enhancing tri-service synergy and integrated employment of SF.

5. While each Service continues to function within the purview of its

respective doctrinal constructs for SF, the evolving nature of conflict necessitates
a joint doctrinal framework. This Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations
articulates a unified philosophy encompassing principles, capabilities and
employment strategies for SF across land, maritime and air domains. It is
envisaged as a foundational reference to facilitate joint planning, execution and
capacity building for Special Forces in consonance with emerging roles and
missions of the 21st century.

6. The doctrine provides a strategic and operational-level framework while

maintaining the flexibility for adaptation to Service specific roles. It must,
however, remain a living document—subject to periodic review and realignment
with the evolving threat matrix, technological advancements and operational
experience.

(Anil Chauhan)
General
Chief of Defence Staff

27 Aug 25

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 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

CONTENTS
Chapter 1 Special Forces Operations : An Overview
1

Chapter 2 Operational Imperatives and Considerations 9

Chapter 3 Organisation, Characteristics and Concept of Employment

19

Chapter 4 Roles and Missions

27

Chapter 5 Command, Control and Planning

33

Chapter 6 Enablers for SF Operations

43

Chapter 7 Selection and Training

55

Chapter 8 Future Contours

61

Glossary

Part-I Acronyms / Abbreviations

67

Part-II Terms and Definitions

69

References
73

Record of Amendments
74

Notes
76

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 Special Forces Operations: An Overview

PARA Team in Action

Under Water Diving Operation

vi
 Chapter 1

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS: AN OVERVIEW

Special Forces

Special Forces Operations

Historical Perspective

Evolution of Indian Special Forces

Need for Joint Doctrine

 Special Forces Operations: An Overview

SF Operations: Indian Context

The Mandhol gun raid, was a daring raid conducted by 9 PARA (Cdo) during
1971 War. The raid targeted Pakistani artillery positions in the Mandhol
village, located in Poonch sector and resulted in destruction of six Pakistani
artillery guns. The Mandhol raid is considered a significant tactical victory
and is credited with forcing Pakistan to change its war strategy. It is also
regarded as the first surgical strike by Indian Army's Special Forces inside
enemy territory.
During the same war, Chachro raid was another daring operation conducted
by 10 PARA (Cdo). Led by then Lt Col Sawai Bhawani Singh, the unit raided
Chachro and other towns in Sindh province, Pakistan, capturing and inflicting
significant damage on Pakistani forces. The operation is notable for its
success, with the unit capturing multiple communication centres without a
single casualty.
On 16 March 2024, during Op SANKALP, the Indian Marine Commandos
(MARCOS) conducted their first ever combat para-drop operation at sea
from Indian Air Force's C-17 Globemaster III aircraft to intercept pirates on
MV Ruen.

10 PARA Team after capturing Chachro Village in Pakistan

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 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

CHAPTER 1

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS: AN OVERVIEW

Special Forces

1. 'Special Forces (SF)' refers to a body of specially selected military

volunteers, suitably organised, trained and equipped with the capability to
operate across the spectrum of conflict. By virtue of their organisation and
training, Special Forces can be inserted by land, air or sea and can operate in
adverse environment to accomplish assigned missions at the strategic and
operational levels. SF provides the operational commander with utility and
flexibility, including employment options in direct action attrition tasks,
surveillance and reconnaissance, unconventional tasks and other tasks
independent of conventional operations.

Figure 1: Features of Special Forces

Special Forces Operations

2. Special Forces Operations are small scale clandestine, covert or overt

operations of an unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature, undertaken to
achieve significant political or military objectives.These operations are
conducted against targets of strategic or operational importance in hostile,
denied or politically sensitive areas. The paralysing effect and disorientation
caused to the enemy through such operations can be swiftly exploited by
conventional forces to gain strategic or operational advantage.

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 Special Forces Operations: An Overview

PARA Team that conducted Mandhol Gun Raid

Operation SANKALP: Water para-drop by MARCOS

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 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

Historical Perspective

3. Special/ Commando/ Guerrilla operations are as old as history of warfare

which itself is replete with instances of various audacious actions by a special
group of men led by an intrepid leader. Examples from ancient Indian mythology
include night raid on Lanka by legendary warrior Lord Hanuman in Ramayana
and ruthless decapitation of Pandava camp on final night of Mahabharata by
warrior named Ashwathama. In recorded history, Kautilya's exposition on 'Koot'
and 'Tusnim Yuddha' in Arthashastra are fine examples of inclusion of Special
Operations in statecraft. In medieval Indian history, actions of Gora and Badal in
Khilji camp, Rani Abakka's night raid to regain Ullal from Portuguese General
Peixoto, tactics of Maharana Pratap in Battle of Dewair, Shivaji's escape from
Panhalgad and subsequent overnight attack and night raid on Vishalgad and
Shaista Khan's palace are some of the known examples. Chhatrapati Shivaji
Maharaj pioneered the Shiva Sutra or Ganimi Kava guerrilla tactics to defeat
larger and more powerful armies of the Mughal Empire. In the pre-Independence
era, Kerala Verma successfully used guerrilla tactics while operating in mountain
forests against British East India Company in India.

Evolution of Indian Special Forces

4. Meghdoot Force. The concept of special operations gained

prominence during World War II, with forces like the British SAS and
Commandos demonstrating their effectiveness. The 1965 India-Pakistan war
highlighted the need for specialised units capable of operating behind enemy
lines. Thus, a commando unit called the Meghdoot Force, comprising volunteers
was raised under Lt Col Megh Singh in 1965. The successful operations by
Meghdoot Force demonstrated the value of unconventional forces.

5. Army. Following the 1965 War, 9 PARA

(Cdo) Battalion was raised on 01 July 1966. This
is considered the first dedicated special
operations unit of the Indian Army. This laid the
foundation of raising of Special Forces
Battalions with specialised tasks. Later, on
01 Jun 1967, 9 PARA (Cdo) Battalion was split
into two, raising 10 PARA (Cdo) Battalion. In
Para SF during an Operation
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 Special Forces Operations: An Overview

1978, conversion of 1 PARA Battalion to 1 PARA (Cdo) – an experimental

commando wing on the lines of SAS, was carried out. Subsequently, both 9 and
10 PARA (Cdo) have been re-structured on lines of 1 PARA (Cdo).

6. Navy. The MARCOS (Marine Commando Force), an elite Special Force

of the Indian Navy, has a historical foundation in the Indian Navy's diving
specialisation, established in 1955. In April 1986, recognising the need for
specialised maritime operations, Indian Navy began planning for creation of a
dedicated Special Forces unit, capable of undertaking missions in maritime
environment, conducting raids and reconnaissance & counter terrorism
operations. This led to formation of Indian Marine Special Force on 14 Feb 1987,
later renamed MARCOS in 1991.

MARCOS

7. IAF. The youngest of the services special forces, IAF SF Garud was
officially established in February 2004. It was conceived to provide specialised

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 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

capabilities for airfield protection, combat search and rescue and other Air Force-
specific special operations.

IAF SF Garud

8. AFSOD. The history of Indian Special Forces is one of continuous

adaptation and evolution, driven by operational needs and emerging threats.
These elite units have grown in both size and capability, playing an increasingly
vital role in meeting strategic military objectives. In recent years, there has been a
move towards greater integration and synergy among the Services special
forces which has led to the establishment of Armed Forces Special Operations
Division (AFSOD) under HQ IDS.

Need for Joint Doctrine

9. Globally, Special Forces have proven instrumental in executing complex

politico-military tasks, often in volatile and high-risk environments. Operational
experiences have consistently underscored the imperative for doctrinal clarity,
unity of effort and synchronised planning in SF employment. The Joint Doctrine
for Special Forces Operations provides a cohesive doctrinal framework for
integrated development, planning and employment of Special Forces. It
promotes synergy across the three services, harmonising existing Service-
specific doctrines whilst preserving the operational uniqueness of each.

10. The doctrine reflects convergence of operational philosophies, beliefs

and core tenets of the Army, Navy and Air Force Special Forces, into a unified

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 Special Forces Operations: An Overview

and coherent approach. It undergirds strategic and operational planning

processes and facilitates capability enhancement through joint training,
interoperability and standardised procedures.

11. In alignment with the Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces, this
document draws from operational lessons as gleaned from contemporary
conflicts and remains dynamic in construct. It should be read in conjunction with
other doctrinal publications such as Joint Doctrine for Training and Joint Doctrine
for Sub-Conventional Operations and must be periodically reviewed to ensure
relevance and responsiveness.

Helocasting

8
 Chapter 2

OPERATIONAL IMPERATIVES AND CONSIDERATIONS

Operational Imperatives

Considerations for Employment of SF

 Operational Imperatives and Considerations

SF Operating at LAC

SF Training in Deserts
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 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

CHAPTER 2

OPERATIONAL IMPERATIVES AND CONSIDERATIONS

Operational Imperatives

1. The Indian Special Forces (SF) are being called upon to operate in an
increasingly complex and dynamic environment. Geopolitical shifts, rapid
technological innovations and emergent non-traditional threats demand that our
Special Forces remain agile, versatile and forward-thinking more than ever before.

2. Conflict Continuum and Employment of SF. Conflict today exists on a

broad continuum, from cooperation and competition to confrontation, conflict and
combat. Notably, conflicts below the threshold of declared war have become
predominant. Limited Wars, Special Operations, Proxy Wars, Hybrid Conflicts
and Grey Zone Warfare are increasingly the norm. The ability of SF to conduct
operations in conventional, unconventional and non-kinetic domains makes
them a critical instrument of national power.

3. Geo-Strategic Landscape. India's strategic geography places it amidst

nuclear-armed neighbours, volatile regions and contested domains. Border
disputes, transnational terrorism, proxy conflicts and competition for strategic
resources define India's immediate operating environment. The Special Forces
must maintain high readiness to operate across the spectrum of conflict. SF
Missions could range from hostage rescue to counter-proliferation to securing
strategic interests.

4. Internal Security Considerations. Internally, India faces threats from

insurgencies, terrorism and organised crime networks. Special Forces are often
deployed for surgical strikes and counter-insurgency operations.

5. Grey Zone and Hybrid Threats. The increasing prevalence of grey

zone tactics, non-attributable and blurring the lines between peace and war,
requires SF to adapt to multi-domain engagements. Hybrid warfare combines
military and non-military means, including disinformation, cyberattacks,
economic coercion and proxy forces.

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 Operational Imperatives and Considerations

6. Cognitive and Information Warfare. The human mind is an emerging

battlespace. Adversaries are leveraging social media, deep fakes and
psychological operations to influence public opinion and destabilise societies.
Indian SF must be capable of conducting offensive and defensive Information
Operations, countering propaganda and exploiting the information domain for
operational advantage. Enhanced skills in cultural awareness, strategic
communication and psychological resilience will be crucial.

7. Urban and Sub-Surface Terrain. Urbanisation is rapidly altering the

battlefield. More than half of the world's population now resides in urban areas
and future conflicts are likely to be waged in these dense, complex environments.
The rise of megacities and sprawling urban areas presents unique operational
challenges such as three-dimensional movement, high civilian density and the
need for precision. Subterranean spaces — including tunnels, underground
facilities and sewage systems — may become battlegrounds in their own right.
Indian SF must invest in specialised training for urban and subterranean warfare,
incorporating advanced surveillance tools, unmanned ground systems and
enhanced breaching techniques.
8. Maritime and Littoral Challenges. As India's interests expand across
the Indo-Pacific, maritime and littoral operations are becoming increasingly
crucial. Future missions may involve the use of manned and unmanned
underwater vehicles, seabed operations and amphibious raids. Securing key
maritime chokepoints, protecting energy assets, conducting special
reconnaissance and direct action missions at sea will be important tasks. The
expansion of the maritime domain into undersea and seabed operations requires
new capabilities in underwater navigation, stealth insertion and deep-sea
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).

MARCOS on Mission
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 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

9. Technology and Innovation. Technological innovation is a critical

enabler for Special Forces. The increasing use of autonomous drones,
miniaturised sensors, wearable technologies and AI-driven ISR platforms
enhances mission efficiency and effectiveness. Robotics, swarm drones,
quantum communication and cyber warfare tools are redefining operational
capabilities. Special Forces will increasingly rely on secure communications,
data fusion, AI-assisted decision-making and real-time intelligence to achieve
mission objectives. Additionally, advanced camouflage systems, exoskeletons
for load management and enhanced combat medicine technologies will improve
operational endurance and survivability.

SF Soldier Operating with Robotic Mule

10. Insertion and Mobility Innovations. Insertion methods are diversifying

beyond helicopters and parachute drops. Future operations may utilise drones
for aerial insertion, jet packs, gliders and para-gliders for stealth, small
submersibles for covert maritime access and all-terrain vehicles for rapid
movement in harsh environments. Portable systems like electric mountain bikes
and ultra-light motorbikes could enable silent and rapid infiltration. Surprise and
flexibility will be enhanced through the mastery of multiple insertion and
extraction methods tailored to diverse mission requirements.

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 Operational Imperatives and Considerations

Mobility Innovations – All Terrain Vehicle and Jet Pack

Considerations for Employment of Special Forces

11. Operational Commanders have Special Forces at their disposal for

execution of CONOPS. Since, Special Operations cannot provide solutions for
every security challenge, apt utilisation helps to effectively manage expectations
and to sustain combat worthiness. Some considerations for Operational
Commanders are mentioned below: -

11.1. Strategic Success. Special operations alone, can typically

achieve decisive tactical success. When coupled with multiple such actions
across the AOR or in conjunction with follow-on action, they can achieve
decisive strategic success. Occasionally, a solitary special operation, can
have some strategic effect on its own, particularly in terms of signaling intent
and capability through discrete operation. Without any capitalisation by
other supporting elements - whether military, diplomatic or economic—the
achievement of decisive strategic effects by SF alone is rare.

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 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

11.2. Objective vis-à-vis Risk. Success in Special Operations hinges

on unorthodox application of force. Often this involves risk, which can be
managed but not totally eliminated. The ability to accomplish objective is
dependent on Operational Commander's appetite to court risk. This
brings forth need for promulgation of lucid Rules of Engagements to
address legal, moral and strategic dimensions of warfare.

11.3. Employment in Conventional Tasks. Special Warriors, by

virtue of their attributes, can perform a wide spectrum of jobs. Tasks
outlined for Special Forces must be commensurate with their expertise.
Tasking of relatively low priority missions may sometimes become an
operational necessity, as Special Forces available at a certain point of
time under a given set of circumstances may well be the best option. It is
however, advisable that the Commanders be fully conversant with the
intricacies of employing Special Forces on non- traditional missions and
therefore, employment on such missions is a considered and deliberate
decision.

12. Special Forces Operations Vs Conventional Operations. Special

Forces Operations may be undertaken in support of conventional military
operations or independent of conventional military forces. Special Forces
Operations complement and do not compete with conventional operations.
While operating with main combat forces, Special Forces are best employed in
complementary role to enable achieving a decision or to extend their capabilities.
However, Special Forces Operations differ from Conventional Operations in
degree of risk, modes of employment, operational techniques, degree of
dependence on contiguous/ close support, detailed operational intelligence,
innovation and indigenous assets. These operations should be planned as an
integral part of an overall campaign across the spectrum of military operations.
Special Forces Operations can also be conducted as independent operations in
support of national military objectives.

13. Considerations for Employing SF vis-à-vis Conventional Forces.

SF are best employed in versatile, self-contained teams that provide
Commanders an extremely flexible force capable of operating in ambiguous and
swiftly changing scenarios. It is pertinent to note that Special Forces are not a
substitute for conventional forces and are distinct from them. However,

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 Operational Imperatives and Considerations

operations conducted by Special Forces are planned jointly and executed in

conjunction with efforts of conventional forces. Therefore, Special Forces are
required to conduct joint and integrated training regularly; both within the Special
Forces and with conventional forces including insertion/ extraction from
platforms/ assets over land, air and maritime domains. Following are the
considerations while employing Special Forces vis-a-vis Conventional Forces: -

13.1. Low Visibility. Special Forces capitalise on speed, surprise,

audacity and deception and can be employed where conventional forces
appear to be politically, militarily or economically inappropriate. They act
as a precursor to large scale offensive operations; minimising risks of
escalation and maximising returns.

13.2. Combat Readiness. Unit/ sub-unit earmarked to conduct special

operations are required to maintain high combat readiness including
mission oriented training, advance skills set and high equipment
serviceability.

13.3. Joint Planning. Special Forces Operations require joint planning

and coordination for resources and support. Once deployed, their self-
reliance allows them to function under austere conditions with limited
resources/ infrastructure that conventional forces often need.

13.4. Military Asymmetry. Special Forces Operations generate

military asymmetry by neutralising enemy military/ national assets that
otherwise could impede attainment of own mission objectives, if permitted
to operate with impunity.

13.5. Psychological Impact. Successful SF Operations have an

element of psychological impact/ dislocation/ disruption on enemy that
degrades its will to fight.

13.6. Target Selection. The selection of targets for Special Forces

Operations requires in-depth deliberation; and essentially such targeting
should have a direct bearing on attaining own strategic/ operational/
tactical objectives with high degree of reliability and precision.

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 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

13.7. Unconventional Warfare. In modern times, there is a gradual

but significant inclusivity of unconventional/ irregular warfare by
incorporation of irregulars/ Private Military Companies/ Contractors
(PMCs) world over. Since the risk of escalation as well as financial burden
are less, sponsoring of cross border terrorism/ insurgency as a tool to
achieve broader national objectives by nation states is on the rise. Special
Forces are most suitable to counter the warfare waged by adversaries by
employing irregular tactics.

Underslung Light Strike Vehicle (LSV)

17
 Operational Imperatives and Considerations

Under Water Diving using Close Circuit Sets

18
 Chapter 3

ORGANISATION, CHARACTERISTICS
AND CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT OF SF

Indian Special Forces

Characteristics of Special Forces

Concept of Employment of SF
 Organisation, Characteristics and Concept of Employment of SF

PARA (SF) Mod Airborne Battalion in Action

20
 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

CHAPTER 3

ORGANISATION, CHARACTERISTICS AND CONCEPT OF

EMPLOYMENT OF SF

Indian Special Forces

1. All three Services have raised SF to meet Service specific and National
requirements, details of which are given in succeeding paragraphs.

2. PARA (Special Forces) Battalion. PARA (SF)

Battalions are placed directly under IA's Commands or
kept as strategic reserve and specialise in theatre specific
SF operations during war, conflict and peace. PARA (SF)
Battalions follow 'Modular Small Team Concept' in their
organisation, with functional grouping of personnel based
on core specialisation and role. The small teams are
organised in a manner to possess a mission mix of
specialised skills, cultural/ linguistic proficiency, handling
of varied weapons and equipment, so that they can
operate independently or in conjunction with other
Services' forces with inherent capabilities and integral fire PARA (SF) Badge
power.

3. PARA (Special Forces) Mod Airborne Battalion. PARA (SF) Mod

Airborne battalions have unique capability of manifesting themselves behind
enemy lines by vertical envelopment using airborne insertion and carrying out
airborne assault to capture/ secure vital objectives in depth areas, which are
otherwise beyond reach of regular forces. Utilising their speed and mobility,
these specialised airborne units are capable of surprising enemy at unexpected
locations. Their employment or mere threat of employment to spearhead an
operation has great strategic value, making Airborne Forces a threat-in-being for
the enemy. The Airborne Forces are characteristically designed to be employed
enmasse and necessarily require link-up/ aerial re-supply drops to enhance their
operational stamina. The employment of Airborne Forces requires prudent
planning and can achieve disproportionate results.

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 Organisation, Characteristics and Concept of Employment of SF

4. Marine Commando Force (MCF). The

MARCOS have acquired rich experience and
international reputation for professionalism by
flawless execution of Marine Special Operations
over the years. MCF is organised into MARCOS
units assigned to commands of IN. MCF units are
organised into subunits for undertaking Special
Forces Operations.

MARCOS Badge

MCF

5. IAF SF Garud. The IAF SF Garud, essentially act as an interface

between air and ground elements of air power to enhance precision and lethality.
The IAF SF Garud are fully integrated in IAF conventional and sub-conventional
operational matrix to conduct combat controlling, terminal attack control,

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 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

personnel recovery functions and counter asymmetric threats, to augment the

overall efficacy of air power.

IAF SF Garud Warriors IAF SF Garud Badge

6. Armed Forces Special Operations Division. AFSOD under HQ IDS

facilitates joint development, planning and employment of Special Forces and
comprises of specialised units from Indian Army's PARA (SF), Indian Navy's
Marine Commandos (MARCOS) and IAF SF Garud.

Characteristics of Special Forces

7. The forces undertaking special operations must possess the following

characteristics: -

7.1. Responsiveness. Special Forces always maintain a very high

level of operational readiness to respond to any crisis or developing
situation. They also maintain high levels of training for employment under
all terrain and climatic conditions.

7.2. Agility. It is the ability to act faster than the enemy and is a
prerequisite for initiative. It is a physical and mental quality. Special Forces
enhance ability of the commander to choose where and when to conduct
the operations. Their ability to enter and exit an area from pronounced

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 Organisation, Characteristics and Concept of Employment of SF

distances keeps the enemy off balance and amplifies the impact of a small
force.

7.3. Initiative. Ability of Special Forces to extend range of operations

provides the Operational Commander greater flexibility in setting terms of
the battle. They provide speed and flexibility to redirect actions and retain
the initiative, thus compelling the enemy to react. Determination and
audacity ultimately ensures success.

7.4. Depth. It is the extension of operations in space, time and

resources. Special Forces provide Commanders the ability to reach
depths of the theatre. They expand available period by reducing planning
and deployment timings. Depth ensures that Special Forces elements will
be positioned where they will be most effective. If the enemy perceives
that its entire area of operation is vulnerable to Special Forces, it may
commit its assets for extensive rear area security.

7.5. Synchronisation. It is arrangement of battlefield activities in

time, space and purpose in a way which produces the maximum relative
combat power at the desired point. SF offer suitable military response to
situations which require precision and effect based operations. SF
provide the ability to move quickly to, where their actions may enhance
effect of conventional forces.

7.6. Versatility. Special Forces are versatile and have the ability to
meet diverse challenges, shift focus, reorganise themselves and move
from one role or mission to another, rapidly and efficiently.

7.7. Critical Strategic Resource. Special Forces cannot be mass

produced, as also, capable Special Forces cannot be created after a crisis
takes place. Therefore, Commanders must use this critical resource
judiciously. Special Forces as a rule should not be employed on tasks
which are within capability of regular forces.

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 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

Concept of Employment of SF

8. SF should be employed as Force Multiplier to cause psychological

dislocation of the enemy, undertaking missions across the spectrum of conflict to
target and decisively denude enemy's war waging capabilities. A few salient
aspects pertaining to the concept for employment of SF are highlighted below: -

8.1. Force Multiplier. Employment of Special Forces Force should

act as a force multiplier while targeting the Centre of Gravity (COG) and
ultimately enemy's will to fight. At strategic level, Special Forces must be
employed against High Value Targets (e.g. COSC tasks) located in depth.
Special Forces when employed against tactical targets, should be
authorised only by strategic/ operational commanders to produce
strategic/ operational level effects.

8.2. Command & Control. Special Forces Operations follow

centralised command and control at the highest level because of sensitive
nature of mission's profile and limited availability of SF. SF follow directive
style of command to provide necessary flexibility.

8.3. Jointness & Interoperability. Special Forces Operations

require extensive teamwork, synergy and interoperability within Services'
Special Forces and supporting platforms/ assets.

8.4. Access to Highest Level of Intelligence. The importance and

sensitivity of SF Operations demand high precision in targeting and
therefore require access to highest level of intelligence.

8.5. Information Security. SF Operations rely heavily on surprise

and deception to compensate for their small teams, limited fire power and
sustainability. Thus, secrecy of such operations should be maintained on
a 'need to know' basis.

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 Organisation, Characteristics and Concept of Employment of SF

8.6. Flexibility and Mobility. Directive style of command ensures

precise application of SF whilst allowing maximum freedom of action. The
Commander must ensure that SF understands his intentions, the mission
and desired effect of mission on his overall plan. SF must be told what
effect they are to achieve, why they should achieve it and must be
allocated appropriate resources for the same. A Commander, thereafter,
must use minimum control measures so as not to limit their freedom of
action.

26
 Chapter 4

ROLES AND MISSIONS

Roles of SF

SF Missions during Levels of Conict

 Roles and Missions

CT Operations

Maritime Interdiction Operations

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 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

CHAPTER 4
ROLES AND MISSIONS
1. The roles, missions and tasks of the Indian SF are diverse and critical to
national security. These elite units are designed to undertake high-risk
operations that demand specialised skills and tactics in hostile, denied or
politically sensitive environments.
Roles of SF
2. Special Forces are versatile, rapidly deployable and are able to project
power. The overarching role of the Indian Special Forces is to act as a strategic
asset capable of roles as discussed in succeeding paragraphs.
3. Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Designation (RSTD).
Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Designation (RSTD) role of Special
Forces complements intelligence collection by obtaining vital information
required for decision making at the politico-strategic or strategic operational
levels and their engagement by suitable weapon systems. Human intelligence
provided by own forces is of highest reliability. Broad categories of
reconnaissance, surveillance and target designation missions are: -
3.1. Information Reporting. Special Forces collect and report
information of enemy forces, such as their strength, dispositions and
movements. Special Forces can also collect and report targeting/
environmental data (meteorological and hydrographic) for strike planning
by aircraft/ maritime platforms/ assets. Special Forces can also carry out
reconnaissance of essential entry points for operations, such as Combat
Beach Reconnaissance (CBR) prior to an amphibious landing or
reconnaissance of landing/ drop zones prior to a heliborne or an airborne
operation. Special Forces can reach and communicate with civilians and
indigenous forces to gather information.
3.2. Target Acquisition. This includes long range reconnaissance
and patrolling, as also strategic reconnaissance for gaining battlefield
intelligence and reconnaissance deep in enemy or foreign territory. At the
operational level, Special Forces could acquire targets of significance to
the Commander to support plans and trigger interdiction.
3.3. Target Designation. Terminal Guidance Operations involving

29
 Roles and Missions

laser target designation by Special Forces for the air force/ artillery/ Long
Range Vectors (LRVs) allows precise engagement of key targets.
3.4. Post-Strike Damage Assessment (PSDA). They can also carry
out battle damage assessment including damage inflicted by own weapon
systems on targets of strategic/ operational significance for ascertaining
requirement of repeat targeting.
4. Offensive Action. SF can undertake offensive action both before and
after outbreak of hostilities. Raids are fundamental to SF offensive operations.
This involves swift infiltration to target area to destroy the enemy forces or their
assets. Unlike Infantry/ conventional maritime forces, SF do not hold ground but
de-induct on completion of mission or secure linkup with ground holding forces.
In Low Intensity Conflict Operations (LICO) environment, SF can operate for
protracted periods in hostile territory to conduct a succession of offensive
actions. Likely offensive missions by SF can be broadly classified as: -
4.1. Sabotage. These are against key enemy installations,
communications and vital supplies and can also have a diversionary
effect.
4.2. Punitive Operations. Special Forces need to be always
prepared for undertaking punitive operations to counter nefarious actions
of forces/ groups inimical to our nation.
4.3. Raids for Personnel Recovery. Special Forces may be required
to capture key enemy commanders or rescue own prisoners of war and
hostages. These raids involve direct assault and are high risk, but can
have significant psychological impact.
4.4. Air Ambushes. Special Forces may lay air ambushes near
enemy air fields/ Advance Landing Grounds (ALGs)/ Forward Area
Rearming and Refuelling Point (FARRPs) using Man-portable Air
Defence Systems (MANPADS). Air Ambushes may also be laid in own/
enemy territory on likely enemy aerial ingress routes, duly enmeshed with
own Control and Reporting (C&R) System.
5. Unconventional Warfare. This refers to a broad spectrum of
clandestine/covert military operations, normally of long duration, predominantly
offensive and conducted by specially trained forces. It includes guerrilla warfare
and other direct covert activities as well as the indirect activities of subversion,
sabotage and intelligence collection. Special Forces, due to their unique skills

30
 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

which include ability to operate independently in small teams for prolonged

durations and linguistic/ cultural orientation are suited for such actions.
6. Engaging Critical Targets. SF are primarily employed in engaging
critical enemy targets across all stages of military operations and at all levels of
war. Some of the possible objectives are: -
6.1. Strategic Objectives.
6.1.1. Capability to strike deep at enemy's strategic high value
targets, which will deter him from engaging in proxy war or in
waging war.
6.1.2. Adversely affect enemy infrastructure created in support of
war fighting capability.
6.1.3. Disrupt enemy's national civil and higher military Command
and Control (C2) systems.
6.1.4. Attack such high value targets which would paralyse
enemy's economy and affect his capability to continue waging war.
6.2. Operational/ Tactical Objectives.
6.2.1. Expose Enemy's deception plans.
6.2.2. Isolate enemy military commanders from their forces.
6.2.3. Degrade enemy Air Defence Control & Reporting (C&R)
systems.
6.2.4. Degrade/ destroy operational level C2 systems.
6.2.5. Destroy critical logistics installations.
SF Missions during Levels of Conflict
7. SF operate in entire spectrum of conflict and envisaged missions during
various levels of conflict are as under: -
7.1. Peace Time.
7.1.1. Out of Area Contingency (OOAC)/ Operations Other Than
War (OOTW) including employment in UNPKO (United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations)/ Multi National operations.

31
 Roles and Missions

7.1.2. Assistance and advice to Friendly Foreign Countries

including Foreign Internal Defence (FID) tasks.
7.1.3. Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO).
7.1.4. Search and Rescue (SAR) Missions.
7.1.5. Non Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs).
7.2. NWNP Scenario (CI/ CT, Proxy War & LIC).
7.2.1. Punitive Special Operations.
7.2.2. Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Designation
(RSTD) and Post Strike Damage Assessment (PSDA).
7.2.3. Neutralising terrorist threats, conducting anti-hijacking
operations and rescuing hostages.
7.2.4. Conducting operations to quell insurgencies and maintain
internal security.
7.2.5. Surgical Strikes.
7.2.6. Psychological operations.
7.2.7. Conducting covert clandestine missions, including
intelligence gathering and actions having deniability.
7.2.8. OOAC and OOTW.
7.3. Conventional Operations.
7.3.1. RSTD and PSDA.
7.3.2. Conducting Direct Action (DA) tasks to include raids,
ambushes and offensive strikes against specific targets. They may
also include Destruction of Enemy Air Defence (DEAD) and
underwater sabotage for sea denial.
7.3.3. Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO).
7.3.4. Combat Controlling (CC) functions comprising securing of
an airfield and providing command, control and communication
aspects for air traffic control.
7.3.5. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).

32
 Chapter 5

COMMAND, CONTROL AND PLANNING

Command and Control of SF Operations

Special Forces Operations Planning

 Command, Control and Planning

Training to Operate in Difficult Terrain

Training on Loiter Munition System

34
 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

CHAPTER 5

COMMAND, CONTROL AND PLANNING

1. SF are strategic assets, capable of operating across the complete

spectrum of warfare including unconventional scenarios. Since tasking of
Special Forces, especially for strategic and operational level missions, is carried
out at the highest levels, their command and control is also exercised at the
highest level. Another advantage of retaining command and control at the
highest level is that the forces are deployed for best effect and not dissipated
away by sub optimal tasking.

Command and Control of SF Operations

2. Special Forces Joint Operations (SFJO).

2.1. PARA (SF), MCF and IAF SF Garud possess Services' specific
core capabilities and advance skill sets required to support their
respective Services' campaign objectives. Services' Special Forces
should not duplicate their efforts in developing specialised skill and
capabilities which may be available in other Services' Special Forces.

2.2. On joint tasks necessitating core skills of more than one SF, the
decision is given by the highest military authority at command/ theatre
level. SFJO are complex in nature, involving multiple agencies within the
Armed Forces as also national agencies. Therefore, they require detailed
joint planning and execution at national/ Services level. Joint planning
occurs concurrently at Service HQ, designated Command Headquarters
and SF unit level.

2.3. When Special Forces from multiple services are employed

together, the requirement of a SF Operations advisor is imperative. The
designated SF Commander should be involved in the overall planning
process from the outset. The representatives of echelons supporting SF
Operations are required to assist in planning of insertion/ extraction, fire
support, combat support, deception, re-supply etc.

35
 Command, Control and Planning

3. SFJO Targets. AFSOD will be responsible for coordination of SFJO

targets given by the COSC and will advise the Chairman COSC on employment
and coordination.

Special Forces Operations Planning

4. SF Operations are high risks operations, have limited window of

opportunity for execution and necessitate assured success. The sensitivity of
many special missions may force specific political, legal, time, area or force size
constraints upon Special Forces and their supporting assets. Commanders
must, therefore, evaluate the appropriateness of Special Forces for a specific
mission and associated risks. Common Operating Planning Process (COPP)
should be employed for planning all Special Forces operations.

5. Basic Considerations for Planning. SF should be integrated into the

overall plan right from the inception stage and SF elements executing the
mission must plan the mission. Basic considerations for planning are given
below: -

5.1. Objective. SF Operations must support strategic and operational

objectives. The targets nominated for Special Forces should contribute to
overall success of the campaign.

5.2. Precise Intelligence. The probability of SF Operations' success

depends on precision with which SF applies its strength against
accurately identified enemy weakness. Thus, there is a requirement of
accurate and timely intelligence.

5.3. Desired Effect. When employing Special Forces, desired effect

should be specified rather than specific courses of action. Special Forces
must, therefore, be issued mission-type order that clearly defines the
purpose of the mission. For example, disruption of radar covers of 'A'
sector for 'X' hours provide the SF Commander flexibility to employ his
troops. Whereas, mission such as destroying radar antenna at 'X' location
restricts the Special Forces planner and could preclude achieving desired
effect.

36
 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

5.4. Simplicity. The plan of execution of special operation should flow

from the beginning to the end with simple, successive steps. Many targets
will have their own complexities, therefore, it is imperative that SF
Commander accepts the complexities of the target and its surrounding
environment.

5.5. Concentration for Effect. SF Operations missions depend on

the application of concentrated combat power by a small force in a narrow,
circumscribed time and space in the objective area, followed by rapid
withdrawal, before the enemy can retaliate by superior combat power into
the area. SF use minimal force levels and rely on stealth, unconventional
tactics, techniques and surprise to achieve their tasks.

5.6. Surprise. Surprise is an absolute pre-condition for SF

Operations. Overall force ratios are so unfavourable to Special Forces
that there will be no chance of success if the enemy is alerted in time to
concentrate a reaction against them. Lack or possible loss of surprise is a
binding criterion to cancel, delay or direct the operation to an alternative
target.

5.7. Flexibility. Although SF Operations must be planned to the

smallest detail, yet the plan must be flexible enough to allow for rapid
improvisation to deal with unexpected difficulties, which may arise during
the execution. Special Forces can deal with the unexpected, in the
following ways: -

5.7.1. Self-contained. Making the plan self-contained to

eliminate requirement of external coordination during critical
moments.

5.7.2. Bottom Up Planning. Planned from the bottom up, by

the people, who will execute them. This will, not only make them
fully aware of the details of the selected plan, but also the courses
of actions that were rejected in planning but are retained in their
collective memories and thus available for instant reference, if
needed.

37
 Command, Control and Planning

5.7.3. Alternate Plan. Interactive planning and rehearsals to

evaluate the feasibility of the plan. Thereafter, briefing the basic
plan to the SF troops to the level that no instructions are thereafter
needed during execution of mission. Rehearsals of alternative
plans should also be carried out to enable SF to adapt
instantaneously to dynamic situations.

5.8. Lead Time. This planning consideration is more applicable to

surveillance and reconnaissance missions. The Commander must
consider lead time required to prepare, obtain, process and report SR
information. SR mission tasking must specify when the information is
needed.

5.9. Rehearsals. Special Forces Operations don't have option of

second attempt. Therefore, detailed and repeated rehearsals, are critical.
These rehearsals should be conducted with the exact force to be
employed under same time and distance constraints in an environment
where terrain and weather conditions closely simulate the intended
operations area.

6. SFJO Directive. COSC is the highest military level decision-making

body on the conduct of SFJO. On receipt of Operational Directive for SFJO, the
designated C-in-C will outline his concept of SF Operations in the overall
strategic/ operational plan, including direction for deployment, employment and
sustenance of SF to achieve the strategic and/ or operational objectives. The SF
Operations advisor will assist in planning, which will involve the following: -

6.1. Mission Selection & Target Validation. The mission criteria that
will govern selection of suitable SFJO are as follows: -

6.1.1. Identify Potential SF Missions. The special operations

mission should be clearly spelt and must complement the
Commander's strategic/ operational plan.

6.1.2. Operational Feasibility. Being lightly armed, SF is not

organised/ equipped for regular operations and therefore, should

38
 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

not be assigned with missions suitable for regular forces.

6.1.3. Appropriate Mission Support. Adequate mission

support in terms of platform/ assets (for insertion/ extraction, fire
support, recovery), intelligence, EW, communications, logistics etc
is imperative for the success of operation.

6.1.4. Expected Outcome vis-a-vis Assessed Risk.

Commander must carry out detailed risk assessment while
authorising the mission.

6.2. Identify Requirements. Identify following requirements for

Special Forces and supporting assets: -

6.2.1. Identify operational, environmental and intelligence

requirements that Special Forces must address.

6.2.2. To prepare, provide, sustain and augment SF resources in

the theatre.

6.3. Mission Tasking Order. Once the target is validated for

engagement by the highest Commander, Mission Tasking Order for
execution is issued.

7. Planning at Execution Level. Steps of the planning process are as

explained below: -

7.1. Objectives and Guidance. The SF Commander derives

objectives from Mission Tasking Order.

7.2. Target Development. Target development flows from the

objectives and guidance reflected in Op Directive. Target development
includes assessing enemy capabilities and determining enemy
vulnerabilities.

7.3. Force Selection. Force component selection is the analysis of

39
 Command, Control and Planning

effect required at the target and suitable force components available.

Planning staff will de-conflict targets, missions, timing, etc and inform SF
Commander. SF Commander will task various components for their
respective assigned targets.

7.3.1. Before nominating targets, planning staff assesses

damage required on a target. In some cases, a preliminary
evaluation of the lethal force requirements may be required before
presenting the target nomination list for approval.

7.3.2. Similar to lethal analysis, non-lethal alternatives may also

be considered to conserve assets and take clandestine actions to
reduce collateral damage. Evaluation of all available assets and
capabilities should be conducted to ensure that the Commander
knows all appropriate targeting options i.e. Special Forces, land,
maritime or air platforms/ assets.

7.4. Mission Planning. The following procedures apply specifically to

SF Operations mission planning, with some steps to begin before the
preceding one is completed: -

7.4.1. Target Analysis/ Evaluation. Specific target selection in

mission area during any Special Operation involving a Direct
Action (DA)/ target designation mission must be done using
CARVER evaluation criteria in order to utilise available resources
efficiently and achieve desired effect: -

§ Criticality.

§ Accessibility.

§ Recuperability.

§ Vulnerability.

§ Effect.

§ Recognisability.

40
 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

7.4.2. Intelligence Preparation. Once the feasibility

assessment of the target is completed, SF Commander should
prepare comprehensive intelligence picture of the target.

7.4.3. Plan Development. SF units and the supporting

agencies develop plan of execution. Exhaustive rehearsals should
be conducted and the shortfalls should be assessed. Such plan
should be prepared, maintained and periodically updated as long
as the target remains valid for SF employment.

8. Execution. Activities during the isolation of SF unit executing the

mission include last minute planning, training, rehearsals, adjustments in plans,
equipment preparation and rest immediately preceding insertion into the target
area. Intelligence and operational updates should continue until the mission is
executed. Mission execution generally involves infiltration/ insertion, mission
execution and exfiltration/ extraction.

9. Combat Assessment. In the final phase, the SF Commander must

conduct a timely review of the executed mission through debriefs of the SF post
completion of the mission. The success of a Special Forces mission is gauged by
whether the targeted enemy facility, forces, actions and capabilities were
affected, as desired. A review of the assessment is critical to assess the change
in the course of action or order re-strikes in response to the developing
operational situation. In that case, the Special Forces targeting cycle is
reinstated at the most appropriate stage.

41
 Command, Control and Planning

Figure 2 : Special Forces Operations Planning Process

42
 Chapter 6

ENABLERS FOR SF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Support

Communication Support

Fire Support

Logistics Support

Air Support

Maritime Support

Information Warfare Support

Space Support
 Enablers for Special Forces Operations

CASEVAC Drill during training

Training for Resupply

44
 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

CHAPTER 6

ENABLERS FOR SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

1. Special Forces are employed for high value targets and often early in a
campaign. Therefore, they have to depend on other national resources/
agencies for support in terms of intelligence, logistics, command, control,
communications, air and space support, fire support, environment/
meteorological data, legal support etc. SF should have access to all available
resources and possess the ability to task these agencies for detailed and specific
inputs towards achievement of its mission. Confidence between SF and
supporting agencies must be built by maintaining mutually agreeable channels of
communication by ensuring a close liaison and discreet handling of information
obtained thereof. Support for SF Operations will be tailor-made to suit the
mission requirements with the overriding aim of retaining flexibility and initiative
with the designated SF Commander. The details on a few combat support and
support elements directly enabling SF Operations are explained in the
succeeding paragraphs.

Intelligence Support

2. Intelligence support to Special Forces Operations involves providing timely,

accurate and actionable intelligence. Special Forces require intelligence on varied
aspects ranging from terrain, weather, society, economy, religion, ethnicity, enemy
strengths, disposition and capabilities (including electronic assets) etc. These
inputs are critical not only for insertion and extraction but are equally relevant for all
phases of operation.

3. Types of Intelligence Support. Various types of intelligence

requirements for Special Forces Operations are as under: -

3.1. Human Intelligence. Special Forces require HUMINT to

understand enemy intentions, capabilities and activities. It entails
gathering intelligence through informants, defectors and captured
personnel.

45
 Enablers for Special Forces Operations

3.2. Signal Intelligence. Special Forces require SIGINT to help in

identifying enemy's location and patterns of activities. It entails intercepting
and analysing radio transmissions, phone calls and electronic data.

3.3. Imagery Intelligence. Special Forces require IMINT for detailed

images of enemy position, infrastructure and terrain features. It entails
obtaining and analysing visual information from satellite imagery, aerial
reconnaissance and other sources.

3.4. Geospatial Intelligence. Special Forces require GEOINT to help

in understanding physical environment, including terrain, infrastructure
and natural features by analysing geospatial data. It assists in mission
planning, navigation and target identification.

3.5. Open-Source Intelligence. Special Forces require OSINT to

augment the intelligence sources and provide insights into local
conditions and public sentiments. It entails gathering information from
social media, media reports and academic publications.

3.6. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). Maritime Domain

Awareness (MDA) is an all-encompassing term that involves being
cognisant of the position and intentions of all actors, whether own, hostile
or neutral, in the constantly evolving maritime environment in the areas of
interest. It is extremely important and required for SF Operations in
maritime domain.

3.7. Air Domain Awareness. Awareness of relevant aspects of air

domain is essential for planning and execution of SF Operations.

4. The various facets of intelligence support for SF Operations are as

follows: -

4.1. Timely Availability. SF should be provided timely intelligence for

drawing up targeting and mission planning. Though much of the general
intelligence is likely to be already available with intelligence agencies,
specific requirements of SF for precise information need to be acted upon
with the highest priority.

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 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

4.2. Integrated Intelligence Inputs. Integrated intelligence and

counter intelligence obtained from the fusion of Signal Intelligence
(SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Human Intelligence
(HUMINT) is essential for Special Forces Operations mission planning. In
the Indian context where various intelligence agencies exist under
different operating authorities/ ministries (with few overlapping
responsibilities), an integrated approach is imperative for Special Forces
to avoid delay and reduce response time. DIA, a central agency at the HQ
IDS, coordinates with various agencies, civil and military, to provide single
point inputs. DIA is also responsible for ensuring that the SF intelligence
and counter intelligence requirements are identified and understood by
the intelligence staff and agencies. The intelligence staff, in Service HQ
and regional command HQ, will then be responsible for validating these
requirements.

4.3. Prioritised Intelligence. Special Forces Unit Commander

should prioritise intelligence requirements. The HQ IDS or the Service
HQ designated for specific mission will be made responsible for making
intelligence support responsive.

4.4. Rapidly Updated. Reliable, secure communications among

intelligence staff and agencies will be established and maintained
throughout. The communication lines will linkup - intelligence agencies,
Special Forces unit commander and HQ IDS/ Service HQ at all times.
These lines must enable rapid transfer of data and imagery without
compromising position of the SF detachments.

4.5. Focused Analysis. Greater focus and in-depth analysis of

social, political, economic and demographic factors along with operational
factors are required for special operation missions.

4.6. ISR Assets. Real time information can be made available to

Special Forces by the use of ISR assets. ISR assets can also be effectively
used for communication relay and data transfer in support of SF Operations.
It is essential that Special Forces develop good understanding and working
relationship with the ISR units supporting them.

47
 Enablers for Special Forces Operations

Communication Support

5. SF possess the capability to communicate anywhere, anytime and under

all weather conditions to the maximum extent possible. SF employ a variety of
communication equipment using multiple methods for communication, reporting
and querying providing seamless lateral and vertical connectivity. The
communication systems integrate not only with the state-of-the-art systems, but
also are backward compatible with older less sophisticated communication
equipment. The systems used are secure, with anti-jamming features,
survivable, maintainable, inter-operable with other supporting Services' assets
and have wide deployability and versatility.

6. SF Communication Systems provide rapidly deployable communication

capability for command and control (C2) and mission support functions in the
Operations. SF maintain mission support communications for ISR, planning,
insertion/ extraction, execution, logistics and other operational functions at SF
unit locations and mounting bases.

Fire Support

7. The organic fire power with Special Forces is limited. This is compensated
by the use of surprise and shock action in execution of their missions. This limited
fire power can be augmented by the fire support from the platforms/ assets from
Services or other agencies depending upon the mission's requirements and
operational environment. The support could be in the form of artillery, air strikes,
Naval Gun Fire Support (NGFS), drone strikes etc.

8. For various types of fire support, detailed planning involving compatible

communication radio set and common operating procedures to call fire support
and its application on the target with precision needs to be rehearsed and clearly
understood. Coordination between SF and fire support is crucial to ensure
effective and precision targeting while minimising the risk to friendly forces.

48
 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

Logistics Support

9. The logistics requirement is worked out in detail at the initial planning

process itself. The requirement could entail making available inter Services
assets like military items, supplies or services required for sustaining the
operation towards achievement of the aim within the stipulated time frame in the
available window of opportunity. In the light of special equipment being used by
Special Forces, relevant procedures to contract supporting items need to be
identified and put in place at the initial stages itself.

10. Guiding Principles. The basic tenets of planning logistics support for
SF Operations are as follows: -

10.1. Self-Containment. Normal and routine maintenance behind

enemy lines is not feasible. In addition, unique equipment with SF, calls for
self-sufficiency as far as possible during the duration of deployment.

10.2. Need Based. Special Forces are limited with what they can carry
and the operational situation will vary for each mission. SF maintenance
must, therefore, be need based. Logistic support should be tailored to the
specific requirements of each mission.

10.3. Readiness. SF Operations are likely to be conducted at short

notice and usually in advance of general mobilisation. It is, therefore,
imperative that the logistics units, designated to support SF missions, are
identified during the planning process itself and liaison established for
initiating the support lines at short notice. Logistic intelligence should be
corroborated to plan for living off the land in hostile areas.

11. Logistics Planning. The SF Unit Commander must interact with

logistics units of Services and other agencies to prepare them to support
envisaged special operations plan. The logistics annexure to such plans must
outline logistics policies, tasks, procedures and servicing arrangements for
support of assigned and attached SF in the area of operations. It must be
thoroughly coordinated with the Command/ theatre logistics support plan and

49
 Enablers for Special Forces Operations

services elements executing this plan to ensure achievability of SF peculiar

logistics support. The following aspects need special emphasis: -

11.1. Sustenance for SF Missions. Logistics planning for SF

Operations is an on-going process, which must be initiated side by side
with the development of SF Operations mission plan. SF normally operate
from forward bases or in remote or denied areas. Therefore, resupply and
casualty evacuation for special missions are to be planned and executed
like an operational mission as opposed to normal logistics responsibilities.
Consequently, logistics support to Special Forces operational plans
requires assured emergency resupply.

11.2. Casualty Evacuation. Treatment of Special Forces casualties is

based on high degree of medical training at unit and sub unit levels and
the determination to evacuate the casualty.

11.3. Air Maintenance. SF will usually rely on Air Maintenance (fixed

wing or helicopter) as a means of getting supplies and evacuating
casualties, which must be planned as operational missions. Wherever
possible, resupply and evacuation by land should be considered.

11.4. Host Nation Support during OOAC. Policy directives

highlighting political or diplomatic approvals required for undertaking SF
Operations as part of OOAC and the areas of support required from the
host nation need to be identified at the planning stages itself.

11.5. Other Means of Logistics Sustenance. Caches, agents and

proxies form important part of logistics sustenance of SF Operations
detachments in sensitive areas.

Air Support

12. Air support to SF in execution of their mission is an important factor. Many

Special Forces world over have integral aviation and space-based assets for
planning and undertaking SF Operations. In Indian context, air assets both fixed

50
 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

and rotary wing need to be affiliated to SF for greater comprehension and

responsiveness. The air effort would primarily be required for the following: -

12.1. Insertion and extraction in hostile or denied air space in all weather
conditions.

12.2. Assist rescue and recovery operations.

12.3. Offensive air support.

12.4. Aerial reconnaissance.

12.5. Re-supply and casualty evacuation.

Maritime Support

13. Maritime support may involve utilisation of maritime platforms for

movement to objective area, fire support, deception and deterrence. The SF
tasked for engagement of targets in maritime environment including off-shore
installations may have to be supported by air force/ maritime assets for insertion
and extraction, intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, NGFS, rescue and
recovery and logistic support in maritime environment. It requires specialised
training, equipment and coordination between Naval and SF units to effectively
execute these missions.

SF Operations in Maritime Environment

51
 Enablers for Special Forces Operations

Information Warfare Support

14. Electronic Warfare Support. Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities are

required to support SF Operations, enhance situational awareness &
surveillance and provide non-lethal effects for offensive actions. EW support will
be factored in the SF Operations directive itself. SF can also be tasked to support
the EW plans of operational commanders by monitoring, direction finding,
jamming etc. Requirement of EW support in SF Operations are as follows: -

14.1. Electronic Support Measures (ESM) Support. SF require ESM

support comprising of detection and monitoring of radiated energy from
communication equipment, radars, infra-red/ thermal sensors, lasers and
electro-optical equipment.

14.2. Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) Support. SF require ECM

support to prevent or reduce enemy's use of electromagnetic spectrum.
The applications in SF Operations are: -

14.2.1. Jamming. Jamming may be required during insertion

and extraction for suppressing enemy air defence radars, battle
field radars and weapons. Further deployment of unattended
jammers by SF could facilitate own EW efforts.

14.2.2. Electronic Deception. SF can use electronic deception

for local diversion to enable their operations or be tasked to
conduct electronic deception at strategic and operational level, as
part of overall deception plan. When jamming and neutralisation
are not possible for insertion/ infiltration, electronic deception may
be used to assist SF operations.

14.2.3. Electronic Counter Counter Measures (ECCM)

Support. Special Forces require ECCM support to prevent or
reduce efficacy of enemy's ECM measures.

15. Cyber Operations Support. Cyberspace support for SF Operations

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 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

includes conduct of cyber intelligence gathering, network exploitation and cyber-

attacks on adversary's system. This enables SF to gain a strategic advantage,
disrupt enemy communications and conduct covert operations. Cyberspace
support also enhances situational awareness and facilitates mission planning
and execution in complex and contested environments.

16. Information Operations (IO) Support. IO support entails capabilities

to influence, disrupt, corrupt, enemy's human and automated decision making
while protecting our own. The IO support to SF Operations should be considered
to maintain information superiority. These efforts are important to achieve
surprise, help isolate target area and enable gaining control of the operational
environment.

Space Support

17. Support which can be provided by space based assets is as under: -

17.1. Communication Support. SF require real time communication

between troops, SF Operations Command Post (SOCP), intelligence
agencies and higher headquarters, thus necessitating satellite based
communication facilities.

17.2. Intelligence, Surveillance and

Reconnaissance (ISR) Support. SF
also require reconnaissance and
image intelligence pictures from
satellites for real time information on
terrain, infrastructure and enemy
movement.

Training to Kill

53
 Enablers for Special Forces Operations

Water Para Jumps by SF

54
 Chapter 7

SELECTION AND TRAINING

Selection of Special Forces Personnel

Special Forces Training Philosophy

Joint Training
 Selection and Training

Exercise Desert Hunt (Feb 2025): First Integrated Tri-Service SF Exercise

House Intervention: Exercise Desert Hunt (Feb 2025)

56
 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

CHAPTER 7

SELECTION AND TRAINING

1. Special Forces are required to accomplish tasks which are beyond the
capabilities of the conventional forces or need to be accomplished through
covert/ clandestine means. This capability of 'do what the others cannot' is
attained from a time tested system of stringent selection, intensive specialised
training, technology intensive equipment and innovation. SF operatives are
trained through rigorous training regimens pushing limits of physical and mental
endurance. Through a combination of gruelling physical exercises, advanced
combat simulations and psychological conditioning, soldiers are transformed
into SF operatives capable of executing missions in utmost hostile environments.

2. The present system of training of SF is Service specific. Standardised

procedures for each unit is based on its area specific role. Training is conducted
in respective Special Forces schools and cross-training through subscription in
other Services' schools, as also through inter-Services' SF training institutions.

Selection of Special Forces Personnel

3. All three Services follow different mechanisms to induct troops in SF.

However, there are certain commonalities in selection procedure viz need to
volunteer for Special Forces, recommendation of senior officers in chain of
command and high level of physical and mental fitness and courage. This is
tested during the gruelling probation Training cum Selection procedure which is a
highly selective and thorough process. This is aimed at identifying individuals
with exceptional abilities/ qualities, commitment and necessary physical, mental
and personal attributes required to excel in demanding and high stake
environment and execute complex and challenging missions with precision and
effectiveness. Trainees have the option to exit to other arms in case they become
non-volunteers for SF duties or if found unsuitable for SF duties.

4. Attributes of Special Warriors. Certain qualities of Special Forces'

personnel have come to be recognised widely. Personnel are specially selected,
trained, assessed and equipped. They have access to high-level intelligence,
latest technology and demonstrate boldness, intellect and perseverance.

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Special Forces Training Philosophy

5. Tailor Made Training. Special Forces have a unique role and follow
unconventional means to execute their missions. Hence, it is essential to develop
tailor made training methodology different from traditional training systems.

6. SF Training. There are certain basic and advance skill sets required by
SF units both individually and collectively. Some of the skills are given in
paragraphs below: -

6.1. Basic Skills. These skills are central to SF and proficiency in

these is essential to execute the assigned roles. These provide the
functional capability to undertake varied tasks. Based on the aptitude of
an operator assessed during his selection process, he is assigned a
primary and secondary skill from five fundamental skills namely,
Weapons, Communication, Medical, Navigation and Demolition. In
addition to the primary and secondary skills, an operator is required to
gain functional/ operational level proficiency in all basic skills to become a
successful SF operator.

Weapons Training
6.2. Advance Skills. Skills like Under Water Diving (UWD), Chariot
Training, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Terminal Attack Control,
Combat Free Fall (CFF), Mountain Warfare, Winter Warfare, Combat
Controlling, Engine Running Operations, Trike operation, Paramotor flying,
Extended Range Payload Operations (ERPO) etc are termed advance
skills/ mission focused skills. Based on the mission requirements, SF
operators are imparted advance skills through specialist courses.

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 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

6.3. Cultural and Behavioural Skills. Since, the SF have a

significant cross border role, soldiers are required to be educated and
trained to develop and sustain long term relationships with indigenous
personnel/ people. They will require cross cultural traits that permeate the
dialogue and relationship they build. Therefore, gaining and maintaining
cultural competency is critical. Cultural skills comprise of following three
components: -
6.3.1. Awareness of one's own cultural world view and attitude
towards cultural understanding.
6.3.2. Knowledge of different cultural practices and their world views.
6.3.3. Cross-cultural skills.

6.4. Linguistic Skills. Language proficiency is a key component in

cross cultural missions. It will be useful in covert/ clandestine missions and
also developing rapport with foreign personnel. The focus must remain on
spoken, listening, writing and reading skills through unit sponsored training,
self-study and periodic deployments to the region of desired linguistic and
cultural orientation.

7. Training Requirements. The Special Forces training is intense,

extreme, physically and mentally demanding and as dangerous as live missions.
Each Special Forces mission is unique in its own way and requires specific
training. The training requirements are incorporated in training instructions by
Services and validated in training/ rehearsals/ exercises at various formation
level war games and validation exercises. The feedback is ploughed back into
the training cycle and new training methodologies are evolved for further
specialised training and rehearsals.

Joint Training

8. SF will continue to train in their respective Special Forces Training

Institutes, for selection, basic skills and other Service specific skills. When
employed jointly, SF must have high level of interoperability by way of common
standard operating procedures, joint training and common means of
communication. Joint training of Para (SF), MARCOS and IAF SF Garud is vital

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for maintaining highly capable, adaptable and interoperable SF to address

complex security challenges. This can be achieved by following means: -
8.1. Advance Skill Training.
8.2. Joint training and Exercises.
8.3. Live Situation Training (LST).

9. Joint Training and Exercises. Exercises simulate near real scenarios

and impart mission type training to ensure readiness and effectiveness in diverse
environments. Focus areas for joint training are as under: -
9.1. Training of SF and crew of platforms/ assets (aircraft, submarine
etc) for insertion and extraction by night, in adverse weather, using night
vision and other conventional methods.
9.2. Joint training of SF with EW assets of the three services.
9.3. Training of SF for terminal guidance of PGMs launched from air,
long-range artillery and NGFS.
9.4. Joint communications, IW and Command and Control Warfare (C2W).
9.5. OOTW, including OOAC.
9.6. Develop the ability to operate in an integrated and cohesive manner.
9.7. Earmarking SF resources for joint training and capacity building by
Services Headquarters.

10. Live Situation Training (LST).

LST is achieved by deployment of
Special Forces in operational areas to
gain realistic operational experience.
Joint LST may be progressed in
Northern/ Eastern Command, Creek
areas and fleet deployments.

Joint SF Training

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 Chapter 8

FUTURE CONTOURS

Command & Control

Resource Allocation

Joint Service Training Institutes

Future Equipment Prole

 Future Contours

Logistics Innovations

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 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

CHAPTER 8

FUTURE CONTOURS

Command & Control

1. Special Forces provide support and punch to the field formations.

Accordingly, Special Forces are ideally employed under the command and
control by Regional Commands. When employed for joint operations, SF can be
employed through HQ IDS/ envisaged integrated structures.

Resource Allocation

2. 2.1. SF Resources. Existing SF resources of the three Services

would continue to operate under Regional Commands, as per their region
specific roles. For OOAC, Regional Force Projection and Time Urgent
Response Contingency, elements of Indian Army Special Forces,
Airborne Forces, Indian Navy/ IAF and elements of Defence Intelligence
Agencies (DIA) would form task based groupings, functioning under
Service Headquarters / IDS, only for the duration of the said operation.

2.2. AFSOD. The organisational structure and role of AFSOD could

be expanded in future in keeping with operational requirements. AFSOD
will be under COSC for tasks mandated by the COSC and in support of
operations in various theatres.

3. Integration. For mission accomplishment, the Special Forces will

integrate with concerned Directorates / Branches both within the Service and
Inter Service/ Agency. This shall encompass the aspects of training, validation,
readiness and serviceability of platforms, equipping and procurements,
intelligence, operations and operational logistics.

Joint Service Training Institutes

4. To minimise duplication and enhance effectiveness, SF may be trained

jointly on advanced skills. Existing Special Forces Training Schools of three
Services need to be upgraded to Joint Service Training Institutes (JSTIs), each

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 Future Contours

being a Centre of Excellence (CsOE) for a specific core competency. This can be
done without transferring the command and control from lead service and by
optimising existing infrastructure with assets and resources from all the Services.

Future Equipment Profile

5. In the coming decade, a range of potentially revolutionary technologies

and novel uses could change the character of Special Operations.
Advancements in weapon systems, new technologies and the methods for
employing these weapons/ equipment will revolutionise the battlefield. Some of
these are: -

5.1. Unmanned Vehicles. UAVs are already proven warfighting tools

on the battlefield. The next decade is likely to see greater development
and deployment of host of other unmanned vehicles, ranging from ground
vehicles to sea based surface and sub-surface platforms for
reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, communications, jamming,
resupply, laying and clearing mines etc.

5.2. Lethal Autonomous Weapons. As autonomous technology

progresses, some countries may remove humans from firing decision
loop, replacing them by AI assisted autonomous fire control systems.

5.3. Swarm Systems. While simultaneous attack by swarm of aerial

drones to achieve saturation of self defence systems has already been
witnessed, power of swarming goes way beyond just numbers and direct
attacks. Swarms of unmanned vehicles controlled by an AI enabled
system could communicate with each other and adjust their tactics and
targets to dynamically evolve as battlefield conditions change and
conduct plethora of missions such as targeting, logistics resupply, field
repairs, communications, electronic warfare, terminal guidance, signal
augmentation, etc.

5.4. Smart Ammunition. Smart ammunition enhances range of the

projectile, allows a bullet to track moving targets and adjust its trajectory to
accommodate unfavourable conditions and unexpected factors thus
enhancing accuracy of the firer.

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 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

5.5. GPS Spoofing Systems. GPS spoofing and mobile pulse

generators can lure/ misguide platforms and weapons off course,
potentially causing them to stray into neutral or hostile territories or into
striking unintended targets.

5.6. 3D Printing. 3D printing technology utilising advanced metals,

innovative alloys, new ceramics etc has the potential to revolutionise
provision of resupply, repair and spares cheaply and quickly.

5.7. Directed Energy Weapons. Directed Energy weapons like

LASERS, Electromagnetic Pulses and rail guns etc would tremendously
enhance targeting ranges and improve success rates by reducing efficacy
of body armour of enemy troops.

5.8. Biological Weapons. Belligerents may use tactical biological

weapons against own Forces. Thus we need to have protective measures
against such threats to ensure own survivability.

5.9. High Density Electrical Power Storage. Advanced battery

technology would have a transformative effect on power and load
calculation, thus enhancing operating cycles and reducing need to
turnaround operational teams after deployment.

5.10. Biotechnology. Advanced biotechnological innovations could

improve ability of individual soldiers to fight and survive under modern
battlefield conditions. Adaptive body camouflage, weather adapting
advanced skin covering fabrics, hydration systems, fatigue reduction
wearables, monitoring/ medication devices on/ inside human bodies etc
would be able to diagnose and improve health status, treat ailments/
allergies/ shocks and even inject medicines while in combat.

5.11. Exo-Suits. Exo-Suits or powered exoskeletons take weight away

from wearer's joints and employ predictive AI to anticipate user's next
movement thus improving stability and reducing fatigue, thereby
enhancing physical capability of the wearer.

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 Future Contours

5.12. Distributed Warfare. To ensure survivability against highly

accurate and lethal weapons, a new concept of distributed warfare has
emerged and needs to be tapped.

Conclusion

6. Indian Special Forces are poised to play a decisive role in ensuring

national security across a multi-domain and multi-threat environment. The
operating environment will be characterised by complexity, unpredictability and
rapid technological change. To succeed, SF must cultivate agility, technological
sophistication, strategic depth and a holistic operational mindset. This Joint
Doctrine aims to enhance common understanding, terminologies and basic
procedures and pave the way for greater interoperability and synergy.

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 Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

GLOSSARY

PART I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFSOD Armed Forces Special Operations Division

ALGs Advance Landing Grounds
ANE Anti- National Elements
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
CAPF Central Armed Police Forces
CFF Combat Free Fall
CIS Communication Information System
COSC Chiefs of Staff Committee
COTS Commercial off the Shelf
CPOs Central Police Organisations
C2W Command and Control Warfare
C&R Control & Reporting
C3 Command, Control and Communication System
4 2
C I SR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information,
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
DIA Defence Intelligence Agency
EMP Electro Magnetic Pulse
ECM Electronic Counter Measures
ECCM Electronic Counter Counter Measures
ESM Electronic Support Measures
EW Electronic Warfare
FID Foreign Internal Defence
GCS Ground Control System
GRTC Garud Regimental Training Centre
HQ IDS Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff
HUMINT Human Intelligence
IMINT Imagery Intelligence
IA Indian Army

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 Glossary

IAF Indian Air Force

IPKF Indian Peace Keeping Force
IN Indian Navy
IW Information Warfare
LICO Low Intensity Conflict Operations
LTDs Laser Target Designators
MANPADS Man Portable Air Defence Systems
MARCOS Marine Commandos
MIO Maritime Interdiction Operations
NBC Nuclear, Biological & Chemical
NCA National Command Authority
NGFS Naval Gun Fire Support
NWNP No War No Peace
OAS Offensive Air Support
ORBAT Order of Battle
OOACs Out of Area Contingencies
OOTW Operations Other Than War
PGMs Precision Guided Munitions
PMFs Para Military Forces
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs
RWR Radar Warning Receivers
SAG Special Action Group
SAR Search and Rescue
SF Special Forces
SFJO Special Forces Joint Operations
SLOC Sea Lanes of Communication
SOP Standard Operating Procedures
SR Surveillance and Reconnaissance
SOCP Special Forces Operations Command Post
SIGINT Signal Intelligence
UAVs Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UWD Under Water Diving

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GLOSSARY

PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Advance Landing Ground (ALG). An airfield with minimum essential facilities

for use as an ALG, or when main or re-deployment airfields are out of action or as
required for tactical flexibility.

Airborne Assault. Airborne assault is an operation conducted by specially

trained units and formations dropped by parachute or landed by assault aircraft
or helicopter, with their combat equipment for immediate operations.

Airborne Operations. Airborne operations are military operations which

comprise the movement and delivery of combat forces and their logistics support
in an objective area by means of air for execution of military missions. These
operations require high degree of control of air, should be planned in a tactically
sound manner while factoring AD threats, with a deliberate consideration of
depth of operations inside hostile territory.

Asymmetric Warfare. War between two sides with very dissimilar goals, which
makes the fight inherently asymmetrical from methods that are not in
consonance with traditionally perceived warfare i.e. big armies pitted against
each other on the battlefield, utilising strategy or tactics to outwit the opponent. It
encompasses anything that alters the battlefield to negate opponents ad-
vantages or own disadvantages.

Combat Control Measures. These are measures taken immediately after any
air or ground attack and include all actions that facilitate prompt reporting and
assessment of damage, casualties, presence of any threat and unexploded
munitions. It also includes rescue, first aid and transfer of casualties to hospitals,
firefighting and clearance of debris.

Centre of Gravity (COG). The source of power that provides moral or physical
strength, freedom of action, or will to act. In generic terms, a Centre of Gravity
(COG) can be defined as that source of massed strength - physical or moral, or a
source of leverage - whose serious degradation, dislocation, neutralisation or

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 Glossary

destruction would have the most decisive impact on the enemy's or one's own
ability to accomplish a given military objective.

Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). The COSC is a forum of the senior most
military leaders of our Armed Forces which advises government on all military
and strategic matters in respect of military coordination, direction and policy
between the three services. The CDS is the permanent Chairman of the
committee with heads of all three Services as its members. There are 12 sub-
committees under COSC.

Electronic Warfare (EW). Actions involving the use of electro-magnetic energy

to determine, exploit, reduce or prevent use of the electromagnetic spectrum by
adversaries and actions taken to ensure our own effective use of
electromagnetic spectrum.

Forward Area Re-arming and Refuelling Point (FARRP). A temporary facility

organised, equipped and deployed by an aviation Commander, normally located
close to the area of operations to provide fuel and ammunition to the aviation
units in combat.

Fourth – Generation Warfare (4GW). 4GW is a type of conflict characterised

by blurring of the lines between war and politics, combatants and civilians. The
fourth generation signifies the loss of monopoly of nation states on combat
forces, returning to modes of conflict common in pre-modern times. 4GW is
normally characterised by a violent non-state actor fighting a State. The fighting
can be physical, done with elements of cultural norms and belief in victory
providing strength to the non-state actor. This type of warfare lacks a strictly
hierarchical authority, formal structure and has the ability of the perpetrator to
keep a low profile.

Guerrilla Warfare. It is an irregular war, usually by a small body of troops or

insurgents including acts of subversion, assassination, attack on supply lines
and terrorism.

Hybrid Warfare. Hybrid Warfare is a Military strategy employing political tools

and blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare and cyber warfare with other

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methods like psychological operations, diplomacy, economic influence, foreign

intervention etc. By combining kinetic operations with subversive efforts, the
aggressor intends to avoid attribution or retribution. Hybrid warfare can be used
to describe the flexible and complex dynamics of the battle space requiring a
highly adaptable and resilient response

Information Warfare (IW). It is defined as a deliberate attempt to gain access

to, tamper with and exploit information and information systems of the adversary
to own advantage; at the same time preventing him from doing the same to own
side. Its major components are Electronic Warfare (EW), Cyber Warfare and
Psychological Warfare (Psy W)

Insurgency. Armed rebellion by a section of population against the legally

constituted Government, with the support or sympathy of the local population, ob-
tained voluntarily or by coercion. It covers the full spectrum of conflict from
subversion to full-scale guerrilla war including the emergence of guerrilla bands
into regular units.

Joint Operations Committee (JOCOM). JOCOM is a Committee in HQ IDS. It

functions under the directions of COSC and handles all matters referred to it in
respect of joint operations and plans, coordinates intelligence and surveillance
related matters of three Services including technical intelligence.

Low Intensity Conflict Operations (LICO) / Low Intensity Maritime Officers

(LIMO). LICO/ LIMO is a generic term encompassing all kinds of armed
conflicts that are below the threshold of war. LICO/ LIMO figures at the lower
spectrum of conflict and is characterised by the asymmetry of force levels
between the regular forces and the irregular opposing force. The force applied
and the violence generated depends on the code of conduct and the capabilities
of the weaker side. The legal rules impose restrictions on the actions of security
forces.

Maritime Domain Awareness. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is an all-

encompassing term that involves being cognisant of the position and intentions
of all actors, whether own, hostile or neutral, in the constantly evolving maritime
environment in the areas of interest. MDA is a vital ingredient to a nation's

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 Glossary

maritime security and economic well-being. The intelligence on presence of

foreign naval units including warships, submarines and aircraft, enable
monitoring of their activities for discerning their deployment trends and
intentions.

No War No Peace (NWNP). A typical No War No Peace (NWNP) environment

is marked by the necessity to alter/ control the behaviour of the adversary
through calibrated application of Kinetic and Non-Kinetic capabilities while
remaining below the threshold of war and preventing onset of major combat
operations.

Out of Area Contingency (OOAC). Politically sensitive peace time operations

involving a short term, rapid projection or employment of forces, beyond India's
territorial boundaries, to secure national interests. These are conducted in crisis
avoidance or crisis management situations requiring the use of military
instruments to enforce or support diplomatic initiatives. The nature of such
operations could range from aiding a legally constituted friendly government,
conducting security assistance operations, Humanitarian Assistance and
Disaster Relief (HADR), non-combatant evacuation operations.

Proxy War. Proxy war is a war conducted between nations utilising non-state
players to fight on their behalf. In any case, at least one of them must employ a
third party to fight on their behalf.

Sabotage. It is a covert act, causing physical damage to property and

equipment, with a view to assist the enemy or a hostile foreign power for
furthering a subversive political aim.

Strategic Reconnaissance. A type of reconnaissance which aims at getting

information that may influence the general conduct of the campaign at theatre
and national level. This is normally carried out from the air or space.

Vertical Envelopment. A form of manoeuvre conducted by heliborne/ air borne

forces with an aim of seizing enemy objectives in depth with a view to cut off his
escape routes, disrupt communications and ultimately destroy him by
developing operations in conjunction with a ground thrust.

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REFERENCES

1. Indian Maritime Doctrine, 2015.

2. Joint Doctrine for Indian Armed Forces, HQ IDS, 2017.

3. Doctrine of the IAF, IAP 2000-22.

4. ‘Special Forces’, by Knowledge World New Delhi in association with

Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM,
VSM (Retd).

5. ‘India's Special Forces’, by Vij Books India Pvt Ltd New Delhi in
association with United Service Institution (USI), Lt Gen PC Katoch, PVSM,
UYSM, AVSM, SC (Retd) .

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RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

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RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

S.No Chapter/ Paragraph(s) Affected Authority Remarks

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 Notes

NOTES

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Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

NOTES

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 Notes

NOTES

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